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1Abstract
This thesis provides an analysis of how labour’s agency in Savannakhet border 
manufacturing industry is transforming Lao economic territory within the context of Greater 
Mekong Subregion integration. The analysis builds on autonomist Marxist and spatial 
understandings of labour’s agency to illuminate global corporate relocation, state 
territorialization, and local development.  The methodological and theoretical approach 
presented focuses on the capacity of everyday, unorganized, spatialized agency of workers 
to impact on labour relations and broader economic development.  The approach thus 
challenges a common framing of labour’s agency as primarily relevant in terms of trade 
unions and resistance, and stimulates a broader consideration of workers’ agency in 
development. The enquiry draws on the concept of territorial coherence to link workers’ 
agency to broader processes of spatial economic organization. Workers’ everyday and 
spatial practices within a form of territorial organization provide an opportunity to 
reconsider how the relocation of global manufacturing firms may be problematized by local 
conditions. In this light, misconceptions about ‘the race to the bottom’, which place power 
primarily with mobile capital, are refuted. Worker’s spatialized actions and practices emerge 
as a terrain of struggle in their incorporation into global manufacturing, revealing how 
labour and capital condition and constrain each other. Territorial coherence also provides a 
framework to illuminate state territorialization projects undertaken to connect with global 
capital. Analysis of the case indicates that state territory continues to structure and striate 
global economic space despite the claims for the openness of relational, networked forms of 
spatiality. The two theoretical approaches combine to illuminate labour dynamics in Lao 
border manufacturing. Shedding light on the prospects of Lao industrialization and 
regionalization policy, limited and partial development and integration is suggested. In 
regard to the contested reworking of territory, border manufacturing in Savannakhet signals 
themes of broader relevance in global economic development. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Laos: From Land-Locked to Land-Linked
In recent Lao government development discourse the idea of turning the country from ‘land-
locked to land-linked’ has become prominent. The logic goes that Laos is no longer to be 
imprisoned by its geography at the heart of the Southeast Asian mainland but rather Laos’ 
central position will provide a conduit for regional trade flows as transport corridors criss-
cross its space. In turn connectivity will lead the country to become an attractive destination 
for foreign direct investment, especially from neighbouring countries. Laos is to become a 
production base as much as a node of connectivity, with foreign investment the key to 
unlocking the land. Implicit in the notion of becoming ‘land-linked’ is of course that people 
on that land will be linked in new ways with people within and beyond that land. Perhaps 
also implicit is that land and people may be linked in different ways, ways not pre-ordained 
but determined by the varying and contending motivations, actions and interests of the 
social agents concerned and the power relations between them. The transformation of 
social relations and the transformation of space are thus deeply interwoven. Prominent 
among these intertwined social relations are those between foreign investors and local 
workers. Lao workers are actively entering into global and regional currents of investment 
and trade. To discern the precise means and consequences of the dual transformation of 
space and social relations through the prism of labour’s agency is the primary concern of this 
thesis. The case thus concerns labour’s agency in foreign-invested export manufacturing – 
especially within the Savan-Seno Special Economic Zone - in the border town of Savannakhet, 
southern Lao PDR. 
1.2 Problématique 
The dual transformation of social relations and space is, it seems, at the heart of the 
restructuring of global production. Mobile capital often attempts to reorganize production 
by taking advantage of lower-cost locations in the developing world. Capital and capital-
facilitating states are often taken to be the primary, or only, actors involved, or at least the 
only actors possessing the capacity to shape the process. This seems restrictive to me in that 
it leaves out another key actor which may shape the dynamics of global restructuring and 
development - labour. Capital relocation is an inherently spatial phenomenon. It creates the 
spatial organization of the global economy in new ways. This raises important questions of 
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why does capital move to the places it does, how does it affect those places, and how do 
those places or territories – through the agency of actors based there - affect capital. The 
question I therefore seek to answer is: how does labour as an actor shape its own 
incorporation into the social relations and economic space of global production? The thesis is 
situated at the intersections of three broad debates; the race to the bottom; labour’s agency 
in development and human geography; and the role of territory in a world viewed by many 
as defined by networks and flows. 
The first debate of relevance pertains to the ‘race to the bottom’, the idea that mobile 
capital will constantly move production to escape high production costs or restrictive 
regulatory environments. Does the race to the bottom really exist? What is the best way to 
conceptualize it? How is labour incorporated in a race to the bottom? With whom does 
power lie when capital moves to low-cost locations? The second debate relates to the last of 
these three questions; the role of labour’s agency in development and human geography. 
How does labour as an actor affect transformative social processes?  What counts as 
relevant agency? How is labour’s agency spatial and how does spatial agency matter? How is 
labour’s agency connected to - enabled and constrained by - other social actors and sets of 
social relations? The third debate centres around the role of territory in a globalizing world. 
What role, if any, do bounded territorial spaces still matter in a world of increasing flows and 
connectivity? How are different national territories linked together in processes of regional 
or global integration to create new geographic scales? The case of Savannakhet will be used 
to shed light on these questions.
1.3 Research Questions and Sub-Questions 
The central research question for this thesis is: 
How has the agency of Lao workers shaped: 1) labour relations in export-oriented foreign-
invested manufacturing; and 2) territorial economic development in Kaisone Phomvihane 
District, Savannakhet, Lao PDR in the period 2009-2014?
The central research question was broken down into four sub-questions to operationalize 
the enquiry: 
Sub-question 1. What are the geographic political-economic parameters – firm 
characteristics and strategies and state institutions and policies - in which workers’ agency 
operates in and on?
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Sub-question 2. How do workers move through the manufacturing segment of the labour 
market? How do they move to, stay in and leave employment in industrial manufacturing?
Sub-question 3. How do they build resilience to the demands of industrial employment and 
how do they rework it to their advantage or implement resistance – and thus shape the 
dynamics of territorial economic development?
Sub-question 4. How do foreign employers and the state change their strategies of control 
and management in response to workers’ agency and actions - and therefore how does 
labour’s agency constrain the developmental options open to them?
1.4 Relevance of Research Questions 
The central research question (CRQ) seeks to understand if, how and to what extent labour’s 
agency shapes the ‘race to the bottom’ and the territorial developmental process the race is 
a part of. The CRQ seeks to challenge a notion of global economic restructuring which 
presents a dichotomy between mobile capital and place-bound labour and then derives from 
capital’s mobility the immediate capacity to dominate labour. The question works from the 
assumption that labour is not a factor of production found by capital in a place, but rather 
one that is actively constructed by the actors involved. Therefore the central research 
question seeks to locate the role of labour itself in the process of social construction. Against 
an understanding of workers’ impotence vis-à-vis capital and state power, I seek an 
understanding of the ways in which labour’s strategies, actions and practices may be said to 
be constitutive of global restructuring and local territorial development processes.
The CRQ attempts to explore the role of labour’s agency by understanding how it shapes 
labour relations within globalized workplaces as well as labour agency’s wider 
developmental effects both for workers and global capital. Labour’s agency points towards a 
wider conception of workers’ social being in development; labour’s status within factories 
and also its conditions of existence beyond the factory. The aim is to bring into view a wider 
set of social relations which labour is at the centre of, including those of its social 
reproduction in households and communities. The CRQ thus seeks to draw out the effects 
that foreign-invested production and local social reproduction may have on each other. 
‘Territorial economic development’ directs attention to the ways that labour – and the 
geographic area more widely - benefits or is disadvantaged by its employment. How workers 
shape the dynamics of accumulation in those workplaces - and so shape the possibilities for 
industrial development in the area - will also be brought into focus. An important issue here 
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is who actually benefits from this specific type of investment and development strategy, and 
whether the strategy is a viable one which will bring widespread developmental advantages. 
Sub-question 1 addresses the structure/agency debate and debates on regional integration. 
The question addresses how workers are constrained by the agency of other actors and 
whether subaltern actors can affect in a historically significant way larger processes of socio-
spatial change. 
Sub-question 2 raises the issue of workers’ agency and highlights labour market mobility and 
its role in shaping the dynamics of employment. It works on the assumption that workers’ 
choices in engaging in different forms of employment is an important expression of agency.
Sub-question 3 speaks to the meaning of labour’s agency in development. The question 
attempts to reframe labour’s agency in development away from a hegemonic notion of 
‘agency as resistance’ and highlight other types of significant labour’s agency. The question 
thus prompts one to think about how labour’s agency operates to its advantage in 
constrained political contexts. By focusing on other aspects of workers’ agency it broadens 
the strategies, actions and practices which may be of relevance for development in the local 
territory and associated global development processes.
Sub-question 4 addresses debates over labour control regimes as well as debates over the 
relation between capital-labour relations and the state. The question addresses how 
labour’s agency may condition and constrain the available strategies open to notionally 
more powerful actors, such as the state, both in the present and in the future.  This indicates 
how, why, and to what extent a particular form of industrial development and capital 
accumulation emerges.
1.5 Lao Labour’s Agency, Fixity and Mobility, Territorial Coherence, and Foreign-
Invested Border Manufacturing 
To explain the case of labour’s agency in Savannakhet I deploy a conceptual framework 
which combines the notions of the fixity and mobility dialectic, labour’s autonomous agency, 
social construction, and territorial coherence.
I argue that workers actively shaped their incorporation into global foreign-invested 
manufacturing primarily through their spatial strategies of fixity and mobility. By labour’s 
fixity I understand their strong ties to certain places – households and communities – and 
the associated activities which reproduce social relations within those places and the places 
themselves. Mobility is understood primarily in the senses of international migration, labour 
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market mobility, and seasonal mobility to switch between industrial employment and 
subsistence-oriented agriculture. Spatial practices thus emerge as an important part of the 
Savannakhet manufacturing workers’ class composition.
The fixity and mobility dialectic was also of significance to capital’s strategies. I employ David 
Harvey’s notion of the ‘spatial fix’ – whereby capital relocates to new sites due to pressures 
on profitability - to interpret capital’s behaviour. Savannakhet is located on the border with 
Thailand and on the East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC), a key transport infrastructure 
development of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) regional integration project. The 
Savan-Seno Special Economic Zone (SASEZ) was established by the Lao government to 
attract foreign investment and promote industrialization by offering liberalized import-
export arrangements and tax incentives. Foreign firms investing in Savannakhet were 
typically multinational firms with existing production networks in the region, especially 
Thailand. They were performing spatial fixes by relocating part of their production process to 
Laos to take advantage of lower costs across the border. 
The race to the bottom is conceptualized as a drive to reduce the social cost of labour, 
rather than just to reduce direct wage costs or labour rights per se. Reducing the social cost 
of labour entails constructing weak and informal workforces which are unable to claim rights 
or effectively disrupt production and cause the cost of labour to rise; it is thus based on 
instituting power relations between capital - and its state backers - and labour.  In this sense 
the firms were pursuing a strategy of racing to the bottom, as they sought in Laos a cheap 
and easily controllable labour force with little access to labour rights or recourse to 
legitimate industrial action in an authoritarian political context. Capital and state thus 
attempted to enact a social construction of labour as informal, lacking access to rights and 
largely young and female. However, the existing form of Savannakhet’s territorial coherence 
– animated by labour’s fixity and mobility – placed some power with labour and caused 
capital and the state to have to adapt their strategies in response to labour’s agency. 
Territorial coherence is understood as a combination of a specific form of regulation with a 
concrete form of the capital valorization process and specific forms of social reproduction 
which result in a relatively stable pattern of development. Territorial coherence is based on 
the territorial organization of production, with territorial organization understood as both 
force and relation of production. Territorial coherence raise the question of who the 
territory is coherent for. I suggest it is possible that a territory is more coherent and stable 
for social reproduction over capital accumulation or vice versa. Existing forms of territorial 
16
coherence may present barriers to the establishment of new forms of territorial coherence, 
as I suggest in fact happened in Savannakhet.
Foreign invested factories seeking labour had to contend with an existing territorial 
coherence in Savannakhet weighted towards social reproduction and based largely on the 
axis of migration to Thailand and agriculture. Savannakhet’s territorial coherence came from 
many Lao seeking work in Thailand and remitting money and/or having small-scale 
agriculture as a subsistence platform for livelihoods. Social reproduction in Savannakhet was 
integrated into capital accumulation but it was largely delocalized through migration to 
Thailand. An existing form of integration between Laos and Thailand was thus present 
through the mobility of Lao workers. 
Foreign firms sought a new form of territorial coherence between Laos and Thailand by 
establishing border manufacturing in Savannakhet to take advantage of proximity to 
Thailand and lower production costs. The existing territorial coherence based on labour’s 
spatial strategies complicated this process, causing changes of strategy on the part of capital. 
Firms began to increase wages and benefits, make changes in the labour process, and 
apparently established specific types of labour control regimes in order to retain a stable 
workforce. Overall, capital accumulation could proceed but in an attenuated way which 
allowed labour to capture a somewhat increased share of the value produced.
I understand the state, following open Marxist theory, as a complementary political form of 
capital-labour relations, with the exact forms and functions developing in conditions of 
historical specificity in relation to class struggle. The development of specific states as social 
forms of the capital-labour relations is however understood as refracted through 
overdetermined ideological environments, meaning that states are determined by, and yet 
irreducible to, the capital-labour relation. 
The state transformed itself in relation to capital-labour relations as it reterritorialized space, 
largely in favour of the territorial coherence of capital. The Lao state reterritorializing its 
space into the Savan-Seno Special Economic Zone provided the spatial and regulatory 
conditions which would allow the easy import and export of capital and commodities that 
allowed zone and border manufacturing to function. Territory thus continued to play a 
defining role in creating articulatory nodes for production networks and the creation of the 
regional scale of the GMS. Ultimately, the new attempted form of territorial coherence and 
regional integration had to come to terms with an existing territorial coherence and it was at 
their interface that an open and contested development process unfolded. 
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1.6 Main Contributions
This thesis provides three main theoretical contributions:
1. I develop a concept of labour’s agency which contributes to both debates in labour 
geography and labour in development. By theorizing labour’s agency more 
extensively in terms of fixity and mobility, I contribute to providing a theoretical 
understanding of how unorganized, everyday agency affects developmental 
processes, especially in constrained political circumstances.
2. I link autonomist labour theory with the concept of territorial coherence. I thus 
contribute to spatializing the notion of class composition. This enables an 
autonomist labour reading of the social construction of territory and scale in the 
global economy, therefore contributing to filling a gap in the literature which largely 
locates agency in such processes with state and capital actors. 
3. I refine the notion of the race to the bottom by linking the social cost of labour with 
territorial coherence to provide a framework for understanding how mobile capital 
must adapt to specific, local conditions when relocating. In doing so I demonstrate 
the continuing relevance of territory in the global economy.
The main empirical contributions of this thesis are:
1. I provide - as far as I am aware - the first academic study of foreign-invested export-
oriented manufacturing in Laos outside of the garment sector.
2. I contribute the first academic study of the Savan-Seno Special Economic Zone. 
3. I provide evidence for how Laos and Lao labour are incorporated into the Greater 
Mekong Subregion project. 
4. I contribute to understanding how the Lao state is developing as a capitalist state.
1.7 Methodology
This study takes as a starting point for empirical investigation the two existing theoretical 
notions of the race to the bottom and labour’s agency. Border manufacturing in 
Savannakhet offers a case study which can test the limits of this existing theory in order to 
critique and refine it, with the aim of establishing a more inclusive research orientation. The 
task set for the enquiry is thus theoretical reconstruction rather than the theoretical 
generation of inductive grounded theory (Burawoy 1998; Glaser and Strauss 1967). Existing 
theories on the race to the bottom, especially regarding spatial practices within the new 
location, and on how labour’s agency is seen to operate, were deemed insufficient to fully 
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explicate the case. The approach taken resembles Burawoy’s ‘extended case method’ in 
which generality is not inferred from the data but rather ‘we can move from one generality 
to another, to more inclusive generality’ (1998: 16). The uniqueness of the case is therefore 
not a problem because we are less interested in its general ‘representativeness’ as much as 
how it can contribute to reconstructing theory (ibid. 16). The aim here is to avoid the 
methodological trap of creating a dichotomy between ‘either specific and context-
dependent or universal and generalized’ (Morgan 2007: 72). Following Morgan (ibid. 72) it is 
questionable ‘for research results to be either so unique that they have no implications 
whatsoever for other actors in other settings or so generalized that they apply in every 
possible historical and cultural setting’. Theoretical reconstruction which allows for a 
refinement of a theory to account for more cases – to show the possible implications for 
actors in different settings - is thus preferred to a restrictive focus on representativeness. 
Theory in the extended case approach is the precondition of research (Burawoy 1998: 25). 
New empirical details are sought in the investigation of the case, but they are taken to be 
building blocks for the reconstruction of theory and not a positive real world ‘truth’ (ibid. 27). 
The logical form of reasoning thus involves abduction, whereby anomalous facts are 
observed and reasons sought for those facts, occasioning theoretical reformulation and 
innovation (Timmermans and Tavory 2012). The anomalous nature of specific empirical 
instances means they cannot be used as generalizations, but they are however sufficient for 
highlighting the inadequacy of existing theory, and the need for a revision of the theory. The 
theory then becomes capacious enough to cover other empirical settings without necessarily 
having to apply in its entirety to those settings. It is enough that the theory has incorporated 
the previously anomalous elements so that it can highlight potential empirical details to be 
pursued by the researcher in other cases, without claiming that those details will have 
necessary pertinence in the different historical and social circumstances.
The methodological heuristic and conceptual framework that provided the entry point for 
the investigation was Katz’s (2004) conceptualization of labour’s agency as operating in the 
modes of ‘resilience, reworking, and resistance’ combined with the autonomist premise that 
labour’s agency drives changes in capitalist organization. Of specific interest was testing how 
the notions of resilience and reworking could effect change on the part of capital and the 
state. Such an approach has significant relevance due to the highly constraining political 
environment in Laos which severely represses direct and confrontational action - resistance - 
in civil society. On this basis two hypotheses were constructed to both test the theories and 
provide grounds for theory reconstruction (Gerring 2007: 39). The hypotheses were:  
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1. Workers’ agency shapes the specific characteristics of labour relations through a 
number of everyday strategies which build resilience and enable them to at times 
improve their position in the capital-relation.
2. Workers’ strategies for building resilience and improving their positions, reworking, 
cause employers and state institutions to change their own strategies and methods 
of producing, dominating and managing the labour force, thus providing a counter-
acting source of power to the race to the bottom dynamic. 
The hypotheses indicate certain modes of action but the content of those modes is left open 
to question, leaving space for anomalies and surprising results to appear. Using these 
theoretically grounded hypotheses as a guide I will seek to show where, when, why and how 
labour’s agency matters in the case of Savannakhet border manufacturing. Drawing 
conclusions from these empirical instances I will then reconstruct theory accordingly.
Causality will be inferred by applying process tracing, whereby ‘multiple types of evidence 
are employed for the verification of a single inference’ with evidence drawn from ‘unique 
populations’ (ibid. 173). The value of a method of inference construction that relies on 
multiple strands of evidence lies in highlighting ‘different aspects of a causal relationship, 
providing a form of triangulation’ (Gerring 2012: 333, original emphasis). George and 
Bennett (2005: 207) observe that ‘[p]rocess tracing is an indispensable tool for theory 
testing and theory development’. Process tracing generates many observations within a case 
and then requires that the observations are linked in specific ways in order to constitute an 
explanation for the case (ibid. 207). This is of import for the application of the extended case 
method in that in using process tracing all the steps within a causal chain must be accounted 
for by a hypothesis ‘or else that hypothesis must be amended – perhaps trivially or perhaps 
fundamentally – to explain the case’ (ibid. 207). Process tracing thus plays an important role 
in case-based theoretical reconstruction. Such a method of inference construction is also 
appropriate to a historical and relational understanding of causality (ibid. 223), which seeks 
to outline the mutually constitutive relations between the agency of different sets of social 
actors. 
1.8 Fieldwork Process and Methods
Fieldwork was conducted in Laos from October 2013 to June 2014 (from December 2013 in 
the main Savannakhet fieldwork site). Participants were selected through ‘purposeful 
sampling’ and 55 interviews were conducted (Cresswell 2013: 154-157). Four groups of 
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informants were identified and approached for interviews: company managers; local state 
officials; Savannakhet workers; and experts from non-governmental or international 
organizations. One technical school manager was also interviewed. The first three groups 
were the major stakeholders in the case of foreign-invested manufacturing in Savannakhet 
and it was intended that a relational picture would emerge of how each conditioned and 
constrained the strategies and actions of the others. With regard to workers both local 
factory workers and migrants working in Thailand were interviewed, although the local 
factory workers were the main focus within this group. Methods of contacting informants 
varied. With experts, the snowballing technique was the main method of contact (Overton 
and van Dierman 2003: 43). Company managers were primarily contacted through formal 
approaches via Savannakhet University, at which I was based during fieldwork. Workers 
were initially contacted through the University formally approaching village heads. The 
village heads then acted as gatekeepers and introduced me to workers in their villages. 
Snowballing was then undertaken to contact more workers after initial contact was made. 
Villages for worker interviews were initially selected on the basis of information gathered in 
company manager interviews. Other villages were selected on the basis that they were: 1) 
rural, as company managers informed me that most of the workforce was from local rural 
villages, and 2) in a 20 kilometre radius of the Savan-Seno Special Economic Zone, as the 
emphasis was on factory workers from across the local labour market. 
Six weeks were spent in the capital Vientiane during which I awaited relevant permissions 
from the government for conduct of fieldwork in Savannakhet. During this time two expert 
interviews were conducted, advice was sought from other knowledgeable actors based in 
NGOs, and secondary data was gathered. The research process can be an uncertain and 
contingent one requiring flexibility and the rapid adaptation of pre-conceived plans when in 
the field (Brydon 2006). This proved to be the case in my fieldwork. In Savannakhet, the 
initial focus was on factories in the Savan-Seno Special Economic Zone and factory workers. 
It rapidly emerged however that other foreign-invested factories outside the zone had a 
bearing on the local labour market and whose managers and employees could provide 
important data. The investigation was therefore expanded to these factories. Moreover, the 
importance of the extent of migration to Thailand became quickly evident and so the initial 
focus on local factory workers was widened to include data gathering from returned and 
current migrant workers. 
The primary research method was the semi-structured interview. For each set of 
interviewees a separate questionnaire was prepared which would allow a checklist of 
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respondent-relevant topics to be covered while simultaneously enabling unexpected facts 
and lines of enquiry to emerge. Questions which were theory driven and hypothesis directed 
were asked (Flick 2014: 218) with assumptions embedded in the questions which have ‘the 
purpose of making interviewees’ implicit knowledge more explicit’ (ibid. 219). At the core of 
each set of questionnaires was the issue of labour’s agency. Katz’s (2004) methodological 
heuristic of ‘resilience, reworking, and resistance’ was used to frame questions concerning 
workers’ employment and living conditions. Interviews with company managers, state 
officials, and non-governmental organization staff followed a more open semi-structured 
pattern, but interviews with workers tended to follow a more structured adherence to the 
question list. All types of interviews featured pre-prepared ‘probe’ questions (Flick 2014: 
208). Due to the more structured adherence to the interview schedule with workers, probe 
questions were especially useful for eliciting information with this group of respondents. 
As many interviews as possible were conducted up until a point of saturation (Sarantakos 
2005: 349). Thematic analysis was undertaken through the development of data codes 
(Gibson and Brown 2009: 130). Code construction was concept-driven and data-driven 
(Gibbs 2007: 44-45). Concept-driven codes related to existing topics from the literature or 
the interview schedule such as recruitment location, wages, working hours, or motivations 
for firm relocation. Data-driven codes gathered unexpected themes or themes not easily 
fitted in the study’s pre-existing conceptual categories such as worker retention incentives, 
or house construction. Codes were collected into ‘code families’ in order to draw attention 
to important relationships between the codes, for instance the code family ‘non-factory 
livelihood practices’ (Gibson and Brown 2009: 138). Both topic and analytical code families 
were used (Richards 2015: 110-112).  For instance, the code ‘non-factory livelihood 
practices’ was used to collate all information related to that topic, whereas analytical coding 
involves a greater level of abstraction to collect a variety of data that are linked together 
into a conceptual category. The code of ‘fixity’ was a conceptual code linking together a 
number of legal, material, and social practices. 
The technique of triangulation was also employed to build a more comprehensive and 
objective representation (Silverman 2006: 291). I gathered secondary data from local and 
national government agencies, including national- and local-level statistical data, and also 
maps of the district. A walk-through observation of conditions was undertaken in two 
factories. In addition, when the importance of farming in factory workers’ lives became 
obvious a small quantitative survey of 41 respondents was undertaken in one village from 
which many workers came. The target participants were heads of farming households 
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selected on the basis of area sampling (Sarantakos 2005: 162). Claiming no wider 
representativeness the survey was primarily used as a technique of triangulation to 
corroborate and contextualize interviews. 
The methodological approach and methods outlined allow me to answer the central 
research question and sub-questions and engage in theoretical reconstruction of labour’s 
agency in export-oriented foreign-invested manufacturing in Savannakhet, and Laos’ 
integration into the Greater Mekong Subregion project. 
Research was conducted in line with SOAS’s ethics policy. All participants were informed in 
advance, either in writing, verbally or both, of the content and aims of the research. Consent 
was given by all participants for the anonymized use of interview data. Some participants 
however waived the right to anonymity. Workers, factories, factory managers, have all been 
anonymized under pseudonyms in the empirical chapters. 
1.9 Structure of the Thesis
Chapter 2 outlines key concepts on the race to the bottom and labour’s agency in 
development. I develop a concept of race to the bottom as a push to decrease the social cost 
of labour through creating informality, and a spatialized conception of labour’s agency which 
goes beyond the common frame of resistance. Chapter 3 develops a geographical political 
economic framework for the case, linking labour’s agency with the concepts of the spatial fix, 
territorial coherence, and regional integration as scale construction. The theoretical 
approach thus defined, Chapter 4 outlines a brief history of Laos with special focus on Laos’ 
relations with powerful external actors and its changing economic geography. Chapter 5 
discusses the contemporary political economy of development in Laos in light of ongoing 
regional integration processes. The chapter analyzes the key role of the state in 
reterritorializing Lao space to benefit powerful external actors and in managing the mobility 
of Lao populations. I deem the state’s reterritorialization of space as a key means to regional 
integration, using the case of special economic zones in the north of Laos to illustrate the 
argument. Chapter 6 recounts the history and contemporary situation of labour in Laos. The 
theme of the state as a political form of capital-labour relations is developed. Contemporary 
migration and manufacturing are two key focuses of the chapter. With the historical, 
geographical and political economic background established I turn to empirical analysis in 
Chapter 7, outlining the local context of Savannakhet and increasing foreign direct 
investment in the area. I thus analyze the establishment of the Savan-Seno Special Economic 
Zone and how it is inserted into regional integration. Chapter 8 presents how workers’ 
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agency manifests in Savannakhet manufacturing, especially exploring labour’s spatial 
strategies. Chapter 9 develops the themes of the previous chapter to demonstrate how 
foreign-invested companies and state institutions have had to adapt their strategies in light 
of workers’ agency. The chapter explores the implications of the relational agency of labour, 
capital and the state for economic development in Savannakhet and Laos’ regional 
integration. 
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Chapter 2: Labour Agency, Social Construction and Development 
The rise of globalized production has involved new divisions of labour and the 
incorporation of more people as labour within global capitalist social relations. The power 
of capital to relocate in search of low-cost production environments has led to claims of a 
race to the bottom in wages and labour rights. The power to act and influence in this race is 
often analytically and discursively located with companies and state actors. However, 
capital and states attempting to attract and develop capital are, I believe, only formed in a 
conflictual relation with labour. This calls for a reconsideration of how workers themselves 
influence the transformations in global production and with it development processes at 
multiple geographic scales. I propose that a concept of labour’s agency rich and flexible 
enough for application to contemporary global production must be developed. To do so I 
analyze three interrelated themes: the race to the bottom; labour’s agency in development; 
and labour’s spatial agency. I suggest that understanding transformations in global 
production as primarily capital’s power to move – a race to the bottom – tends to be 
teleological and elides labour’s agency as a constitutive part of global capitalist 
development. I do not deny that capital behaves in this way but a focus on capital’s powers 
runs the risk of missing important counter-tendencies and contestation. I thus seek to 
reassert labour as a developmental actor. Especially, I seek to highlight the importance of 
non-institutionalized, everyday practices and actions of labour in distinction to formal 
organizations such as trade unions. I try to ascertain labour’s role in its own social 
construction. This leads me to consider the role of space in labour’s agency. Space matters, 
I suggest, because labour makes strategic use of it, and so a focus on labour’s spatial 
agency – especially what can be deemed the dialectic of fixity and mobility – is especially 
apt for understanding labour’s non-institutionalized practices. In short, I suggest that 
workers’ practices of moving between places and being ‘fixed’ – for instance having strong 
ties and obligations to families and associated socially reproductive activities - in certain 
places is especially useful for comprehending the case of Lao border manufacturing. I draw 
on several theoretical sources to build this understanding of labour’s agency. 
Knafo’s (2010) argument for the methodological importance of agency in social analysis 
appears to me as an important point of orientation. Social relations and identities are, I 
believe, continually constructed through the actions and practices of social actors. Any 
critical approach must attempt to reveal how power operates and who benefits from any 
25
specific historical-geographical social construction (Taylor 2009). Social construction is thus 
a key organizing concept of this study, as the logical corollary of a focus on agency. 
Approaches which re-centre labour in capitalist development, including autonomist 
Marxism (Cleaver 1992) and open Marxism (Bonefeld 1992 et al), provide another 
conceptual foundation. The creation of the social relations of globalized production, I 
propose, proceeds through the strategies, practices and actions of multiple social actors, 
centred around the core antagonism of capital and labour in determinate historical-
geographical conjunctures. Katz (2004) offers a heuristic for understanding different modes 
of labour’s agency that are not reducible to resistance. Smith (2006) and Kelly (2009) offer 
ways to think about the mobility and fixity of labour, while Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011) 
provide insights for situating labour’s agency in a dense web of social relations which both 
constrain and enable agency. Before expanding on these themes I analyze notions of a race 
to the bottom in contemporary global production. ‘Race to the bottom’ is interpreted as an 
attempt to drive down the social cost of labour rather than wages or labour rights per se 
(Chang 2009). What is suggested by the present case is that the race to the bottom is not 
unilinear and inexorable but a contested process filtered through the conditions of local 
labour markets and dependent on the social construction of workforces.
2.1 The Race to the Bottom 
2.1.1 The Race to the Bottom: Labour in a Globalizing World
Shifts in global manufacturing production since the 1960s have been one of the key 
elements of global capitalist restructuring, and have led to the ‘race to the bottom’ thesis 
(Selwyn 2013). In the post-Second World War era of decolonization1  the advanced 
capitalist countries (ACC) of Europe, Japan and North America maintained their positions as 
the industrial and manufacturing core of the world economy.2 Fordist production systems 
and Keynesian policies sustained a post-war boom through the 1950s and 1960s. A collapse 
in investment and a major economic crash in the ACCs spurred by the OPEC oil crisis 
occurred in 1974 leading to stagflation; stagnant growth and high inflation (Armstrong et al 
1991: 172. 228). The crisis and stagnation in the ACCs was not the only phenomenon of 
rapid change in the post-war period. Newly industrializing countries from the global South, 
1 A global colonial division of labour had broadly involved colonized countries in a subordinate 
position of raw commodity provision to metropolitan producers of high value-added manufactured 
goods (see Breman 1989; Breman 1990; Northrup 1995; Blackburn 1997; Kaur 2004; Slocomb 2007; 
Raman 2010; Beckert 2015). 
2 Theoretically this led to core-periphery and dependency models. See: Frank 1969; Wallerstein 1989.
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including the four ‘Asian Tigers’ of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, 
experienced average export growth of 11 percent per year between 1970-1980, and 
created an increasing share of global manufacturing output from the 1960s onwards (ibid. 
288; Dicken 2011: 31).  
The crisis in the ACCs in the 1970s helped to drive the relocation of production (Armstrong 
et al 1991: 267-269). The dispersion of manufacturing to sites in the global South 
constituted what Frobel et al (1980) referred to as ‘the new international division of labour’ 
(NIDL). Manufacturing was relocated by ACC firms to low-wage production locations in the 
global South as one means of alleviating the crisis of profitability (Dunn 2004: 30-31; Dunn 
2009: 162-163; Dicken 2011: 20-21). Accordingly foreign direct investment jumped 
massively in importance as a share of countries’ GDP (Dicken 2011: 22-32). The increased 
transnational mobility of capital and relocation of production have led some to claim an 
inexorable dynamic for the restructuring of global capitalism. 
The ‘race to the bottom’ thesis posits that the pressures of global competition and the high 
mobility of capital leads investors to seek out locations with ever lower wages and poorer 
labour rights standards. Capital mobility will in turn lead states to compete on deregulating 
and disciplining labour, and to cut back on welfare spending in an effort to attract FDI 
(Chan and Ross 2003; Mehmet and Tavakoli 2003; Rudra 2008). Other authors have 
countered this bleak view with the argument that globalization can actually have positive 
effects for labour through providing job opportunities or importing decent ACC labour 
standards or practices along with capital (Krugman 1997; Kabeer 2004; Mosley and Uno 
2007; Greenhill et al, 2009).  The majority of literature on labour and globalization it seems 
to me, implicitly or explicitly, uses or responds to the notion of the race to the bottom. 
The ‘race to the bottom’ is a notion which requires unpacking because it is used by 
different authors to refer to different things. What exactly is the ‘bottom’ in question? 
Scholars have used it to refer to distinct, yet interrelated things, but particularly: labour 
rights; direct labour costs; and the social cost of labour.  This has led to different answers as 
to whether a ‘race to the bottom’ is really taking place or not. I propose that the race to the 
bottom is best conceptualized as one of a race to the bottom in the social costs of labour. A 
focus on labour rights or direct wage costs is too narrow to fully comprehend the benefits 
which accrue to capital from production relocation. 
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2.1.2 Rights and Exploitation in a Race to the Bottom?
One prominent strand of mainstream labour literature investigates the impact of 
globalization on labour rights. The race to the bottom is framed in terms of access to and 
enforcement of collective labour rights, particularly free association and collective 
bargaining. Operating within a positivist, quantitative approach, no conclusive consensus 
has been reached with studies finding variously for positive impacts on labour rights 
(Neumayer and De Soysa 2006), FDI seeking locations with stronger rights protection 
(Kucera 2002), negative impacts (Mehmet and Tavakoli 2003) or a mixture of positive and 
negative effects of mobile FDI (Rudra 2005; Mosley 2008; Mosley 2011; Blanton and 
Blanton 2012).  This debate however suffers from severe conceptual and methodological 
limitations.  First, the focus on labour rights as the primary methodological entry point to 
ascertain globalization’s impact is too narrow a conceptualization of the relationship 
between workers and the global economy. Second, labour is often treated in this work as a 
homogenous category. This is a problematic consequence of methodological nationalism 
and use of cross-country panel data sets. What this leads to is making labour’s agency 
largely absent as labour is reduced to the passive recipient of global forces. 
An alternative approach taken by more critical scholars has been to highlight how the 
suspension or violation of labour rights allows wages to be suppressed and exploitation to 
unfold (Elson and Pearson 1981; Deyo 1989; Chan and Ross 2003; Chan and Ngai 2010; 
Chan and Siu 2010; Dominguez et al 2010). Elson and Pearson (1981) provided a classic 
statement of how developing country states abrogate rights to payment of minimum 
wages, length of the working day, freedom of association, industrial action, and collective 
bargaining in order to push down wages in ‘world market factories’ and raise the rate of 
absolute surplus value. Frobel et al (1980) noted the growing use of outsourced, 
fragmented production which broke down production processes into low-skilled and highly 
labour-intensive operations across multiple sites. 
Literature linking the violation of labour rights as part and parcel of the drive to reduce the 
direct costs of labour in export manufacturing have often used national, sectoral and/or 
factory level case studies to illuminate the grievous exploitation that occurs in the name of 
trade and development (Chan 2001; Ngai 2004; Arnold and Hewison 2005; Chan and Ngai 
2010; Crinis 2010). Chan (2001) for instance has drawn on numerous incidents of rights 
violations and employer violence and negligence in Chinese factories to claim that China’s 
workers are ‘under assault’ in the globalizing economy. These studies demonstrate that 
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capital attempting to reduce direct wage costs via relocation is certainly a tendency in 
global restructuring. Drawing the conclusion from these studies that the race to the bottom 
is only about driving down wages would however, I believe, be mistaken. If this were the 
case it might suggest that all factories would engage in these coercive measures in order to 
stay competitive. On the contrary, low-skilled manufacturing factories may sometimes pay 
much higher wages than legal minimums because they prioritize, for example, workforce 
retention (McKay 2004). States have been complicit in exploitative abuses by suspending, 
removing, and not enforcing rights or processing them in an attenuated, corporatist form 
(Fernandez Jilberto and Riethof 2002; Glassman 2004; Pringle and Clarke 2011). The issue 
of state (in)action to drive down wages, I would propose, actually indicates that the race to 
the bottom can be conceptualized at a deeper level than relocation for wage reduction.
A general trend of informalization of labour has been identified by many scholars as 
characteristic of the contemporary global labour regime. In informalization rights are 
curtailed, benefits and entitlements stripped away and employment constituted and 
reconstituted as a casual and non-permanent relationship with the end of providing flexible 
workforces attractive to mobile capital (Standing 1999; Davies and Ryner 2006; Webster et 
al 2008; Vosko 2010; Standing 2011; Breman 2013). The recomposition of labour on terms 
advantageous to employers appears to be at the core of neoliberal strategies to facilitate 
the expansion and circulation of global capital flows. A key contemporary task has thus 
been to map the manifold ways in which this occurs in both developed and developing 
countries (Arnold and Bongiovi 2013; Breman and van der Linden 2014). I draw on the 
notion of informality to highlight how the race to the bottom can be read in terms of social 
power relationships.
2.1.3 The Social Cost of Labour
Chang (2009) contends that the development of integrated production, distribution and 
consumption systems on a world-scale to create a ‘global factory’ has made capitalist 
labour the common substance of social life.3 Capital permeates and subordinates all spaces, 
times and aspects of society to commodity production and consumption (see also Dalla 
Costa and James 1975; Cleaver 2000). The global factory allows capital to organize labour 
into a specific social form, ‘it becomes commonly informal’ no longer requiring ‘regular, 
protected and formal jobs for accumulation’ (Chang 2009: 165, original emphasis). 
3 Chang’s focus is Asia but the argument logically extends to the global scale.
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‘Informal’ work does not only apply to the ‘informal sector’.4 Informality is not primarily 
constituted as a legal or institutional relationship but fundamentally as a power 
relationship between capital and its state backers on the one hand and labour on the other. 
Thus informal work can exist as ‘in-fact’ informal labour within regulatory systems of 
standard legislation as employers and labour movements lack the will and/or capacity to 
protect workers (ibid. 167). ‘[F]ormal workers’ may ‘have no power to access legal and 
institutional regulation and…the standards to which they are entitled’ (ibid. 170). This latter 
group may include agency workers, migrant workers, special economic zone (SEZ) workers, 
and workers in countries with no or few democratic unions (ibid. 170).
Capital then relentlessly seeks to impose the informal as the social form of labour in order 
to drive down the social cost of labour. Social costs of labour come in many forms including 
but not limited to: increase in wages; increase in indirect labour costs such as hiring and 
retention costs or welfare taxation; and the increasing costs of exploitation that increase 
investment costs, but which do not match proportionately the increasing rate of 
exploitation i.e. expensive investment without labour working faster or harder (ibid. 177; cf. 
Standing 1999: 98-101). This has implications for the conception of the ‘race to the bottom’ 
as it indicates that capital seeks to shed labour costs which are indirect as well as direct, 
and potential as well as actual. Potential costs may come from operating in environments 
where workers are able to effectively claim rights and entitlements and possess the power 
to disrupt production, so capital’s strategy becomes to either informalize workers by 
pushing to remove protections and weaken labour or to move to places where labour lacks 
the capacity to claim legal entitlements (Holloway 1995). Reducing the social cost may 
involve reducing wage costs, but companies may not choose to compete on wage costs if 
higher wages are necessary to stabilize the workforce and social costs can be curtailed 
through deprivation of legal rights (McKay 2004; Xue 2008; Anner 2015). Theorizing the 
race to the bottom as social cost of labour may also, it appears to me, be consistent with 
capital moving to places where direct labour and/or indirect costs, such as pensions, 
benefits and labour taxes, are both relatively higher than other places, but where capital 
can contribute less tax overall to the maintenance of the social infrastructures which 
reproduce that labour (Harvey 2006: 401-402). For example, tax exemptions in export 
processing zones may be understood in this light.
4 Itself part of an untenable dualism. See Breman 1976.
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Conceptualizing the ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of the social cost of labour and the 
expansion of a particular set of power relations enables us to see how globalization puts 
downward pressure on the costs of labour without necessarily reducing formal labour 
rights or entailing that production relocates to the country with the lowest wage costs. 
Looking at the social cost of labour and dynamics of informalization, I suggest, are 
especially useful in the present case. Focusing on the expanded notion of social cost of 
labour also allows us to identify the race to the bottom as a general tendency of spreading 
and deepening power relations within the global factory while allowing room for counter-
tendencies, such as workers’ resistance. 
2.1.4 Labour’s Response
Informalization of labour in the neoliberal global economy has undermined trade unions 
and labour movements (Standing 2009: 88-90). This has been most notable in countries 
with well-developed labour movements, as demonstrated by falling trade union densities 
(OECD 2016). Informalization and its consequent fragmentation of workforces has also 
affected the capacity of unions to organize in developing countries (Fernandez Jilberto 
2002; Hewison and Tularak 2013). A range of strategies have been advocated to revive 
trade unions. Broadly speaking suggested responses fall into two categories: building 
coalitions within communities and other social movements (Seidman 1994; Moody 1997; 
Lambert and Webster 2001; Waterman 2001; Brookes 2013); and rescaling unions into new 
international configurations such as global labour federations (Piven and Cloward 2000; 
Evans 2010; Evans 2014). For reasons of space these strategies and their drawbacks5 
cannot be addressed in-depth here. It is sufficient to note that they indicate that any 
narrative of a unidirectional race to the bottom and working class defeat is problematic. 
The global restructuring of power relations between capital and labour is uneven and 
variegated. However, such approaches have a tendency to present labour as essentially 
reactive.  The focus is on the response to globalization which it is inferred is primarily 
enacted by capital and states. This precludes examination of how labour’s agency operates 
within the process of global restructuring. The notion of rescaling also highlights another 
aspect which is not well addressed in much race to the bottom literature: the specifically 
spatial elements of labour’s incorporation in global restructuring. For example, the 
methodological nationalism of mainstream, positivist work may occlude wide subnational 
differences.
5 See Silver and Arrighi (2000); Cumbers et al (2016). 
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Capital then can be said to prefer weak, precarious labour forces and to actively seek them 
out when attempting to relocate production. ‘Seek out’ is perhaps a misleading way to 
frame the process of global labour incorporation because it implies that precarious labour 
is waiting to be found, already existing in a state of automatic structural weakness vis-à-vis 
capital. This would be to elide the multiple strategies, actions and practices of key actors 
such as companies, state officials and workers themselves which socially construct labour 
forces in relation to mobile capital. 
2.2 The Social Construction of Labour for Global Manufacturing
E.P. Thompson in his The Making of the English Working Class (2013) provided an early and 
highly influential account of working men and women’s agency. For Thompson the English 
‘working class did not rise like the sun at the appointed time. It was present at its own 
making’ (ibid.8).  Class, for Thompson, should not be thought of as a structure or category 
but rather as a historical relationship embodied in real people and contexts. The coming to 
class-consciousness was a contested and arduous social process (ibid. 8). In a similar way 
labour should be thought of as actively constituted by multiple actors. Focusing on the 
social construction of labour forces directs attention to the multiple strategies of capital 
and states that attempt to create weak, informalized labour forces for capital’s global 
restructuring. The focus here is on the state’s and capital’s roles in this process, before 
addressing workers’ role below. 
Labour is a fictitious commodity: human beings are not created with the intention of the 
sale of their labour-power in the labour market (Polanyi 2001; Marx 2013). Workers must 
be shaped in certain ways that enable buyers of their labour power to put them to work 
productively. Labour is thus formed through ‘the interaction of contested material, social 
and cultural processes that are filtered through the specific institutional contexts of 
different locales’ (Taylor 2008: 21). Labour forces for low-cost export manufacturing can be 
moulded through: the institutional and regulatory structures of the state; the hiring and 
labour control strategies of employers; practices of inclusion and exclusion which dictate 
who can enter the workforce according to factors such as class, gender, age and ethnicity; 
and relationships within families which determine which members engage in wage labour 
(ibid. 21). 
State policy is often pivotal in labour force formation for strategic economic goals. For 
example, in China’s economic reforms, starting in 1976, state policy was crucial in altering 
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the relations of employment and social welfare in society - through the hukou fixed 
residence system and the destruction of the Maoist ‘iron rice bowl’ welfare institutions - so 
that a large swathe of the population would become available for wage labour in the 
nascent private manufacturing sector (Cantin and Taylor 2009). State policy can thus be 
crucial for commodifying labour and enlarging the pool of surplus labour from which capital 
can draw. State policy can also influence the terms on which labour is sold as a commodity, 
namely the wages and working conditions within enterprises. Significant variation between 
countries can occur in similar enterprises due to alternative types of state mediation of 
industrial relations, as for example in Chan and Wang’s study of Taiwanese-invested 
factories in China and Vietnam (2004).
The notion of a labour control or factory regime (Burawoy 1985) may be usefully deployed 
here to illustrate how the state’s regulation of the production process constructs workers 
in different workplaces. Burawoy makes a broad distinction between strategies of coercion 
and consent and derives from this the ideal types of market despotic and hegemonic 
regimes (ibid. 87). The former depends on economic and employer coercion to secure 
control while the latter emphasises the state´s regulatory and ideological role in resolving 
conflict and incorporating workers´ interests into a hegemonic form of control (ibid. 12-13). 
Strategies to form and control labour unfold at multiple interlocking scales through a 
variety of institutions. At the factory level different companies can pursue different 
strategies depending on the requirements of the labour process and local labour market 
conditions. For example, in the advanced electronics sector:
Given the need for production quality and stability, management often prefers 
worker consent over coercion, even in the absence of state intervention to enforce 
labour laws or provide welfare provisions. This is increasingly true for final assembly 
processes, since on-time delivery is crucial and a consent-based system is potentially 
less disruptive (McKay 2004: 174) 
Firms, in this argument, may thus adopt different labour control regimes based on their 
position within the value chain (McKay 2004; Xue 2008). Different labour control regimes 
may be present even within the same factory for different sections of the workforce. For 
example a more hegemonic regime for a permanent, core workforce may exist and another 
tending to despotism for the informalized, temporary workers working by their side 
(Webster et al 2008; Zhang 2008). Labour control regimes also extend beyond the factory 
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to community level institutions such as churches which frame workers´ lives (Kelly 2001; 
Kelly 2002; Neethi 2012). 
The feminization of workforces for industry has also been a widespread phenomenon in 
industrializing countries. The preferences of capital and the social expectations of women’s 
participation in labour markets combine to produce largely feminized workforces in 
industries such as garments, textiles and footwear. Capital displays preferences for young 
women workers as they are cheaper and also viewed as more docile and compliant and so 
less likely to lay claim to work rights (Mies 1986: 117; Theobald 2002; Caraway 2005). In 
addition capital discursively constructs young women, in distinction to men, as having 
‘nimble fingers’ which are able to cope with detailed manufacturing tasks such as sewing 
(Elson and Pearson 1981).
Migration flows are also used by both developed and developing country employers to 
secure a steady supply of cheap, weak labour. These migration flows can be formal and 
documented but are often informal, including trafficked workers. Migrant workers are 
subject to legal restrictions on both the duration of their stay and on where and in what 
industry they can work. This can create a workforce which is vulnerable and compliant, as 
workers fear deportation, and which is funnelled into precarious and low-wage sectors (De 
Genova 2004; Binford 2009; McDowell et al 2009; Anderson 2010; Harrison and Lloyd 2012; 
cf. Breman 1996). Workers may also be bound to specific, highly exploitative workplaces 
through restrictive labour contracts or practices such as the confiscation of travel 
documents (Arnold and Pickles 2011; Kothari 2013). Racialization of labour combined with 
the process of feminization has led to workforces which are doubly subordinated in relation 
to other groups of workers. For example, in Thailand undocumented Burmese women 
migrants have been constructed as a low-cost, disposable workforce for the garment 
industry, with few other sectors open to them (Pearson and Kusakabe 2012; see also 
Resurreccion and Sajor 2010). 
Social construction is thus a key element in the incorporation of workers into global 
capitalist relations. Social construction indicates how capital and states must actively 
pursue strategies which first, entail the use of power and coercion, and second, take 
advantage of and reproduce social inequalities and differences in order to form labour 
forces suitable for specific industries. However, many of these accounts treat workers as 
passive in this process; as the putty that is moulded by powerful state and business actors.  
While applying Burawoy´s concepts of factory regime they actually lose sight of a major 
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point of his work; the emphasis on the worker’s subjective experience (1979: 77). Studies 
instead approach coercion and consent from the side of capital and fail to explain what it is 
that needs to be controlled. There occurs a collapsing of labour´s agency into an unruly 
mass which necessitates disciplining. A methodological entry point of the labour control 
regime tends to look first at the institutional structure thus making that structure of control 
precede the social relations which generated it. It begs the question of what needs to be 
controlled in the first place. What is it exactly about the specific social relations in specific 
places that means a specific labour control regime exists and not any other? Using labour 
control as the entry point, or explaining in terms of a firm’s requirements in the value chain, 
can only answer this question in an indirect and attenuated way. What I will seek to show is 
that approaching social construction and development processes from the perspective of 
labour’s agency is able to provide insights that may be missed by a labour control regime 
focus. Paying attention to the social construction of labour through intentional strategies 
also enables a more open analytical approach to global social dynamics. 
2.3 Agents of Development
2.3.1 Open, Contested Development
‘Development’ is fruitfully understood as a historically open-ended process, contrary to the 
teleological and structuralist implications of a straightforward ‘race to the bottom’ framing. 
‘Development’ here is understood broadly as the transformation of social relations, 
incorporating the contested process of capital accumulation and the practices of agencies 
such as governments to stimulate and modify that process (‘intentional practice’) (Cowen 
and Shenton 1995: 28; Bernstein 2006: 50). I frame my interpretation in the historical 
materialist critique of political economy provided by Marx (2013), for me the most 
compelling analysis of capitalism.6 In my understanding, the social relations of capitalism 
are understood as having economic, political, ideological and cultural aspects, and as 
6 Briefly, in the historical materialist account, capitalism centres around the capital-labour class 
relation, whereby capital controls the means of production and is able to appropriate the surplus 
value – the difference between the value produced and what the direct producers are paid - which 
workers create in the labour process. Capital then is essentially a social relation, but one which is 
mediated through the valorization process where value is produced by labour and then valorized in 
exchange. Capital as money (M) buys the commodities of the means of production and labour power, 
turns them into more commodities (C) and realizes their value as profits in exchange (M’) to leave 
the central formula of M-C-M’. Capitalist competition compels endless re-investment of profits and 
perpetual creation and destruction of value. Opposing class interests in the distribution of the 
surplus and organization of the labour process – especially over labour time - make capitalist social 
relations of production inherently conflictual and contradictory. Class struggle is therefore central in 
capitalist development (Marx 2013). 
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inherently conflictual and dialectical7 (Clarke 1977; Roberts 2002; Ollman 2003; Sum and 
Jessop 2013). The ‘intentional practice’ of development is widely understood in terms of 
actions taken towards creating a modernized, liberal capitalist social formation as the telos 
(Thomas 2000; see also Rostow 1990; Escobar 1995). ‘Development’, I would suggest on 
the contrary, does not however proceed in a teleological, linear, and even manner.  Even in 
so-called ‘developed’ countries the transformation of social relations constantly occurs. 
That capitalism always seeks expansion and to overcome barriers to accumulation is 
inherent to it as a mode of production, as is instability, crisis, and uneven spatial 
development (Clarke 1990; Taylor 2007; Brenner 2009a; Duménil and Lévy 2011). 
Conceiving of development as open directs attention to power and those who wield it and 
suggests that the continuance of that power is not inevitable. A lack of inevitability and the 
variable historical-geographical concreteness of global processes should be borne in mind 
when we turn to analyzing the case of Lao border manufacturing. 
2.3.2 The Relevance of Agency
I suggest that a methodological focus on agency yields rich insights into developmental 
processes.  It is a guiding assumption of this work that social relations and structures are 
not naturally occurring phenomena but socially constructed through the intentional and 
non-intentional actions of social agents. Explaining the relation between structure and 
agency thus cuts to the heart of questions of social transformation and power (Cox 1981). 
The concept of structural power can be taken to mean that power resides in the structural 
location occupied by a person or group in a set of social relations which people must 
participate in due to the centrality of these relations in social production and reproduction 
(Glassman 2003: 681). For example class location and gender bestow structural power 
within social structures of capitalism and patriarchy, power which may be used 
intentionally or confer unintentional benefits (ibid. 681). Structural power as a notion 
however carries with it the danger of analytical reification of a fluid and changing reality:
while the notion of structural power puts a premium on social change, it also 
paradoxically, made it difficult to conceptualize social change because it entailed a 
circular logic: if structures empower the very people who are interested in protecting 
7 Following Ollman (2003) dialectics is understood as a method which identifies the internal relations 
which constitute social phenomena. Things are construed as existing only in and through their 
relations with other things so that those relations are internal to, and thus constitutive, of a thing. 
Four kinds of relations are of particular relevance: identity/difference; interpenetration of opposites; 
quantity/quality; and contradiction, with contradiction of most importance (ibid. 15-19). 
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a given social order, how can we explain change?...how can less privileged social 
forces overcome the biases embedded in society in order to transform it? (Knafo 2010: 
497; see also Bonefeld 1992)
Such a reification of structure is accompanied by a tendency to structural determination, 
whereby any change can only be explained at the ontological level of structure (Knafo 
2010: 499). Giddens’ (1984) concept of structuration attempts to overcome the binary 
between agency and structure by arguing for their intertwined complexity in social 
causation. Giddens argues that agents and structure constitute each other, and also that 
structure has contradictory effects for agents: ‘the structural properties of social 
systems are both medium and outcome of the [agential] practices they recursively 
organize…Structure is not to be equated with constraint but is always both constraining 
and enabling’ (ibid. 25). Structure thus provides ‘recursively organized’ rules and 
resources for action, which in turn shape and change those sets of rules and resources 
(ibid. 25; cf. Jessop 1990). 
Knafo (2010) suggests however a key limit to the structure/agency debates which Giddens’ 
work8 exemplifies. Knafo argues, persuasively I think, that agency is best approached as a 
methodological construct for framing analysis rather than an ontological object of analysis. 
This is to escape the incompatibility of a structural conception of power and a notion of 
social change based on agency in the agency/structure debate (ibid. 494). The question of 
agency and structural determination is based ‘on an illusory assumption that one can 
distinguish’ one from the other (ibid. 500). Proving the importance of agency as creating 
significant change depends on showing that this change was not predetermined by 
structures. The threshold for deciding this however will vary according to the author or 
theoretical approach, with a moment of agency for some an example of broader structural 
determination for others. Therefore posing the question of determination in terms of 
agency versus structure ‘requires an arbitrary distinction that can never be convincingly 
established on the grounds of ontology’ (ibid. 500-501). Reinterpreting the issue as a 
methodological one shows that structural readings provide a ‘misleading’ perspective that 
‘blurs the process of social construction and reifies reality’ (ibid. 504). Focusing on 
structural constraints to action often leads to analyzing the agents constrained by such 
structures and misses that ‘for every agent who is constrained, there is always another who 
8 For other criticisms see Thompson (1989) and Urry (1991).
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is empowered’ (ibid. 504). A focus on restrictive structures is itself limiting because it only 
addresses one side of a more complex social relation:
What appears to be the product of structural constraints is always a product of 
agency when properly resituated within a social relation that takes into account the 
power of another actor exploiting these structural constraints. The agency/structure 
debate is thus ill defined because it examines the issue in terms of a dual relation 
between structure and agent, when in fact we are dealing with a social relation 
between agents which is only mediated by structures (ibid. 504). 
Framing the issue as an agency/structure dichotomy also runs the risk of presenting 
agency as fetishized and thing-like, rather than something which is itself socially 
constituted through the strategies, actions and practices9 of actors in relation with each 
other (ibid. 499). Konings (2010: 68) concurs when he notes that social construction is 
‘triadic in nature’ entailing ‘agent-agent relations that are necessarily mediated by 
norms and conventions’ instead of agent-structure relations per se. Such an approach 
takes into account people who exploit structures, thus focusing on what is achieved 
through structures and not on the product resulting from those actions. ‘The process of 
social construction’ is thus revealed rather than merely its outcome (Knafo 2010: 505). 
Konings (2010: 59) also suggests that institutional structures ‘leverage’ agency, allowing 
it to extend in ways that would not be possible if power were merely brute force. As 
Knafo (2010: 509) summarizes, to move beyond the reification of social reality ‘it is 
necessary to account for agency all along the way of the analysis’. 
For the present work, I submit that a methodological focus on agency allows the ‘process of 
social construction’ to come into sight. Following agency in the analysis behoves us to 
identify how the strategies, actions and practices of key actors condition and constrain each 
other. Rather than assuming that power necessarily lies exclusively with one set of actors 
due to their structural location, we may uncover less obvious sources of power, operating 
in historically significant ways. Contestation on the part of subaltern actors can appear, not 
9 ‘Strategy’ I take to mean the intentional courses of action which are undertaken to achieve a 
specific goal. ‘Actions’ are understood broadly as specific acts that are typically more time-limited 
and singular, e.g. specific instances of attending a meeting or organizing a strike. By ‘practices’ I 
understand more long-term repeated instances of actions which indicate an identifiable pattern of 
behaviour and may be, but not necessarily, more institutionalized, e.g. religious observance, 
regularly skipping work, gendered divisions of labour within a household. 
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as a reaction to power, but as a determinant of the pathways open to nominally more 
powerful actors. The race to the bottom is subverted at source as it is constituted within 
power relations which are not wholly determined by the powerful. 
2.3.3 Social Agency and Development: Capital and State 
Who, or what, are the agents of economic development? The state, capital or both in 
combination are typically posed as the main instigators of development (on the state, 
Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Chang 2002; Khan 2007; Rodrik 2008; on capital, Bauer 1971; 
Stern 1989; Lal 2002; Brenner 2006). The state/market framing is also prominent in 
debates on the global restructuring of labour and production discussed above. Capital 
moves to set up production in low-cost locations. States facilitate it by removing barriers to 
investment or internationalizing their institutions (Glassman 2004). By framing the issue in 
a dualistic way other actors of relevance for the economic development process are either 
excluded a priori from the discussion or relegated to a peripheral role. Labour is just such a 
lacuna (Breman 1995; Selwyn 2012). As noted above there is also a tendency to make 
labour passive in the race to the bottom literature, a subject of control and structural 
power. In so doing authors relegate class struggle to a secondary place in the analysis. I 
briefly analyze capital and states as developmental actors, before drawing on open 
Marxism (Bonefeld et al 1992) to show how they might be theorized in relation to labour.
Recent mainstream development economics has been underpinned by a specific notion of 
agency, which establishes the main driving actor as the private entrepreneur or firm - 
capital and the market as the main mechanism for development. The neoclassical theory of 
agency is erected upon the pillars of methodological individualism, rationality, and 
utility/profit maximization. Individuals will act in all circumstances to rationally maximize 
their utility and firms will act to rationally maximize their profits (DeMartino 2000: 39). 
Individual utility or profit maximization will not only lead to the best outcomes for 
individuals but also to socially optimal welfare through the market mechanism (Wolff and 
Resnick 2012: 57-58). Markets should therefore be as free as possible and the state should 
not engage in market-distorting interventions. Freedom for risk-taking entrepreneurs to 
invest and trade will lead to the best developmental outcomes (Lal 2002). This logic 
became the basis for the Washington Consensus policy prescriptions of liberalization, 
deregulation and privatization (Gore 2000). 
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The agent as found in orthodox neoclassical economics is deficient as a means for 
understanding developmental processes and represents an ideal-technical construct which 
fails as a useable simplification of reality.  Interconnected criticisms can be levelled at its 
abstraction of the economic from the social, its ahistoricism and aspatiality, and its 
untenable conceptualization of rationality (Brohman 1995; Foley 2004).10 Moreover, the 
notion of business as the main actor in development has been challenged empirically by 
work on the state as a developmental actor. 
States have a number of key roles in capitalist development. The state can fundamentally 
undergird and facilitate private capital accumulation by providing the institutional and 
infrastructural conditions for production and exchange. States are crucial for creating and 
securing systems of property rights, enforcing contracts, and maintaining macroeconomic 
stability (Amsden 1989; Lal 2002). The state also has the major role of delivering large-scale, 
territorially extensive, infrastructural investments. These include roads, railways, and ports, 
which are too large and risky for private investors (Martinussen 1997: 259). The state may 
also act directly as the agent of accumulation through state-owned enterprises 
(Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985: 57-58; Wade 1990: 272-273). 
The developmental state paradigm has been prominent in presenting the state11 as an 
effective developmental actor (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; P. Evans 1995).  The 
developmental state model has a strong and efficient state at the core of developmental 
efforts, but which is nevertheless responsive to society and has mechanisms which allow 
communication and cooperation between state and society (P. Evans 1995). A particular 
focus of developmental states, for example, has been import-substitution industrialization 
(Amsden 2008: 100-101). Wade (1990) asserts that the most successful East Asian 
developmental states have engaged in a course of ‘governing the market’ where policies 
have steered enterprises into higher-wage, higher-technology alternatives and away from 
short-term speculation and low-wage activities (ibid. 287).
10 New institutional economics (NIE) attempted to solve issues of market failure and transaction 
costs by positing the existence of rationally-formed non-market institutions, but still suffers from the 
deficiencies of neoclassical agency (Bates 1995; Fine 2006; Khan 2007).
11 Jessop (2008: 9) defines the state loosely, as ‘a distinct ensemble of institutions and organizations 
whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on a given 
population in the name of their ‘common interest’ or ‘general will’’. This is a useful, in that it points 
to power and complexity, although somewhat ahistorical formulation, as I understand contemporary 
states in their historical specificity as capitalist. 
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However, the developmental state model offers a problematic conceptualization of 
development which limits its usefulness. The developmental state paradigm works within 
the limiting state-market dichotomy. Statist theorists have acknowledged the influence of 
classes on state formation and state action. However, the way they conceive of class 
distances the concept from its necessary corollary, class relations (Chang 2013). 
Developmental states are analyzed in terms of state-society relations which are reduced to 
state-capital relations and, in turn, government-business relations. This stems from a vulgar 
conception of capital as ‘owners of a source of revenue’ rather than capital as a social 
relation, marginalizing labour in the analysis and denying its agency as a positive source of 
social transformation (ibid. 89-94).
A Marxist focus on the social relations of capitalism and their role in constituting the state 
perhaps yields greater insights into the state in development. Developing countries are, at 
least, deeply implicated in a global capitalist system even if their socio-economic structures 
are only capitalist in a rudimentary manner (Fine 2013: 25). Marxist approaches to the 
state seem to me better suited to reveal the specific historically capitalist content of 
developing country states.12 
2.3.4 Open Marxism and the State
Open Marxism (OM) is useful for effectively identifying the specifically capitalist content of 
states, by analyzing the state form as a mode of existence of the antagonistic capital-labour 
relation. As such it is able to identify the historical significance of labour’s agency within the 
state form and thus internally relate the agency of the state and the agency of labour.13 
Open Marxism seeks to establish a non-deterministic, non-teleological, and thus open, 
approach to the analysis of capitalist development through highlighting the centrality of 
class struggle. Struggle is necessarily open-ended and outcomes cannot be predicted 
through laws or tendencies (Bonefeld et al 1992: xii). OM seeks to establish the state as a 
form of the fundamental capital-labour relation. ‘Form’ is understood as ‘mode of 
existence’ i.e. ‘something or other exists only in and through the form(s) it takes.’ (ibid. xv). 
The class antagonism between capital and labour is thus ‘a contradictory relation of 
historical specificity’, one ‘which bathes all social phenomena in a certain historical form of 
12 For criticisms of the Marxist position see Migdal 1994 and Leftwich 2000.
13 OM is preferred to the strategic-relational approach of Jessop (1990; 2002; 2008), as while the 
latter offers a sophisticated account of the state it maintains an untenable separation between the 
political and economic, upholds a problematic ontological distinction between structure and struggle, 
and provides an inadequate basis for understanding how systemic change occurs (Clarke 1991a; 
Bonefeld 1992; Kelly 1999; Charnock 2010b).
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existence’ (Bonefeld 1992: 100). Labour as a determining power in capitalist social relations 
is given in that labour can autonomize itself from capital but capital can never fully 
autonomize itself from labour, i.e. capital depends on labour for its existence (ibid. 103). 
This is not to introduce economic reductionism because these relations are already social 
relations rather than merely economic ones. Social relations, in a specific and determinate 
historical process, are subsumed under a dominant relation of production thus determining 
them as developed forms of that relation (Clarke 1977: 10).  The economic, political and 
ideological are thus forms which the class relation assumes (ibid. 10). The specifically 
capitalist state develops through a historical process whereby it progressively assumes the 
role of guarantor and enforcer of private property. The social antagonism of capital and 
labour is displaced into the state (Bonefeld 1992: 116-117). The existence of class struggle 
entails a state as a form necessary for containing and mediating it (Clarke 1991b: 190).  The 
state is thus to be viewed as ‘a distinct mode of existence of exploitation in that’ it 
‘internalizes in its historic development the preservation of the substance of value (living 
labour)’ (Bonefeld 1992: 119). The state has a tendency to arrogate to itself means of 
organizing labour power, such as education, skills, health, discipline, and enforcement of 
legal rights, and moreover processes working class aspirations through its institutional 
forms. The state is thus a mode of existence of labour in capitalist social relations (ibid. 
119). Rather than being derived from the economic relations of production the state stands 
as a separate but necessary form -  a complementary form - of the same underlying 
relations (Clarke 1991b: 193). The existence of class struggle implies that capitalist 
production is not structure with given foundations but rather a process, the reproduction 
of which depends on reproducing its own foundations (ibid. 190). Only through the course 
of this struggle does the state acquire and develop its particular institutional forms and 
various functions (Clarke 1991a: 53). 
Accepting these premises, it seems to me, presents several analytical advantages for the 
present case. First, they provide a way to integrate state, labour and capital not as discrete 
and interacting but as fundamentally related and subsisting through each other. This 
overcomes the dichotomous posing of the state and/or capital as the main agent of 
capitalist development. Attention is also directed to the ways states historically develop 
institutional forms which preserve and process labour. What Clarke and Bonefeld seem to 
suggest is that these institutional forms arise from concrete historical - and open -
circumstances of struggle. The institutional forms thus cannot be read off in a functionalist 
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manner from the general requirements of capitalist production. Particular institutional 
forms will be shaped in important ways by labour struggling over their social reproduction. 
Therefore, an important question is not only how does the state shape labour but also how 
does labour shape the state?
Open Marxism has been criticized on the grounds that it has a ‘totalizing’ ontology which 
emphasizes the capital relation as the sole source of human social praxis (Bieler et al 2010).  
There is a danger here of reducing the multiple discrete forms of social life to an 
unchanging, transhistorical essence of the capital relation (Roberts 2002: 88; Bieler et al 
2010: 31). Roberts (2002) suggests that open Marxist categories need to be opened up to 
the idea of refraction in order to meet this criticism while retaining their insights. 
Refraction refers to the distinct and qualitative ideological characteristics of social forms of 
life (ibid. 99).  The content of concrete social forms reflect and refract the content of other 
social forms such as ethics, epistemology or popular culture. Social forms are thus 
‘simultaneously determined from without exactly through its determination from within’ 
and ‘a diverse arrays [sic] of social forms permeate each other’ (ibid. 100). Social forms thus 
assume historical and social concreteness through this overdetermined process of 
refraction (ibid. 101). This also makes the category of social form truly open by highlighting 
how social forms are determinate but only gaining ‘identity through the constant shifting 
interaction with other objects’ (ibid. 101). 
Roberts offers a useful extension of the core open Marxist premises, which I think, is useful 
for considering elements of the present case. By viewing capital-labour relations as 
refracted through ideological environments, the way is opened to integrate, for example, 
important cultural or discursive elements into an analysis of concrete social formations or 
the capitalist state form. Roberts’ work thus suggests the important question of what 
ideological notions are present and influencing the development of capital-labour relations 
in a determinate historical-geographical context.
Open Marxism, as Roberts hints at, asserts the centrality of class struggle but is less 
forthcoming on the concrete manifestations of that struggle. OM holds up labour as a 
determining power in capitalist relations but leaves undeveloped the nature of labour as an 
actor. It is necessary then to elaborate further how labour acts to constitute development 
processes. 
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2.4 Labour Agency and Development  
Focusing on labour’s agency, I seek to demonstrate, provides important insights, but the 
focus comes with caveats. My understanding of labour’s agency is predicated on the 
acceptance of the Marxist concepts of class struggle and capitalist mode of production. 
However, even for those not convinced by these concepts, I hope labour’s agency may still 
provide a stimulating shift in perspective when thinking about development. In my 
particular Marxian interpretation labour is a central actor in development but cannot be 
promoted to the central one. There seems a danger to me that accepting that labour is a 
determining power in capitalist social relations may lead to a reductive position in which 
capital (or the state) is only ever reactive to labour (Camfield 2004: 440). This seems to me 
not to be the case. While accepting that labour and capitalist strategies to intensify and 
expand labour remain at the core of contemporary social organization (Cleaver 2002) I also 
heed Camfield’s warning ‘that concepts like labour and capital formulated at the level of 
abstraction of Capital should not be used in more concrete historical studies without 
considerable care’ (2004: 440). My focus on labour’s agency is therefore not to take a class-
reductionist position. Other sources of social praxis such as gender and race relations also 
suffuse society, as do a myriad of overdetermined ideological forms (Roberts 2002; 
Camfield 2004: 442). Class it seems to me is thus constituted through gender, race and 
other dimensions of life as a relational process (Thompson 2013). In sum, I suggest that in 
the analysis of capitalist development it pays to direct attention to that which makes it 
specifically capitalist, the capital-labour relation, with labour’s agency restored to a central 
place, but also that the latter notion is developed with sufficient attention to the 
complexity of who workers are and how they act in specific contexts.
2.4.1 Labour Movements and Development
Labour’s capacity to act, to challenge and influence the social relations of capitalism has 
most clearly emerged in the institutional forms of labour movements; particularly the trade 
union and the political party. These forms of collective organization have often become 
closely linked in an institutional nexus which channels and mediates the organizational 
strength of labour both within industrial relations and the broader social and political field. 
Miliband (1989: 69) highlights the ‘imperative need for [institutional labour] agencies 
formally empowered to advance working-class interests and demands’. Silver (2003) 
focuses on how capital moving geographical sites of production has caused labour 
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movements to spring up in the new locations. Labour movements have thus been the 
prime agents channelling labour militancy in the twentieth century (ibid. 131-138).
Scholars of labour movements in development have thus drawn attention to both the 
potent capacity of organized labour and its repression and co-optation by authoritarian 
states. Many studies illuminate the histories of labour mobilization and repression in 
different countries, and thus how political conditions provide opportunities for effective 
mobilization (Hadiz 1997; La Botz 2001; Brown 2004; Glassman 2004). What emerges from 
these studies is a clear sense of the potential power of organized labour to influence the 
course of development, but also that historically capital and the state have colluded to 
construct workers as weak and informal. The extension of capitalist power relations as 
inseparable from economic development, it appears to me, becomes evident.  
Another strand of the literature paints a more hopeful picture of how labour has the ability 
to organize to act as a political and economic force. Candland (2007; cf. Levitsky and 
Mainwaring 2006) documents how organized labour in India and Pakistan contributed to 
democratic consolidation and determining economic policy (such as preventing 
privatization) in the post-colonial era. Seidman (1994) demonstrates how the patterns of 
rapid industrialization in Brazil and South Africa created the conditions for class 
consciousness and class mobilization. The growth of militant trade unionism was reinforced 
by alliances with community-based campaigns for public welfare such as housing and local 
services, entailing real social and economic gains for emerging working classes (ibid.). 
Seidman makes the important point that workers’ agency is always embedded within wider 
circuits of community and social reproduction, although her analysis still falls within a 
problematic framing of labour and development.
Labour as an actor within the development process is typically analyzed in terms of the 
‘labour movement’ and ‘resistance’. Certainly, collective, organized action by labour has 
been a key phenomenon impacting development. I do not deny this but seek to build on it 
by suggesting that labour’s agency and capacity to affect developmental processes is more 
variegated. I thus argue that using the categories ‘labour movement’ and ‘resistance’ as the 
primary entry points to analysis can mislead and obscure key elements of workers’ agency.  
I raise two key objections. The first is that this approach tends to reduce labour’s capacity 
to affect the development process to only being properly realized within formal collective 
organizations.  This leads to an analysis of labour in terms of whether a labour movement is 
nascent, repressed or fully mobilized. In doing so, the analysis potentially excludes other 
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significant actions and practices. It implies for example that labour has no meaningful 
agency when formal organizations are banned, apart from attempts to form organizations. 
It is not that labour movement authors do not recognize that, for example, wildcat strikes 
take place in repressive labour regimes but they are treated as of little significance except 
as a prelude or accompaniment to union formation (ibid. 176, 193). This presents what may 
be termed a teleological approach to labour’s agency whereby labour only possesses full 
and realized agency in the form of class conscious collective organization. All other actions 
are mere way stages to this end point rather than having potential in themselves to affect 
social processes (Miliband 1989: 69). In some cases however, wildcat strikes and protests 
may substitute for ineffective, co-opted trade unions (Clarke et al 2007; Pringle 2011; Siu 
and Chan 2015) and thus narrow or constrain the strategies open to capital or the state. 
Workers’ agency should thus be read on its own terms as having potential to influence 
social processes.
The notion of ‘resistance’ as the paradigmatic content of labour’s agency is also 
problematic. As with agency being primarily interpreted as occurring in the form of labour 
movements to the exclusion of other forms, so with resistance; agency and resistance are 
conflated. In much of the literature, labour is either resisting capital and/or the state by 
actively struggling for its rights and interests or alternatively is repressed and passively 
exploited. It is as if the agency of labour springs into existence at the very point when they 
start resisting (e.g. Chan 2011). In addition, scholars of labour movements rarely define 
exactly what they mean by ‘resistance’. The concept is implicitly taken to mean an open 
confrontation or dispute with employers or state in pursuit of rights and/or interests, 
typically taking the form/s of a petition, a protest, or a strike. Labour as an agent of 
development thus largely emerges as the militant worker struggling for better wages and 
working conditions. To be clear, I do not dispute worker militancy as an important and vital 
part of labour’s role in development. What I do suggest is that conflating agency with 
resistance presupposes that labour’s agency only operates in highly specific circumstances 
and times, a move which elides workers’ motivations, strategies, and actions at other times 
and in other circumstances. Methodologically it is important to pay attention to what 
workers actually do on an everyday basis, as well as in more exceptional periods of 
militancy, in order to ascertain the points at which agency becomes significant and 
produces a change in the behaviour or strategy of other actors. In this way a more complex 
and empirically richer notion of agency can come into view. 
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2.4.2 Reformulating Labour Agency: Autonomy and Going Beyond Resistance
Labour’s agency can, I suggest, be theorized more adroitly to reflect the multiple ways that 
workers act. The active constituting power of labour to influence developmental 
trajectories, argued for by open Marxists, is a theme usefully developed by autonomist 
Marxism. Katz’s (2004) theorization of a more variegated notion of agency can, I believe, 
supplement autonomist theory by providing more nuanced ideas of what constitutes 
relevant agency. 
Autonomists have affirmed the key role of class struggle in capitalist development and 
emphasized that labour’s agency is not only significant within institutional frameworks of 
trade unions and political parties but also as an autonomous force outside and in 
antagonism to these organizational forms. The key point that autonomist Marxist 
approaches make is that the practices and struggles of labour, which may take place within 
or without formal class organizations, are the key drivers of capitalist development rather 
than law-like structural features (Wright 2008). This argument allows us to go beyond 
framing labour strategies in terms of trade unions. Autonomists raised critical questions 
about the relationship between the working class on the one hand and, on the other, trade 
unions and working class-supporting political parties.  New forms of working class struggles 
became the subject of a theorization which was: 
able to articulate…the position that the working class is not a passive reactive victim, 
which defends its interest against capitalist onslaught, and that its ultimate power to 
overthrow capital is grounded in its existing power to initiate struggle and to force 
capital to reorganize and develop itself (Cleaver 2000: 65)
Autonomists argue ‘that the organizational and technological innovations that characterize 
the ‘real subsumption’ of capital – full capitalist control over the labour process associated 
with the expansion of the scale of production - were effectively driven by workers’ 
insubordination to and defiance of capital’. Capitalist development is thus not determined 
by law-like structural imperatives but instead by labour’s productive and organizational 
powers (Bowring 2004: 104; see also Wright 2002: 64). 
Class composition arose as a key concept in autonomism. Class composition refers to the 
power and organization of the working class relative to that of capital, within a determinate 
configuration of production. Class composition emerges through the social and technical 
division of labour and also from the cultural milieu, organizational forms and political 
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direction of a specific context (Witheford 2004: 8). Capital responds to increasing working 
class cohesion by restructuring the bases of working class organization in an attempt to 
‘decompose’ its power and create a new ‘controllable class composition’. The introduction 
of new technologies and new organizations of machinery and labour is implemented in 
order to undermine workers’ struggles (Cleaver 1992: 114). In turn the working class will 
attempt to ‘recompose’ class relations in their favour (Dyer-Witheford 2004: 8). The crucial 
point here is that working classes are constantly remaking themselves and being re-made 
in conflict with capital (ibid. 8). Labour thus emerges as an entity which engages in its own 
social construction (Cleaver 1992: 114). The recomposition of different categories of labour 
can only be achieved through appropriate forms of organization. Workers develop and 
abandon forms of organization depending on the concrete class relation they are within 
(Cleaver 2000: 67). This theoretical perspective brings into view new forms of autonomous 
organization in production which may otherwise lie hidden (ibid. 67-68; Wright 2002: 50). 
The notion of class composition appears to me as a useful corrective to labour control 
regime approaches which prioritize analysis of the institutional and organizational forms 
developed by state and capital. It shifts perspective to make us analyze what it is exactly in 
a specific circumstance which has to be controlled. Moreover, the notion of recomposition 
behoves us to think about what spontaneous and hidden types of organization are present, 
especially useful in a context like Laos of highly limited freedom of association. 
Autonomist thought also generated another useful theoretical innovation for 
understanding labour’s agency; the social factory. Autonomists argue that the reproduction 
of capital includes the reproduction of the classes. The accumulation process thus 
incorporates the labour of those who reproduce the working class, thus the labour within 
households and communities. Consequently the working class must be redefined away 
from a narrow focus on factory labour to include non-factory workers, thus providing a 
framework for understanding how the struggles of women, students, peasants and the 
unemployed play a role in contesting the reproduction of the capitalist system (Cleaver 
2000: 70; Wright 2002: 135). Feminist autonomists developed key insights into the 
articulation of socially reproductive work, typically performed by women, with labour in 
direct production: 
We have to make clear that, within the wage, domestic work produces not merely 
use values, but is essential to the production of surplus…the entire female role…has 
had and continues to have a precise and vital place in the capitalist division of labour, 
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in the pursuit of productivity at the social level (Dalla Costa and James 1975: 33, 
original emphasis)
The concept of the social factory indicates that the ‘radius of exploitation’ expands to 
incorporate multiple points of the circuit of capital (Dyer-Witheford 2002: 4). This entails 
that labour’s agency must be analyzed not only at the point of production but as embedded 
within complexes of reproductive work in the household and community.
The notion of the social factory thus, I would propose, offers a compelling way to think 
about the social division of labour in a given territory. First, it appears especially useful in 
contexts of industrialization where women constitute the main body of the workforce. How 
and to what extent does factory labour transform the gendered division of labour within 
the household? Whose socially reproductive labour is mobilized to facilitate the social 
construction of factory women? It seems especially pertinent in contexts of 
deagrarianization and industrialization where access to the means of production may still 
exist to a certain extent for some workers. To what extent is subsistence agrarian work 
directed towards supporting capital accumulation, or conversely providing a basis for 
undermining it? These matters, are it would seem of direct relevance to the issue of the 
social cost of labour in a race to the bottom. Struggles over socially reproductive labour 
time may for example impose additional indirect labour costs on capital. 
There are several drawbacks to autonomist theory. Besides a tendency to present capitalist 
development as only driven by labour (see above) autonomism tends to frame agency as 
that of a collective subject, and as one which is more or less consciously organized even if 
this is hidden. This appears to me as unsatisfactory and limiting as arguably other types of 
individual or unorganized agency may affect capitalist development. Another key drawback 
is that spatial themes are left undeveloped. How workers may actively make use of space 
to form a division of socially reproductive labour can be made more concrete. A means to 
overcome the latter drawback will be outlined below but first I turn to problematizing the 
hegemonic notion of resistance. 
Katz (2004) takes aim at interpreting all autonomous subaltern actions as instances of 
resistance. She argues that many of these actions can simply not be construed as 
‘oppositional practices’ as they are ‘not enough to transform the social relations of 
oppression and exploitation’ which frame many people’s daily lives (ibid. 242). In 
resistance’s stead Katz seeks to distinguish those social practices:
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whose primary effect is autonomous initiative, recuperation, or resilience; those that 
are attempts to rework oppressive and unequal circumstances; and those that are 
intended to resist, subvert, or disrupt these conditions of exploitation and oppression 
(ibid. 242)14
Katz’s threefold categorization of agency is potentially problematic as it invites empirical 
application as a rigid ideal-type schema. The risk is identifying actions as fitting neatly into 
one or the other category when they are in fact more fluid in origin and implication.15 Katz 
herself notes that practices of resilience, reworking and resistance are overlapping and 
have a practical ambit to inform praxis rather than create arbitrary categories (Katz 2004: 
256).  With this warning in mind, the value of Katz’s approach is, I suggest, threefold. Her 
approach is useful as a heuristic when approaching agency. It can be used as a more refined 
methodological entry point than a simple focus on agency per se. It imposes some order on 
an investigation but not an overly limiting one as long as practical flexibility is adhered to. 
Its second strength is that it directs analytical attention to variegated types of agency and 
so dissolves the category of resistance and disrupts its hegemonic grip on labour theory. 
The third benefit springs from the second in that broadening the scope of relevant agency 
enables us to more clearly trace the connections between production and social 
reproduction and show how the capital-labour relation is embedded in dense webs of 
social relations. 
2.5 Labour’s Spatial Agency
Labour, I would contend, is fruitfully understood as an inherently spatial agent. It seems 
clear to me that labour makes strategic use of space in order to enable its social 
reproduction. Migration is a case in point but I would propose that labour makes other 
efforts to command space. Given the preceding analysis of autonomous agency I would go 
14 Resilience manifests in the small acts of getting by which form the substrate of people’s daily lives. 
The building of resilience encompasses reformulating economic practices and sustaining reciprocal 
relations of care to ensure daily social reproduction. These acts are not oppositional and do not 
entail a consciousness which might contest power relations. The flipside of this is that workers or 
other subaltern actors are sustained, providing the grounds for modes of action beyond survival and 
recuperation. Reworking refers to those practices ‘that alter the conditions of people’s existence to 
enable more workable lives and create more viable terrains of practice’. Reworking projects involve 
a different type of consciousness, involving the recognition of problematic conditions and focused 
attempts to effect change. Resistance, for Katz, means developing an explicitly oppositional 
consciousness ‘to confront and redress historically and geographically specific conditions of 
oppression and exploitation at various scales’ (Katz 2004: 246-251, quotes from pages 247 and 251).
15 Sportel (2013), in her application of Katz’s approach to coconut workers in Kerala, is arguably 
prone to this. 
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further and say that labour’s efforts to command space can be viewed as an important 
component of specific class compositions. Social construction of labour it would seem is 
perhaps better recast as socio-spatial construction of labour, a point well-illustrated, I 
submit, by the dialectic of fixity and mobility. 
The work of Herod (2001) has been central in demonstrating the spatial agency of workers. 
He distinguished between approaches based on a ‘geography of labour’ – how capital 
utilizes the geographical differentiation of labour – and those on ‘labour geography’ – how 
labour is an actor in its own right which actively shapes the landscapes of capitalism (ibid. 
4-6). The production of social space16  is crucial for workers’ survival and their social 
reproduction. Labour’s self-reproduction takes place in specific places which entails that 
they ‘are likely to want to shape the economic landscape in ways that facilitate this self-
reproduction’ (ibid. 33). Workers are heterogeneous and they will have different spatial 
fixes – spatial strategies which allow survival and social reproduction. Labour seeking 
particular spatial fixes at different historical conjunctures allows for a more deeply political 
analysis of the contested production of social space under capitalism because ‘it is the 
conflicts over whose spatial fix (capitalists’ or workers’) is actually set in the landscape that 
are at the heart of the dynamism of the geography of capitalism’ (ibid. 36, original 
emphasis).17 
Harvey (2006) argues that capital has ‘spatial fixes’ – strategic use of space to resolve 
overaccumulation crises – and Herod usefully articulates that notion for labour. The 
importance of labour creating its own spatial fixes revolves, I argue, in large part around 
various strategies and practices which take advantage of, or seek to produce and reproduce, 
fixity and mobility. Fixity is understood in a threefold sense: from the perspective of labour; 
from the perspective of capital; and from the perspective of the state. For labour it is the 
quality of establishing and reproducing the dense social relations, as well as material 
resources and activities which sustain these relations, in the grounded places in which 
workers live and reproduce their lives (Miller 1992; Hudson 2001). For capital it is the 
requirement to place and physically retain workers in the workplace (Smith 2006; Pun and 
Smith 2007). For the state, fixity of labour implies securing a workforce within the country 
to adequately staff the available means of production. The different meanings of ‘fixity’ of 
workers for different actors suggests the interpenetration of opposites (Ollman 2003: 16). 
16 See Chapter 3. 
17 Herod’s insights have been developed by, among others: Rogaly (2009); Cumbers et al (2008); 
Carmichael and Herod (2012) Oseland et al (2012) Cumbers et al (2016). 
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Fixity from the perspective of one actor may mean mobility from the perspective of 
another. For example, fixing workers in the workplace for capital may entail an extended 
form of mobility for the migrant workers being so fixed. Mobility may contradict fixity, 
leading to the possible dissolution of fixed places by out-migration, but also may sustain 
places through the inflows of remittances or immigration. 
Harvey (2006) outlines the importance of labour’s mobility and fixity.  For example, greater 
mobility of workers enables capital to adopt new labour processes and move location more 
easily. Harvey, however tends to locate power over mobility with capital. Thus capital for 
him uses labour’s striving after a better life to manipulate mobility to its requirements, and 
so both migrating and staying in a place can lead to strengthening capital’s hand rather 
than undermining it (Harvey 2006: 385). Harvey does not detail how labour’s command of 
space may, for example, shape factory labour regimes. A more fine-grained analysis of 
workers’ spatial actions and practices is capable, it seems to me, of adding extra 
explanatory value. 
Mobility, I suggest, also has the potential to undermine capital accumulation and result in 
changes in the labour process. Labour power is indeterminate in that the capitalist can 
never fully ascertain the exact amount of labour that will follow from buying labour power 
(Smith 2006). Workers and management engage in work-effort bargaining to attempt to 
ensure an adequate transformation of labour power into labour to satisfy the capitalist’s 
goals and, from the worker’s perspective, to generate as high wages and benefits as 
possible. As part of this workers are able to leverage their freedom to move and sell labour 
services in different places into possible benefits, such as higher wages elsewhere (ibid. 
391). Mobility emerges as a terrain of struggle and workers can strategize around their 
mobility both occupationally and transnationally to reproduce their lives on more 
advantageous terms (Alberti 2014: 866; see also Mezzadra 2004). 
Employers must engage in some form of ‘capture’ – or fixity -  of the employee before any 
production or labour process can begin, an idea which can be related to notions of coercive 
and consensual labour regimes (Smith 2006: 394). For example, in Chinese special 
economic zones accumulation has been enabled by dormitory labour regimes which both 
facilitate and constrain mobility and limit workplace labour organization. The provision of 
accommodation by factories facilitates the mobility of migrants from rural areas to move to 
industrial areas but also constrains them by making them more dependent on the 
employer (Pun 2004; Pun and Smith 2007; cf. Kelly 2002: 402-403).
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Geographical mobility may be in contradiction with the strong connections workers have 
with the typically territorially fixed matrix of family, community, and institutions where 
social reproduction occurs (labour’s fixity) (Kelly 2009).  Labour, in the main, emerges from 
dense sets of place-based, territorially circumscribed relations which both facilitate and 
constrain workers’ actions and practices. Spaces of reproduction, especially the household 
and local communities, in countries can be interpreted as constituted by dynamics of fixity 
and mobility. Households are fixed in place and must be reproduced in those places, but 
their reproduction may extend beyond those places, for example through labour migration 
and remittances. These activities may then impact on local employment dynamics by, for 
example, subsidizing local wage rates (ibid: 452).
The contradictory dynamics of workers both moving and also retaining strong ties to 
specific places which they aim to reproduce – their fixity – it appears to me are especially 
useful for analyzing the present case. Capital’s efforts to fix workers in place seem of 
greater relevance in a country with a relatively small labour market and in a border context 
which facilitates easy out-migration. In an authoritarian context such as Laos political and 
trade union rights are severely curtailed, thus foreclosing a range of strategies, so it seems 
that workers’ everyday use of space also assumes greater importance as a strategy for 
struggling for social reproduction. 
A further refinement of the concept of labour agency is provided by Coe and Jordhus-Lier 
(2011) who note the way that labour is embedded in broader webs of social relations, 
especially global production networks (GPN), state structures, community politics, and 
labour market intermediaries. Agency must thus be understood relationally by considering 
‘labour’s positionality’ within the aforementioned social webs (ibid. 214). While their 
analysis is still framed within the terms of structural constraints which Knafo (2010) 
criticizes, they do usefully highlight other key actors whom labour forms relations with and 
how these relations create differentiated potential for workers’ agency to effect change.  
For example, different subject positions held within communities go beyond the identity of 
‘worker’ with ‘gender and family identities, or loyalties based on ethnicity, age and place’ 
shaping the potential for agency (ibid. 223). Labour market intermediaries actively shape 
labour markets, allowing flexibility for some individual workers and some firms while 
having a destructive effect on trade unionism by increasing worker fragmentation (ibid. 
227). They suggest integrating these factors ‘offer[s] researchers a better analytical 
framework – one which can explain why some workers’ actions seem to matter more than 
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others – a more sophisticated understanding of the structural constraints and social 
relations that shape labour’s agency’ (ibid. 228).
Coe and Jordhus-Lier thus present a useful methodological orientation. They identify key 
groups of actors who constrain and enable the agency of workers - despite a somewhat 
structuralist rendering - and are at pains to reiterate the relationality of workers’ positions 
within these broader systems. If, for example, GPNs and state institutions are not taken as 
reified structures but as the product and mediator of specific social relations which stem 
from and supply differential potentials for subaltern agency then an important set of 
dynamics is highlighted. A voluntarist account of labour’s agency is superseded while 
simultaneously bringing into view the complex mediations of the capital-labour relation. 
We are returned to Knafo’s (2010) argument that following agency along the analysis 
uncovers the process of social construction, and so also the very constitution of power 
relations and the grounds and possibilities of their contestation. 
Conclusion
The race to the bottom can be interpreted as the attempt on the part of capital to spread a 
specific set of power relations by imposing informal work. Understanding it in this light 
suggests a focus on the active constitution of these relations is required. The 
methodological entry point of labour’s agency to this process of social construction 
indicates that to proceed we identify the main strategies, actions and practices of labour 
which significantly constrain capital and stimulate counter-strategies. We cannot assume 
that only certain forms of agency will be of relevance or even that the same strategies, 
actions and practices will have the same effects in different locations. Such an approach 
should also be applied to the transformations of the state. If state transformation is 
understood as a historical internalization and mediation of historically and geographically 
specific capital-labour antagonisms then we would do well to carefully note the forms and 
functions which develop out of these highly particular contexts. Fundamentally, not all 
cheap labour is the same and the costs paid to use it may be difficult for capital to bear. 
A focus on labour agency also foregrounds starkly the issue of social reproduction. It allows 
us to trace more clearly the lines of connection that run between global capital circuits in 
export-oriented factories and transformations in the social division of labour. How, why 
and to what extent does labour’s engagement in global production re-orient divisions of 
labour in a territory towards globalized capital accumulation, and conversely how do 
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existing conditions of social reproduction constitute the wage-relation within the factory 
walls? In short, how does the social territory surrounding a factory become a terrain of 
struggle over who bears the costs of capital accumulation and of labour’s social 
reproduction? 
The foregoing questions it seems to me can be fruitfully posed especially in relation to 
space. Labour attempts to strategically use space to its advantage, in essence to command 
space. I suggest that spatial practices are part of class composition. Identifying the dialectic 
of fixity and mobility as of particular relevance to the present case suggests that we must 
identify who is mobile, what types of mobility matter, and what are the constraints on 
mobility, and conversely who is fixed and what types of staying or embedding in place 
matter. We would do well to elucidate how the fixity and mobility of a particular actor 
contradict each other, as well as how the different mobilities and fixities of different actors 
contradict or interpenetrate with one another. This is an especially relevant theme for the 
conceptual framework developed in this thesis. In the next chapter I suggest that 
developmental processes can be understood through investigating how flows of capital and 
labour may be brought together into a fixed spatial frame for capital accumulation to 
proceed. 
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Chapter 3: Reworking Territory and Scale
In the preceding chapter I suggested that workers are inherently spatial agents, and that 
attention to labour´s variegated agency can provide important insights into developmental 
trajectories. In this chapter I would like to specify more clearly how labour´s agency fits into 
geographical patterns of capitalist development. In the context of globalization, regional 
integration projects and FDI how exactly is labour incorporated into a regional economic 
space or a global circuit of capital? Or following the arguments already outlined on labour’s 
agency, how does labour incorporate itself into geographical development processes or 
refuse incorporation? These are the questions I seek to answer in this chapter. To do so I 
introduce three organizing concepts which, it seems to me, are particularly useful for 
interpreting the dynamics of border manufacturing in Laos in the context of Greater Mekong 
Subregion regionalization. The first is the dialectic of fixity and mobility, an important 
contradiction of capitalism, which has been elaborated into the concept of the ´spatial fix´ by 
Harvey (2006). Both capital and labour have their own spatial fixes, their own particular 
methods and motivations of fixing in places and moving between them, which leads to the 
question of how they are made to cohere in a place in order for accumulation to proceed. 
Building on Swyngedouw’s (1992) conceptualization of territorial organization as a 
contradictory unity of force and relation of production, the second organizing concept that I 
suggest is territorial coherence, understood as a historically specific combination of social 
reproduction, capital valorization and territorial regulation that produces a pattern of 
territorial development. The third is that regional integration can be understood as projects 
of political economic scale-building to create territorially cohesive expanded domains for the 
production of surplus value and circulation of capital. Moreover, a constitutive element of 
regional scale-building is the reterritorialization of spaces within states in order to create 
new forms of cohesion between states. A focus on labour’s spatialized social reproduction 
strategies is the key theoretical manoeuvre which I suggest helps to illuminate and tie 
together cross-border regional scale-making, state reterritorialization and the spatial fixes of 
capital. Labour through its practices and actions, including those to command space, 
constitutes and constrains specific forms of territorial coherence, and so drives capital and 
state strategies to recompose labour in forms suitable for constituting new scales. The 
analysis of how capital-labour relations produce territory and scale through processes of 
struggle and contestation can help us to understand the unfolding of patterns of uneven 
development, and the distribution of resources, wealth and power that accrues to the actors 
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involved. Before I outline these concepts in more detail I review some existing approaches to 
regional integration and capitalist spatial development.
3.1 The Socio-Spatial Relations of Capitalism: Fixity and Mobility 
3.1.1 Regional Integration 
Regional integration and regions1 has been understood as comprising economic, political, 
cultural and security dimensions (Baldwin 2008; Das et al 2013). The focus here is however 
on the specifically political economic elements of integration. Regional integration may be 
defined very broadly as ‘a process of economic or political organization at work in a 
supranational area, halfway between world and national level’ (Fau 2014: 7). Two types of 
regional integration often distinguished are political and institutional (de jure) and economic 
(de facto) (ibid. 7). Several analytical pathways have led from this dichotomy. One is try to 
analyze which comes first. Has regional integration and inter-governmental cooperation 
been driven by bottom-up economic actors or by states in a top-down manner pursuing 
political objectives? (Yoshimatsu 2002; Baldwin 2008; Ravenhill 2008; Chin and Stubbs 2011). 
Another closely related approach is to analyze which motivations for integration are most 
important for states - political or economic? (Ravenhill 2010). One problematic issue with 
privileging the state or a bloc of states as the starting point is that it will likely miss the 
processes at multiple scales which constitute regional integration. Bottom-up and top-down 
dynamics may co-exist (Sum 2002: 50, 67). Another more fundamental issue with this kind of 
framing is that it tends to make a binary of the economic and the political and imply that 
these are externally related processes and logics. Rather, it is more fruitful to understand 
how the political and economic are both internally related and moments of the same 
underlying social relations (Clarke 1977). Binary framing also presents states or market 
actors - firms and organizations such as lobby groups - as the main or only actors in the 
process of regional integration. To take as one example there is the focus on regional 
integration as the creation of free trade areas. Regional integration here is primarily 
understood as enacted in regional trading blocs through the creation of free trade areas or 
customs unions (Panagariya 1999). Regional integration is thus viewed as the extent of trade 
(and perhaps also capital market) liberalization and flows within a bloc of countries, with 
political economy issues revolving around questions of protectionism, sequencing of reforms 
1 ‘Region’ and ‘regional integration’ are here taken to refer to supranational regions and integration, 
rather than subnational regions such as the Northeast of Thailand (Scott 1997). ‘Region’ is thus 
understood as an ensemble of territorially contiguous nation-states. 
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and negotiation overs tariffs and non-tariff barriers (Baldwin 2006). More critical attempts to 
understand how a hegemonic coalition of forces drives integration have replicated the 
analytical narrowing of regional integration by prioritising political governance building 
(Perkmann 2007). How this might affect subaltern actors such as labour, or indeed how they 
may affect the processes of regional integration is left largely unexplored (Smith et al 2002). 
Disciplinary backgrounds of regional integration scholars in international relations and 
international economics also mean that a third sense of regional integration - the 
geographical – especially the importance of transnational transport infrastructure - is largely 
not an issue of analytical concern (Fau 2014; cf. Coe 2014). In short, many accounts of 
regional integration lack any account of the workers who make it possible or ignore or 
under-theorize the specifically spatial elements of that integration, and much less bring 
them together. 
More promising is the work of critical geographers who have analyzed particular regional 
integration projects. Sparke et al (2004), for instance, highlight the way that the Indonesia-
Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle integration project has attempted to assemble land, 
labour and capital in ways that are ‘complementary’, or to put it another way take 
advantage of uneven development between the countries. Uneven development is also a 
concern of Glassman (2010) who seeks to show how regional integration in the GMS has 
incorporated countries and populations on uneven and unequitable terms. Glassman brings 
a welcome focus on class forces but tends to approach his analysis from the perspective of 
powerful actors such as international investors, and there is consequently a lack of analysis 
about how subaltern actors create regional spaces. Sturgeon (2013) highlights the way that 
petty traders and small-scale farmers have played a role in regional integration but labour’s 
active production of space still remains somewhat under-conceptualized. I thus aim to build 
on this critical body of work to provide a framework for analyzing how labour actively 
contributes to producing space, territory and scale in regional integration processes.
3.1.2 Fixity and Mobility
I develop the concept of fixity and mobility introduced in Chapter 2 to suggest that a focus 
on their dialectic sheds useful light on the dynamics of the capitalist space economy (Harvey 
2006). The focus on fixity and mobility builds on a particular conception of the relation 
between space and society. Space is understood not as a static ontological given but rather 
as produced through multiple social relationships and in on-going construction (Lefebvre 
1991).  Understanding space as emerging from the flux of interrelations entails that it is 
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never – like economic development - closed or finished (Massey 2005: 9-11; cf. Bonefeld et 
al 1992; Sheppard 2008). Following Soja (1989)2 the relation between society and space is 
best understood as a mutually constitutive socio-spatial dialectic which forms the social and 
spatial relationally and simultaneously. Social being is intrinsically spatial and temporal and 
‘space-time should not be abstracted from the analytical concept of the sociocultural.’ 
(Munn 1986: 268 in Harvey 1996: 218). The focus on social production encourages 
consideration of who produces space, how, and to what ends. Moreover, socially produced 
space reacts back on the social relations which constituted it and so co-constitute the course 
of those relations (Soja 1989). A focus on the contradiction between fixity and mobility can 
illustrate this point more clearly. 
Mobility and flows are caught in dialectical tension with the status of fixity.3 The flux of 
processes which constitute the world are constantly undergoing solidification into what 
Harvey has termed ‘relative permanences’ and ‘structured coherences’ (Harvey 1996: 55; 
Harvey 1989: 332; see also Merrifield 1993). The ‘process of place formation is a process of 
carving out ‘“permanences” from the flow of processes creating spatio-temporality’ (Harvey 
1996: 261). This approach apprehends the social-natural world as constituted by relations, 
processes and flows which are contradictory and internally related, rather than discrete, 
externally related ‘things’. Matter, social relations and their intersections are fixed into 
configurations which temporarily provide stable frameworks for the conduct of social life. 
Furthermore, various degrees of fixity are actually needed to enable the manifold types of 
mobility: 
There are interdependent systems of ‘immobile’ material worlds and especially some 
exceptionally immobile platforms, transmitters, roads, garages, stations, aerials, 
airports, docks, factories through which mobilizations of locality are performed and re-
arrangements of place and scale materialized (Hannam et al 2006: 3) 
Mobilities should not be thought of as simple flows but as a flux which ‘involves tension, 
struggle and conflict…the complex intersections of immobilities and mobilities (Urry 2007: 
25). The social life of modernity unfolds through what has been termed a dialectic of 
´mobilities and moorings´ (Hannam et al 2006). Socio-spatial configurations – such as 
territory and scale - may provide a ‘relative permanence’ and ‘structured coherence’ for a 
2 See also Dear and Wolch 1989 and Harvey 2008. 
3 Authors have referred to the dialectic of fixity and motion (Harvey 1996; Brenner 1998). I use 
´mobility´ over ´motion´ because I refer throughout the work to the mobility of capital and labour, 
which makes it preferable for clarity´s sake to the more abstract connotations of ´motion´. 
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stable set of capitalist social relations. The notion of territorial coherence in the pursuit of 
expanded scales for capital accumulation is, I hope to show, of particular relevance in 
analyzing the current case. Before delving into more concrete socio-spatial configurations I 
outline in more general terms how fixity and mobility are of relevance to capitalism, by 
turning to the concept of the spatial fix. 
3.1.3 The Socio-Spatial Dynamics of Capital: The Spatial Fix
For Lefebvre every society, born from a particular mode of production, produces space in its 
own specific manner and moulds space according to the peculiarities of that mode (Lefebvre 
2009: 187). This more general point can be applied to the capitalist mode of production, 
where capital accumulation appears to pivot on a relentless process of deterritorialization 
and reterritorialization to embed in certain territories to produce value and to constantly 
move to expand and break down spatial barriers to accumulation (Brenner 1998). Harvey 
(2006) explains these dynamics by developing the concept of the ‘spatial fix’. Harvey locates 
his critique of the capitalist space economy within a theory of crisis formation and resolution. 
He organizes this critique into three ‘cuts’ which start with orthodox Marxist crisis theory 
which is then made progressively complex by the introduction of temporal and spatial 
moments of the crisis process (Sheppard 2006: 124-126). The first ‘cut’ focuses on the role 
of overaccumulation and devaluation of capital in forming crises, involving value realization 
problems where commodities are not sold and investments are not transformed into profits 
(Harvey 2006: 202). The second ‘cut’ presents the search for the temporal fix which is 
needed to smooth out the various time lags, that is turnover times inherent in the 
production process, as well as the cycles of overaccumulation and devaluation. Here the role 
of finance and credit is vital for raising the large amounts of money required for investing in 
expensive fixed capital equipment, and shifting capital from less to more profitable areas of 
the economy. However, financial markets ultimately quicken the rate of accumulation and 
technical change and so accelerate the obsolescence of fixed capital. Cycles of 
overaccumulation and devaluation can be held at bay temporarily through financial means 
but eventually the law of value bears out (ibid. 324-329).  
The first two ‘cuts’ lay the foundations for Harvey’s exploration of whether a ‘spatial fix’ can 
resolve the crisis tendencies in capitalist production. Harvey argues that the ‘production of 
spatial configurations can…be treated as an ‘active moment’ within the overall temporal 
dynamic of accumulation and social reproduction’ (ibid. 374). Harvey points to four kinds of 
spatial fix: market-based land use allocation; transport infrastructure in spatial integration; 
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expanding capital to new territories; and territorial governance and social infrastructures. I 
address the first three in this section, and discuss the latter in relation to territorial 
coherence below. 
The first is the role that the land market has in allocating land and reshaping the built 
environment into different use-values, promoting the highest and best (from the perspective 
of capital) uses of the land both in the present and in anticipation of future surplus value 
production (ibid. 367-368). 
The second kind of spatial fix concerns the vital role of spatial integration of production, 
distribution and exchange. In order for complete circuits of capital to form capitalists must 
solve the problem of connecting spatially dispersed sites of production and consumption. 
The relentless pressure from competition to reduce turnover time by realizing value in 
exchange entails that capital constantly seeks to break down spatial barriers and 
revolutionize communication and transport. Transport investments alter the shifting relative 
spaces of the circuits of capital and capitalists in different locations fare in diverse ways. 
Some may benefit from temporary excess profits whilst others face devaluation of labour 
power and fixed capital. Fixed capital in the transport industry in the form of the built 
environment, including roads, rails, ports and terminals, is especially vulnerable to location-
specific devaluation. The major contradiction in this process is that capital, often in 
conjunction with states willing to fund and coordinate such large-scale projects, attempts to 
overcome spatial barriers to accumulation by creating a transport and communications 
structure which is highly vulnerable to place-specific devaluation and so becoming a barrier 
to accumulation itself (ibid. 376-380). Here one form of the dialectic of fixity and mobility 
asserts itself. The spatial fix requires a certain amount of fixity in order to facilitate mobility, 
but the very mobility and dynamism of capital undermines that particular form of fixity. The 
spatial fix in the sense of fixing in place can thus only be a temporary ‘fix’ as in the sense of 
solving a problem (Harvey 2004: 65-66; see also Brenner 1998). It is important to note here 
how the spatial configurations themselves play a determining role in producing other socio-
spatial relations. They react back upon the processes of value creation and devaluation by 
becoming respectively conduits and barriers.
The expansion of capital to new territories relieves the pressures of overaccumulation at 
home. New outlets for capital must be found on an expanded geographical basis and this 
means both the extension of the productive forces and the social relations of capitalism. The 
latter point is important as it means as an inherent part of capital’s spatial fix the institution 
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of wage labour is extended and the proletariat grows on a global scale. Crises are less 
intense if there is a rapid increase in the labour force, occurring through either primitive 
accumulation or increase of population. If the transition to capitalist social relations and 
overaccumulation outlet possibilities are blocked then the spatial fix is negated and global 
crises are ready to unfold (Harvey 2006: 434-436; cf. Smith 1984).  New territorial divisions 
of labour are thus imperative to ameliorate crisis tendencies. 
The significance of the spatial fix for contemporary political economy has been heightened 
since the 1970s by the development of global transport and communication networks which 
have resulted in ‘space-time’ compression (Harvey 1990). Capital is now able to be more 
geographically mobile and is able to take advantage of freer locational choice. Smaller 
differences in resources bases, local physical and social infrastructures, and labour costs gain 
greater importance for capital seeking to relocate. This situation thus engenders intensified 
competition between places to attract capital (Harvey 1996: 297-298; Sheppard 2002: 311). 
This is essentially the race to the bottom narrative outlined in Chapter 2.
Harvey’s work develops strong arguments for how the socio-spatial dialectic of capitalism 
operates, and demonstrates how the spatial is a determinate moment in capitalist 
development. Particular spatial orderings affect the profit rate which has implications for the 
social dynamics of accumulation. Spatial configurations developed in order to solve the 
problems of accumulation become over time barriers which must be overcome, leading to a 
new round of spatial reconstruction. This latter point illustrates how both time and space 
are important for the present analysis. Spatial organization of social relations adequate for 
capital accumulation at one historical moment may, at another time, need to be torn down 
and reconstructed in a constant process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. 
 3.2 Territory and Economic Development
3.2.1 Bordering Spaces, Territorialization and Economic Flows 
I propose, given that capital must constantly fix itself in places and associated social and 
institutional-regulatory orders, that examining territory can illuminate development 
processes. I would like to highlight three interrelated aspects of territory of relevance to the 
present argument. The first is that territory is continually socially produced through the 
practices of territorialization. The second is that states are actually produced through 
establishing and maintaining territorial regulatory and institutional arrangements to create 
control over space and population. Third, territory and territorialization are still key concepts 
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for understanding economic processes in a world of increased flows and mobilities which 
cross territorial boundaries. This establishes the foundations for the introduction of the 
notion of territorial coherence below.
Territory is conceptually interwoven in social science debates with the concept of the 
nation-state and bounded political spaces.  Territory should however not be seen as a 
natural container of a culture, society or economy which is homologous to the space which 
the borders demarcate. Neither should states be seen as fixed units of sovereign space, as 
the state, territory and sovereignty are not always coincident - due to for instance its 
internationalization or lack of internal sovereignty or control (Cox 1987; Agnew 1994). To 
see them as fixed units would be to fall into the ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew 1994). Rather, it is 
more fruitful to understand territory as resulting ‘from a historically specific, mutually 
transformative articulation between the state, the continually contested processes within it, 
and the land or soil that it inhabits, owns, control and exploits’ (Brenner and Elden 2009: 
362). Therefore it is useful to distinguish analytically ‘between ‘territory’ (appropriated 
enacted space), ‘territoriality (the sum of relations between subjects therein), and 
‘territorialization’ (the process through which these relations are established)’ (Jones 2009: 
494). 
The production of territory, following Lefebvre, can be seen as unfolding through territorial 
practices and representations of territory. Territorial practices would include the physical 
and material creation of borders, fences and boundaries which mark external limits, and 
moreover the construction and maintenance of large-scale infrastructure which enables 
flows of goods, commodities, information and energy. Representations of territory involve 
abstract ways of representing territory such as maps and charts which create imagined 
notions of a bounded political space (Brenner and Elden 2009: 365; see also Walker 1993; 
Winichakul 1994; Elden 2010). Boundaries are understood here not as fixed, essential spatial 
entities but rather as social processes which are constructed and reproduced through a 
variety of material, ideological and discursive practices (Paasi 1998; Paasi 2009). Anderson 
and O’Dowd (1999: 595) note state borders ‘seldom, if ever, offer a coincidence of economy, 
polity and culture, but instead [represent] and often [reify] a particular relationship between 
them that…may prove either transitory or durable.’ Bordering practices thus create some 
extent of territorial coherence for activities contained within them. Territory’s boundaries 
are malleable and porous but nevertheless present barriers to different social actors and 
perform ordering functions that are historically and geographically variable. 
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Despite the caveats on the overflowing of borders, territorialization processes construct a 
material and institutional reality for social life within boundaries, especially due to the 
infrastructures of governance and regulation developed within territorial frames (Sassen 
2006). The development of more or less coherent governance structures which regulate and 
control bounded spaces at both national and sub-national scales is a hallmark of the 
territorialization process (Storper and Walker 1989: 215-216; Dicken and Malmberg 2001; 
Brenner 2004). Brenner and Elden (2009: 368), discussing the work of Lefebvre, suggest that 
state territorial strategies are central in the co-implicated transformations of territory and 
state institutions, the latter shaping and reshaping the ‘inherited territorial structurations of 
political-economic life, including those state institutions themselves’.  Territorialization of 
space by the state can thus be seen as central in the enacting and extension of power over 
the population of a given bounded space. Indeed, territory can be productively thought of as 
´the political form of space produced by and associated with the modern state´, one which 
constantly undergoes reordering such as centralization, decentralization, zoning and 
demarcating land use policies (ibid. 362, original emphasis; see also Brenner 2004; Lestrelin 
et al 2012). Spatial organization is thus ‘inherently political and always contested’, a point 
which will be returned to below in the discussion of territorial coherence (ibid. 368). The 
regulatory and material orders of territories such as nation-states also provide foundational 
infrastructure for the circulation of capital (Brenner 1998). 
Brenner (2009a: 37) provides a useful summary of the territorialization of world space into a 
grid of bordered territories in the era of capitalist industrialization, indicating the importance 
of territorial structuring in the formation of a world market and global capitalist social 
relations: 
 (a) The intensified regulation of interstate boundaries; (b) the increasing parcelization 
of state space among intergovernmental administrative hierarchies; (c) the 
development of enhanced infrastructural capacities through which states could 
attempt to extend their authority over all “points” within their jurisdictional borders; 
and (d) the imperialist conquest and territorial division of peripheralized zones of the 
world economy under the yoke of colonial rule 
The importance of territory in the contemporary global political economy has been 
challenged however by approaches which emphasize the relational and networked nature of 
flows which transcend territorial jurisdictions. Some have argued that the increased ability 
of finance and productive capital to move at ease over national borders has undermined the 
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national state as the primary locus of political economic organization (Castells 1999); the 
territorial jurisdictions of states supplanted by a ‘borderless world’ (Ohmae 1994). Places, 
for Amin (2002) in the era of globalization may thus be thought of as non-territorial nodes in 
webs of relations. Places are thus transitory and non-essential. Cities are network sites 
where economic flows and distanciated organization are translated and transmitted. Focus 
on ‘nested scales and territorial boundaries cuts out so much of the topology of economic 
circulation and network[s]’ (ibid. 395). Amin sees globalization as ‘the intensification of 
mixture and connectivity as more and more things become independent’, entailing that a 
framing of territorialization and scales is perforated, and consequently analytically disabling 
(ibid. 395) Discussions of regionalism within nation-states have similarly focused on how 
regions are open and discontinuous, assemblages of near and distant networked flows and 
relations which traverse regional space. Fluid relations, it is claimed, call into question 
regions as territorially fixed (Allen and Cochrane 2007: 1162-1163; see also Massey 1994; 
Amin 2004). Relational approaches however have a tendency to exaggerate the importance 
of relational connectivity and misleadingly underplay the constraining factors - for example 
elements such as class, gender, race, and location - which may affect the agency of some to 
access connective possibilities and opportunities (Jones 2009: 493). As some have pointed 
out, positing a relations-network versus territorial-scalar binary is also unhelpful, a 
‘both/and’ approach preferable to one of ‘either/or’ (Hudson 2007; Prytherch 2010; 
Harrison 2013). Socio-spatial relations are multi-dimensional (Jessop et al 2008; Leitner et al 
2008; Brenner 2009a). Scale, territory, place, and network are ‘mutually constitutive and 
relationally intertwined’ (Jessop et al 2008: 389). I would suggest that a focus on fixity and 
mobility manages some of the tension between the different approaches as it can help us to 
understand how space ‘is only ever semi-coherent in its concrete realization’ and ‘to 
investigate where, why and how processes of regionalization [and I would add 
territorialization] are negotiated, constructed and contested, becoming semi-permanently 
fixed, or conversely, dissolving altogether’ (Jonas 2012: 265). Territories are still, in a world 
of increased flows and connectivity, important it seems to me as they are able to provide a 
means of at least temporary fixity, both infrastructural and institutional, that facilitate those 
flows.  I will return to the salience of territory and borders below, but first I will take up 
Jonas´ challenge to outline how at least a ´semi-coherent´ realization of economic space may 
be conceived.
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3.2.2 Territorial Coherence
The territorial organization and integration of economic activities provides important 
insights for analyzing capitalist development. I would propose that the notion of ‘territorial 
coherence’ - drawn from Swyngedouw’s (1992) conceptualization of territorial organization 
– can be united with the concepts of fixity and mobility and the socio-spatial construction of 
labour to understand development processes, such as export processing zones, or scale 
building processes. 
An entry point to the notion of territorial coherence is Harvey’s (2006: 398-405) fourth sense 
of spatial fix.  Territorial governance and social infrastructures are for Harvey a spatial fix. 
The circulation of values through governance structures and social infrastructures are 
moments within the circulation of capital. Value taxed through the mediation of the state 
eventually returns to capital in the form of effective demand for commodities produced. 
Accretion of high quality conditions, through territorially-based social infrastructure 
investments, of say healthcare or education, can provide locational advantages for firms and 
attract productive capital to that area. Contradictions arise however in that the maintenance 
of social infrastructures imply costs for capital in the form of taxes, and if the costs rise 
capital is prone to fleeing these territories for ones which have less suitable social 
infrastructure conditions but, crucially, lower maintenance costs (cf. Chang 2009). The 
geography of social reproduction suitable for accumulation shaped at one historical moment 
may not be consistent with capital’s requirements at a later moment. The socially produced 
geographical infrastructure becomes the barrier that must be overcome. This translates into 
social, institutional, and regulatory restructuring, mediated through the state and social 
struggle, in order to remould the territory into a social geography suitable for the shifting 
requirements of capital accumulation (Harvey 2006: 398-405). 
Swyngedouw (1992) develops these themes into a highly suggestive argument. Territorial 
organization is conceptualized in a dual manner as both a force of production and a social 
relation. Territorial organization comprises: ‘natural’ goods such as natural resources and 
water; collective goods such as collective equipment necessary for the production and 
circulation process and reproduction of the labour force, private fixed collective capital – the 
ensemble of existing capitalist units, and the ensemble of qualities of living labour; the 
institutional and regulatory forms – both formal and informal - which establish, regulate, 
and perpetuate the territorial configuration’s cohesion; and the characteristics of individual 
capital units (ibid. 418). The circulation of capital proceeds through the territorial 
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organization of a space/technology nexus so that the territorial organization itself can be 
considered as a force of production. A key aim for capital thus becomes the competitive 
monopolization and command over superior space/technology systems created through the 
relative fixity of its physical, infrastructural, institutional form, and specific qualities of its 
labour force (ibid. 419-424). Swyngedouw suggests that specific forms of capitalist territorial 
organization have a greater or lesser degree of territorial coherence for capital accumulation: 
‘Territorial coherence…refers to a specific combination of the form of territorial regulation 
with a concrete form of the valorization process which generates a relatively stable pattern 
of territorial development’ (ibid. 419). Territorial organization constantly develops through 
reconfiguration of complex technical and spatial divisions of labour as particular forms of 
territorial organization become barriers to further growth, unable to produce competitive 
rates of absolute or relative surplus value. Here the contradictory unity of territorial 
organization as force and relations of production becomes evident (ibid. 428). Territorial 
reorganization implies reconfiguring the relations of production through the spatial 
structure of production and circulation and with class struggle over production and social 
reproduction time and space:
a precondition for the further development of the productive force of spatial 
configuration necessarily entails a change in the pattern of spatial or territorial 
configuration and, hereby, a transformation of the spatial pattern of production and 
consumption; hence the continuous struggle over spatial organization, not only 
between capitalists, but also between reproduction and production space (ibid. 425)
I interpret Swyngedouw to mean here that a specific form of territorial organization loses 
coherence over time for capital valorization. The struggle over reproduction and 
production space implies to me that, a form of territorial organization can be coherent for 
social reproduction over capitalist production. Swyngedouw highlights the importance of 
territorial organization for social reproduction:
Territorial configuration as a materialized social relationship…comes into conflict with the 
need for a permanent revolutionizing of territorial organization as a force of 
production…The struggle over the appropriation of labour time becomes…a struggle over 
the appropriation of space, over the control and command of social and productive 
territory (ibid. 428)
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Swyngedouw, however, approaches the notion of territorial coherence from the perspective 
of regulation and capital valorization which underplays the significance of social 
reproduction in a territory’s spatial configuration. The spatial reorganization of production 
and circulation must contend with the concrete forms of social reproduction which both 
make valorization possible and also contradict it. Indeed in a context of development, 
territorial coherence for social reproduction could be prevalent. Access to the means of 
production in the form of farmland for subsistence and/or petty commodity production may 
provide a stable pattern of coherence for social reproduction but act as a barrier to the 
territorial reorganization of productive forces for capital. It seems to me that there are 
important implications of Swyngedouw’s account for countries in contexts of 
industrialization or deagrarianization where command  over agricultural space is important 
and processes of primitive accumulation occur (Glassman 2006; Hall 2012). Complex 
industrial/agricultural divisions of labour may be present in countries undergoing structural 
transformation with implications for command over the organization of production space 
and time (Bryceson 1996). At the heart of inter- and intra-class conflict over labour-time and 
the production and valorization of capital is:
exactly the content and territorial boundaries of specific territorial forms of coherence. 
The scale of territorial coherence is itself the outcome of a struggle, i.e. the struggle 
between the control over place (the struggle over the production, realization and 
distribution of surplus) on the one hand, and the control over space (to control the 
conditions of the struggle over the production, realization and distribution of surplus) 
on the other (Swyngedouw 1992: 429) 
The foregoing indicates that the substance of contested and open economic development 
operates at the interface of old and new forms of spatial composition of production and 
social reproduction. This is an important point because it encourages us to think historically. 
The inherited territorial unity of the forces and relations of production may act as an 
important barrier to attempts to create new territorial configurations. It suggests that we 
should focus attention on the historically determined organization of production/social 
reproduction within - and between - given territories, as well as on which actors and social 
forces animate and command this organization, in order to identify the conditions and 
possibilities for various new forms of territorial coherence. 
There are a number of lacunae in Swyngedouw´s analysis. His focus is on territorial 
organization and cohesion within bounded territories and less on what happens between 
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territories. Institutional and regulatory forms can operate at international scales 
(Swyngedouw 1992: 418) but there how exactly territorial organization might operate in 
contexts of uneven development across international boundaries or in regional integration 
processes is largely left unexplored. Swyngedouw highlights the importance of fixity but 
perhaps underemphasizes the importance of some types of mobility i.e. between territories 
(Brenner 1998). Mobility may provide investment or employment opportunities that allow 
greater coherence in some territories while undermining the viability of other territories 
(Gough 2014). The dynamics of fixity and mobility in the formation of territorial 
development must be kept in view as they are a key manifestation of the strategies of the 
actors involved.  Each territory will have a socio-spatial construction of labour defined in part 
by labour’s spatial strategies for social reproduction (Herod 2001). Existing socio-spatial 
construction may also act as a barrier to capital accumulation within a territory and to the 
expansion of capital into new territories. For example, migration may form territorial 
coherence which privileges social reproduction. Social reproduction strategies may provide 
the means to resist exploitative labour relations. Illustrative of this is Mullings’ (1999 in Kelly 
2009: 452) finding that transnational remittance income received by households in Jamaica 
provided a level of financial security which allowed workers to resist labour intensification 
demands from managers. 
What I propose is that the notion of ‘territorial coherence’ as set out by Swyngedouw - one 
where capital valorization is paramount in coherent territorial organization – is recast as a 
more open notion.  Here, strategies of social reproduction to command space, tie together 
and reproduce places also block or accommodate with capital accumulation strategies to 
produce more open-ended development. Labour’s spatial practices thus emerge as part of a 
class composition which contributes to forms of territorial organization coherent for social 
reproduction. It is implied in Swyngedouw’s account that the end result of spatial 
reorganization is territorial coherence in favour of capital. I propose therefore that a 
recasting of territorial coherence to take greater account of the spatial strategies of social 
reproduction may also open up the possibility of spatial economic organization based on the 
refusal or supersession of the capitalist mode of production. Labour’s agency thus emerges 
as an important factor in development processes within and between territories. 
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3.2.3 Global Production Networks and Territory
 GPN scholars can offer some informative points to flesh out how foreign capital may 
concretely form territorial coherence when investing in new places. 4 While GPN analysis 
mobilizes a network metaphor it has the virtue of not presenting networks as free-floating 
above the local social relations and jurisdictions of state power. GPN research has thus 
advanced three interrelated concepts which attempt to account for the grounded geography 
of production networks and their relation to local and regional development processes: 
embeddedness; value; and strategic coupling (Henderson et al 2002; Coe et al 2004). 
Territorial embeddedness refers to the way that productive activities are located within, and 
shaped by, a dense web of social, political and institutional relationships that are territorially 
specific, for example state regulation, social networks and local labour markets. (Henderson 
et al 2002: 452-453; Dicken et al 2001; Hess 2004). GPNs can be embedded in territory ´in 
the sense that they absorb, and in some cases become constrained, by the economic 
activities and social dynamics that already exist in those places (Henderson et al 2002: 452, 
emphasis added).5 The latter is an important point to remember in considering notions of 
the race to the bottom and ´hyper-mobile´ capital i.e. capital must adapt to existing 
territorial coherences in order to reterritorialize. 
The creation and distribution of value in the process of territorial embedding is important 
for translating a region’s articulation with global production networks into sustained 
economic development (Henderson et al 2002: 448). The creation of value includes the 
labour process which generates surplus value; and also various forms of rent from such 
factors as asymmetrical access to key product and production technologies. Value capture is 
perhaps most crucial for regional development processes as value may be created and 
enhanced in a location but still it may not be possible to capture and utilize it to the 
location’s benefit. Government policy on, for example, taxation and repatriation of profits 
can determine the extent of value capture (Henderson et al 2002: 448-449; Coe et al 2004: 
473-476). It is possible that the articulation of a GPN and a region is on fleeting and 
exploitative terms with little lasting developmental benefits accruing from the investment, 
with repatriation of profits (realized value) and the eventual relocation of production 
4 The global commodity chains (GCC) and global production network (GPN) analyse the organisation 
of transnational production (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Henderson et al 2002; Smith et al 2002; 
Gereffi et al. 2005; Palpacuer 2008). The approaches provide useful heuristics to analyse the 
governance and intricacy of global production processes but the focus here will be how networks are 
territorially embedded.
5 See also Dicken et al 2001 and Selwyn 2012.
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networks elsewhere (Coe et al 2004: 474). A highly important point to consider in the 
formation of new types of FDI- and GPN-based territorial coherences is who is the territorial 
reorganization coherent for? 
Strategic coupling provides a concept which attempts to link territorial development 
processes with the development and expansion of GPNs. Coe et al (ibid.) argue that regional 
(or local) economic development in an era of globalization must be conceptualized at the 
interface of endogenous regional advantages and global production networks. The specific 
economic endowments found in a region (e.g. various configurations of labour, technology, 
knowledge and organizational capacities) which constitute potential economies of scale and 
scope are only advantageous to that region’s development to the extent that they can be 
linked to the strategic needs of trans-local GPN actors. When the endogenous endowments 
and trans-local strategic needs are complementary, a process of strategic coupling takes 
place (ibid. 471). 
Strategic coupling is a relational conception of the dynamic emergent effects of the 
contingent intertwining of ‘terrritorialized relational networks and global production 
networks within the context of changing regional governance structures’ (ibid. 469, original 
emphasis; cf. Yeung and Coe 2014). The role of labour to Coe et al is pertinent.6 The 
organizational strength and flexibility of labour is a key factor in how complementary a 
region is with the strategic needs of trans-local GPN actors (ibid. 472). Coe et al (2008: 284) 
assert that the ‘clear spatial asymmetry between place-bound labour and polycentric GPNs’ 
raises questions of how labour as an active spatial agent can shape the development of GPN 
dynamics. The tendency to present labour as fixed/immobile and GPN capital as mobile is 
misleading however. Labour’s mobility may also be a key determinant in providing the 
territorial resources needed for enacting strategic coupling, and furthermore labour may 
have to be actively made immobile in order for the GPN to operate (Ngai and Smith 2007; 
Arnold and Pickles 2011; Arnold 2012; Carswell and De Neve 2013). Therefore the exact 
forms of labour’s mobility and fixity must be ascertained to comprehend how strategic 
coupling is facilitated and/or blocked.
6 Early GCC suffered from inattention to labour. Selwyn argues that for GCC analysis to be properly 
utilized as a framework then the important role of labour and class relations in co-determining 
patterns of global production must be acknowledged and foregrounded (2012: 216; see also Smith et 
al 2002). 
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Here it is also useful to consider the territorial wage patterns noted by Storper and Walker 
(1989: 217) to demonstrate how even immobile labour within territorial agglomerations may 
not be at a disadvantage. The spatial pattern of industry location and territorial labour 
markets affects the shares of income between classes by changing the relative bargaining 
strength of labour and capital, so for example the introduction of several new factories into 
an already tight local labour market raises the relative strength of labour. These territorial 
pattern effects may raise labour’s share of income. Labour’s mobility power - the threat of 
exit to other higher paying competitors – may be enough to enforce a territorial wage 
pattern which raises workers’ income enough to secure them in place (Smith 2006). 
 GPN frameworks for the analysis of place-specific development are however limited by 
insufficient connections to the sphere of social reproduction. Kelly (2013), for example, 
contends the GPN framework is less able to account for on the one hand place-based 
developmental changes such as social differentiation and uneven development which are 
not directly related to the firms at the centre of such networks; and on the other household 
livelihood strategies (ibid. 84-89; see also Kelly 2009; Heyer 2013). GPN insights therefore 
inform a broader theoretical framework of territorial coherence rather than being the main 
analytical window in this case. They can provide a finer-grained understanding of the 
dynamics of foreign capital’s entry into a new territory. Tracing the agency of workers which 
links foreign-invested production networks with broader territorial economic activities is 
nevertheless preferred here as it brings social reproduction into view and connects more 
directly to questions of regional integration. 
Territorial economic development can be understood then through the creation of distinct 
territories through bordering practices, institutional and regulatory development, and the 
combination of the latter with infrastructure, technology and labour to form territorial 
coherence. The spatial extent of such territorial complexes is subject to change as actors 
seek to transform the scale of their activities as a means to command space for production 
and/or social reproduction. 
3.4 Scale, Territory, and Regional Integration
3.4.1 Scale
Territory and the scale of development are deeply implicated, because the social production 
of scale – for example a region – requires the setting of a territorial extent over which 
particular processes or institutions operate. Territorial organization of production and 
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economic activity crosses borders and so integrates national and subnational territories. 
Regional integration projects I would thus suggest are attempts by various actors to 
construct scales through the creation of specific forms of territorial coherence, recomposing 
the balance of productive and socially reproductive activities through the command of 
improved and expanded space/technology/labour nexuses. Crucially, socio-spatial 
constructions of labour are central in driving these processes, and so the socio-spatial 
construction of labour also involves rescaling class relations.
Smith (1984) argues that scale is not a pre-existing, naturally occurring hierarchy of smaller 
and larger arenas of action but rather a socially constructed demarcation of spatial 
organization. ‘In the doomed attempt’ to realize spatial fixes, ‘capital achieves a degree of 
spatial fixity organized into identifiably separate scales of social activity’ (ibid. 135). Scale in 
this conception then is not an ontologically pre-given set of frames - ‘local’, ‘regional’, 
‘national’, and ‘global’ - for social relations but rather constructed by these relations 
themselves through various political economic struggles, strategies and contestation 
(Delaney and Leitner 1997). Competing conceptions of scale have generated some 
conceptual confusion and some scholars calling into question its analytical validity (Miller 
2009). This has led some to argue that scale should be eliminated as a concept in human 
geography and be replaced with a ‘flat ontology’ of horizontal flows (Marston et al 2005; see 
also Moore 2008). This poststructuralist rendering of a ‘flat ontology’ however 
misrepresents the Marxist political economic conceptions of scale that are its target. In the 
poststructuralist reading the dialectic of fixity and mobility is ignored, with scale presented 
as structuralist, and Marxist discussion of ‘material’ and ‘real’ is conflated with reification 
(Leitner and Miller 2007: 117-118; MacKinnon 2010: 26). The notion of scale can thus still be 
deployed using the tools of historical materialism to construct adequate accounts of regional 
integration processes. 
Brenner (2001: 604) has referred to the process of ‘scalar structuration’ as a dimension of 
socio-spatial processes - rather than a spatial property per se – such as capitalist production 
or social reproduction. To the extent that ‘a given social, political or economic process is 
internally differentiated into a vertical hierarchy of distinct spatial units, the problem of its 
scalar structuration arises’ (ibid. 604). Spatial scales are never fully fixed but ´restructured in 
terms of their extent, content, relative importance and interrelations´ (Swyngedouw 2004: 
73
33).7 Miller argues that three processes are implicated in the construction of scale, namely 
‘constructing borders, establishing territorial extent, and determining the responsibilities 
and capacities of the various levels of territorially nested institutions’ (2009: 56). Miller 
concludes that scale can be defined as ‘a set of territorially nested, malleable relationships 
among territorially embedded or constituted agents and institutions, shaping their 
responsibilities, capacities, opportunities, and constraints through territory-specific rule 
regimes, resources, and identities’ (ibid. 62). This is partly useful as it provides a succinct 
framing of what might be termed ´scales of regulation´ but as Swyngedouw (2004: 33) notes 
these are in constant tension with ´scales of networks´, that is constantly deterritorializing 
and reterritorializing economic networks and flows. The emphasis then I would propose 
should be on how ´scales of regulation´ and ´scales of networks´ are overlain to produce 
´structured coherences´ of varying durability. In processes of capitalist development capital 
circulation can be deemed as requiring a relatively fixed territorial infrastructure and 
associated institutional-regulatory framework. Capital circulation is thus organized over 
‘multitiered territorial-organizational arrangements’ (Brenner 1998: 464). However, when 
overaccumulation crises appear this scalar architecture must often be reworked – rescaled - 
in order to maintain accumulation. The contradiction between fixity and mobility in the 
circulation of capital manifests as continuous tension ´between the territorialization of social 
relations within relatively stabilized scale-configurations and their recurrent rescaling 
through capital´s deterritorializing drive towards time-space compression´ (Brenner 1998: 
461). I therefore interpret rescaling as a means through which spatial fixes are enacted. The 
territorialization of space in capitalist development is thus the basis for rescaling. Rescaling 
can involve the creation of new scales – by for example setting new territorial extent - and 
reconfiguring the relations between territorially embedded actors operating at different 
scales within a scalar hierarchy (Brenner 2009c: 73). Restructuring of scales in order to 
command them is a key part of social strategies for control and empowerment and such 
´scale redefinitions in turn alter the geometry of social power by strengthening the power 
and the control of some while disempowering others´ (Swyngedouw 2004: 33, emphasis 
added). The latter point directs our attention to the inequitable and exclusionary effects of 
the creation of new scales which are often undertaken in the name of modernizing 
economic development beneficial for all (Cammack 2016).   
7 The state has received particular attention as being transformed through the transferral of 
institutional and regulatory powers downwards to subnational scales and upwards to transnational 
entities. See Swyngedouw 2000, Brenner 2004, Brenner 2009b, Brenner 2009c, Büchs 2009, Cox 2009, 
Jessop 2009.
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3.4.2 Regional Integration and Rescaling
Regional integration can be interpreted as a process of rescaling. In this interpretation a new 
territorial extent is set for overlapping scales of regulation and scales of networks and new 
relations are established between actors operating at different scales within the new scalar-
territorial organization – such as regional capital/local labour (Brenner 2009c: 73). European 
integration under the European Union, for example, can be read in this light as the free 
movement of capital, goods, and labour, continuous eastward expansion, and regulatory 
and policy gearing towards these movements created a neoliberal space of capital 
circulation favouring powerful class actors and resulted in the transfer of certain state 
capabilities to European institutions (van Apeldoorn 2002; Bieler 2006). Similarly, in 
attempts to escape crisis Cammack (2016: 175-176, original emphasis) observes the Asian 
Development Bank´s role in supporting ´material processes of regionalization (physical 
infrastructure in energy, transport and communications, and regional production chains), 
and developing a comprehensive regional project informed by an ideology of 
competitiveness aimed at transforming states and instituting a global capitalist world order´. 
The state transformation in question may be on the one hand orienting central level 
facilitation of enabling business environments through, for example, capital-friendly 
investment laws (Carroll 2012) or on the other, transformations at the subnational level. 
Brenner (2004: 58) argues that national economic spaces have been rescaled into 
strategically differentiated sub-national territories which are better able to ground 
deterritorialized capital, which attempts to gain competitive advantages through locally and 
regionally specific conditions of production. Regional integration has been enacted through 
this rescaling as integration ´simultaneously opens up national competition and necessitates 
a greater sensitivity to subnational conditions´, a process that can be referred to as 
´glocalization´ (Swyngedouw 2004: 38). Brenner (2004: 166) elaborates that the emergence 
of place-specific institutional, regulatory and infrastructural complexes can be understood as 
political strategy ´intended to position particular subnational economic spaces within 
supranational circuits of capital accumulation´. Brenner suggests then, in a formulation 
which I think can be usefully deployed in the context of the Greater Mekong Subregion, that 
reterritorialized subnational spaces form articulatory nodes which permit new types of 
territorial coherence on an expanded regional scale. 
Labour is somewhat under-analyzed in theoretical work on the political economy of scale.8 
Great attention is given to the projects of state and capital to rescale with much less of a 
8 Although see Chapter 2 on trade union rescaling. 
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role for labour in the debates, despite repeated affirmations that scale is ‘contested’. This 
risks dissociating the analysis of scale from a grounding in the class relations of capitalism 
(Charnock 2010a). Class relations and labour’s agency are scaled and central to processes of 
rescaling. For Gough (2004: 188-195) social relations may be both a cause and an aim of 
rescaling with the reorganization of capital and its scale always formed in relation to labour. 
Classes have differing abilities to command territories and distances of different scales and 
so shifts in scale constitute a method of class struggle. Restructurings of capital which shift 
between scales in order to escape crisis tendencies and sustain accumulation are projects of 
capital but projects which are premised on labour as an active agent. That is, capital enacts 
rescaling projects in order to escape or control labour´s agency. For example, the breakup of 
national wage-bargaining and its fragmentation to the local level subjects labour more 
strongly to the discipline of capital by drawing it into competition between individual 
capitals. This form of ‘neoliberal localism’ is based on, and stems from, the value discipline 
caused by global stagnation and its consequences of heightened transnational capital 
mobility relative to labour. Labour may be locally confined and the labour market and wages 
constituted contingently at the local level but it is also made to compete with other labour 
at expanding scales (ibid. 195). The construction of new scales of economic governance, 
either through supranational governance structures such as the European Union, global 
trade architecture such as the World Trade Organization, or regional economic integration 
projects such as the ASEAN Economic Community, enables larger domains of capital mobility 
and competition which deepen value discipline (ibid. 199; Cammack 2009; Cammack 2016). 
That is, regional integration processes act to provide larger arenas for capital’s spatial fixes. 
In addition, the increased distances at which class relations can operate mean that 
employment relations are transformed into abstract, global relations which obscure the 
operation of power: ‘the greater distances between production and labour on the one hand 
and decision making on the other tends to produce a more powerful market fetishism: more 
remote competitors, markets, corporate headquarters and state decision making tend to 
depersonalize economic processes’ (Gough 2004: 199). Workers can seek to resist the 
disciplinary and fragmentary effects of capital and state rescaling projects by building their 
own scales (Gough 2010). Many efforts to resist exploitative employment or become 
resilient to it will be enacted at the local scale but workers can also build relations with 
trans-local actors which allow them to push back against capital’s rescaling projects (Gough 
2004: 190). 
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Scale can be understood in a dual sense of overlaying ‘scales of regulation’ and ‘scales of 
networks’ which create ‘structured coherences’ for capital accumulation and economic 
development. As territorially-nested sets of malleable social relations they shape 
opportunities and constraints and are both the outcome and object of social struggles. 
Changing scale can thus be a form of class struggle as in the creation of larger domains of 
capital mobility. Regional integration can therefore be understood as projects of rescaling to 
create cohesive expanded domains for the production of surplus value and circulation of 
capital. As Brenner notes however, scaling up can also mean scaling down to create new 
articulatory spaces.
3.5 Spatial Reordering, Territorial Coherence and Special Economic Zones
The geographical political economic dynamics which have been discussed thus far can, it 
seems to me, shed light on the operation of special economic zones in the global economy. 
Reterritorialization of state space and associated rescaling of state regulatory-institutional 
orders can manage the fixity and mobility of capital and labour in order to integrate a 
territory with regional or global capital circuits. The territory is thereby rescaled by 
incorporation in a regional or global hierarchy. This appears to be a persistent theme in 
special economic zone development. Special economic zones, it seems to me, can be 
conceptualized as articulatory nodes which facilitate new forms of territorial coherence in 
scale-making processes. 
Territory and borders remain salient in the global economy because they can be used to 
create spatial frames for structuring capital accumulation and managing the mobility and 
fixity of capital and labour in expanded regional and global scales (Mezzadra and Neilson 
2013). States and capital have actively sought to fix bounded spaces for capital accumulation 
such as free trade zones, economic corridors, offshore tax havens, special economic zones, 
and resource extraction enclaves (Sidaway 2007a; Fau et al 2014; Bezuidenhout and 
Buhlungu 2015). This suggests that, in one sense, it is precisely differentiation of territorial 
jurisdictions that allow particular networks and connections – particularly of powerful class 
actors – to form. The reterritorialization of space within and between countries is 
implemented with the intent of creating new forms of territorial coherence which privilege 
some and disadvantage others. Efforts to fix mobile capital and labour in territories lead to a 
diversity of macro-regional, national and sub-national spaces differentiated through 
institutional and regulatory orders (Ong 2006; Sidaway 2007b).  Mezzadra and Neilson 
summarize the variation and complexity of these territorial-institutional arrangements:
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The strange form of excision, by which states establish such zones and enclaves by 
removing them from ordinary normative arrangements, allows a plurality of legal 
orders, labour regimes, patterns of economic development and even cultural styles to 
emerge…Rather than being spaces of legal voidness, they are saturated by competing 
norms and calculations that overlap and sometimes conflict in unpredictable but also 
negotiable ways (2013: 208)
Special economic zones are one such type of territorialization to take hold in the era of 
globalizing capital, with the first modern export processing zone in Asia established in 
Kaoshiung, Taiwan in the mid-1960s9 (Ong 2006: 103). Special economic zones provide a 
specific territorial enclosure which provides advantageous conditions for globalized capital 
accumulation through a differentiated treatment of capital and populations within the 
national space (Park 2005; Ong 2006; Laungaramsri 2014). Differentiated treatment is 
achieved through regulatory packages of tax breaks, the lowering of trade barriers, special 
rules for the circulation of commodities, capital, and labour through the zone, and other 
incentives to attract mobile capital (Aggarwal 2006; Banerjee-Guha 2008; Brautigam and 
Tang 2011; MMN 2013). Special economic zones, it seems, can be seen as one means of 
enacting a ´strategic coupling´ between GPNs and localities. In doing so these territories and 
populations within them are rescaled within a scalar formation.
Ong (2006) challenges us to consider how such territorial innovations transform the relation 
between states and citizens, although her conceptualization of such zones as ones primarily 
of ‘exception’ requires qualification. She argues that zones involve ‘de facto or practical 
adjustments and compromises in national sovereignty’ (ibid. 78). These practices she terms 
‘graduated sovereignty’ with governments flexibly managing sovereignty by adjusting 
‘political space to the dictates of global capital, giving corporations an indirect power over 
the political conditions of citizens in zones that are differently articulated to global 
production and financial circuits’ so that neoliberal zones act as exception to broader state 
power structures (ibid. 79). Zones also administer populations differently to create 
‘graduated citizenship’. Access to rights and welfare are restricted, for example, for low-
skilled workers compared to higher-skilled workers in zones such as science or technology 
parks. Preferential treatment in the zones can also be distributed along lines of citizenship 
and nationality, race and ethnicity (ibid. 79). Ong here clearly indicates the importance of 
social construction of different population groups in order to facilitate the articulation of 
9 Neveling (2015) identifies the first export processing zone/special economic zone as established in 
Puerto Rico in the 1940s. 
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territorial enclaves with global capital flows, while nevertheless tending to elide workers’ 
agency.10 Workers and other subaltern groups in the zones of ‘exception’ are the subject of 
differentiated governance practices and not the source of their own. Capital and state are 
the main bearers of agency. 
Another issue with Ong’s approach to ‘graduated sovereignty’ is that the emphasis on 
‘exception’ to national state power is perhaps misleading as to how zones reinforce state 
power. Brenner (2004: 16, original emphasis) echoes Ong when he asserts: ‘it is no longer 
capital that is to be molded into the (territorially integrated) geography of state space, but 
state space that is to be molded into the (territorially differentiated) geography of capital’.  
Posing the issue in a dichotomous ‘either/or’ way is misleading as the moulding of a space 
may serve both the aims of capital and also the state. Park (2005) casts doubt on SEZs being 
solely or primarily ‘exception’ to national powers orders by examining government’s role in 
zones in South Korea. While accepting that graduated sovereignty is apparent in Korean 
zones, they were ‘hybrid spaces’ which combined neoliberal elements and ‘active state 
intervention in industrial development’, the latter inherited in a path-dependent manner 
from South Korea’s developmental state institutions (ibid. 868). Arnold (2012), in the case of 
border economic zones in Southeast Asia, argues persuasively that SEZs found in border 
areas operate to reinforce state power and legitimacy. Border SEZs provide conduits to more 
diversified economies and regional divisions of labour by engaging in mutually reinforcing 
enabling and restricting practices. For example, in Thailand in a border economic zone on 
the boundary with Myanmar the establishment of labour-intensive manufacturing in the 
area has allowed foreign-invested firms to access cheap Burmese migrant labour while at 
the same time blocking that labour from moving further into Thailand. This serves state 
goals of national security, population control and legitimacy from maintaining the ethnic 
integrity of the nation’s territory (ibid. 745-748; see also Arnold and Pickles 2011). Zoning 
and other territorial practices may also be used by the state to manage the mobility and 
fixity of capital and labour, through for example locating special economic zones on borders 
to take advantage of cheap labour from neighbouring countries (Arnold and Pickles 2011; 
Arnold 2012; cf. Dwyer 2013; Dwyer 2014). 
Referring to the work of Andrew Walker, Arnold (2012: 744) observes that a focus ´on the 
supposedly neoliberal ways of managing territory and citizens involves playing down the 
extent to which states throughout the modern era have also sought to link their territories 
10 Her previous work has more space for agency, although also downplayed. See Ong 1987. 
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and citizens with the political dynamics, economic systems and natural resources of 
neighbouring countries´. This all suggests to me, that viewing border or SEZs as primarily 
zones of exception or enclave spaces for global capital accumulation overstates their 
´excision´ from the surrounding territory. To be clear, I agree that the forms of ‘excision’ can 
and do integrate zones and enclaves with larger-scale economic processes in ways that are 
exclusionary and oriented to benefits of trans-local actors. The point is however that the 
new forms of territorial coherence within zones and between the spaces they articulate are 
potentially affected by existing forms of territorial coherence in the area. The socio-spatial 
construction of labour required for such zones illustrates this point. 
The establishment of SEZs hinges on the creation of localized labour regimes. Specific labour 
rules and regulations thus construct zone workforces as low-cost and controllable and these 
labour control systems can operate through both formal and informal mechanisms (Kelly 
2002; McKay 2004: Park 2005; Chan and Ngai 2010; Chan 2014). This is well considered in 
the literature and it has provided valuable insights. However, there are blind spots in the 
analysis of zone labour regimes, one of which is workers’ agency, especially of the everyday, 
variegated kind.11 Ngai and Smith (2007), for example, may examine how a ‘dormitory 
labour regime’ is used to enable a flow of rural migrants and fix that flow in place, but the 
onus is on the strategies which zone capital uses to do this. In short, there is a lack of 
attention to how labour participates in its socio-spatial construction through its own 
practices of fixity and mobility and social reproduction, and thus how this affects the stability 
and prospects of differentiated zones of global accumulation. Echoing the faults of Ong´s 
´neoliberal exception´ and some GPN analysis there is a tendency to consider the socio-
spatial construction of labour in relation to what happens within the zone and not how the 
internal coherence of the zone both depends on and also changes constructions of livelihood 
and divisions of labour beyond its boundaries. This issue is especially pertinent for the 
reconfiguration of territorial organization as capital expands into new spaces and encounters 
socio-spatial constructions of labour embedded in existing coherences of social 
infrastructure, production, social reproduction and space, which must be overturned or 
accommodated with. Contestation over territorial coherence is I would propose one way in 
which labour affects the rescaling process of regional integration.
11 Chapter 2.
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Conclusion
The foregoing has articulated a conceptual framework that I suggest is useful for interpreting 
the case of Savannakhet border industry and GMS regionalization. Regional integration 
projects can be fruitfully read, I believe, as political economic scale-making processes which 
are enacted to create expanded domains of capital mobility and circulation. The dialectic of 
fixity and mobility thus emerges as a key conceptual lens as mobile capital must 
reterritorialize to operate on an expanded scale. The fixity/mobility lens directs our 
attention to who or what is fixed in place or mobile (or both) and the exact methods through 
which they are made so. What type of spatial fix is being performed and how does it cohere 
with or contradict the spatial fixes of other actors? The notion of territorial coherence, it 
seems to me, can help to grasp the multiple, interlaced and contradictory fixes and 
mobilities. How are the elements which compose capitalist spatial development – 
institutional-regulatory order, bounded spaces, capital, labour – brought together to cohere 
long enough for a stable pattern of accumulation to emerge? How does class struggle – with 
labour’s agency at its core – determine the exact ‘content and territorial boundaries of 
specific territorial forms of coherence’? How are fixity and mobility reorganized to destroy or 
overturn one form of territorial coherence in order to create a new form, especially on an 
expanded scale? How do the spatial strategies of labour to command space for purposes of 
social reproduction produce a particular form of territorial coherence which contradicts and 
constrains the territorial reorganization of capital? The relevance of these issues, it seems to 
me, lies at the heart of regional integration, the reterritorialization of state space, uneven 
development and any global race to the bottom. Understanding regional integration in 
terms of the changing configurations of social reproduction-capital valorization-regulation 
opens a way past a market-led ‘bottom-up’ or a ‘top-down’ political-institutional rendering 
and towards the contested and negotiated imbrication of various actors’ strategies and 
practices operating at different scales to create differentially inclusive forms of cross-border 
connection. Moreover, it shifts focus to include the grounded practices and lived 
experiences of subaltern actors which both produce and contest certain forms of integration. 
Purchase is therefore gained on how regional integration operates as - and builds on - 
uneven and inequitable development in order to forge channels, corridors, and zones of 
articulatory coherence between territories. Such spatialities function for some powerful 
actors such as investors or state officials but disrupt forms of socio-spatial organization 
beneficial for other actors or exclude wider distribution of surplus value. Conversely, it 
seems, existing forms of territorial coherence can act as barriers for the expansion of capital 
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into new territories attempting to access a low social cost of labour in a race to the bottom. 
In short local conditions of social reproduction and labour markets matter when mobile FDI 
attempts to embed in a new territory. This points to the need for a detailed understanding 
of the specific geographical and historical trajectories through which territories are 
produced, the subject of Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4: Laos’ History – Peripheral Centrality
The notion of turning Laos from a land-locked to a land-linked country (Pholsena and 
Banomyong 2006) has become a keystone of the Lao government’s recent development 
discourse on regional integration. Laos sits at the geographical heart of the Southeast Asian 
peninsula and its historical remoteness from larger centres of power, trade and population 
has caused Laos to be peripheral to the main sweep of the Southeast Asian mainland’s 
history. Laos’ peripheral status is, however, a paradoxical one because of the very centrality 
of its geography. Foreign powers have long vied for influence, strategic advantage and 
economic benefit and Laos has become an arena for struggles because of its simultaneous 
geographical peripherality and centrality; what I term its peripheral centrality. This chapter 
therefore situates contemporary development processes and the present case in a 
historical context of Laos’ shifting orientations and integrations with its neighbours.
I demonstrate that Laos’ peripheral-central status in Southeast Asia historically resulted in 
it becoming an arena for contending external interests – an issue with clear contemporary 
parallels. The Lao have thus engaged in a balancing act to manage and derive benefit from 
foreign forces. I focus on three interrelated themes: the development and transformation 
of the Lao polity and state; the economic geography of Laos; and the multiple, tangled 
relations with external actors which the Lao have tried to balance and derive advantage 
from.
4.1 Early Lao Mandalas: Lan Xang
Ethnic Lao form a sub-grouping of the broader Tai ethnic group, which also includes 
contemporary Thai in Thailand, Shan in Myanmar/Burma and Tai Leu in Yunnan. By around 
2000 BCE the early inhabitants of Laos were Austroasiatic-speaking groups ancestral to the 
present-day ethnic minorities now residing in Laos’ highland areas (Stuart-Fox 1998: 10). 
Tai groups began to migrate southwards into Laos probably from the border area between 
China and Vietnam in the late first millennium and early second millennium CE (ibid. 26; 
Lieberman 2003: 240). By the mid-14th century Tai groups had established polities in Laos 
(Stuart-Fox 1998: 32). Tai political organizations above the village level were known as 
meuang1 and would be comprised of several villages presided over by an aristocratic lord, 
the chao meuang. Meuang were organized in what historians have termed the mandala 
1 A word with contemporary meanings signifying ‘town’, ‘city’ or ‘country’. 
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form. Mandalas were a form of political organization prevalent in mainland Southeast Asia 
from at least the first millennium CE. A mandala was formed by a central settlement from 
which power radiated in concentric circles of decreasing power the farther from the centre 
a territory lay. Rulers of a powerful central meuang could extract tribute, in the form of 
economic surplus and labour requirements, from smaller meuang within their sphere of 
power. Smaller meuang which lay between powerful centres would pay tribute to both 
centres (Tambiah 2013; see also Wolters 1968). Low population densities entailed that 
political power was marked, rather than by the control of territory, by the ability to control 
populations in order to produce economic surplus and gain labour for war and royal 
construction projects (Reid 1988: 132-135). Early Tai centralizing polities were predicated 
on an agricultural basis of irrigated wet-rice cultivation (ibid. 20-25; Lieberman 2003: 50).
Early Lao meuang were peripheral to larger power centres elsewhere on the mainland. It 
was not until the rise of the kingdom of Lan Xang in the 14th century that a Lao polity 
formed a powerful and extensive mandala of its own. Lao chronicles assert that Lan Xang 
was founded by Fa Ngum in 1353. Fa Ngum is said to have unified Lao meuang occupying 
the middle reaches of the Mekong and the northern and eastern sections of the Khorat 
plateau2 through military force (Stuart-Fox 1998: 43-44). Lan Xang was ‘decentralized and 
segmentary in its political organization’ (ibid. 45) with four principal meuang, including the 
capital Xiang Dong Xiang Thong,3 as the core and each with its own dependent, secondary 
meuang. 
The structure of early Lao society was composed of three classes: nobility, commoners 
(phai) and slaves. The king and powerful lords of larger tributary meuang formed the top 
layer, below which came the free peasantry, valued as surplus producers and soldiers, and 
then slaves. Highland ethnic minorities lived according to their own laws and customs and 
largely stood outside Lao society (ibid. 47).  Stuart-Fox (ibid. 49-50; cf. Evans 2002: 13) 
argues that in terms of the production and extraction of wealth Lan Xang had ‘a semi-
feudal tributary mode of surplus accumulation in which a hierarchy of local rulers 
channelled a proportion of whatever surplus wealth they could extract to their immediate 
overlord in the form of tribute, along with provision of so many armed men in the time of 
war’. Relations of blood and marriage between the royal centre and tributary governors did 
not prevent revolts and power depended less on administrative structures than on military 
2 Now northeastern Thailand.
3 Present day Luang Prabang.
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capabilities and economic prosperity (ibid. 59, 73). Lan Xang was thus prone to fissiparous 
tendencies which would eventually lead to the break-up of the mandala.
Wealth was generated through craft production, tin and iron ore mining, alluvial gold 
panning and valuable forest product collection. Trade networks were crucial for leveraging 
this production into wealth with Lan Xang occupying an important position at the 
intersection of trade routes. Riverine transport enabled lowland-highland trade and 
established rivers as principal trade arteries. The main Lao commercial centres engaged in 
trade with neighbouring mandalas in Yunnan, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam 
(ibid. 49). Trade was made difficult however by Lan Xang’s distance from larger population 
centres and maritime trade routes. The geographical position of Lan Xang made trading a 
long and arduous process. The difficulty of moving goods and resources across Laos’ space 
would become a recurrent theme of its economic history. 
Figure 1: Lan Xang (dark green) circa 1400 CE4
Laos’ history is marked by the ebb and flow of competing powers’ struggles to influence 
this territory at the centre of the Southeast Asian peninsula. Other Tai polities, as well as 
China, Vietnam and Burma have all attempted to derive benefit from projecting political 
and military power into Laos from the time before Lan Xang emerged as an independent 
44 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lan_Xang#/media/File:Map-of-southeast-asia_1400_CE.png
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entity until its dissolution and fall.  Lan Xang as a unified entity began to disintegrate in the 
late 17th and early 18th centuries. A series of succession disputes provoked the dissolution 
of Lan Xang into three antagonistic polities, Luang Prabang in the north, Vientiane in the 
middle, and Champasak in the south. The decline of Lan Xang was matched by the ascent 
and consolidation of the Siamese polity of Ayutthaya and by the late 18th century all three 
of the Lao meuang which represented the broken remnants of the Lan Xang kingdom were 
under the suzerainty of the Siamese (ibid. 103). 
Lan Xang was in a loose long-distance tributary relationship with China. More or less 
regular tribute was sent to China - albeit with some long periods between missions - 
throughout the Lan Xang era (Stuart-Fox 1998: 59 passim). Lao rulers, during periods of 
weakness, at times requested China to intercede with Siam on their behalf (ibid. 117). The 
16th and 17th centuries were marked by multiple conflicts as the Tai polities of Lan Xang, Lan 
Na and Ayutthaya, as well as Cambodia and Burma jostled for power on the peninsula 
(Lieberman 2003: 263-274; Wyatt 2003: 76-85). Lan Xang was able to benefit to a certain 
extent from trade in its luxury forest products and resources such as gold as increased 
coastal, i.e. foreign, demand solidified commercial links with its maritime neighbours 
Ayutthaya and Cambodia, and to a lesser extent Burma and Vietnam (Lieberman 2003: 265). 
Lan Xang, on the whole however, was unable to easily access the commerce with Asian and 
European merchants that was so profitable to its coastal neighbours. Exclusion from trade 
also had the disadvantage of reduced knowledge and use of the latest military equipment 
and tactics. Developments in accurate European firearms impacted negatively on the use of 
elephants in war and advantage swung to the coastal states who had the means to pay for 
European mercenaries and arms (Stuart-Fox 1998: 98). Technology transfer was thus a 
problem for Laos well before any attempt at industrialization. Trade with Yunnan and 
Guangxi in China was unable to offer an adequate alternative to maritime trade, hindered 
by difficult routes and limited volumes (Lieberman 2003: 285).
The disadvantageous geographical position of the Lao polity was also reinforced by the 
loose administrative structure founded on personal relationships between rulers and ruled. 
Lan Xang was unable to cohesively generate overarching loyalty to the monarchy and state 
across its territory. Lao rulers were therefore unable to control labour on a sufficient scale 
to consolidate economically and militarily (Wyatt 2003: 84-85). The succession disputes of 
the early 18th century broke Lan Xang into three antagonistic parts and this dissolution was 
aided and abetted by both Vietnam and Ayutthaya promoting their own interests 
(Lieberman 2003: 285). Rising Siamese power entailed Lao meuang transferring their 
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allegiance to Ayutthaya and a further sapping of Lao rulers’ ability to control labour and 
extract tribute (Stuart-Fox 1998: 91). Continued fragmentation of the Lao kingdoms in the 
19th century was marked by increased competition between Siam and Vietnam for 
influence over meuang east of the Mekong. For example, some Lao rulers, such as of the 
Phuan territories in northeast Laos, sought to balance over-dependence on Siam by 
entreating for Vietnamese protection (ibid. 128-132).  Siam was the more influential 
however and was to leverage economic benefit from hegemony over Lao territories. By the 
1850s Siam was receiving significant annual taxes in kind as well as specie. Lao offered 
resistance to this extraction with several meuang in arrears, but the in-kind goods still 
flowed to the advantage of Siam (ibid. 136). 
Siamese hegemony was the cause of population migrations in the 18th and 19th centuries 
which arguably reverberate to the present day. Siam was responsible for the forced 
migration of a significant part of the Lao population from east of the Mekong to the west 
bank and the Khorat plateau. The Siamese conquest of Vientiane in 1778 led to thousands 
of Lao families being deported to central Siam (ibid. 112). Later in 1827 the Chao Anouvong 
rebellion led to further depopulation of Lao territories. This revolt was the last attempt by a 
Lao kingdom, Vientiane, to throw off the yoke of Siamese suzerainty. Chao Anouvong, the 
ruler of Vientiane attempted to recapture the Lao population of the Khorat plateau and 
reconstitute the power of Lan Xang but his failure and defeat entailed the forced 
resettlement of Khorat plateau Lao closer to Bangkok and the entire population of 
Vientiane to be deported to the central Khorat plain, to enable greater Siamese control 
over them (ibid. 125-127). The Siamese policy of forced resettlement continued in 
subsequent years in order to deny any Lao support for a Vietnamese invasion (ibid. 130-
131). By the time of a political agreement in 1847 which ceased hostilities between Siam 
and Vietnam ‘the east bank was a virtual wasteland of abandoned villages and rice fields’ 
(ibid. 131). Such forced mobility suggests a reason for Laos’ contemporary low population 
densities (and the concomitant issue of mobilizing sufficient labour for capitalist 
development), although as we shall see below this was not the last large-scale permanent 
movement of the Lao population across the Mekong. Cross-Mekong movement and 
attempts to fix populations in place in order to further political and economic ends of 
Siamese hegemonic control have given way in more recent times to Lao economic 
migration to Thailand. The contemporary principles of fixity and mobility were 
foreshadowed by historical upheavals. 
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Lan Xang, despite periods of ascendancy and regional power in the 15th and 16th centuries, 
was undermined as a coherent political entity by: its loose administrative structure 
dependent on personal relations and the concomitant inability to command populations 
and their labour; its distance from lucrative maritime trade routes; the internecine 
succession disputes of its elites; and the prolonged interference in its affairs by powerful 
neighbours. The second half of the 19th century saw the emergence of a foreign power 
from farther afield which was to have a lasting impact on Lao history: France and its project 
of colonial domination.
4.2 Laos in French Indochina
The expansion of French colonialism in Indochina from its initial base in Cochinchina – the 
southern section of Vietnam - was provoked by both capitalist interests and inter-
colonialist competition with Britain (Brocheux and Hémery 2009:32-39). The annexation of 
the Lao territories, was part of a bid to extend influence over the rich and populous 
territories of Siam west of the Mekong (Stuart-Fox 1997: 20). France began its piecemeal 
colonization of Laos in the late 1880s, initially utilizing different Siamese and Vietnamese 
conceptions of tributary relationships to its advantage. The Siamese understood Lao 
meuang requests to enter tributary relations as attempts to balance between competing 
power-centres while the Vietnamese interpreted such requests as entreaties to enter into 
the imperial order and so recorded tributary meuang as administrative divisions of Vietnam 
even where Vietnamese influence was small. France utilized the existence of these 
administrative divisions to claim control over Lao territory. The French embarked on an 
aggressive policy of extending their influence on the east bank (Stuart-Fox 1997: 22-23). 
After skirmishes between Siam and France in the disputed territories in 1893, France 
engaged in gunboat diplomacy, sailing two ships up the Chao Phraya river and training their 
guns on the royal palace in Bangkok. A treaty was signed in 1893 giving France control over 
the east bank from the kingdom of Luang Prabang in the north to Cambodia in the south. 
Negotiations in 1896 with the British led to the ceding of territory north of Luang Prabang 
to France in return for the acceptance by the French of a neutral and independent Siam. 
France was able to gain two extensions west of the Mekong in Xainyabuli and part of 
Champasak in 1904 (ibid. 23-26). Thus demarcated Laos was incorporated into the French 
domain of Indochina, in which it would occupy a subordinate position. 
Laos and Cambodia were to play a minor part in the French colonial project in Southeast 
Asia, with Vietnam being ascribed greater economic importance. The French held 
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Indochina to be a single territorial entity composed of five parts – the Vietnamese 
territories of Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina, as well as Laos and Cambodia. The 
Mekong’s Lao east bank territories were not considered by the colonists a separate and 
coherent political entity but rather an extension of Indochina. Laos was thus a hinterland of 
Vietnam, and colonial policy was directed at ways to serve and consolidate France’s 
Vietnamese interest (ibid. 28). Laos’ subservience within the Indochinese colonial space 
became manifest in interrelated administrative and economic modes of domination. 
Laos was constituted as a single administrative entity in 1899. The French administration 
was, at least nominally, direct, except for the Kingdom of Luang Prabang where a 
protectorate was established (Stuart-Fox 1997: 30). The French attempted to run the 
administration at a minimal cost with upper (northern) Laos in 1914 run by 224 officials, of 
which the French contingent numbered 24. Brocheux and Hémery (2009: 86-87) argue that 
this minimal administration required preserving and accommodating the existing Tai-Lao 
political structures in order to construct a central, minimal, state-controlled structure 
which transformed local potentates into civil servants  of the colonial state. The low 
numbers of French in the administration entailed that administration was in effect indirect. 
The French thus were insulated from resentment against corruption, taxation and corvée 
labour, with anger rather directed at indigenous officials (Stuart-Fox 1997: 31). 
France held that colonies were expensive and so should pay for themselves. In this way the 
colony could become of value to the French empire and self-fund its administration and 
development (Gunn 1990: 18; Stuart-Fox 1997: 46). France initially had high hopes for Laos 
as a conduit to Chinese trade and a source of wealth, but the Mekong could not provide a 
route to China (Osborne 1975). Hopes of trade were also dashed as it soon became 
apparent that trade both in Laos and the Khorat plateau was oriented towards Bangkok 
(Stuart-Fox 1997: 46). Efforts to promote economic development centred on repopulating 
Laos with a workforce and on constructing a transport infrastructure. 
French Laos was beset by the problem of low population density. Compounding this issue 
in the French view was that the Lao were deemed to be indolent and lacking the vigour 
needed for development. The solution was to import more energetic surplus labour from 
Vietnam, especially Annam, to repopulate the colony (Gunn 1990: 33).  The economic 
potential of Laos thus ‘awaited exploitation through the investment of French capital and 
the introduction of Vietnamese labour’ (Stuart-Fox 1997: 29). Statistics from 1936 indicate 
that 27,000 Vietnamese inhabited Laos out of a total population of 1,012,000. The 
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Vietnamese were largely concentrated in urban areas and mainly worked as government 
officials, labourers and traders (Gunn 1990: 34-35). French capital was extended into Laos 
first as merchant capital, with competition from comprador Chinese and Vietnamese, and 
then as industrial capital in transport infrastructure and resource-extractive exports (Gunn 
1990: 22-23). Tin-mining was the main focus of capitalist investment in the Lao economy 
with a noticeable upswing in mining investments in the late 1920s, attracting large 
amounts of capitalization on the Paris Bourse (ibid. 26). Exploitation of Lao timber, 
especially teak, was also notable with 12,000 to 15,000 logs of wood sent down the 
Mekong to Saigon annually. Other export-oriented investments included the development 
of rubber and coffee plantations, although production remained at a low level compared to 
other areas of colonial exploitation, with rubber plantations of 20,000 hectares and coffee 
production of a mere annual output of 3000 tons in 1940-1945 (ibid. 28). In Laos primitive 
accumulation was incomplete and 95 percent of the population existed in a state of 
autarkic subsistence, an obstacle to capitalist production and trade, compounded by the 
country’s relative geographical isolation (Murray 1980: 6; Gunn 1990: 28-29).
The spatial reconstruction of the territories advanced by the French attempted to weld 
Laos to the Vietnamese colonies, as a provider of commodities and a vent for Vietnamese 
surplus labour. The debloquement or opening up of Laos and its integration into the wider 
Indochinese economic space assumed a key role in France’s plans for the mise en valeur of 
this hinterland. An emphasis on transport infrastructure was such that Gunn (1990: 40) 
argues ‘the “development” of the country was almost coterminous with road construction’. 
Road and rail construction was intended to reorient Laos away from its traditional links 
with Siam (ibid. 40-41). Attempts were made to link the Mekong towns to the Vietnamese 
coast across the Say Phu Luang cordillera, with three routes eventually crossing the range 
in Thakhaek, Savannakhet and Xieng Khouang provinces. The extension of the road 
network enabled goods to be transported from Savannakhet to Saigon in three days, an 
improvement compared to the twelve days such a journey took along the Mekong. The 
roads were not of sufficient carrying capacity in the eyes of French planners to shift bulk 
produce, with a railway seen as the panacea for Laos’ economic isolation. The boom in tin-
mining in the 1920s gave added impetus to the rail project with plans drawn up for a 187-
kilometre line from Vietnam through the Mu Gia pass to Thakhaek, in the vicinity of the tin 
mines (Stuart-Fox 1997: 47-50). The railway ‘would bring migrants in and take produce out, 
enabling Laos…to fulfil its ‘natural’ role as the resource-rich hinterland of French Indochina’ 
(ibid. 50) but never materialized, a victim to the Great Depression (Gunn 1990: 40). 
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Without the space-spanning means to valorize extracted commodities, metropolitan 
investment remained low (Stuart-Fox, 1997: 50). The low level of economic development 
would impact on the administrative capacity of the state and associated political and social 
development.
French Laos operated on a minimal budget, a limitation which resulted, through the prism 
of French neglect, in poor social outcomes for the population. Internal security and revenue 
collection were prioritized over health and education spending, with negative knock-on 
effects for future human resource development (Stuart-Fox 1997: 43-44). Laos’s local 
revenue collection was insufficient to cover its expenditures and its budgetary needs were 
met by subsidies from the general Indochina budget (Gunn 1990: 43). Efforts to make up 
the local budget deficit were to fall on Lao taxpayers. Indirect taxation and capitation 
formed the principal bases of local revenue mobilization. Opium, alcohol and salt 
monopolies played the key role in mobilizing indirect tax revenue (ibid. 42-44). The taxation 
system also acted to monetize the economy by forcing the conversion of a part of 
subsistence agricultural production into market exchange or alternatively necessitating the 
local population to seek wage work in French dominated agro-mineral production (Murray 
1980: 68-69). In addition to capitation, prestation (corvée labour dues) formed part of the 
burden on the population (Gunn 1990: 48).5 Certain continuities in the transition from 
tributary to colonial modes of exploitation were present. The colonial state ‘in its role as 
appropriator of agricultural surplus and as mobilizer of manpower, for whatever 
reason…was heir to the historical tradition and prerogatives of centralized State [sic] 
power’ (ibid. 48).
Political development and widespread resistance to French rule was somewhat slow to 
emerge. The sections of the indigenous population who benefited most from the French 
presence was the small client elite, ethnically Lao and with origins in the nobility, and to a 
certain extent a Chinese comprador class. No indigenous capitalist class was formed with 
industrial capital primarily in the hands of the French and trade dominated by Chinese and 
Vietnamese (Stuart-Fox 1997: 52; Gunn 1988: 34). The elite was apparently small and 
dependent enough to accept French arguments that Laos needed French-directed 
modernization over political representation (Stuart-Fox 1997: 43). Most of the indigenous 
population remained engaged in production close to subsistence and, sparsely scattered 
and highly ethnically heterogeneous, lacked an overarching political identity or means of 
5 See Chapter 6 for a discussion of Lao labour history.
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large-scale autonomous political organization. Revolts in resistance to French taxation 
requirements did occur, notably by the southern highland minorities (Gunn 1990), but it 
took wider regional dynamics to provoke the development of nation-building and 
communism. 
France actually encouraged a form of Lao nationalism in the 1940s in order to differentiate 
Laos as a political space and shield it from an assertive Thai irredentism. A strong 
nationalist discourse influenced Thai politics in the 1920s and 1930s, and became strongly 
connected to ‘an irredentist drive to incorporate Laos and Cambodia’ into a pan-Tai 
political unity (Ivarsson 2008: 60). The French were thus faced with the task of reorienting 
Laos away from Siam politically and culturally as well as delinking its economic space from 
west of the Mekong. Ivarsson (ibid. 94) notes that ‘the formation of a ‘cultural frontier’ 
between Laos and Siam by attributing a unique historical, religious and linguistic 
distinctiveness to Laos’ was a crucial part of integrating it into Indochina. The incorporation 
of Laos into Indochina therefore rested paradoxically on encouraging a distinctive identity 
of its own (ibid. Ch. 3). The impact of French efforts in forming a coherent Lao national 
identity should not be overstated however given the political and ethnic fragmentations 
which inhered in colonial Laos (Stuart-Fox 1997: 60). The first stirring of cultural 
nationalism was certainly not ‘a popular movement with mass appeal’ (ibid. 52). The overall 
effect was to foster a sense of Lao identity and promote the concept of a potential Lao 
nation in a small part of the elite who would go on to play prominent roles in the struggle 
for independence (Gunn 1988: 103). A nascent cultural and political identity amongst the 
Lao would dovetail with the occupation of the Japanese army in 1945 to provide the 
conditions for a national independence movement.
Japan executed a military coup de force against the Vichy French administration in 1945 
and encouraged Laos’ independence, eventually leading to the formation of a first Lao-
controlled government, that of the Lao Issara (‘Free Lao’) nationalist grouping (Gunn 1988: 
108). The Japanese surrendered to the Allies in August 1945, with their surrender received 
to the north of the sixteenth parallel by the Kuomintang Chinese and to the south by the 
British. The Lao Issara, led by Prince Phetsarath, a prominent aristocrat, proclaimed 
independence in October 1945 (ibid. 139). This government would prove however to be 
short-lived as the British allowed the French to re-establish control in the south around 
Pakse and the Chinese became the new power-brokers in the north. The Lao were 
politically fragmented and divided by regional antagonism which hindered the 
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establishment of a coherent national opposition to the various forces contending the 
country’s domination (ibid. 132; Stuart-Fox 1997: 60). 
The French completed their reoccupation in 1946 and attempted to reconstitute their rule 
in the guise of the Kingdom of Laos. The Lao Issara government fled to Bangkok (Gunn 1988: 
173). An agreement signed between the French and the king of Luang Prabang in August 
1946 established the Kingdom of Laos as a constitutional monarchy within the French 
union. Some devolution of powers took place but the French commissioner still held a 
power of veto (ibid. 173-74). The Royal Lao Government (RLG) was not representative of 
the wider population. It was dominated by the aristocratic elite which had benefited most 
in terms of French education and reinforcement of the Lao class hierarchy (Stuart-Fox 1997: 
66-68). The Lao Issara maintained guerrilla activity from bases in Thailand but the most 
significant pressure on the French’s position in Laos and their grip on Laos came from the 
insurgency of the Viet Minh in the First Indochina War (Gunn 1988: 216-217). US pressure 
to give full independence to Indochinese countries, including recognition of an 
independent Laos, further tipped the balance of forces in Indochina away from the French 
(Stuart-Fox 1997: 75). A Treaty of Friendship and Association in October 1953 transferred 
residual French powers to an independent Laos. The Geneva Conference of 1954 confirmed 
the cessation of hostilities in the First Indochina War and the French withdrawal. The 
conference however was but an early staging post in the arduous journey to a stable 
political settlement in Indochina as Laos’ first blush of independence was undermined by 
the regional dynamics of the Cold War.
4.3 Laos’ Independence and the Cold War
Communism entered Laos through Vietnamese migrants and the early communist 
opposition to colonialism in the late 1920s and 1930s was dominated by the Vietnamese 
community, with limited impact on the local population. The first stirrings of communist 
activity in Laos occurred in the context of peasant rebellion and worker strikes in 
neighbouring Annam6 in 1930. Shortly after in 1931 the French authorities reported the 
operation of a Vietnamese communist cell in Savannakhet, and further believed that 
militant communications would also pass through the Mu Gia pass in addition to trade and 
transport infrastructure. Refugees from the disturbances in Annam swelled the migrant 
labour force in the areas of Khammouan and Savannakhet and formed a population open 
to communist agitation (Gunn 1988: 44-45; see also Goscha 1999). The Vietnamese 
6 The central region of Vietnam.
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founded and led Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) was the only political movement in 
Laos which sought a mass following (Stuart-Fox 1997: 52). A Lao Regional Committee of the 
ICP was formed in 1934, an event which marked the first recorded participation of Lao in 
the communist movement, although this was minimal (Gunn 1988: 40). A more repressive 
French administration forced the movement to go further underground from 1938 through 
to 1946 when the tumult of the end of the Second World War would bring new 
opportunities for communist advance (ibid. 79-82, 97). The Lao Issara was riven by internal 
disputes and in 1949 a leftist faction affiliated with the Viet Minh and led by Prince 
Souphanouvong – a scion of the Luang Prabang royal family – broke away and helped to 
consolidate control of mountainous areas of eastern Laos held by their Vietnamese allies.  
Souphanouvong and Lao comrades formed the Neo Lao Issara (‘Free Lao Front’) 
organisation in 1950, subsequently changing the name to Pathet Lao (‘Lao Nation’; PL); the 
name by which the Lao communists would become best known. The communist Phak 
Phasason Lao (Lao People’s Party) soon followed, founded in secret in 1955 (Brown and 
Zasloff 1986: 44-45). It was to become the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), the 
current rulers of Laos (Phomvihane 1981: 19). A 1953 Viet Minh-led offensive established 
Pathet Lao control of the northeastern provinces of Phongsaly and Huaphan, the two 
provinces forming the ‘liberated zone’ base area from which the revolutionary struggle for 
the control of Laos would be launched (Stuart-Fox 1997: 83).
The United States had been increasingly active in the East Asian arena since the end of the 
Second World War as they attempted to secure a capitalist hegemony in the region in the 
face of growing communist and nationalist movements. The Geneva accords attempted to 
enshrine Laos’ neutrality with the withdrawal of French and Vietnamese forces from the 
country (Stuart-Fox 1997: 85-86). Negotiations for a political role for the Pathet Lao 
continued through 1955, at the end of which elections took place. It took until 1957 before 
the First Coalition government was formed. The settlement would ‘reintegrate both PL 
provinces to Royal Lao government administration’, lead to ‘acceptance of the communist-
controlled Lao Patriotic Front [‘Neo Lao Hak Xat’] as a legal political party’, and eventually 
include two PL ministers (in Planning, and Religion and Fine Arts) (Stuart-Fox 2002: 58). 
The US was deeply dissatisfied with the outcomes of the conference in light of the 
concessions given to the Pathet Lao and so refused to endorse it. The US viewed Laos as a 
‘domino’ under immediate threat from what it deemed to be an aggressive expansionist 
communism. The US’s anxiety to halt the spreading virus motivated increasing involvement 
in Lao affairs. An embassy was thus established in 1955 along with ‘a substantial CIA 
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presence’ (Stuart-Fox 1997: 89). The neutral status of the country entailed that ‘US 
assistance to the RLG had to be disguised and dispersed in secrecy’ (Phraxayavong 2009: 
63). American aid to Laos averaged USD 43 million a year in the period 1955-1970 rising to 
approximately USD 50 million between 1971-1973 (ibid. 103). The majority of US aid 
funded the military and propped up the country’s economic stability with a smaller amount 
directed to socio-economic development projects (ibid. 99). 
By 1963 the PL had been excluded from government, attempts at a Government of 
National Unity had failed and the American-backed General Phoumi Nosavan emerged as a 
strongman leader in Vientiane. The Pathet Lao waged war from their mountainous 
redoubts in the east (Stuart-Fox 1997:  123-129). American aid increased greatly during this 
period to buttress rightist forces. Stuart-Fox (ibid. 130) argues that ‘USAID in particular 
expanded rapidly to the point where its parallel administration included counterparts for 
virtually every government ministry and department, a structure that could only be 
described as neo-colonial’. The US believed that aid would boost consumer spending and 
provide a spur to the economy and living standards. The RLG, however, severely 
mismanaged the aid, abusing an import programme to gain massive rents. Developmental 
aid projects failed to have much of an impact and were unable to spread to the areas 
controlled by the Pathet Lao. The Pathet Lao made grassroots political hay from the RLG’s 
aid mismanagement, accusing the government of fostering corruption and failing to deliver 
aid to rural areas (ibid. 126). 
The Pathet Lao for their part also received foreign aid, aid which served the geostrategic 
aims of their allies. The communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam provided military 
support and advisors to the PL. This included detachments of North Vietnamese troops 
fighting inside Laos (Stuart-Fox 1997: 138; see also Langer and Zasloff 1970). The USSR and 
China also ‘provided official substantial military assistance’ to their Communist brethren in 
the PL (Phraxayavong 2009: 109). The North Vietnamese presence in eastern Laos both 
bolstered the PL and also acted as a strategic buffer against the encroachment of hostile 
US-backed forces into border areas with North Vietnam  (Langer and Zasloff 1970: 156). 
The war years effectively carved Laos into three spheres of foreign influence. The RLG area 
of the west and Mekong valley was maintained with US and Thai patronage; the east was 
under the sway of the North Vietnamese; and the north was under the influence of the 
Chinese, where the Chinese army was constructing a road network into Laos as part of a 
1962 agreement between the Lao and Chinese governments (Stuart-Fox 1997: 135, 142) 
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The Lao civil conflict thus served as a proxy engagement in the Cold War and ‘Lao leaders 
became the tools, willing or not, of powerful outside forces whose use of Lao territory as an 
extension of their own conflict showed little concern for its impact on the Lao people’ (ibid. 
135). 
Military advances for the Pathet Lao over 1968-1970 and the waning of American 
involvement in Vietnam created a more advantageous position for them in the negotiations 
leading to the Third Coalition government, the Provisional Government of National Union, 
officially formed in 1974 (Brown and Zasloff 1986: 99-106). The neutralist prince Souvanna 
Phouma, a half-brother of Souphanouvong, acted as prime minister with twelve ministerial 
portfolios shared equally between the rightists and the PL. The government functioned 
relatively well for a year but was undermined as the balance of forces in the former 
Indochina swung towards the communists. Phnom Penh and then Saigon fell to communist 
forces in April 1975 and the PL moved to take advantage of the evolving conditions. PL 
forces expanded their territorial control in the northeast and encouraged massive 
demonstrations by students and workers against the corruption of the political right. 
Prominent rightists and generals began to flee to Thailand. Souvanna Phouma, in an 
attempt to stave off the risk of civil war facilitated PL control of the vacated ministerial 
positions and the movement of PL troops into RLG-controlled territory without armed 
resistance. The PL initiated a purge of the bureaucratic apparatus and a People’s 
Revolutionary Committee set new controls and restrictions on prices, property transactions 
and personal movements. The offices of USAID were shut in the face of demonstrations 
and American aid ceased leading to economic turmoil (Stuart Fox 1997: 158-162). King 
Savangvatthana was forced to abdicate and on 2nd December 1975 the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic (LPDR) was proclaimed (ibid. 164).
The post-independence period of Laos clearly highlights the contestation over Lao space by 
powerful external actors and the implicated struggle of Lao actors to orientate the country 
in a particular geopolitical direction. In the end the communists – and an orientation to 
Vietnam – won out.
4.4 After the Revolution: The Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party after 1975 moved to consolidate their power as large 
numbers fled across the Mekong. The LPRP initiated a project of nation and state building 
along socialist lines but market reforms were initiated in the 1980s and by the start of the 
21st century the country was increasingly integrating with the market economy of the 
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Southeast Asian region.  The socialist remaking of Laos, in contrast to the Year Zero shock 
therapy of Democratic Kampuchea, was intended to proceed in a gradual step by step 
manner to socialism, bypassing the stage of capitalist development. Initial economic 
reforms focused on nationalization of private sector assets, development of the state 
sector including its banking and trade capacities, and promotion of agriculture, especially 
the expansion of irrigated rice production, multiple cropping and labour use rationalization 
(St John 2006: 32-33; see also Doré 1982). The new regime was however handicapped by 
an extremely low level of resources with which it could enact reform. In 1977, the Lao 
regime displayed continuity from the RLG in that 81 percent of its revenue came from 
foreign aid, although this time the aid came from Vietnam, the USSR and other communist 
bloc nations (Evans 1991: 91; Phraxayavong 2009: 142-145). The LPRP was faced with 
almost complete lack of economic surplus for boosting production and utilization of 
productive capacity in industry was at 30 percent (Evans 1991: 90-91). An interim three-
year plan was initiated in March 1978. The plan aimed to expand and strengthen the 
socialist economy. A primary objective was to achieve self-sufficiency in grains, especially 
rice, by 1980 (ibid. 96; St John 2006: 34). The new regime targeted agricultural 
collectivization as a means to achieve this (G. Evans 1995). The party began promoting 
collectivization at the end of 1977 and launched a formal policy of collectivization in early 
1978. The policy foundered however on poor implementation and peasant resistance and 
the programme was effectively abandoned by December 1979 (Stuart-Fox 1996: 164; St 
John 2006: 37-38).7 The LPRP attempted to implement the plan through the institutional 
form of state centralization but they lacked the organizational capacity to enact the 
reforms (Evans 1991: 98). Admission of the failure of the policy led the LPRP to conclude 
that they had attempted a transition to a planned socialist economy too hastily. Economic 
policy shifted focus to officially recognize different economic forms which could be used to 
develop Laos, including private capitalist and state socialist. A first five year plan was 
initiated in 1981 with an emphasis on boosting agricultural and forestry production and 
reducing dependence on Thailand for import and transhipment of goods. Liberalization was 
included with for example private trade at border crossings allowed (St John 2006: 52-53). 
These early measures foreshadowed a more extensive market-based reform programme 
starting in 1986. Socialism, as an economic system based on extensive planning and state 
control of the main sectors of production, in Laos was thus never embedded deeply. The 
7 See Chapter 6.
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Lao flirtation with any form of socialist mode of production was brief, lasting a mere 10 
years before the country embarked on an extensive course of capitalist reform. 
The Fourth Congress of the LPRP in November 1986 saw the official sanctioning of 
economic reform. A new party line emerged on the need for economic restructuring, 
termed in Lao as chintanakan mai, or ‘new thinking’ (Stuart-Fox 2002: 264). It was 
implemented through the New Economic Mechanism, a wide-scale decentralization of 
economic decision-making. Pricing, production targets and wages were delegated to local 
economic units and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The exchange rate was unified and the 
private sector and import substitution were encouraged. Restrictions on internal 
agricultural trade were lifted. State subsidies were removed from SOEs and they had to 
‘self-finance’ themselves through after-tax profits and bank credit. Increased autonomy 
along market lines did not bring success and in 1989 the government ramped up the pace 
of reform in response. A programme of privatization was launched which covered around 
260 SOEs. Privatization found its complement in an emphasis on international trade and 
FDI, and a foreign investment law was promulgated which sanctioned wholly owned 
enterprises and equity joint ventures. In July 1988 a drive was launched to attract foreign 
investment, with Thai capital being a particular target. Domestic capital formation in Laos 
was paltry – the private domestic savings rate was negative – and the government aimed to 
attract capital to boost technological and economic cooperation with other countries. The 
new investment code allowed the remittance of profits and salaries and in certain 
conditions offered tax incentives - features which would be developed in subsequent 
foreign investment regulation. By the early 1990s private ownership had become the main 
form of property rights in the service and agricultural sectors. That this liberalization was 
not matched by a boom in investment can be attributed to a weak supportive framework 
of underdeveloped legal structure, inadequate physical infrastructure, and a peripheral 
position in the circuits of world markets. The economic liberalization was not however 
matched by a political parallel, with the LPRP retaining firm control. A constitution was 
promulgated in 1991, partly in response to potential business entrepreneurs’ concerns over 
a lack of legal framework protecting investment (St John 2006: 81-90). 
The 1990s were a decade which consolidated and extended the reform of the Lao economy 
along capitalist lines and oversaw increasing economic integration with Laos’ neighbours. In 
1994 a new, refined foreign investment law was introduced. The law freed up restrictions 
on joint ventures, introduced lower corporate tax rates, opened new areas to FDI and 
sought to expedite investment through a one-stop service provided by the Foreign 
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Investment Management Committee. The state also sought to expand its taxation revenue 
with a new land tax and a registration tax on housing and property. The liberalization of the 
economy did see a boost to GDP and growth rates averaged more than 6 per cent between 
1990-1996 (ibid. 113-114). Structural transformation began to occur. The ratio of GDP 
contributed by industry and services rose relative to agriculture. Industry’s contribution to 
GDP grew by 12.6 percent in 1991-1993 and 12.3 percent in 1994-1997 (Bourdet 2000: 66). 
Agriculture however performed poorly leading to polarized and uneven wealth and income 
distributions between rural and urban areas (St John 2006: 114). Trade liberalization saw 
the beginning of a progressive integration with the global economy, which continues to the 
present. Change in the composition of trade accompanied an increased quantity of trade. 
Exports rose from USD 96.6 million in 1991 to USD 316.9 million in 1997. Similarly imports 
jumped from USD 215 million to USD 647.9 million between 1991 and 1997. Wood and 
timber products fell from 42.3 per cent of total exports to 28.6 per cent in the same period, 
while light export manufacturing began to make its mark especially in the form of garments, 
which leapt from 15.6 per cent to 28.3 per cent of total exports over 1991-1997 (Bourdet 
2000: 78-79). The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 put the brakes on Laos’ economic 
transformation largely due to spillover effects from the severely affected Thailand. Thailand 
was the main trading partner and source of foreign investment leading to declines in 
exports to the Thai economy and FDI (St John 2006: 115). Foreign direct investment 
pledges rose from USD 170.1 million in 1992 to peaks of USD 2064.3 million in 1994 and 
USD 1292.6 million in 1996 but dipped to USD 78.4 million in 1999 (Freeman 2001: 109). 
The decline can be attributed, Freeman (ibid. 113-114) argues, to the floundering of the 
Thai economy, increased competition from China, Cambodia and Myanmar, and decreased 
investor confidence in economies with weak business environments following the financial 
crash. The crisis was a stumbling block in Laos’ deepened integration with the region, 
cooperation which was formalized in Laos’ accession to the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN).
Laos officially acceded to ASEAN on 23rd July 1997. The motivation was primarily economic - 
in search of greater access to development aid, investment and trade – although some 
have suggested the positive security implications of closer political integration and 
cooperation with neighbouring states (Pholsena and Banomyong 2006: 28-38). Accession 
set the stage for a gradual insertion of Laos into the trading area of the ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement (AFTA). Recognizing the backwardness of the Lao economy, full integration was 
postponed until 2008 (ibid. 39). Agreements signed in 1998 laid out economic objectives 
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intended to expedite economic integration including: facilitating the transport of goods; 
maintaining AFTA; and simplifying and harmonizing customs regulations to facilitate trade 
and transit (ibid. 125). ASEAN integration was consistent with the government’s stated 
development mantra of turning Laos from a ‘land-locked to a land-linked’ country 
(Pholsena and Banomyong 2006; Jerndal and Rigg 1999).
The turn of the millennium and the first part of the new decade proved somewhat rocky for 
Laos due to political turbulence and economic uncertainty. An unprecedented anti-
government protest hit Vientiane in August 1999 in the wake of discontent at the 
government’s economic mismanagement. The students and teachers responsible called for 
reform and free and fair elections but were met instead with fierce repression and 
imprisonment. A bombing campaign of disputed provenance was waged throughout 2000, 
and anti-government guerrilla raids occurred. At the Seventh Party Congress in March 2001 
the old guard of the LPRP consolidated its grip on power and staved off any pressure for 
meaningful political reform. Over 2001-2004 the macroeconomic situation stabilized, 
although the majority of government revenue was still provided largely by donor funding - 
around some 80 per cent of the budget in 2001 - and revenue mobilization remained 
problematic. Growth stood at 5.9 per cent in 2003 and signs of FDI picking up provoked 
hopes of an upturn (St John 2006: 157-162). Prime Minister Bounnhang Vorachit stated in 
September 2002 that the government’s aim was to promote as much investment as 
possible, including through the use of special economic zones and border trade areas 
(Lintner 2003: 141). Cooperation with Thailand increased in the form of agreements to 
open border checkpoints to facilitate trade and tourism, and ties with China strengthened. 
China’s role in resolving the economic turbulence of 1999 signalled an increase of influence. 
China had provided generous export subsidies and interest-free loans that had contributed 
to stabilizing the kip. Border trade with China picked up due to the rising relative prices of 
Thai goods (ibid. 142-143). Efforts continued at reform of the investment process and the 
first special economic zone, the Savan-Seno SEZ, was established by decree - although not 
physically - in 2003 (Freeman 2004: 126). Continued political control by the LPRP did not 
necessarily translate into infrastructural power and administrative capacity remained weak 
(Hlaing 2006). 
4.5 The Contemporary Lao Economy
I close this chapter with a short snapshot of the contemporary Laos economy, before 
addressing the dynamics of geographical political economic development that have created 
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this developmental situation. In the last decade Laos has experienced high growth rates, 
driven in large part by foreign investment in hydropower and mining. External trade has 
increased although the state’s capture of the benefits of trade has been somewhat limited. 
A current account deficit remains. Despite growth foreign debt remains a concern and the 
budget is still supported by significant amounts of foreign aid.
Laos’ incorporation into the developmental mainstream was evidenced by a rapidly 
changing macroeconomic position. GDP per capita grew from USD 326 in 2001 to USD 
1,751 in 2013 (World Bank 2016). Total merchandise exports saw a seven-fold increase 
from USD 336 million in 2003 to USD 2.26 billion in 2013. The rise in exports was mirrored 
by increased imports from USD 462 million to USD 3.02 billion during the same period (ibid. 
16). Between 2007 and 2014 growth averaged around 7.8 per cent annually, reaching highs 
of 8.5 per cent in 2010 and 2013 (World Bank 2016). The composition of exports has seen 
significant fluctuations in the period from 2000. The beginning of the noughties witnessed a 
shift away from primary commodities and to manufactures, especially garments and 
footwear, propelled by preferential trade schemes such as the Generalized System of 
Preferences. Composition swung back to primary commodities in the middle of the decade 
due to increased external demand for ores, metal and fuels. In 2010 primary commodities 
constituted around 80 per cent of total exports (Menon and Warr 2013: 6-7). Mining and 
hydropower have made especially significant contributions in recent years. For example in 
2013 these two sectors composed USD 1,983 million of the total merchandise exports of 
USD 3,882 million (IMF 2014a: 27). The share of manufacturing in exports had dropped by 
2013-2014 but the sector has shown a long-term increase in real terms. In 2003 value-
added output contributed by manufacturing amounted to 9 percent of the total, rising to 
11 percent in 2013 (World Bank 2014b: 18). 
The gradual liberalization and expansion of the Lao economy has been accompanied by an 
ongoing structural transformation (see Table 1). Laos’ external trade position is also weak. 
The current account deficit was an estimated USD 3.2 billion or 25 per cent of GDP in 2014 
according to ADB figures (ADB 2015b; 2015c).  The foreign exchange position is precarious 
and vulnerable to a terms-of-trade shock (ADB 2015c: 221; IMF 2014a: 4, 6). In response to 
these challenges Laos has embarked on a course of fiscal tightening (ADB 2015c: 220). The 
kip has appreciated in real terms in recent years despite close management by the 
authorities, and has hit export competitiveness (ADB 2015c: 221; World Bank 2015b: 107). 
Inflation has moderated in recent years. In November 2013 the rate of inflation reached a 
high of seven per cent, mainly propelled by rising food prices (World Bank 2014a: 4).
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Table 1: Sectoral Value-Added Contribution of GDP (%)
Sector/Year 1990 2000 2006 2010 2014
Agriculture 61.2 45.2 35.3 32.7 27.7
Services 24.3 38.2 37.0 35.5 40.9
Industry 14.5 16.6 27.7 31.8 31.4
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2016.
In 2014 however the annual rate had declined to 6.4 per cent, as a result of slower food 
price inflation and decreasing fuel costs in the context of falling global oil prices (World 
Bank 2015a: 10). 
Sustained economic growth has been correlated with improvements in human 
development indicators. A reduction in poverty has taken place, much-trumpeted by the 
government. According to government statistics, poverty incidence, as below a nationally 
defined poverty line, was 46.0 per cent of the population in 1992-1993 before dramatic 
drops to 39.8 per cent in 1997-1998 and 32.6 per cent in 2002-2003. Incidence declined at 
a similar rate, to 27.6 per cent, in the five-year interval to 2007-2008 before slowing 
somewhat to 23.2 per cent of the population in 2012-2013. Poverty reduction was 
especially marked in rural areas, declining from 51.8 per cent to 28.6 per cent from 1992-
1993 to 2012-2013, as compared to a drop from 26.5 per cent to 10 per cent in urban areas 
during the same time span (Warr et al 2015: 16). Government data indicates that absolute 
poverty has decreased but this has been accompanied by a rise in inequality. Laos’ Gini 
coefficient increased from 0.31 to 0.38 between 1992 and 2012. Warr et al (ibid. 10) 
summarize the inequality dynamic in the 20 years of their study as ‘[o]verall, the poor 
gained in real terms, but the rich gained much more.’ Average life expectancy rose from 
53.6 years in 1990 to 66.2 by 2014 (UNDP 2016). Educational coverage also expanded. 
Measured by mean years of schooling, education showed an increase from an average of 
3.1 years in 1990 to 5.0 years in 2014 (ibid.).
The contemporary macroeconomic context then is one of sustained growth fuelled by large 
injections of FDI with fiscal instability and an external position vulnerable to indebtedness 
and trade shocks. An ongoing structural transformation is underway but still incomplete. 
Poverty has declined for many but inequality has grown which, along with changes in 
employment structure, indicates increasing social differentiation. 
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Conclusion
Laos’ peripheral centrality and distance from maritime trade routes can be used as key 
frames for interpreting Laos’ history. While wishing to avoid a simplistic geographical 
determinism, it seems clear that these factors have had crucial influences on Laos’ 
historical development. Three persistent themes emerge. The first is the question of the 
exact nature of the Lao territories’ relations with external actors. How has Laos been 
influenced by larger neighbours or powerful external actors, on what terms, and how have 
Lao actors balanced relations with different external actors? Careful consideration of these 
questions can provide insights into the specificities of Laos’ subalternity throughout its 
history. On the whole Lao territories have been dependent on or subordinate to variously 
the Siamese, the French, the United States, or the Vietnamese at least since the time of the 
dissolution of the Lan Xang kingdom. This has not however entailed a state of abjection for 
all as Lao actors have sought strategic engagement with external actors to constellate 
power to their advantage within Laos. The French operated through and patronised an 
existing aristocracy, the RLG grew fat on American aid and the Vietnamese buttressed the 
power of the LPRP during and after the revolution. Peasants and workers were often left 
out of the largesse of economic aid, or the fruits of resource extraction and had access to 
the prestigious hierarchies of power blocked. Clearly some subalterns are more subaltern 
than others. It seems then that in contemporary development it pays to direct attention to 
how Lao actors engage with foreign influences to boost their power relative to both 
foreigners and other Lao actors. 
The second prominent theme relates to the first and it is the persistent question of 
orientation and integration. To which of its neighbours should Laos be oriented politically 
and economically and how should space be produced to enable integration and access to 
maritime circuits of trade? The French answered this question by resolving to weld Laos to 
Vietnam as part of a cohesive Indochinese economic space. The Lao government during 
pro-market reforms of the 1990s first turned to Thailand and then to a rising China. 
Orientation and integration are of course pertinent to the present regional integration, so 
the production of space in the service of specific forms of integration should be a clear 
concern of the present work. We would also do well to consider these first two themes in 
relation to each other. How do Lao actors engage with foreign forces to enact specific 
forms of spatial integration which differentially incorporate populations? 
This question speaks to the third persistent theme; the mobility and fixity of Lao 
populations. It seems there are interesting historical parallels throughout Lao history where 
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the powerful undertook to move people in or out of Laos to meet labour and/or security 
needs. For example, the forced depopulation of the Mekong’s east bank by the Siamese or 
the import of Vietnamese labour by the French to valorize natural resources. Low 
population densities and the demand for labour power have led to recurrent efforts to 
facilitate mobility and fix it in Lao territory, and Thailand has historically been a destination, 
willingly or not, for the Lao, especially those of the Mekong valley. Therefore, we should 
ascertain the possibility, extent and drivers of both the need to fix labour in place in Laos 
and movement of Lao people to Thailand. I suggest that all of these themes are manifesting 
in new ways in the era of Laos’ rapid capitalist development and deepening integration 
with its neighbouring countries, issues to which I now turn. 
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Chapter 5: The Political Economy of Lao Development and Regional 
Integration 2006-2014
Laos’ historical status of simultaneous centrality in the Southeast Asian landmass and its 
peripherality to the region’s economic circuits and political power remains a key issue in the 
country’s contemporary development.  This chapter situates the Savannakhet case in the 
broader spatial development processes of Laos’ capitalist transformation, especially recent 
policies to control the fixity and mobility of populations and territorialization projects – such 
as special economic zones - which allow integration with foreign capital and wider regional 
spaces. I thus develop empirically the key concept of territorial coherence in the Lao context. 
Moreover I develop the theme of the state taking on a historical form of capital-labour 
relations through its spatial practices. These are issues that will recur when we examine the 
empirical case of Savannakhet more closely. 
In a manner reminiscent of the French débloquement and orientation to a wider Indochinese 
space, the Lao government now pursues economic transformation through integration with 
the wider Southeast Asian region, especially the mainland. The Lao government seeks to 
secure its power and legitimacy through the development of a modernized capitalist 
economy. A strategy framed discursively by the government as turning Laos from a 
‘landlocked to a land-linked’ country comprises two main intertwined strands. The first is to 
turn Laos into a frontier space for regional and global circuits of capital; opening the country 
to FDI provides a fertile arena for foreign companies’ spatial fixes, overcomes the paucity of 
domestic capital formation, and stimulates economic transformation. The second is to 
create the material infrastructure and spatial organization which facilitates the circulation 
and fixing of capital, commodities, and people through and within Lao territory. The aim of 
the government then is to create Laos as a production base, a logistics node, and a territorial 
bridge necessary for the connectivity of the larger scale territorial formations of the Greater 
Mekong Subregion (GMS) and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). Capitalist 
modernization implies the transformation of the underlying social relations into a class 
structure characterized by a capitalist class and wage labour. Regional integration has thus 
entailed for Laos an ongoing reconfiguration of space, investment, and people which provide 
‘structured coherences’ for capital accumulation.
In this chapter I make five interrelated claims about the political economy of Laos’ regional 
integration and development. The first is that the Lao state prioritizes the development of 
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capitalism and the spatial fixes of foreign capital over other interests – such as labour or 
subsistence farmers - and is thus undergoing a historical process of transformation into a 
social form of capital-labour relations, albeit it one refracted through the ideological 
environment of post-socialist Laos. Foreign capital from Laos’ large neighbours – China, 
Thailand, and Vietnam – is especially prominent, maintaining a history of contestation over 
that space. The second claim is thus that through integration with regional capital circuits 
the state is not deprived of power but actively reproduces its power, sovereignty and 
legitimacy. Third, regional integration into the GMS scale attempts to achieve territorial 
coherence between national state spaces defined by high levels of uneven development, 
which presupposes transforming the territorial coherence within national territories. The 
fourth is that regional integration is grounded in local places and most notably enacted 
through state and capital strategies which manipulate space and control population, 
including their fixity and mobility. In the case of Laos and the GMS flows of capital, 
commodities and labour are processed through flexible yet strong reterritorializations of 
bounded state spaces which continue to structure and striate regional space. Fifth, 
economic territorialization projects and scale making processes are thus closely intertwined 
with the social construction of labour forces within and between territories. I thus develop 
the key critical lenses of fixity and mobility and territorialization which can shed light on the 
empirical investigation.
5.1 Development Policy as Capitalist Transformation
Development policy in Laos displays elements of economic liberalization, interventionist 
developmentalism, and post-socialist authoritarianism, but is fundamentally one of FDI-led 
capitalist transformation. The state’s development strategies aim to achieve the dual goals 
of enabling capitalist accumulation and transformation and reinforcing the legitimacy and 
power of the state in the context of constrained resources (GoL 2011: 79-81). The Lao state’s 
efforts to transform Laos into a capitalist social formation have implied class projects to 
encourage the development of a Lao capitalist class and effect a structural transformation in 
the labour force away from subsistence agriculture and towards wage labour and market 
commodity production. The Lao state thus has a class character as Glassman explains: 
The Pathet Lao state has…faced the difficult task of generating capital and an 
attendant class transformation through the efforts of a nascent protocapitalist class 
within and around the state, without substantial “national” resources or class 
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allies…The question for the class elites within the Lao state…is not an abstract question 
of socialism (or capitalism) but rather a concrete question of how to generate 
economic activity and forms of development that will enhance its own power and 
enable it to accumulate more surplus (2010: 140; see also G. Evans 1995: xiv-xx)
Figure 2: Contemporary Laos1
The overarching development goal reiterated by the government is graduation from Least 
Developed Country (LDC) status by 2020 (Sisouphanthong 2014: 182). The core method to 
1 Source: University of Texas Libraries 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/laos_pol_2003.jpg
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achieve this is to promote development of a diversified capitalist economy which will result 
in high levels of GDP growth and rising income per capita, and align this process with the 
human development aims of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. For this 
end policy makers have sought to utilize Laos’ abundant natural resources - especially 
hydropower, minerals, and land resources - provide an attractive environment for FDI, and 
promote structural transformation in the context of increasing international integration (GoL 
2006b: iv-viii). The 7th National Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP) for the years 
2011-2015 (GoL 2011) lists four broad overarching targets: maintain economic growth at 
eight percent per annum, with a GDP per capita target of USD 1,700 set for 2015; achieve 
sustainable development through integrating economic development with socio-cultural 
development and environmental protection; ensure political stability, fairness and order in 
society; attain the MDGs and full integration with the ASEAN Community by 2015 as means 
to enable Laos to graduate from LDC status (ibid. 79). The government’s targets can be 
interpreted as intentionally mutually supportive. High levels of economic growth and 
‘sustainable development’ to be achieved through regional integration will contribute to 
maintaining ‘political stability’ and ‘order’, terms which can be read as meaning the 
continuing dominance of the LPRP over the state and society and the maintenance of its 
legitimacy (ibid. 59). 
An industrialization and modernization strategy has thus been in place since the beginning of 
the century, with the government following a long-term plan based on stages: 
These are implementation of the 5th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) as a starting point of 
integration in regional and global economies, implementation of the 6th Five-Year Plan 
(2006-2010) as a building-up period, and completion of the industrialized foundation 
to graduate from the status of an LDC (2011-2020) (Oraboune 2011: 272)
The government has prioritized five main sectors for capitalist expansion in the country: 
‘hydroelectricity, agricultural production, tourism, mining, and construction material 
manufacturing’ (Oraboune 2012: 52). Industrialization is to be effected through the 
modernization of the agricultural sector, upgrading to more value-added activities of agro-
processing, the utilization of foreign capital, and the transfer of labour out of agriculture into 
industrial employment (GoL 2011: 95; World Bank 2014b).  For instance, in order to develop 
Lao industry and upgrade its ability to compete in domestic and export markets the strategy 
aims to ‘[i]nvite foreign capital of high quality that adheres to the principles of fair business 
practice and environmental regulations’ that should also ‘create jobs for local people and 
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enable transfer of technology’ (GoL 2011: 99). The government states in the 7th NSEDP that 
private domestic and foreign investment would account for ’50-56’ (USD 7.4-8.3 billion) 
percent of total investment over the plan period (ibid. 85), indicating the constraints of low 
levels of domestic capital formation. Moreover, this industrialization strategy, it should be 
stressed, is an open, export-oriented one. The government thus set a target in 2011 of an 
increase in export value by 18 percent per annum (ibid. 81). Moreover, exports are expected 
to stimulate ‘backward linkage sector development’ (Oraboune 2011: 273). 
Manufacturing development - while not as prevalent in government plans as natural 
resource extraction and agriculture - is an important means for providing structural 
transformation out of agriculture, especially since the natural resources sector creates few 
jobs (World Bank 2014b: 34). The 7th NSEDP sets a target for ‘processing’, a category 
containing manufacturing, to contribute at least 24 percent of GDP by 2015, and highlights 
garments, food and drink processing, wood processing and construction materials as key 
areas for development (GoL 2011: 97-98). The ‘manufacturing and handicrafts’ sector is 
targeted for growth rates of ‘maximum 13% per annum and to account for 15% of GDP’ by 
2015 (ibid. 81). An emerging trend in manufacturing development has been Laos’ insertion 
into regional and global production networks through the processing of intermediate goods, 
that is ‘semi-finished goods and parts and components’ (Oraboune 2011: 268). For example, 
the garment industry in Laos mainly consists of subcontractors - many of whom are investors 
from Thailand, China and Japan - importing materials and performing ‘cut make trim’ for 
export (ibid. 281-282). Motorcycle assembly factories are also prominent instances of 
foreign-invested companies – Korean, Japanese, and Chinese - importing components from 
suppliers in the region, especially in Thailand, to construct motorcycles for export and to 
supply the domestic market (ibid. 285-293). Establishing Laos as an export-oriented 
assembly platform is thus one important avenue of industrial development which potentially 
ties together government aims of foreign investment, regional integration, technology 
transfer, and the provision of non-agricultural jobs. 
Laos’ capitalist transformation has been accompanied by transformations in the state. Laos 
seeks to follow a linear, stage-based trajectory of structural transformation and capitalist 
modernization. Such a strategy entails changes in the forms and functions of the Lao state in 
its historical development to becoming a complementary form of capital-labour relations 
(Clarke 1991b). Among the key tasks of the ‘public administration’ are ‘upholding the role of 
effective state management of the economy’ and ‘ensuring continuous growth and stability’. 
Moreover the state is to maintain ‘a balance of capital’ and a ‘balance of labour’ (GoL 2011: 
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193) meaning that enough capital is mobilized for the development strategy and matched 
with enough labour in the key investment sectors (ibid. 85-88).  The state should ‘promote 
an integrated, planned market-oriented mechanism…and carefully calculate costs and 
effectiveness of investment projects’, suggesting regulatory and facilitating functions (ibid. 
193). Moreover, ‘intense consultation between the state and the business sector’ will occur 
and these ‘consultations will extend to finding ways to overcome impediments that the 
business sectors face’ (ibid. 196, emphasis added). Notably no other actor is granted the 
courtesy of ‘intense consultations’ over the direction of development. The state thus 
addresses itself to removing barriers to capital accumulation as a first order priority. The key 
point to remember is that the Lao state has embarked on a development strategy of 
attracting FDI, and so the accommodation of foreign capital’s spatial fixes has been 
complemented by the transformation of the Lao state into a political form of the underlying 
social relations between foreign capital and Lao labour. Before I turn to the regional 
integration process I examine some of the key foreign investors and actors operating within 
Laos. 
5.2 Foreign Investment and International Relations 
The regulatory transformation of the Lao government to process capital-labour relations is 
illustrated by the promulgation of the Investment Promotion Law in 2009 (GoL 2009). Article 
4 of the act states that the Lao ‘Government promotes investment in all economic sectors, 
both domestic and foreign, by formulating policies to create a favourable investment 
climate’. The law provides a legal basis for investor rights and investment protection, 
establishes a range of incentives such as profit tax and land lease fee exemptions, 
streamlines investment procedures through a one-stop service mechanism, and codifies 
procedures for establishing and investing in special economic zones. The promulgation of 
the law responds to the reality of booming foreign investments in Laos since the turn of 
century. 
The years between 2006 and 2014 saw sustained FDI flows, increasing markedly since 2013. 
FDI2 stood at USD 187.3 million and then averaged USD 290.6 million3 in 2007-2012 (World 
Bank 2016).4 FDI subsequently surged to USD 426.6 million in 2013 and a massive USD 720.8 
million in 2014. Government statistics cite ‘electricity generation’, likely large hydropower 
investments, as the largest channel for cumulative FDI, totalling USD 6.67 billion between 
2 Net inflows in current USD
3 Author’s own calculation using World Bank data.
4 Domestic capital provided 20.25 per cent of total investment in 2015 (World Bank 2016). 
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1989-2014. Significant amounts of cumulative foreign investment in the same period also 
flowed to mining (USD 5.68 billion), agriculture (USD 2.77 billion), services (USD 2.32 billion) 
and ‘industry and handicrafts’ (USD 1.97 billion) (GoL 2016a). China, Thailand and Vietnam 
jostle for position as the largest investors in Laos (see Table 2). Goto (2011: 78) found that 
between 2000-2009 FDI from China and Vietnam increased rapidly, joining a more steady 
and long-standing amount from Thailand. 
Table 2: FDI by Country 1989-20145
No. Country Projects Value (USD)
1 China 830 5,396,814,087
2 Thailand 746 4,455,364,613
3 Vietnam 421 3,393,802,891
4 Republic of Korea 291 751,072,139
5 France 223 490,626,243
6 Japan 102 438,242,441
7 Netherlands 16 434,466,484
8 Malaysia 101 382,238,773
9 Norway 6 346,435,550
10 UK 52 197,863,480
Total 2788 16,286,926,701
Source: Lao government statistics, http://www.investlaos.gov.la/index.php/resources/statistics
High levels of FDI from China, Thailand and Vietnam reflect Laos´ most important 
international relations; those with its powerful immediate neighbours. Laos´ neighbours vie 
for economic advantage and geopolitical influence, manifesting as investment and aid flows. 
Laos is in many ways in a dependent position vis-à-vis its neighbours but this does not entail 
that Lao actors are powerless and dominated.6 The Lao state actively pursues foreign 
investment to boost development and reproduce its own power and legitimacy.  
China´s recent influence in Laos dates from the late 1990s, after it had played a role in 
stabilizing Laos´ economy after the Asian financial crisis. China´s rise to global economic 
powerhouse caused a shift in relations with its Southeast Asian neighbours as production 
networks were established between China and Southeast Asia, feeding resources into 
5 Table shows approved investments. 
6 High (2014: 174) argues that ´there is a political orientation, present but not inevitable in the Lao 
political mosaic, that does not shy from the efficacy of foreign power, and indeed seeks it out´.
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China´s booming economy especially its export-led manufacturing sector (Thayer 2013: 194). 
Chinese investment and trade ties mounted throughout the decade (Stuart-Fox 2009: 146-
147). The boom in Chinese investment can be attributed to both improving bilateral 
governmental relations, the Chinese state strategy to ‘go out’, to send capital and labour 
overseas, and the eagerness of Chinese investors to seek new avenues for accumulation 
(Goto 2011; Su 2012; Tubilewicz and Jayasuriya 2015).  Chinese investment has been 
especially prominent in the northern parts of Laos close to the border with Yunnan. 
Agricultural land concessions have transformed the landscapes of northern regions as 
Chinese companies have moved in to grow crops such as rubber and bananas (Dwyer 2013; 
Dwyer 2014; Friis 2015; McAllister 2015; Friis et al 2016). The Chinese have also invested 
heavily in the construction of transport infrastructure such as roads and bridges (Stuart-Fox 
2009: 146; RFA 4/2/2016), an endeavour which may benefit Laos but also clearly serves 
Chinese aims of expanding trade and production links across Southeast Asia. Chinese 
investment has been accompanied by an influx of Chinese migrants to Laos, including 
investors, traders, and migrant labourers working on construction projects. This has led to 
considerable tension about the number of Chinese in Laos, amid concerns that such an influx 
will swamp Laos (Stuart-Fox 2009; Tan 2012). These worries have led some to make 
accusations of ‘neo-colonialism’ (Creak 2011: 121), or suggest that ‘Vientiane has effectively 
ceded sovereignty to Beijing’ (Crispin 2010, in Tan 2012: 80). There are however negotiated 
mutual benefits:
What the Chinese want for their grant aid and loans are three things: backing for 
Chinese policy on everything from Taiwan to Tibet; access for Chinese companies to 
exploit Lao resources; and lines of communication through Laos to Thailand. The Lao 
provide all three. What the Lao regime seeks in addition to aid and investment is 
political support in the face of Western pressures for reform, both economic and 
political, that the Lao are reluctant to accept. It receives this support in the guise of 
China’s policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states (Stuart-Fox 
2009: 147)
Some have suggested that China interferes in the sovereignty of Laos itself (Economist 
26/5/2011). The Lao state however uses Chinese power to boost its own influence and 
sovereignty by strategic spatial use of Chinese investments and promoting Laos’ regional 
integration through providing ´lines of communication´ to Thailand (Nyiri 2012; Tan 2012). 
The concrete measures that the state uses relate to its policy of ‘turning land into capital’ 
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discussed below. Laos, and its developmental strategies, is not however entirely pivoted 
towards China but also to Thailand and Vietnam.
Laos retains a close relationship with Vietnam, one which stems from the political tutelage 
and military support during the revolutionary period.  Vietnam views Laos as within its 
sphere of influence and benefits politically from having a stable, client regime on its eastern 
border (Stuart-Fox 2009: 151; Roberts 2012: 161). Vietnam gives aid in many fields, such as 
education and agriculture and also in explicitly political areas such as Party organization, 
security and the military (Stuart-Fox 2009: 149). Economic considerations are also important 
in Vietnam´s relations with Laos, as investment has increased (see Table 2) which has been 
interpreted as an intentional Vietnamese state strategy to boost Vietnamese capital (ibid. 
151; Kenney-Lazar 2012: 1025). The political relations and economic strategies of 
Vietnamese actors I would suggest cannot be easily separated, with political relations paving 
the way for economic cooperation and the extension of Vietnam-based circuits of capital 
into Laos (To et al 2014). Moreover, the Lao state does not facilitate the entry of Vietnamese 
capital in a one-way system of domination. For example, Kenney-Lazar (2012: 1025) notes 
how the Lao government gave land concessions to a Vietnamese company in return for 
financing of an international sporting event hosted by Laos in 2009. On a more local scale 
the illegal timber trade of Lao logs to Vietnam has been facilitated by Lao state officials for 
financial gain (To et al 2014). Vietnamese investments have been in rubber plantation 
concessions, mining, and services and are concentrated in the south and the east of the 
country (Stuart-Fox 2009; Baird 2011; Goto 2011; Kenney-Lazar 2012; Laungaramsri 2012; 
Schönweger and Messerli 2015). While Vietnamese capital is not a focus of the present work, 
its extension into Laos via close political relationships enacted at multiple Lao scales of 
governance demonstrates how Laos is being incorporated into the region via historically 
determined relations with neighbouring countries. 
Laos also has close historical affinities and connections with Thailand but seeks to maintain 
its difference and autonomy from the most economically powerful nation in mainland 
Southeast Asia. Rigg (2009: 708-710) suggests that the Thai/Lao relationship provides a 
pertinent dualism for comprehending Laos. The utility of such a frame stems from, Rigg 
argues, Laos´ attempts to differentiate itself from its larger neighbour with which it shares a 
language7, a religion and many common cultural and social features (ibid. 709). On the one 
7 Thai and Lao are closely related, yet distinct, languages which are mutually intelligible to a large 
extent. Lao speakers have little problem understanding and communicating in Thai because of 
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hand Laos seeks to maintain a physical, political and cultural boundary with Thailand, but on 
the other integrate economically with Thai territory. The importance of Thailand to Laos 
economically is illustrated by trade, as well as investment, figures. In 2014, Thailand was the 
origin of 56 percent of Laos’ imports and the destination for 22 percent of its exports (OEC 
2016). Thai investments have been concentrated in the energy sector, with hydropower 
providing an especially important outlet for Thai capital as well as a benefit in terms of 
energy supply to power the Thai economy (Goto 2011: 78; Baird and Quastel 2015). Laos’ 
orientation to Thailand also operates at a village level. Labour migration to Thailand has 
linked Lao villages with distant Thai places through social networks of labour and 
remittances (Khumya and Kusakabe 2015). Cooperation between the Lao and Thai 
governments has also seen a burgeoning transport infrastructure as part of regional 
integration projects (ADB 2010a; Lainé 2014). An especially pertinent point here is that this 
transport infrastructure has allowed Thailand and Laos to be integrated through the 
extension of production networks from Thailand to Laos (Rasiah et al 2011; Norasingh 2013; 
also Oraboune 2011). As will be shown in Chapter 7 on foreign investment in Savannakhet, 
many of these production networks are those of globally active multinational corporations 
originating in advanced capitalist countries.  Laos´ integration into global circuits of capital is 
being mediated through its integration with Thai territory and companies´ regional bases 
located there.
Relations with other extra-regional countries thus play a smaller but increasingly important 
role in Laos´ industrial development. Japan and Korea have become more prominent in the 
past decade. Japan has been the source for an increasing amount of investment. Approved 
investments8 from Japan totalled USD 90.86 million in 2011-2015 (GoL 2016a). Japanese 
companies are prominent in the Savan-Seno SEZ (Vientiane Times 5/3/2016). South Korea 
also has a rising profile in Laos. South Korea’s approved investments were USD 222.65 
million over 2011-20159 (GoL 2016a). Korean investment has been especially noticeable in 
the success of Motolao,10 a motorcycle manufacturer operating in both Vientiane and 
Savannakhet. France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands have also been significant 
investors in recent years and again European capital has extended regional production 
networks into Laos, also notably in the Savannakhet industrial border enclave (GoL 2016a). 
significant consumption of Thai media. Thai speakers comprehend Lao with more difficulty due to less 
exposure.
8 ‘Approved investments’ refers to investment projects which have been approved by the Lao 
government. They may or may not have actually been invested when the statistics are reported. 
9 See Table 2.
10 Company name has been anonymized. 
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The Lao government has thus enacted its industrialization and modernization strategy by 
opening to FDI, especially from neighbouring countries and the wider East Asian region. FDI 
has boosted the power of Lao state actors at national and subnational scales, as indicated by 
foreign financing of the state and local officials’ facilitation of illegal trade. The Lao 
government thus seeks to recast its peripheral centrality into a new yet historically 
determined set of internationalized social relations which simultaneously reproduce foreign 
capital and the state apparatus. How FDI has played a role in entrenching the power of the 
Lao government over population and territory will be examined in greater detail below. The 
Lao state´s processing of foreign capital-Lao labour relations in new socio-spatial 
combinations within the country is, I suggest, the simultaneous rescaling of Lao territory into 
larger regional spaces of capital accumulation and economic development; the emerging 
scales of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS).
5.3 Regional Integration and the Greater Mekong Subregion Scale
Actors engaging in processes of international economic integration in developing country 
contexts are arguably primarily interested in securing new forms of territorial coherence 
between national jurisdictions (Perkmann 2007; Faludi 2013). In conditions of uneven 
development between and within countries the differing spatial concentrations of capital, 
labour, land and material and informational resources must be recombined to create an 
expanded, integrated space for the circulation of capital.  I suggest, following Glassman 
(2010) that viewing Laos´ regional integration as motivated by various actors´ attempts to 
secure an advantageous territorial coherence – which necessarily implies disadvantages and 
adverse incorporation for other actors – is a useful way to understand the country´s 
contemporary development. It will also be suggested, following Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) 
that regional integration in the case of Southeast Asia does not imply a straightforward 
lowering of barriers to the flows of capital, commodities and people but rather is enacted 
through the reterritorialization of state spaces that attempt to privilege specific powerful 
actors. 
The role of international integration has been conceptualized in terms of increasing 
sophistication in Lao national development plans, incorporating integration into the AEC11 
and the GMS. A core international goal of the 6th NSEDP was membership of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), achieved in 2013. In addition the plan aimed to ‘explore trade 
11 The AEC is one of the three ‘pillars’ of ASEAN integration, the others being the ASEAN Security 
Community and the ASEAN Socio-cultural Community (Das et al 2013). 
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and cooperation arrangements that generate more benefits and limit to a minimum all 
constraints that might impede socio-economic development’ (GoL 2006b: 59). The 7th NSEDP 
provides much more detailed guidance for international cooperation both within the 
frameworks of the AEC and the GMS. The aim of the AEC is to increase Southeast Asian 
regional integration beyond that of a free trade area to create ‘a single market and 
production’ base through the ‘free flow of goods, services, foreign direct investment and 
skilled labour and the “freer flow of capital”’ by the end of 2015 (Tiong 2013: vii-viii). The 7th 
NSEDP thus emphasizes tasks for AEC integration such as: the development of ‘a legal 
system supporting creation of a common market’; creating ‘an enabling and favourable 
environment for competition’;  deepening ‘integration with the ASEAN and world economy’; 
and ‘fulfilling obligations under the AFTA [ASEAN Free Trade Agreement]’ (GoL 2011: 221-
222). While predating the AEC the GMS project coheres with it in terms of facilitating trade 
and investment, promoting infrastructural connectivity, and aiming to narrow the 
development divide between richer and poorer members of ASEAN (Pomfret and Das 2013: 
302-305). The GMS plays a key role in Lao government development thinking. International 
integration targets in the 7th NSEDP for 2015 included achieving the Greater Mekong 
Subregion (GMS) Cooperation Plan and Triangle Development Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam 
Cooperation Plan (a part of the GMS integration project); and increased GMS cooperation 
with neighbouring Mekong basin countries (GoL 2011: 84). The narrowing of the 
development divide may however be questioned because as I suggest in the section below. 
Governments and international organizations are constructing the GMS as a distinct regional 
scale which however links to the broader Southeast Asian scale and the global economy.
The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Programme was established in 1992 and involves six 
countries through which the Mekong runs: Cambodia, Yunnan Province of the People’s 
Republic of China (later expanded to include Guangxi Province); Lao PDR; Myanmar; 
Thailand; and Vietnam. The GMS scheme gained impetus from the changing geopolitical 
context where by the end of the 1980s Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos had emerged from 
years of violent conflict and embarked on market reform. Thailand, at that time in the midst 
of rapid economic expansion, wished to engage in regional integration as it would enable 
access to the resources of its newly peaceful neighbours and other economic opportunities 
that their pro-market turn might present (Krongkaew 2004; Oehlers 2006). In Thai Prime 
Minister Chatichai Choonhavan´s famous phrase the historical conjuncture would be 
summed up as turning ´battlefields into marketplaces´ (Krongkaew 2004). The main 
principles of the GMS Programme were thus formalized into an integration and cooperation 
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agreement (Oehlers 2006: 465). The ADB claims that the ‘Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 
is a natural economic area bound together by the Mekong River’ (ADB 2016), but the reality 
is that it is a socially constructed region produced through intentional strategies and 
discourses. The discursive promotion and attempted naturalization of the GMS as a regional 
construct has ‘been consciously produced within the literature of a specific institution, the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB)’ (Glassman 2010: 6) and can be interpreted as an example of 
the social construction of scale (Delaney and Leitner 1997). The GMS Programme is not a 
formal institution like the ASEAN or a free trade agreement such as the AFTA but rather a 
looser cooperation and integration programme. The GMS is based on the concept of the 
growth triangle: cooperation between neighbouring countries at different levels of 
development to not only bolster trade between them but also to exploit their 
complementarity in order to boost exports to outside the growth triangle (Krongkaew 2004: 
979). Growth triangles are a way to combine investment and cheap labour in an export-
oriented strategy that trades beyond the region and so integrates with the world market 
(Cammack 2016: 177). The GMS could thus ‘’exploit the comparative advantages of the 
participating economies through the reallocation of production bases for purposes of 
export’’ (ADB 1995; 27 in Cammack 2016: 177). Actors driving the GMS integration process 
are then, I would propose, attempting to create new forms of territorial organization and 
coherence between GMS state territories (Swyngedouw 1992). 
In pursuit of territorial reorganization the GMS has ‘five strategic thrusts’ (ADB 2012: 2): 
strengthening infrastructure linkages; facilitating cross-border trade and investment, and 
tourism; enhancing private sector participation and competitiveness; developing human 
resources; and protecting the environment and promoting the sustainable use of shared 
natural resources. The GMS Programme’s strategy to achieve these goals hinges on the first 
‘thrust’ mentioned, infrastructure. A system of ‘economic corridors’ which traverse 
mainland Southeast Asia from north to south and east to west is planned. These economic 
corridors represent a strategy which links together the national territories of GMS countries 
into a supranational space. The corridors operate as lines of connection which link together 
‘nodes’, such as urban centres. Corridors are complexes of transport infrastructure, 
communications networks and cross-border free trade zones which provide opportunities 
for production and trade on either side of the main arteries, while simultaneously providing 
the material infrastructure which facilitate the circulation of capital, commodities and 
people across the subregion (Taillard 2014: 26-27). 
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The ADB’s GMS vision is for corridors to be developed along both north-south and east-west 
axes (ADB 2010a; ADB 2010b; ADB 2010c). Laos is thus transected by both the North-South 
Economic Corridor (NSEC) and the East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC), Savannakhet lying 
along the latter. The EWEC was launched at the Eighth GMS Ministerial Meeting in 1998 as a 
flagship GMS initiative (ADB 2010a: 6). The corridor links the Indian Ocean at Mawlaymine in 
Myanmar with the South China Sea at Da Nang in Vietnam, extending 1,320 km across 
mainland Southeast Asia. The corridor also links together: commercial nodes – important 
commercial centres; border nodes at border checkpoints; gateway nodes – ports at either 
end which give access to external markets; and interchange nodes at intersecting points with 
north-south arterial routes (ibid. 6-7). 
    Figure 3: GMS Economic Corridors12
The ADB specifically targets Laos as EWEC’s ‘weakest link’, noting that trade and tourism 
flow across Laos between Thailand and Vietnam but few Lao produced goods are exported 
12 Source: ADB 2010c, p.2
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along the corridor. Savannakhet province is a particular focus of business promotion for the 
ADB (ibid. 51, 55). While the ADB highlights the need for small and medium enterprises in 
the Lao section of the corridor, ‘cross-border investments’ are pivotal for the EWEC: 
The EWEC provides an opportunity to obtain economies of scale in the production of 
cross-border industries, and this larger production area, in turn, provides the basis 
with which to develop intra-firm trade, implement marketing processes that takes 
advantage of vertical and horizontal product differentiation in markets outside the 
region, expand the volume of intra-industry trade within the EWEC, and bring in much 
needed domestic and foreign investment and financial capital to the subregion (ibid. 
66)
The EWEC is pivotal for creating a ‘larger production area’ which ‘provides the basis’ for new 
forms of territorial organization of ‘cross-border industries’ and the circulation of capital. 
The corridors aim to create a new regional GMS scale by creating an arena for spatial fixes 
for investors, both from the GMS region and further afield. EWEC countries are thus to enact 
policies to attract capital, liberalize trade and make investments in transnational 
infrastructure for the pursuit of greater regional coherence and complementarities in the 
pursuit of global competitiveness, and so the regional strategy is one ‘of state, regional and 
global transformation (Cammack 2016: 178, original emphasis). 
For the Lao state the GMS focus on regional integration dovetails with the long-held spatial 
development discourse of turning Laos from ‘land-locked’ to a ‘land-linked’ country and also 
with FDI-led development.13 Laos hopes to benefit not only from increased trade and 
investment opportunities but also to operate as a logistics platform, criss-crossed by the 
economic corridors of the GMS project along which Laos’ own industrial structure can be 
implanted (Pholsena and Banomyong 2006; Sisoupanthong 2014: 183). 
Cammack (2016: 175-176) indicates both the relevance of the regional scale to the insertion 
of national territories into global capital circulation and the class-oriented nature of these 
transformations. Glassman (2010: 11-12) suggests that a class-based approach to the 
analysis of GMS regionalization is vital to grasp how forms of human agency are central in 
incorporating GMS countries into the new regional scale in highly uneven ways, with for 
example Myanmar – and to a lesser extent Laos – mainly contributing cheap labour. I concur 
13 Scalar construction is also evident in another prominent Lao developmental discourse: that of 
becoming the ‘battery of Asia’ through hydropower development and export (Glassman 2010: 137-
146; Baird and Quastel 2015)
119
with Glassman that this uneven incorporation is driven by class actors. Glassman however 
identifies the class incorporation of Lao workers into the GMS scale as primarily through 
migration to Thailand (ibid. 141), but as I shall demonstrate in Chapters 8 and 9 the uneven 
development of the GMS scale necessitated a new socio-spatial construction of Lao labour 
within Lao territory. Far from creating a smooth space of integrated flows, FDI and regional 
integration have implied reterritorializations of Lao state space and labour.
5.4 The Lao State and Territorialization Projects: Managing Fixity and Mobility 
5.4.1 The Lao State
The construction of territorial coherence on an expanded scale, I would suggest, is in the Lao 
case predicated on the reconfiguration of territorial coherence within the territory 
controlled by the Lao government. The Lao state has thus embarked on rounds of spatial 
restructuring to create a territorial organization for the fixity and mobility of capital 
(Swyngedouw 1992; Brenner 1998; Harvey 2006). Spatial restructuring is also deeply 
implicated with the management of the fixity and mobility of populations as a key part of 
the social construction of labour needed to reproduce that capital. 
State power rests firmly with the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, the only permitted party 
(GoL 1991). The LPRP is pervasive within Lao society and controls the key institutions of the 
government, the military, the bureaucracy and the mass organizations. The latter are the 
Lao Front for National Construction; the Lao Federation of Trade Unions (LFTU)14; the 
Revolutionary Youth Union; and the Lao Women’s Union. The mass organizations are 
directed by the party and substitute for civil society, and function primarily as channels for 
surveillance and indoctrination of different sections of Lao society (Stuart-Fox 2006: 65). The 
Politburo, or officially the Council of Ministers, is the highest executive body (ibid. 64).The 
National Assembly (NA) is the legislative body. Traditionally viewed since its inception as 
merely existing to rubber stamp the decisions of the Politburo, the NA has shown signs in 
recent years of playing a more active role in Lao politics. The Politburo still rules by decree 
but ‘an increasingly active and institutionalized National Assembly…has been drafting, 
deliberating, and implementing new laws’ (Roberts 2012: 152). Public debate in Lao society 
is still however highly constrained (High 2013: 139-146; Belloni 2014).
The LPRP permeates society but the centre in Vientiane does not command strict 
hierarchical control over subnational power structures. The administrative configurations of 
14 See Chapter 6
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the country give latitude for provincial and district-level autonomy and variation in policy 
implementation. The central government has enacted several rounds of decentralization and 
recentralization of powers as it has sought stable administrative solutions for governing its 
transition to capitalist development (Stuart-Fox 2006: 63). The province has been a key scale 
where administrative powers have been de- and recentralized. Soukamneuth (2006: 89; see 
also Barma and Oksen 2014) notes  that provincial governors’ position in the party hierarchy, 
above many ministers, allows them to bypass the command structures of vertically 
organized ministries as in ‘most cases, the higher party rank of ministers, vis-à-vis governors, 
determines the effectiveness of central policies on the local level’.
Appointments at district and provincial level are made by the LPRP, and therefore district 
officials and provincial governors are Party members representing Party interests rather 
than those of local communities. Village head elections are held but with the district level 
determining lists of suitable candidates. Village chiefs thus become proxy agents of the 
district level in the village, thus extending Party and state control to the smallest political 
units (Stuart-Fox 2005: 21). The Law on Local Administration in 2004 established a legal 
platform for decentralization. The Law re-emphasized the administrative structure advanced 
in the late 1980s of provinces as strategic planning units, districts as planning and budgeting 
units, and villages as implementation units (Lestrelin et al 2012: 590-591; Barma and Oksen 
2014: 114). 
Referring to the context of rural development, Lestrelin et al (2012: 591) state that these 
administrative reconfigurations entail that objectives and strategies set at the central level 
drive development processes, but these are reinterpreted and implemented at subnational 
scales depending on local economic opportunities and constraints and the agency of 
provincial and district leaders. Reinterpretation has given rise to regional differences in, for 
example, plantation concessions (ibid. 591). Kenney-Lazar (2012: 1023) also notes  that 
‘central level government policies regulating land concessions are not often implemented at 
the provincial level due to policy misunderstanding and miscommunication, a lack of 
resources to implement policies’ and illegal, rent-seeking behaviour by local officials. 
Provinces and even districts can sign agreements directly with foreign investors 
(Laungaramsri 2012; Lestrelin et al 2012) and so economic integration occurs at multiple, 
differentiated scales constituted by varying levels of regulatory mediation (cf. Tubilewicz and 
Jayasuriya 2015). The autonomy of subnational administrative units is a continuing concern 
for central party leaders, who ‘blame provincial and local officials for siphoning off the fruits 
of development’ (Creak 2014: 160).  Provincial governments, as well as district and village-
121
level officials, are exhorted to implement central directives faithfully and adhere to 
jurisdictional limits (ibid. 161). 
Development policy is thus constructed and implemented in an uneven and contested 
territorial-scalar formation. This configuration of power is constituted by struggles within the 
state apparatus over jurisdictional limits and the extraction, appropriation and distribution 
of economic resources.  The key point here is that Laos’ capitalist development has been 
played out through transformations of the state’s constellations of command over space. 
State actors’ reconfigurations of territorial regulation and specific forms of capital 
accumulation pursue new forms of territorial coherence. 
5.4.2 Territorialization Projects: Managing Mobility and Fixity 
Foreign-invested capital accumulation in Laos, I seek to show, has been facilitated by the Lao 
state through reterritorializations of the country’s space. That is, there has been a 
proliferation of bordered spaces within and on Laos’ borders which have allowed capital to 
enter and articulate Laos with the regional and global scales. Moreover, I suggest that a 
crucial component of the reterritorialization of Lao space is the management of populations, 
with control of people’s fixity and mobility providing a particularly useful lens to interpret 
contemporary development processes in the country. I contend then that FDI transplanting 
into Lao space as a globally integrative social relation has relied on strategies of 
territorialisation, forming parcels of space which favour particular types of economic activity 
and configuring the fixity and mobility of capital and labour. Lao state practices of 
reterritorializing populations are often applied to the population of highland ethnic 
minorities and this provides a context for understanding how somewhat similar practices 
may also be targeting the ethnic Lao of the lowlands in the Savannakhet case. 
A useful starting point for discussing the Lao state’s territorialization projects is Lestrelin et 
al’s (2012) periodization of land use planning policy. They highlight three main projects of 
the LPRP dating from 1975, which started at different times but continue to the present: 
moving people from the hills and exploiting abundant natural resources since 1975; stopping 
the chain of degradation and rationalizing land use since 1990; and turning land into capital 
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since 1997 (ibid. 584-590). Of particular interest for illustrating the present argument are the 
first and third of these projects.15 
In the immediate post-revolutionary period the LPRP was faced with the task of securing 
national territory and welding together diverse populations in a project of socialist state 
reconstruction. In a context where ethnic groups in Laos had fought on different sides in the 
Indochinese wars, the LPRP ‘urgently needed to increase political control over remote and 
potentially subversive populations’ and gather ‘disparate and often poorly connected ethnic 
minorities’ for socialist development (ibid. 584). Internal resettlement of highland 
populations emerged as the key strategy for accomplishing these goals.  Over time the 
resettlement strategy became a key means to achieve government developmental goals of 
facilitating market access and service delivery, reducing swidden agriculture, eradicating 
opium, enhancing cultural integration and nation building, as well as responding to ongoing 
security concerns (Evrard and Goudineau 2004; Baird and Shoemaker 2007; Dwyer 2014). 
Resettlement involves developing Focal Sites and Village Consolidation, both of which 
function to concentrate populations with the aims of poverty alleviation, service delivery, 
commercialization of agriculture, and elimination of swidden cultivation. Focal Sites are 
oriented to the development of infrastructure - ‘roads, schools, health clinics, irrigation, 
market facilities’ – and have been established by national, provincial and district-level 
administrations (Baird and Shoemaker 2007: 874-875). A key point here is that the Lao state 
seeks to create new forms of territorial coherence through moving people and fixing them in 
new configurations of infrastructure and population for the purposes of market-based 
development – the commercialization of agriculture – and state control. 
Another crucial point of relevance to the current case is that the agency of subaltern 
populations was also present.  The often negative effects of resettlement on poverty, health 
and livelihoods have been actively resisted (Rigg 2005: 108-111). For example, resettled 
peoples pursued new mobilities and migrations in search of better livelihood opportunities, 
or ignored or circumvented land regulations (Evrard and Goudineau 2004; Lestrelin 2011; 
Kusakabe et al 2015). Reterritorializations can be contested by subaltern actors in multiple 
ways, even in a constraining authoritarian context such as Laos. As Lestrelin (2011: 317; cf. 
Baird 2010) notes it ‘is not simply a matter of resisting territorial projects that are deemed 
unsustainable or undesirable. It is also a matter of exploiting and colonizing interstitial 
15 The second of these involved promoting sustainable development through the zoning of village and 
forest land into areas of conservation or where particular economic activities would be permitted 
(Lestrelin et al 2012: 587). 
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spaces within and between existing territorialization projects’. It would appear that 
elements of populations ‘exploiting interstitial spaces’ can also be seen in the 
territorialization project of ‘turning land into capital’.
In 1997 the Lao government began implementing a strategy of land enclosures with the 
intention of turning land into a means of economic development. Demand from foreign 
investors for access to natural resources influenced the government to identify ‘”empty” 
space or [free] space for the development of large-scale mining, hydropower, plantation and 
agribusiness concessions’ (Lestrelin et al 2012: 588). Private-sector investment was to bring 
in technological improvements and economies of scale to make large tracts of ‘unutilized’ or 
‘underutilized’ land profitable, while simultaneously achieving long-held policy objectives of 
eradicating shifting cultivation, concentrating remote villages into focal sites by removal 
from project areas, and so integrating ethnic minorities into the mainstream of Lao 
development and culture (ibid. 589). The reterritorialization of parcels of land as centres of 
foreign accumulation has in many cases disembedded local people from traditional 
livelihood systems leading to accusations of ‘land-grabbing’ (Dwyer 2007; Baird 2011: 
Kenney-Lazar 2012; Dwyer 2013). Large-scale land concessions have been marked by 
contestation over the command of space, as village-level territories have been subsumed 
under concession areas and the right to produce and use resources within those areas 
transformed, often in favour of powerful foreign actors but nevertheless with resistance 
from local people (Dwyer 2007; Laungaramsri 2012; Delang et al 2013; Hatcher 2014; 
McAllister 2015). The Lao government’s strategy of ‘turning land into capital’ is a key means 
of regional integration via foreign capital from neighbouring countries. State and 
international organization actors’ pursuit of territorial economic coherence over an expanded 
scale entails the reterritorialization of subnational spaces in Laos and with it the 
transformation of the territorial coherence of land, capital, labour and their regulation within 
those subnational spaces. Rigg (2005: 149) suggests that the marketization of the Lao 
development trajectory ‘involves closing off some, usually traditional, activities and opening 
up other, new ones’. Rigg is perhaps too upbeat about the new opportunities that 
marketized development brings. In the case of plantation concessions the ‘opening up’ of 
new activities has involved dispossession of local communities and their reincorporation into 
the plantation systems under conditions of exploitative wage labour, or as Baird (2011) puts 
it an article title ‘turning land into capital, turning people into labour’ (see also GAPE and JVC 
2011; Kenney-Lazar 2012; and Chapter 6 below). 
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Baird’s phrase neatly encapsulates the dual processes of state and capital’s 
reterritorializations which seek to command and construct both space and populations. As 
noted above FDI has been used by the Lao state to reinforce its political control. More 
concretely, and following Arnold (2012) and Dwyer (2013; 2014), it appears that in Laos the 
reterritorialization of subnational space to provide zones of global capital accumulation has 
been used to control populations, and incorporate them into regional integration in a 
subordinated position, especially at the margins of national territories (cf. Hughes 2011). 
This is somewhat different from saying that graduated sovereignty of special economic 
zones and suchlike are ‘ultimately under the control of…nation-state elites’ (Nyiri 2012: 534). 
Reconfiguring land and capital can be used to reinforce and produce the state’s power and 
control over territory and people rather than assuming a pre-existing state sovereignty over 
a given space (Lund 2011). This suggests that the Lao state is gaining a mode of concrete 
existence as a complementary political form of capital-labour relations precisely through its 
spatial practices. 
Dwyer (2013: 313) argues that land deals between state and foreign capital in northern Laos 
became ‘tools for managing not only problematic villagers, but local authorities as well’ 
demonstrating how ‘new bilateral connections can strengthen the hand of central-level 
authorities’. Central level authorities siting a coconut plantation concession for a Thai 
investor in an area of recent shifting cultivation was seemingly not a search for empty or 
unutilized land but rather for a population without a ‘permanent livelihood’ regarded as in 
need of development. The swidden landscape of the area was for Dwyer ‘not an unintended 
casualty of [the land concession], but its specific target’ (ibid. 318). The sedenterization of 
the population of the area would be achieved by creating the concession and also offering 
local villagers compensation for lost production in the form of wage labour on the new 
plantations (ibid. 316). Moreover, the province level authorities had intended to log timber 
in the concession area but the land deal foreclosed that possibility, reinforcing the power of 
the central level to allocate resources (ibid. 316). In another paper Dwyer (2014) proposes 
that the narrative of Vientiane ceding sovereignty to China is misplaced. He argues that very 
different agribusiness concession arrangements were enacted in two different locations – 
with a ‘far more intrusive and disruptive’ form of enclosure in one site enacted due to the 
Lao state’s historical security concerns over the trustworthiness of certain ethnic groups 
(ibid. 382). The pairing of a Chinese rubber planting project with a focal site of resettled, and 
to the Lao state potentially subversive, ethnic groups resulted in enclosure of land and a 
labour regime which was ‘more enclosure- and wage-labour-heavy’ than concession 
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schemes pursued elsewhere and also ‘deliberately geared…toward keeping…residents on 
the land’ (ibid. 398). It is noteworthy that the construction of the labour force for the 
Chinese plantation was refracted through the particular historically determined ideological 
environment of a security-conscious post-revolutionary state. The state selected ethnic 
groups for land-labour regimes, with large variations in developmental benefits and 
autonomy for the ethnicities in question, in order to satisfy its security requirements. 
Dwyer’s account illustrates how constructed FDI-territorial arrangements reflect existing 
state power, and produce it by differentially incorporating and processing populations, a 
point also relevant to SEZ development in Laos.
5.5 Special Economic Zones as Turning Land into Capital
Special economic zones are one type of project with which the government aims to ‘turn 
land into capital’, and the fact that many have been placed on borders, I would propose, 
means that they offer a particularly privileged lens for understanding regional integration 
and territory in Laos. I want to suggest two key points in this section. The first point is a 
concrete development of the argument that FDI-based territorialization cannot be construed 
as simple erosion of sovereignty – while admitting elements of relinquishing power over 
space to extra-territorial actors may be present. FDI-based territorialization can structure 
and produce the power relations between state and society actors within Laos by developing 
new types of territorial coherence and overturning others. The second is thus that SEZs in 
Laos are constructed by the government and capital to form new types of territorial 
coherence between countries in the region, that is provide exceptional nodes of territory 
which facilitate the circulation of capital on an expanded regional basis. SEZs provide a 
structured territorial coherence which reconfigures land, capital, labour, infrastructure and 
institutional and regulatory orders in pursuit of the FDI that is deemed so crucial to Laos’ 
development. The siting of SEZs on Laos’ borders is crucial as Laos’ peripheral centrality in 
the context of regional integration makes its own peripheries central to its development 
process. ‘Coherence’ does not imply even and equitable spatial integration because SEZs 
privilege the mobility and fixity of some actors, especially foreign capital, over other actors 
such as labour and dispossessed locals. SEZs in Laos structure and striate space in order to 
enact specific, uneven and unequitable forms of regional integration. 
The concept of SEZ development in Laos started, according to government literature, from a 
feasibility study in 2000 on the Second International Mekong Bridge (SIMB) performed by 
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JICA,16 with the bridge linked to the construction of the Savan-Seno zone as an ‘experimental 
site’ for attracting ‘domestic and foreign investment’ (GoL 2012: 4). From the outset then 
SEZ development was tangibly linked to regional integration. Government policy 
distinguishes between ‘special economic zones’ and ‘specific economic zones’. ‘Special 
economic zones’ are enclaves which promote, facilitate and grant special privileges to 
businesses governed under differentiated regulatory regimes from the wider state territory, 
which are designed to attract investment and have an area of at least 1000 hectares. Special 
economic zones may encompass a wide range of economic activities such as industrial 
production and duty-free trade and so are a broader concept than ‘specific economic zones’. 
The latter are zones designed for a specific economic activity such as ‘production for export 
zone, tourism zone, duty free zone, technology and information development zone, border 
trade zone, etc.’ so that a special economic zone may be comprised of different specific 
economic zones (ibid. 1). For simplicity in the following I will use ‘special economic zones’ 
and ‘SEZ’ to refer to both unless specifically indicated. 
The broad aims of SEZs are ‘to contribute to a rapid socio-economic development, to 
integrate Lao economy into the regional and international economies, to promote an 
economic reform based on market mechanism under the supervision of the state [sic]’, aims 
to be achieved through ‘building an industrial foundation moving forward to modernization 
by transformation of land into capital, using strategic position potentiality [sic]’ (ibid. i). The 
emphasis on ‘strategic position’ indicates that SEZs are a core component of the 
government’s spatial development strategy, with zones located in important urban centres 
and in border areas so that they benefit from and construct greater economic connectivity in 
those locations (GoL 2011; Nolintha 2011; Nolintha 2012). The 7th NSEDP thus states: ‘with 
the establishment of economic zones, there will be some diffusion effect, thereby 
stimulating economic development of the area, as well as linking up with neighbouring 
regions for raw materials supply and markets’ (GoL 2011: 151). 
The Lao state has created a new administrative structure and implemented new governance 
mechanisms to implement the SEZ policy. The governance principle for the zones is ‘smaller 
administration unit but wider society’ meaning that each SEZ has the autonomy and 
authority to contact, coordinate and sign agreements with domestic and foreign investors, 
and ‘to consider and approve the investment, business operations, production, services, 
revenue-expenditure, administration and management’ within the zones  (GoL 2010a: 
16 The Japanese state’s international development agency.
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Articles 3-4). The aim is to streamline bureaucratic investment procedures and management 
practices and channel them through a smaller, more efficient internationalized governance 
unit (GoL 2012: 5). Zone administrations are not fully autonomous and remain under the 
oversight of the National Committee for Special and Specific Economic Zones (NCSEZ), which 
in 2014 was located under the Prime Minister’s Office.17 The NCSEZ is chaired by the deputy 
prime minister and was founded in recognition of the importance of SEZs to development 
strategy. In addition, the SEZ Secretariat Committee was established in 2010 under the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment as an administrative unit to support the NCSEZ 
(Nolintha 2011: 201-202). SEZ administrative reform thus represents a rescaling of powers to 
highly localized territorial administrative units in pursuit of grounding FDI, perhaps 
emblematic of a process of ‘glocalization’ (Swyngedouw 2004). 
Figure 4: Lao SEZs.18 Savan-Seno (number 1), Boten Golden City (2), and Golden Triangle (3) 
are shown.
Extensive plans for SEZ development have not been matched by swift development on the 
ground. By 2014 ten special economic zones had been legally established by the 
17 The NCSEZ was moved to be under the Ministry of Planning and Investment in June 2016 as part of 
efforts to streamline administration. See Vientiane Times 16/6/2016. 
18 Source: http://www.investlaos.gov.la/index.php/where-to-invest/special-economic-zone
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government19 but only three had begun operation (GoL 2016b). These were the Savan-Seno 
SEZ (established 2003), the Boten Golden City SEZ (2003), and the Golden Triangle SEZ 
(2007). The Savan-Seno was the only one oriented primarily towards industrial development, 
with Boten Golden City (BGC) and Golden Triangle (GT) SEZs operating models of casino-
based tourism. BGC and the GT SEZs are located in northwestern Laos and are large-scale 
concessions to Chinese investors. The Lao state and investors’ intended objective for BGC 
and GT has been to encourage casino tourism from Thailand and China, countries where 
gambling is forbidden and thus ‘stimulate a development dynamic by providing tax 
advantages’ (Tan 2012: 80). 
Boten Golden City is located in Luang Namtha province on the border with China. It is also 
sited on the GMS’s North-South Economic Corridor. The zone was established legally in 2002 
when the Lao government granted Fu-Khing, a Hong-Kong registered company, a 30-year 
concession of 1,640 hectares (ibid. 80). The zone was opened for business in 2007 with its 
main feature being a casino-hotel complex. BGC’s initial operations were characterized by 
being almost exclusively Chinese, including the employees, small business owners, the 
currency, and communications networks (Nyiri 2012: 536). A yearly increasing concession 
fee was arranged in advance, starting from USD 700,000 until 2010, and USD 2 million in 
2011-2013. With the fee the investors essentially bought the right to levy taxes and 
administrative fees, retained by the zone administration. In addition the administration was 
permitted to enact zone legislation (ibid. 537). By 2010 the zone had run into difficulties as 
reports in Chinese media surfaced of indebted gamblers being illegally detained and 
murdered, and the Chinese government applied pressure to restrict the flow of tourists to 
the zone with the last gambling hall shutting in April 2011 (ibid. 538). The Boten zone 
persists however as a Yunnan province based company acquired GBC from the original 
owners, It was reopened as Boten Beautiful Specific Economic Zone, operating as a cross-
border trade zone and logistics hub, with suggestions of greater Lao government oversight 
(ibid. 539; New York Times 6/7/2016). 
The Golden Triangle SEZ is located in Bokeo province, across the Mekong from Thailand, and 
in the eponymous tri-border area of Laos, Myanmar and Thailand, once infamous for 
narcotics production. The Lao government granted a 3000 hectare concession on a 50 year 
lease to Kings Roman, a Hong Kong registered company, in 2007 (GoL 2016b). Company 
documents have however been reported as stating that the area is 103 square kilometres 
19 Rising to 14 by mid-2016. See Vientiane Times 12/6/2016.
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and lease duration 99 years (Nyiri 2012: 539). The zone is primarily operated by the Chinese 
investor Zhao Wei, who had previously operated a gambling hall in Mong La, Myanmar, but 
under pressure from the Myanmar and Chinese governments had closed it and relocated to 
a more receptive Laos (ibid. 540). The GT SEZ comprises a complex of hotels, casinos, a 
shopping centre, markets, and houses and dormitories (ibid. 541; Laungaramsri 2014: 35). As 
claimed by the developer the GT SEZ is to connect Laos, Thailand and China, facilitating the 
flows of investment and tourism in the region (Laungaramsri 2014: 35). Moreover, the GT 
zone is envisaged by developers as turning into a modern city with a population of 200,000 
and requisite accompanying urban infrastructure, including an industrial park (Nyiri 2012: 
553; Tan 2012: 82-83). The developer’s aims would thus dovetail with the government’s 
aims of using SEZs to drive industrialization and modernization. The GT SEZ’s administration 
is also reportedly largely autonomous from the Lao government, with the power to collect 
taxes and fees and set zone-specific rules and regulations (ibid. 37; Nyiri 2012: 542). The Lao 
government however retains a greater role in the project than the botched Boten zone and 
through ‘owning shares in the new project’ it ‘maintains better control of operations and will 
directly recover profits if the operation is successful’ (Tan 2012: 82). 
The northern SEZs raise the question of sovereignty and domination by foreign actors, 
especially the Chinese – with Chinese FDI being intertwined with national and subnational 
Chinese state actors (ibid. 77-78; Su 2012; Tubilewicz and Jayasuriya 2015). As noted above 
however the Lao state courts foreign actors to reinforce its own control, and this suggests 
analysis should examine how SEZs are strategically deployed by the Lao state, or actors 
within the Lao state, to produce particular forms of social relations. I build on elements 
within existing studies of the northern border zones by Nyiri (2012), Tan (2012), and 
Laungaramsri (2014) to offer an account which hopefully is more conceptually adroit than 
their studies in linking together state transformation, territorialization, foreign capital and 
labour. 
Nyiri (2012: 535) suggests that sovereignty in the border SEZs is vested in Chinese-invested 
private corporations but which attempt to ‘borrow’ the symbolic and administrative 
trappings of the Chinese state to boost their own legitimacy. Nyiri approaches the zones 
from the perspective of the spread of Chinese state power throughout the world and 
underplays both the importance of the zones for regional economic integration and how the 
Lao state deploys and benefits from SEZs. For instance, Nyiri (ibid. 541) mentions without 
comment on the relevance to Lao state power that two-thirds of the GT SEZ consist of hills 
that will not be developed and left as a nature reserve and swidden agriculture will be 
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forbidden there. This is a key territorialization and population management scheme of the 
Lao government, as argued by Dwyer. Nyiri presents sovereignty as ‘contested’ between 
Chinese investors and Lao state actors but at others points indicates how state and capital 
aims may cohere by citing the work of Danielle Tan (ibid. 555). Tan (2012: 85) argues that 
Chinese investment in the northern uplands actually extends and produces central (lowland) 
Lao state control by recasting Chinese investors as tax farmers to raise resources to 
implement rural poverty alleviation and a concomitant consolidation of sections of the state 
apparatus: 
Chinese networks play a crucial role in the new architecture of power by forming 
regimes of wealth accumulation, regulation and control, essential for the survival and 
the redeployment of the Lao state in the context of globalization. By producing rent 
and new opportunities of redistribution among influential personalities, they 
contribute to the viability of the state. This alliance of networks thus constitutes a 
strategy of the Lao state to impede the emergence of a counter-elite and manage 
internal conflicts, especially between provinces and the central government, and 
within the party (ibid. 85-86)
Tan’s formulation is deeply suggestive of the new configurations of power and control 
over territory that are enabled by the internationalization of the state in border regions, 
but she lacks a systematic account of the state which links it to capital accumulation. Tan 
also marginalizes labour – a trait shared by Nyiri - in her analysis of Chinese networks, 
with investors and petty traders deemed ‘the main drivers of change’ (ibid. 71). 
Laungaramsri (2014), in her analysis of the GT SEZ, is clearer on how such zones rest on 
the construction of labour forces and transformations of livelihoods. Laungaramsri still 
frames the GT SEZ in terms of Ong’s ‘graduated sovereignty’ where the Laos government 
has commodified its sovereignty as the only development strategy open to it as a weak 
and poor state vis-à-vis the power of China (ibid. 40), and so the zone has ‘turned the 
border into a neo-liberal space where sovereignty has given way to the force of the 
market’ (ibid. 39). Nevertheless, she identifies two elements which have been crucial to 
the establishment and functioning of the zone: the resettlement and differential 
incorporation of local Lao villagers into zone employment; and migrant Burmese labour 
as a key actor. The zone concession entailed that eventually nine villages would have to 
be resettled and lose their farmland. Villagers from the first resettled village were 
relocated to substandard housing built by the zone developer and had to struggle for fair 
amounts of compensation for their houses and land. Compensation was generally 
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regarded as inadequate by villagers. Lao government officials and village-level power 
brokers were the actors forcing villagers to relocate and negotiating low compensation 
costs. In the new location, less farming land was available leading to reduced subsistence 
food production and longer working hours to achieve it (ibid. 41; Sengchanh 2012: 6). 
Despite claims that the zone would modernize the area and bring much-needed poverty 
alleviating jobs, employment opportunities were limited. Only young people willing to 
work odd hours in the casinos were accepted, or less than one third of the population of 
the relocated village (ibid. 41-46). Moreover Sengchanh (2012: 4) suggests that Lao 
people applying to jobs were also rejected because they could not speak Chinese. That 
Lao people applied to work in the zone did not detract from the feeling of many local 
villagers that the zone represented an unwanted intrusion into their livelihoods which 
ruptured their relation to the land, replacing it with low wages in poor conditions 
(Laungaramsri 2014: 46; RFA 22/1/2014; RFA 11/4/2014). 
Meanwhile the zone administration actively facilitated the mobility of others into the 
zone. Chinese people moved in to start and run key businesses such as restaurants or 
hotels. Migration networks, often connected with the home province of the site 
developer, enabled their access to the zone and the opportunities it presented (ibid. 38; 
Nyiri 2012: 543). Moreover, Laungaramsri contends that ‘the key engine that drives the 
economic force of the SEZ is the Burmese’, migrant workers from Myanmar who 
constitute a large portion of the workforce (2014: 49). Burmese migrants formed an 
informal, exploited and disposable workforce which was easier to mould than a local Lao 
population somewhat resistant to the incursion of the zone in their livelihoods (ibid. 48-
52). Burmese migrants’ incorporation into the zone as ‘neoliberal subjects’ spatially 
dislocated from and unprotected by any state - as well as an oversupply of Burmese 
labour – entailed, for Laungaramsri, they would ‘totally submit…as a profitable 
commodified subject for the advancement of Chinese enterprise’ (ibid. 52). 
Although Laungaramsri tends to underplay the agency of workers to present them as 
passive and exploited, she raises important themes. One is that the new form of 
territorial coherence and GMS regional integration which the zone aims to achieve 
through facilitation of tourism and investment flows is predicated on overturning a 
previous form of territorial coherence, that of the Lao villagers agricultural production. 
Local Lao villagers’ command over space, their spatial organization as a force of 
production, was ruptured. It should also be noted that Lao villagers had their own forms 
of international territorial coherence in engaging in small-scale cross-Mekong trade of 
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agricultural commodities, which presumably would have been reshaped by falling 
agricultural productivity (ibid. 41; Sengchanh 2012: 3). Second, the zone depended on 
capital and state’s differential management of the fixity and mobility, the inclusion and 
exclusion, of populations. Establishment of the zone required moving villagers outside of 
the zone and placing them elsewhere and operation of the zone involved facilitating the 
entry of Chinese and Burmese migrants. A socio-spatial construction of labour therefore 
took place which was vital to the new form of territorial coherence. The Golden Triangle 
SEZ comprised a reterritorialization which integrated Lao space into a larger scale. This 
reterritorialization was implemented by powerful actors and created a particular 
territorial structured coherence which gained cohesion through the differential 
promotion of certain flows (capital, Burmese migrants) and forms of social reproduction 
(zone wage labour over agricultural production). I propose then that in the Lao context 
territorial coherence, socio-spatial construction of labour, fixity and mobility provide a 
particularly fertile framework for understanding the forms of uneven and inequitable 
regional integration that are occurring. 
Conclusion
Reorganization of internal Lao space is a core feature of the Lao state’s development efforts 
and tied closely to integration into larger geographic scales. This suggests that any analysis 
of Laos’ regional integration must look at the exact means through which space is 
reorganized within the country to reach actors and processes beyond the country. 
Reterritorialization within the country appears to be creating new forms of territorial 
integration between Laos and GMS neighbours. The project of changing Laos from a ‘land-
locked to land-linked’ country should be interpreted in this light, with territorialization 
projects – such as SEZs - a key means to ground foreign capital, but also to manage and 
control populations. Contrary to arguments which claim that the state loses power in the 
face of relentless forces of transnational capital, the Lao state actively seeks to reproduce 
itself through interaction with powerful foreign actors. Therefore, analysis would do well to 
be focused on the exact means that the Lao state uses to both attract and ease the flows of 
foreign capital, including institutional and regulatory transformations as well as spatial 
practices, and how these transformations structure the relations between foreign capital 
and subaltern actors such as farmers and workers, and restructure the relations between 
the state and the Lao population in variable geographic and political economic contexts 
within the country. 
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The suggested relevance of territorial coherence, socio-spatial construction of labour, and 
fixity and mobility lead to a number of questions which can guide enquiry of the present 
case: how does foreign capital transform territorial coherence within Laos and between it 
and its neighbours and to whose advantage? Whose agency is driving the changes in 
territorial coherence within and between territories? Whose fixity and mobility matters and 
how and why? What are the socio-spatial constructions of labour in a given territory? The 
latter question is of particular importance, because by taking labour as the entry point at the 
centre of relations of production and foregrounding the way that labour forces are 
constructed we can shed light on how territorialization projects function, who benefits from 
them, and how they might be transformed or contested. Savannakhet presents a very 
different context to the northern SEZs, based as it is in an existing large urban centre in the 
Lao lowlands, and so while I submit these questions retain relevance for the case, the 
answers to them vary significantly from the northern SEZs due to the different constellations 
of territory, resources, and actors in the southern Lao-Thai borderlands. These resulted in 
different possibilities for labour ‘exploiting and colonizing interstitial spaces within and 
between existing territorialization projects’ (Lestrelin 2011: 317). Before examining the 
Savannakhet case I recount a brief history of labour in Laos, and recent changes in work and 
livelihoods in the light of recent capitalist transformations. 
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Chapter 6: Labour in Laos
The landscape of work in Laos is undergoing a period of intense change in the era of foreign 
investment, modernization, and reterritorialization projects. This chapter situates 
contemporary Lao labour within a longue durée of labour dynamics in Laos and within the 
contemporary capitalist transformation. The historical contestation of Lao space by external 
actors has manifested, among other factors, as attempts to appropriate Lao labour power 
and - in a sparsely populated territory – to manage the movement of populations. Historical 
population control has contemporary parallels but there are key breaks with the past in an 
era of capitalist modernization. Highlighting these contemporary dynamics – labour’s 
constitution under a capitalist form of law, wage labour as part of diverse livelihood 
strategies, international migration, and new manufacturing industries – will be important for 
understanding the Savannakhet case. I develop in relation to labour some of the key themes 
introduced in Chapter 5 regarding Lao space. I also highlight how the agency of subaltern 
actors’ – farmers and workers - has been at various points a key factor in historical 
development processes. I specify and expand on the argument that in the era of capitalist 
modernization the Lao state has assumed a political form of capital-labour relations. A key 
claim is that the legal and social formation of Lao workers renders them as ‘in-fact’ informal 
labour (Chang 2009).  
6.1 Work in Lan Xang 
During the period of the Lan Xang polities gendered, ethnic and territorial divisions of labour 
comprised the productive ensemble for livelihoods and trade. Production was at a 
subsistence level in most villages with agricultural labour shared by the family. Men 
ploughed and men and women together planted rice and harvested the crop. Hunting for 
wild game was chiefly the preserve of men while both men and women fished. Women were 
responsible for the production of textiles and household materials, weaving cotton and silk, 
and making baskets, mats and other domestic utensils. Men made ploughs and other 
implements, including traps and nets. Some of these items may have been exchanged within 
the village but this was not production for trading at distances (Stuart-Fox 1998: 48). Craft 
production in the vicinity of larger population centres was present with villages of 
specialized hereditary craftsmen manufacturing tools, weapons, pottery and paper, making 
jewellery and silverware, and weaving dyed cottons and silks. Some villages mined tin and 
iron ore or panned for alluvial gold. Highland ethnic minorities were largely responsible for 
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the collection of valuable forest products. These were exchanged for the cotton cloth, iron 
and silver produced in the lowlands and comprised an important basis for Lan Xang’s 
participation in regional trade networks (Stuart-Fox 1998: 49; Rigg 2005: 46-47). 
Low population densities in Southeast Asia led to polities’ competition over populations and 
their removal to another territory to satisfy labour demands (Reid 1988: 132-135).1 One 
example from this historical dynamic suggests how attempts at labour control and labour’s 
agency drove significant historical developments. In the 1820s the Siamese king Rama III 
ordered a census of manpower in order to enable complete enforcement of each peasant’s 
corvée labour requirements. Lao peasants on the Khorat plateau were forcibly tattooed for 
this purpose. Tattooing of corvée labour was an unknown practice in the Lao meuang and 
was to cause widespread resentment. Lao labour was mobilized to construct public works in 
the new Siamese capital of Bangkok, including defence works at the mouth of the Chao 
Phraya river. Tattooing and corvée demands for such heavy labour caused widespread 
resentment which contributed to the Chao Anouvong rebellion (Stuart-Fox 1998: 119). Lao 
recalcitrance in submitting to the labour demands of a foreign ruler was also to impact 
political events and economic trajectories in the era of colonialism. 
6.2 Colonial Labour Regimes 
The French colonial regime mobilized labour in Laos in two primary ways:  corvée and 
encouraging labour migration from Vietnam. Laos’ sparse, rural population presented a 
problem for the French in valorizing the territory. The hinterland was thinly inhabited by a 
populace not strongly integrated into the cash economy and more dependent on 
subsistence production than wage labour.  Furthermore ‘the Lao were universally decried by 
colonial agents as unwitting and unreliable proletarians’ and characterized via orientalist 
tropes as lazy and innocent (Gunn 1990: 33). Despite this disdain the colonial state still 
chose to extract labour from the Lao populace in order to unblock the country and weld it to 
wider Indochina. Lao corvées were thus put to work largely on road construction, as well as 
on public building and other state projects (ibid. 39-40). Colonial officials interwove labour 
extraction with the taxation system in this endeavour. The Lao had to contribute both tax in 
cash form and prestations (labour dues). Ethnic Lao males aged 19-60 were to pay two 
piastres per year – compelling participation in the cash economy by, for instance, selling 
crops - and were also compelled to perform an annual twenty days of corvée. The 
obligations for ethnic minorities were set at one piaster and ten days of corvée (ibid. 48). 
1 See Chapter 4.
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Prestations were imposed during ‘dead times’ after the harvest season had ended (ibid. 49). 
The colony was thus to benefit twofold from the Lao performance of labour; once through 
the transmutation of work into money and again through the direct imposition of work. The 
preoccupation with generating tax revenue also meant that prestations could be commuted 
into cash payments (ibid. 50). 
The imposition of corvée did not run smoothly and met with various forms of resistance. The 
majority ethnic Lao population evidenced highly mobile rejection of labour obligations. 
According to one report 600-800 families in Luang Prabang districts fled to Siam to avoid 
labour requisitions. 1935 saw the mass desertion of three successive shifts of corvée 
labourers from a public works programme on the RC13 highway. Ethnic Lao and minority 
labourers in Champasak ‘were notorious for late arrival, low productivity, desertions and 
“arrogance” towards the cai [labour supervisor]’ (ibid. 90). Opposition to taxation and labour 
obligations also played a role in fomenting revolts against colonial authority, especially 
among the highland minorities (ibid: 101 passim). While the historical conditions are 
significantly different continuities persist today in the extraction of labour from the Lao 
populace. Now as then Laos’ rulers must deal with mobilizing a relatively sparse labour force 
which proves recalcitrant for easy insertion into emerging labour regimes. An important 
form of agency for avoiding toil in colonial public works was mobility power - the act or 
threat of flight to improve conditions of life – which has contemporary echoes. 
The colonial authorities chose to import Vietnamese workers to do the hard manual toil of 
the French mise en valeur in Laos. The Vietnamese had the virtues of being both more 
numerous than the Lao and, in the eyes of French officialdom, more industrious (Stuart-Fox 
1997: 47). The French encouraged immigration to the extent that the Vietnamese 
population numbered 40,000 in 1943 and formed majorities in the main Mekong valley 
towns (ibid. 51). Vietnamese worked as labourers, traders and government officials (Gunn 
1990: 35). Significant numbers – up to 6000 - worked in the mines of central Laos, one of the 
few highly capitalized investments the French successfully initiated during their rule (Gunn 
1988: 32). Agitation by Vietnamese communists led in 1936 to perhaps the first strikes in Lao 
industrial history (ibid. 64).
6.3 Lao Labour through Independence and Revolution 1954-1975
The independence of Laos in 1954 and the decades of political conflict and war which 
followed saw some limited diversification in the economy and labouring profile. A large 
proportion of the Lao population remained in agriculture (Halpern 1964). Rigg (2005: 46-47) 
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however cautions against imposing a model of bucolic autarky on rural communities in Lao 
history, highlighting a sustained integration into trade networks which exchanged goods 
such as cloth and salt in exchange for luxury forest products and other rural commodities. 
This was true for the decades following independence with rural communities rooted in 
subsistence agriculture but with a partial integration into the cash economy via petty 
commodity production (Halpern 1964: 102-103). Grant Evans (1995: 39) notes in the 1960s 
that the Vientiane plain area of Laos became a frontier zone for landless Isan2 Thai migrants. 
Migrant villages were not wealthy enough to immediately start clearing paddy land entailing 
that ‘a new phenomenon began to arise in some areas: the use of agricultural wage labour’ 
(ibid. 39). In rural areas Lao villagers performed work for others in the village and were paid 
in cash or in kind. Circular and short-term migration from rural areas to the towns for the 
purpose of wage labour also featured as a livelihood strategy (Halpern 1964: 110-111). The 
main towns during this period functioned as administrative and commercial centres, the 
denizens comprised of Lao officials and government employees, crafts people, and Chinese 
and Vietnamese traders. Labour at the bottom of the urban employment hierarchy came 
largely from more itinerant and unstable flows of ethnic minority Khmu migrants in Luang 
Prabang or Isan Thai in Vientiane (ibid. 112). The lack of industry led Halpern to conclude in 
1964 (ibid, 112) that a ‘Lao proletariat based on emigration from rural areas may be some 
time in developing’. 
The Lao communist revolution drew its strength from a social base comprised of the 
peasantry in Pathet Lao (PL) held areas (Phomvihane 1981; Brown and Zasloff 1986). The PL 
also resorted to compulsory measures to mobilize labour. In the zones under their 
administration corvée labour was an obligation (Gunn 1990: 54). Although small in number 
urban labour did have a role to play in the revolution of 1975. The ferment of a crumbling 
economy, American withdrawal and political turmoil provided opportunities for PL agitation 
and labour unrest in the towns (Brown and Zasloff 1986: 115). A strike wave involving 
various workers occurred in government-held areas in the Mekong valley, with strikers 
demanding both higher wages and the removal of corrupt officials. Labour unrest coalesced 
with student demonstrations and strikes to pressure the government in Vientiane and 
strengthen the PL’s hand. In Vientiane a coalition of groups known as the 21 Organizations 
for Peace was comprised of the Lao Labour Federation, the Lao Student Federation and 
constituent organizations of those unions from schools, firms and government sections. In 
January 1975 the coalition successfully pressured the government to approve and 
2 Northeast Thailand. 
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implement a reform programme advantageous to the PL. After the fall of Phnom Penh and 
Saigon to communists in April 1975 strengthened the position of the PL, protests by the 21 
Organizations on May Day targeted prominent rightists in government and provided the 
backdrop for a national insurrection which hastened the right from power and ushered in 
the communist regime (ibid. 115-118).
6.4 Labour under Socialism 1975-1986
The early period of socialism in Laos witnessed several events of importance for labour in 
the country. The first was the flight of a significant proportion of the population across the 
border to exile in Thailand or farther afield. The second was an attempted reorganization of 
the social relations of production in the agricultural cooperativization programme. The two 
events also intersected to a degree with some Lao moving to Thailand in response to the 
rigors of the new agricultural production regime. 
Approximately 100,000 Lao left the country during the first year of the new socialist regime, 
among whom were many professionals, technicians and other educated individuals who had 
served under the Royal Lao government (Brown and Zasloff 1986: 197). Trained technicians 
and civil servants continued to seek refuge in Thailand throughout the early part of the 
1980s in the hope of further resettlement (Stuart-Fox 1997: 185). Almost 10 percent of the 
country’s pre-1975 population had left the country by the 1990s (G. Evans 1995: 70). This 
was to impact on later economic development efforts by depriving the country of both sheer 
numbers and also accumulated skills and knowledge (Evans 1991: 98). 
The communist takeover in Laos did not result in a swift, enforced collectivization of 
agricultural production. Lao peasants were encouraged to be more collectively oriented and 
create ‘solidarity and labour exchange units’ in order to sensitize them to the benefits of 
collective production and institute this on a larger scale in the longer run (G. Evans 1995: 44). 
Economic and geopolitical concerns however prompted the collectivization campaign to be 
rolled out in 1978, in order to boost the productive forces and strengthen administration at 
the grassroots level to stabilize the country politically (ibid. 48-49). Laos, however, lacked 
the critical inputs of machinery and technology to boost yields. The policy therefore hinged 
on a fundamental reorganization of labour, attempting to replace a familial system of labour 
with a rational and formal organization of labour. The latter would operate at a larger scale 
and with a different system of labour allocation and supervision (ibid. 150).  
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Cooperatives were intended to incrementally develop more and more collective forms of 
labour relations in agrarian production (ibid. 94). At the height of the programme there were 
some 2800 purported cooperatives (Stuart-Fox 1997: 179). Cooperatives foundered however 
as peasants proved to be recalcitrant in the face of upheavals to traditional modes of 
organizing work. Traditional peasant organization of work in Laos was centred on the family 
with additional labour requirements being mobilized through kinship relations and location 
in the village social strata. Additional labour obligations were structured through loose 
reciprocity (G. Evans 1995: 140). The collectivization of 1978-79 ran counter to these 
traditional relations by attempting to create large-scale cooperatives that ‘threw together 
people who felt no natural affinity for or commitment to working together’ (ibid. 146). In 
addition, the mark point system used to record and reward work was overly complex, 
leading to disagreements and peasant defection (ibid. 156-158). 
Other issues added to the dissatisfaction and undermined the policy. Peasants were 
supposed to join cooperatives voluntarily but were leant on by zealous cadre to participate. 
Confusion about the aims and implementation of the cooperatives combined with fear of 
force to impel significant numbers of peasants to abandon their land and cross the Mekong 
to Thailand (Evans 1988: 40-41).  Eventually ‘resistance to labour reorganization arising from 
the structure of the peasant economy was successful at spontaneously aborting the push 
towards collectivization’ (G. Evans 1995: 178) and the programme was suspended in 1979 
(Stuart-Fox 1997: 182).  The party promoted cooperatives through the 1980s but they 
waned in importance as enthusiasm was tempered by experience and markets and private 
enterprises grew in importance for development strategy (G. Evans 1995: 60-64). 
Cooperativization existed alongside other forms of production and labour. Villages farther 
from urban centres were characterised by a preponderance of peasants (80-90 percent) in a 
largely subsistence economy. Villages closer to urban centres displayed a more complex 
occupational structure which included commerce, petty commodity production, 
employment by the state and wage labour in the urban economy, although the latter was 
diminished after the shrinking of urban economic activity in the aftermath of the revolution 
(ibid. 67, 75). 
The country’s industrial and service enterprises were nationalized after 1975 (Bourdet 2000: 
14). Wages and labour allocation were set by command (ibid. 16, 125).  Industrial relations 
during the early period of the LPRP order were apparently relatively harmonious. The 
industrial sector was of little significance at that time, employing a mere 0.8 per cent of the 
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workforce. Between 1976-79, a period of unemployment and turbulence, no industrial 
unrest was observed. In the 1980s with continuing high inflation civil servants and state-
owned enterprise (SOEs) employees expressed discontent over wage levels. The government, 
concerned to retain staffing levels for industry gave SOEs the right to set performance-based 
wages. Food and consumer subsidies were also added to provide enough income to stave off 
industrial discontent (Stuart-Fox 1986: 128-129). 
The experience with cooperativization reveals that subaltern actors have previously 
influenced the trajectory of development policy in Laos, despite the efforts of a coercive 
state. Power seemingly lay with the LPRP but peasant contestation over the labour process, 
and the policy rethink this stimulated, suggest that this power must be negotiated and adapt 
to other types of agency rather than imposing its will crudely by force. Notably, the volte-
face was, among other factors, prompted by peasants using one of the few forms of power 
open to them, the ability to be mobile and deprive the country of the labour resources it 
needed for national development. A process of negotiation and adaptation also appeared to 
be a factor in the case of the SOEs as the state responded to the social reproduction 
demands of its workforce, a theme that has continued in the era of foreign-invested 
manufacturing. 
6.5 Labour under Economic Liberalization: Evolving Labour Law and the Lao 
Federation of Trade Unions 
The drive towards diversified industry and modernization through liberalizing the economy 
involved the key element of establishing and transforming a labour market and the social 
relations of employment therein. Since reforms started in 1986 the government has created 
a legal and institutional framework which establishes, regulates and promotes capitalist 
labour relations. Such a framework structures the relationship between capital, especially 
foreign investors, and workers in Laos as a key part of effecting a capitalist economic 
structure. In doing so, it appears that the Lao state has assumed a historical form of the 
social relations which it regulates (Clarke 1991b). 
The primary aim of the New Economic Mechanism concerning labour was the dismantling of 
a command system of labour allocation and wage setting and its replacement with one in 
which ‘labour market outcome, in terms of employment, unemployment and wages, is 
primarily determined by the demand and supply of labour’, thus swiftly reallocating labour 
‘in conformity with the structural transformation aims’ (Bourdet 2000: 117). The 
privatization of SOEs contributed to this goal by helping to establish a labour market. Public 
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sector retrenchments resulted in a twenty percent reduction in civil servants by 1988 (ibid. 
18-19). A law permitting foreign investment was introduced in 1989 but Laos stood little 
chance of attracting capital without the legal underpinning to facilitate and protect 
investments (Rigg 2005: 21). One of the first business regulations to be passed was the 
Labour Law of 1990 which guaranteed employers’ authority over the internal administration 
of labour and the rules of work, thus offering reassurances to potential investors. The law 
set rules for ‘the form of labour contracts, working hours, overtime, holidays, female and 
minor labour, form of payment of wages, health and safety, compensation for industrial 
accidents and diseases and retirement benefits’ and additionally established a ‘legal basis for 
a government agency to regulate and monitor labour’ (Fry 2008: 789). 
The Constitution of Lao PDR, promulgated in 1991, further enshrined the capitalist mode of 
production and indicated the role of labour. Article 14 of the Constitution states that the 
state protects all forms of state, collective and individual ownership, including private 
ownership of domestic and foreign investors (GoL 1991). Article 2 specifically highlights 
‘workers, farmers and intellectuals as key components’ of the people’s democratic state. 
Article 26 asserts that Lao citizens have the right to engage in legal work and the right to rest 
and receive medical treatment and benefits. These rights are matched with an obligation ‘to 
observe labour discipline’ (Article 34). Workers were thus rhetorically elevated and defined 
as possessing rights in relation to work but the injunction ‘to observe labour discipline’ 
coupled with the assuaging of private investors suggested a subordinate role contrary to the 
exalted position outlined. The government issued a revised Labour Law in 1994 (GoL 1994) 
which applied to only the private sector (Fry 2012: 45). The new law consolidated the 1990 
code but also made changes to liberalize and clarify the hiring and termination of 
employment (Fry 2008: 790). 
The new legislation also began to formally establish the role of trade unions. The Lao 
Federation of Trade Unions (LFTU) is enshrined in the Constitution as one of the Party’s key 
mass organizations responsible for uniting and mobilizing citizens for ‘the tasks of national 
defence and construction’ (GoL 1991: Article 7).  The LFTU is part of the party-state 
apparatus and the only legal trade union in the country, its appellation being a misnomer in 
that it is a single hierarchical organization rather than a horizontally linked federation. 
Initially for government employees, membership of the LFTU was extended to private 
employees in 2000 (Fry 2008: 791). The 1994 Labour Law defines the duties of trade unions 
or workers’ representatives as ‘to promote solidarity, educate, train and sensitize workers to 
have labour discipline, and to successfully perform work in accordance with production 
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plans established by the labour units’ (GoL 1994: Article 11).  In addition there are the more 
protective roles of dispute mediation and advocacy on workplace issues (Fry 2008: 790). Of 
particular import in the new law was the effective banning of strikes in all conceivable 
circumstances, subject to legal penalties (GoL 1994: Article 59; Fry 2008: 790). The role of 
the LFTU cannot be understood in terms of an independent, representative workers’ 
organization. Its role is instead that of a ‘transmission belt’ similar to that found in other 
socialist countries such as China. As part of the party-state apparatus such a union role 
involves ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ responsibilities, transmitting ‘political and production 
directives from the leadership of the party-state to the workers, as well as transmitting or 
representing specific worker interests within the forums of the party-state’ (Fry 2008: 786). 
Fry (2012) thus describes the LFTU as a ‘dualist’ trade union, having both production and 
protection functions. The production function manifests in transmitting pressure to workers 
to become more efficient, obedient and diligent and in Laos appears to predominate over 
duties to protect employment rights (ibid. 49).
Figure 5: LPRP Billboard Promoting Work.3 
As investment climbed and economic openness increased throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s, the government extended the armature of regulations to manage and facilitate 
capital accumulation (Rigg 2005: 23). A new Labour Law was introduced in 2006 (GoL 2006a). 
This law provided clarifications of existing articles but also significant additions, including the 
definition of the labour administration agency. The labour administration agency is defined 
3 Source: author photo. The text reads ‘Work protects peace. It is the duty of every citizen.’
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as a multi-scalar organization - comprising at the central level the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Welfare, and then the labour and social welfare division of each province, and of each 
district and municipality (Articles 66-69). The new law further extended the state mediation 
of labour relations by setting provisions for labour inspections (Articles 71-72), strengthening 
to some extent labour protections but still however retaining the prohibitions on industrial 
action. The government enacted a Trade Union Law in 2007 (GoL 2007) in response to 
concerns aired in the National Assembly that the labour law was inadequate for promoting 
the union and protecting workers’ interests. The Trade Union Law ‘enhanced the capacity of 
the union in the private sector and reflected the changing balance between production and 
protection functions’ (Fry 2012: 47). 
The Labour Law underwent further revision into the more comprehensive 2013 Labour Law 
(GoL 2013a). This law extends regulations over multiple stages of labour force formation.   
The 2013 law sets out provisions clarifying elements of skills development including target 
groups for skills development, a level structure for labour skills standards, requirements for 
skills developers or trainers (which stipulates they must ‘have knowledge of a foreign 
language (ibid. Article 15)), and skills evaluation. Sections addressing recruitment are 
another significant addition. Domestic recruitment is addressed with ‘[a]ll forms of 
investment’ required to ‘have a labour requirement plan at all times’ which ‘must be 
reported to the relevant labour administration authority in order for the planning of 
sufficient provision of labour to respond to demand’ (ibid. Article 37). Measures for the 
establishment and dissolution of ‘recruitment service enterprises’ are codified. The 
recruitment of Lao labour for work abroad is also legally formalized and regulations for 
importing foreign labour clarified and extended (ibid. Articles 68-70). The 2013 Labour Law 
increases the number of foreign workers allowed in enterprises due to concerns over labour 
shortages (Vientiane Times 25/12/2013). Article 25 of the 2006 code (GoL 2006a) states that 
foreign workers are only to work in Laos for a limited period and in order to transfer 
expertise. Only 10 percent of manual workers and 20 percent of ‘mental’ or ‘intellectual’ 
workers are allowed to be foreign (ibid.). In the 2013 Law this was increased to 15 percent 
and 25 percent respectively (GoL 2013a: Article 68). 
A new section on the ‘creation of employment opportunities’ behoves ‘[l]ocal authorities at 
all levels’ to ‘create conditions for employment and promote employment’ (ibid. Article 34) 
in order to address ‘unemployment, the migration of urban labour from rural areas to cities, 
and illegal trans-border labour’, and so create ‘conditions providing choice, revenue and 
poverty reduction for employees’ (ibid. Article 32). Employment opportunity creation 
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involves the ‘[p]romotion of occupational freedom, working from home, and the hiring of 
disadvantaged persons, women, disabled persons, or the elderly’ as well as employment 
promotion in rural areas and ‘daily labour, contractors, temporary workers, [and] trainees’ 
(ibid. Article 33). Local authorities are to establish career fairs ‘to create opportunities for 
employers and employees to meet and receive or make applications’ (ibid. Article 35). 
Dispute resolution mechanisms are also overhauled with a corporatist tripartite mechanism 
reaffirmed and clarified through the definition of the rights and duties of employers, 
employees’ representatives, and the state – including the responsibilities of different scales 
of governance down to the village level. The tripartite consultations reforms may be in 
response to the Lao government’s 2010 ratification of the International Labour 
Organization’s Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention (No. 144) 
(ILO 2016). The disciplinary role of employee representatives continues to be legally 
enshrined, with a responsibility to ‘[e]ducate, mobilize and encourage employees to comply 
with laws…the labour unit production plan and other obligations in relation to labour’ (GoL 
2013a: Article 165).  A new article on dispute resolution with international characteristics 
(ibid. Article 153) appears to reflect the reality of rising foreign investment and international 
integration, although the law is vague on what constitutes ‘international characteristics’. 
Perhaps surprisingly the article on the prohibition of strikes during disputes has been altered 
to allow for the possibility of a strike in certain situations. Work stoppages cannot take place 
during the resolution process - except in the event of very serious cases or if the tripartite 
consultation organization agrees to a temporary stoppage in order to avoid damage that 
may occur.4 In the case that a labour dispute cannot be resolved the law allows that a strike 
‘may’ (aat ja) occur but not contrary to laws and regulations5 (GoL 2013b: Article 154).6 The 
vagueness of the wording and the failure to clarify what exactly determines that a labour 
dispute cannot be resolved militates against the law as a guarantee of industrial action.  
The new Labour and Trade Union Laws are supplemented by the 2013 Law on Social Security 
(GoL 2013c). The Law stipulates that the government, employers and employees should all 
pay in to the National Social Security Fund which is to finance various social security benefits 
(Article 6). Fund benefits include entitlements to healthcare, illness and employment injury 
4 In the original: ‘wen sia dtae geuht gawlanee thee haai haeng lae onggaan sam faai hen dee hai yut 
sao wiak sua kaao pheua leek liang kwaam sia haai thee aat geuht keun’. 
5 The original runs: ‘nai gawlanee mee thee baw saamaat gae kai kaw katnyaeng thang daan haeng 
ngaan aat ja mee gaan nat yut ngaan dtae haak baw hai kat gap labiap gotmaai’
6 Lao language version of 2013 Labour Law. Previous references are to English version. 
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compensation, and pensions. Employers are to contribute six percent of the employee’s 
monthly salary and employees 5.5 percent of their earnings (Articles 55-56).
Such legislative developments illustrate the key theme of the social construction of labour.  
It has become a statutory obligation of state authorities operating at different tiers of 
territorial jurisdiction to encourage wage labour and connect capital and labour. A key 
feature is to mobilize workers into various forms of wage employment – ‘daily labour, 
contractors, temporary workers’ – the exact mode of labour seemingly unimportant as long 
as it is gainfully employed in a capitalist enterprise. Moreover, the state aims to facilitate, 
promote and expand the cohort of skilled labour to meet the requirements of the more 
diverse labour processes now undertaken on Lao soil. It would appear that the Lao state is 
attempting to restrain ‘illegal trans-border labour’ by actively connecting it with enterprises 
within Laos. The 2013 Labour Law thus provides a framework through which to incorporate 
more and more people into the institution of wage labour and mould their capacities to the 
requirements of capital. 
Moreover, the form of the capital-labour relations promoted by the labour laws places 
significant power with capital. The emphasis on the duty of the LFTU’s and workers’ 
representatives to ‘train and sensitize workers to have labour discipline’ indicates that the 
Lao state attempts to constitute labour throughout the country as productive, obedient and 
subordinate to private employers. The prohibition of industrial action and independent 
unions reinforces subordination to employers and furthermore it can also be interpreted as 
an attempt to sever at the root the possibility of industrial unrest spilling over into broader 
challenges to the political order. Capital-labour relations are thus processed through the 
state in a way that seeks to mould and discipline workers and establishes the rights of capital 
over those of labour. Another key role of the state I would suggest appears to be to 
reterritorialize Lao labour in a time of rapid economic development and concerns over 
labour market shortages.
6.6 The Lao Labour Market 
The 2010 Labour Force Survey7 gives a labour force aged 15 and over of 3.07 million people, 
with a labour force participation rate at 79.24 (GoL 2010b: 68). World Bank figures (2016) 
7 Lao statistical practice makes it somewhat hard to gauge the extent of wage labour and main 
occupation. The 2010 Labour Force Survey distinguishes between two types of employment, paid 
employment and self-employment. Those in paid employment are employees earning ‘wages, salaries, 
commission, tips, etc.’ (GoL 2010b: 11). Self-employment includes persons working on their own, ‘in 
household enterprises for profit or family gain’, and ‘contributing family workers’ (ibid. 11). It thus 
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indicate this rose to 3.29 million by 2013. Shifts in the sectoral shares of employment have 
been evident as the Lao economy has developed since the 1990s. In 1995, 85.4 percent of 
the workforce was in agriculture, 3.5 percent in industry and 11.1 percent in services. In 
2005 this had shifted to 78.5 percent in agriculture, 4.8 in industry, and 16.7 in services. In 
2011 it was 71.9 percent in agriculture, 8.2 in industry and 19.9 in services (Nolintha et al 
2014: 101). 247,899 were reported to work in the manufacturing sector in 2013 (World Bank 
2014b: 17). The discrepancy between the rising value added by industry to GDP8 and the still 
low number of the workforce in industrial employment can be explained, in part, by the 
capital intensive nature of natural resource growth in Laos, with the natural resource 
extraction sector in 2013 adding some 18 percent to GDP with a labour force of only around 
22,000 people (ibid. 11). We should be wary of assigning too much weight to employment 
data based on broad sectoral categories which rigidly divide and restrict workers to one type 
of employment because, as shown below, labour in Laos is characterized by occupational 
fluidity and multiplicity (Rigg 2001: 69). However, the statistical data does give a broad 
indication of changing deployment of workers and structural transformation. 
According to Laos’ national development strategy, more labour should be transferred out of 
low-productivity activity and to higher value-adding activities.9  The World Bank (2014b: 10) 
in its Lao Development Report 2014 promotes such sectoral shifts in Laos but notes that this 
has been a slow process, with manufacturing firms for example struggling to fill even 
unskilled vacancies in manufacturing. Thus there would appear to be a tight labour market. 
News reports confirm labour shortages, especially of skilled workers.10 The World Bank 
report identifies inter alia low productivity growth and low levels of basic literacy and 
education as hindrances to the shift to industry. The World Bank contends that Laos does 
not have a labour shortage but that there is a large ‘reservoir’ of workers engaged in low-
productivity agriculture that could move to other sectors, with a major issue being that 
there are not enough attractive non-farm jobs (ibid. 11-13). The Bank’s solution to this is to 
appears that only workers in wage labour unmediated by household and family relations are included, 
thus excluding many who work in informal, family enterprises and activities. Only 15.6 percent of the 
15 years plus labour force was classified as a paid employee in 2010, with 48.9 percent ‘self 
employed’ and 34.7 percent in ‘unpaid work for family’ (ibid. 87). Moreover, the Labour Force Survey 
suggests that labour is classified according to its economic activity in the reference period of the 
preceding week (ibid. 11). This may obscure the main occupation, if for example agricultural tasks 
were performed in the reference week, but more annual income is gained through off-farm wage 
employment.  
8 See Chapter 4.
9 See Chapter 5. 
10 See: RFA 24/9/2013; Vientiane Times 21/2/2013; Vientiane Times 25/12/2013; Vientiane Times 
4/3/2014; Vientiane Times 22/5/2014.
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promote a good business environment and remove barriers to investment, rather than, say, 
promote living wages, labour rights, and health and safety standards. The report seems to 
ignore that a significant amount of migration to Thailand takes place which may be depleting 
this ‘reservoir’ of potential labour (see below). Ignoring migration appears to be 
symptomatic of the report’s focus on broad sectoral cleavages which miss the occupational 
dynamism that occurs at the level of the household. The report’s divisions between ‘off-
farm’ (which seems to mean industry or services) and farming, which appears to be 
subsistence or petty-commodity production misses how household members may 
contribute to social reproduction in different ways, with a household sustaining itself 
through both waged off-farm work and farm work. Moreover, the Bank seems to ignore the 
very real transformations in livelihoods and uprooting of forms of territorial social 
reproduction that stem from existing foreign-invested projects.  
The Lao labour market is undergoing a slow structural transformation towards industry and 
services. It also appears to be tight, with enterprises struggling to fill vacancies. The tightness 
of the labour market should be borne in mind as we proceed to the empirical data. 
6.7 Foreign Investment, Development and Transformations in Livelihoods
Foreign investment, state territorialization projects and marketization have wrought 
transformations on labour and livelihoods in the era of economic liberalization. Laos may 
still have a large proportion of its population living in rural villages and engaged in 
agriculture but small-scale agriculture cannot be said to be the only or even primary means 
of survival. Rigg (2005: 150-151) highlights that in Laos, as elsewhere, modernization has 
entailed that ‘rural livelihoods have diverged to the extent that farming, for many families, 
has become one activity among others’, a phenomenon he terms ‘occupational multiplicity 
and pluriactivity’. In this regard livelihood changes in Laos can be interpreted as part of a 
broad process of deagrarianization (Bryceson 1996). Deagrarianization can be understood as 
a process whereby people shift from purely agricultural livelihoods through parallel 
processes of occupational adjustment, livelihood reorientation, social re-identification, and 
spatial relocation (Bryceson 1997a: 4 in Rigg 2001: 119). Rigg (ibid. 135) adds another 
process, spatial interpenetration, whereby rural and urban, and agriculture and industry, 
become interwoven in transitional contexts ‘as rural people…flit between peasant-based 
and worker-based activities as they juggle multiple livelihoods’. Improvements in roads and 
transport, government promotion of cash crops, commodification of natural resources, and 
rising investment has created the conditions for increasing market integration and wage 
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labour throughout the country (Rigg 2005; Rehbein 2007; Baird and Shoemaker 2008; 
McAllister 2015). Deagrarianization also implies more complex social differentiation and 
divisions of labour. Modernization of agriculture and its reorientation to the market 
generates more differentiated complexes of wage labour, petty commodity production, and 
subsistence activities in agricultural areas, recomposing their territorial coherence with 
variegated benefits to participants (Bernstein 2001; Lerche 2010; Harriss-White 2014). 
As noted in the previous chapter Baird has identified ‘turning people into labour’ as the 
corollary of the government’s policy of ‘turning land into capital’. Baird (2011) views these as 
indicative of primitive accumulation, whereby agricultural and forest lands held by 
customary right and used as the basis for rural livelihoods have been enclosed and turned 
over to foreign investors for monoculture plantations of crops such as rubber and eucalyptus. 
People who have lost land to concessions have then been reincorporated into the 
plantations as informal, seasonal labour on low wages (ibid. 18; Laungaramsri 2012). Poor 
working conditions, low wages and lack of access to labour rights have been reported on 
foreign plantations (GAPE/JVC 2011; McAllister 2015). Plantation concessions to Vietnamese 
investors in Attapeu province, according to Kenney-Lazar (2012), have resulted in semi-
proletarianization of some villagers as they retained enough land for some subsistence 
production but had to cover their income with plantation wage labour. Plantation 
concessions have also had knock-on effects in reconfiguring local livelihoods when wage 
labour opportunities on the plantations have been few, with pressures to migrate from the 
area following decreases in subsistence production (Suhardiman et al 2015; Friis et al 2016). 
Exploitative contract farming arrangements – arguably a form of ‘disguised wage labour’ 
(Hariss-White 2014) - have also been noted as a method through which foreign investors 
have changed the livelihoods of Lao villagers (Dwyer 2014; Phoumanivong et al 2015). 
Economic development has also changed the gendered division of labour in Lao society, with 
women being incorporated into capitalist social relations in new ways. In lowland ethnic Lao 
communities11 gendered divisions of labour are not rigid, with women not excluded in 
principle from any particular task, although tasks are gendered by custom (Ireson 1996: 61; 
Rehbein 2007: 37).12 Gender inequalities vary by ethnic group, but Rigg observes of 
agriculture: ‘that women work more for less return would seem to apply across the board’ 
(Rigg 2005: 94).  Ethnic Lao families have traditionally farmed their fields as a household unit, 
11 The type which is the empirical focus of the present work.
12 Rehbein (2007: 37) notes that an exception to this is village politics, where men are almost always 
male. The present author however did encounter a female village head during fieldwork. 
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drawing on every member’s labour. Women and girls have been ‘mainly responsible for 
cooking, household maintenance, water carrying, forest gathering, and care of small 
domestic animals’ (Ireson 1996: 61). For Rigg (2005: 96) while there may be some positive 
gendered aspects of modernization there are negative aspects in, for example, increased risk 
of female and child exploitation in foreign-invested garments factories and the increased 
burden of women’s work in the household as men migrate to employment elsewhere. The 
resettlement of villages has also occasioned extra burdens on women. Kusakabe et al (2015: 
1097) found that for some villages moving from the uplands to the lowlands necessitated 
greater participation in the cash economy, and the responsibility for extra wage labour and 
forest collection was often delegated to women. 
The state’s reterritorialization projects have recomposed territorial coherence and the forms 
of social reproduction in important ways. Resettlement to focal sites and consolidated 
villages has put pressure on land, with resettled populations and original inhabitants 
competing for this limited resource. Competition has led to increased social differentiation 
and dependence on wage labour for poorer households with less access to land - often the 
resettled (Petit 2008; Lagerqvist et al 2014). State resettlement has also been met with 
spatial counter-strategies on the part of villagers to access a workable pattern of social 
reproduction – such as for instance moving from the resettlement site to a location 
considered more advantageous – so that ‘mobility itself [is] an agency used to counter the 
state’s control over mobility’ (Kusakabe et al 2015: 1101). 
Livelihoods have thus become more diverse as modernization has increased and Lao 
households, either willingly or unwillingly, have turned to other forms of employment 
incorporating more wage labour. Delocalization of livelihoods through migration and spatial 
interpenetration are two important factors that will be examined further. Capitalist 
transformation is also affecting the gendered division of labour by providing new jobs such 
as in manufacturing, but we would also do well to consider how this affects the gendered 
division of labour within the household. State reterritorialization has also emerged as a key 
way to manage mobility with associated effects on livelihoods. These important factors will 
be interwoven in unique ways across the country, including Savannakhet. 
6.8 Migration 
International migration has increased in significance as part and parcel of Laos’ 
modernization and regional integration. It is well-known that large numbers of Lao go to 
work in Thailand but Laos is also experiencing significant amounts of in-migration from China 
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and Vietnam, especially in relation to foreign investment from those countries. The patterns 
of territorial coherence within Laos have been composed at distances with migrant workers 
as a vital link constituting the coherence within Laos – through the important role of 
remittances - and integration between Laos and Thailand through a socio-spatial 
construction of labour that benefits low-wage, low-skill Thai industries. In some cases 
foreign investment in different areas may actually be driving migration to Thailand. 
6.8.1 Out-Migration 
Migration to Thailand has a long history, whether through the forced removals during the 
19th century or the flight of refugees or disgruntled peasants after the revolution. Thailand 
as an attractive work destination increased however as its economy expanded rapidly in the 
1980s and 1990s and it began to experience labour shortages for its low-skill industries 
(Phongpaichit and Baker 2002; Huijsmans 2010: 100). Lao migrants in Thailand largely work 
as domestic workers, in agriculture, selling food, construction and light manufacturing, as 
well as in more clandestine occupations such as sex work (SADC 2014: 8; Molland 2010). 
Exact numbers of Lao migrants in Thailand are hard to ascertain13 but estimates put their 
number at 306,624 in 2013, rising from 293,519 in 2011 (SADC 2014: 7). If numbers have 
increased in recent years, causes are likely complex with demographic changes increasing 
working age population, pressures on land and livelihoods, and development of transport 
infrastructure all potentially implicated (Barney 2012; World Bank 2014b; Khumya and 
Kusakabe 2015). Rigg (2007: 167-168) highlights the variability in migration patterns even 
between villages in close proximity to each other. He cautions against functionalist 
explanations which find the causes of this variability in ‘the availability of land, location and 
accessibility, and local employment opportunities and the ‘need’ for villagers to migrate’ and 
suggests migration flows ‘are more likely to relate to intangible factors such as awareness, 
migration links and contacts, and evolving cultures of mobility at the community level’ (ibid. 
168). Rigg notes that material conditions do play a factor but seems to suggest that 
informational and cultural factors are of more importance in explaining variation. Barney 
(2012; see also Estudillo et al 2013) also notes the importance of the cultural and social 
milieu of migration but argues, persuasively I think, for natural resource extraction and 
associated enclosures contributing to youth out-migration. In his fieldwork comparing two 
nearby villages he found that enclosure of land for plantation concessions and knock-on 
13 For example, the Labour Force Survey 2010, based on household surveys, does not clarify whether 
international migrants are included or excluded from the total labour force figures (GoL 2010). 
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effects from a foreign-invested hydropower project had undermined local agriculture-based 
livelihood systems in one. These livelihood changes had acted as a significant ‘push’ factor 
and led to higher levels of migration than the other village (ibid. 79). Notably, Barney 
observes the importance of poor regulation in allowing the extractive companies to gain 
resource rents and externalize risks onto populations (ibid. 80). 
Labour flows are segmented according to gender and age. One estimate has 31 percent of 
Lao migrants to Thailand working in the domestic sector (SADC 2014: 8). Thai employers, for 
example, display a preference for hiring young Lao women as domestic workers over 
Burmese or Cambodian migrants (Barney 2012: 65). Evidence indicates as well that females 
and the less well-educated find it harder to access wage labour in local labour markets and 
resort to migration to Thailand (Estudillo 2013 et al; Khumya and Kusakabe 2015).14 
The vast majority of Lao migrants to Thailand go through unofficial channels (SADC 2014: 4). 
Lao workers have reported difficulties and abuses, often related to their undocumented 
status (Barney 2012: 70). Migrants, for instance, have reported having their freedom of 
movement constrained by fear of arrest, as well as cases of poor working conditions and 
employer abuses (Huijsmans and Phouxay 2008: 42; SADC 2014: 17). Huijsmans (2010: 108) 
notes that the Lao state views migration with ambivalence. On the one hand migration is 
deemed to be a means through which Lao workers can gain access to new skills and 
knowledge and as long as it occurs through official channels is thus compatible with national 
development agendas. The state appears to be somewhat resigned to the realities of 
international migration and emphasizes regularization over complete prohibition, focusing 
prevention efforts on trafficking, especially of young migrants (ibid. 114-115). On the other 
hand, the government has previously passed decrees prohibiting migrants from working in 
jobs that are dangerous or without dignity such as low-paid cleaning and domestic work, 
even though Lao migrants are more likely to be employed in these occupations than any 
other. For Huijsmans, the ‘various limitations that apply to the recruitment of Lao migrant 
workers illustrate that these apparent gains have not by-passed the lingering sensitivity 
intrinsic to Lao-Thai relations15 (ibid. 108). The 7th NSEDP observes that labour supply needs 
to be balanced, advising limiting out-migration of labour (GoL 2011: 69, 121). Interestingly, 
Huijsmans (ibid. 110) observed in his fieldwork in a village on the Thai border that there was 
competition for Lao agricultural wage labour between the Thai side and wealthier land-
14 Sources cited are studies conducted in lowland ethnic Lao villages, and so different gender 
dynamics appear to be at play than the gendered resettlement divisions of labour mentioned above.
15 See Chapter 5. 
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holding families on the Lao side, leading the latter to call for tighter enforcement of illegal 
border crossing. Their arguments were couched in the terms of national development.  
The growth of migration has entailed that remittances have assumed great importance in 
the livelihoods of many households. Migration is part of diversified household livelihood 
strategies which use paddy rice production as the ‘platform’ on which other economic 
activities are based (Newby et al 2013: 5). Manivong et al (2014: 377) in their study in 
Champasak, southern Laos, found that farming households retained enough labour on the 
farm, usually the senior married couple, to meet subsistence production and allocated 
surplus labour - typically younger married couples or unmarried daughters and sons - to 
non-farm wage work, especially in Thailand. Different studies of remittances sent by Lao 
migrants in Thailand have indicated average annual amounts of 10,000-26,000 baht (USD 
300-800) per year (Barney 2012: 73).  Barney (ibid. 73-74) notes that while the exact role 
and importance to livelihoods can be hard to ascertain he encountered evidence of 
remittances used for household agricultural investments. Manivong et al (2014: 376) found 
that for households with rice deficits, remittances were used to cover food requirements 
and other household necessities. Households with sufficient or surplus rice on the other 
hand used remittances for working capital and investment in assets such as inorganic 
fertilizers and water pumps.  Investment in house construction was also a common 
destination for remitted money (ibid. 376). Remittances therefore provided a means to turn 
mobility into fixity as they contributed to physically reproducing migrants’ home villages 
through extending the housing infrastructure and potentially boosting agricultural 
productivity. 
In some areas of rural Laos – especially the Mekong lowlands - the particular form of 
territorial coherence revolves around the axis of migration to Thailand – and the remittances 
therefrom – and agriculture for both subsistence and petty commodity production. Social 
reproduction is ensured through household’s combination of delocalized wage labour and 
access to productive agricultural land. This form of territorial coherence within Laos was also 
certainly a form of regional integration constituting coherence between Laos and Thailand in 
favour of Thai capital as Thai enterprises and individuals benefited from cheap Lao labour.  
Migration is somewhat reluctantly facilitated by the state’s emphasis on regularization 
rather than prohibition and punishment of illegal migrants. The state’s ambivalent attitude 
to labour migration and the calls of more powerful villagers to retain Lao labour in the 
country point to an interesting theme; that of reterritorializing Lao labour within Laos for the 
purposes of modernization. 
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6.8.2 In-Migration
Laos’ integration into the wider regional space has not only been secured through migration 
to Thailand, but also through Laos acting as an arena for neighbouring country labour’s own 
spatial fixes. Foreign investment from China, Vietnam and Thailand has often been 
accompanied by labour, with workers from these countries reported as building projects 
such as hydropower, working in mines and on plantations (RFA 6/11/2013). Burmese 
migration has also occurred.16 Again much of this labour comes through unofficial channels, 
with some 200,000 undocumented foreign workers in Laos according to local media 
(Vientiane Times 2012a in McAllister 2015: 826). 
Chinese migration has been most significant in the north of Laos, in border provinces. 
Estimates from 2010 put the number of Chinese migrants in Laos at 80,000 (ADB 2013: 3). 
Chinese workers began arriving in the 1990s as part of road construction projects and 
cooperation between Yunnan province and northern Lao provinces (Tan 2012: 68). Some of 
these migrants stayed at the end of their contracts to engage in petty trade and business 
opportunities (ibid. 68). 
Vietnamese workers have been reported as being brought in to work on construction 
projects in urban areas and also to work on plantations (RFA 6/11/2013). Vietnamese have 
also arrived to establish petty businesses (Hanh 2014).  Vietnamese migrant numbers have 
been estimated at 20,000 (ADB 2013: 3) although exact figures are hard to ascertain within a 
fluid context of short-term and longer-term migration and ease of crossing the border (Hanh 
2014: 202). The colonial view of Vietnamese workers as more industrious is mirrored in 
current day migratory flows. Vietnamese rubber companies have been reported preferring 
to import their compatriots for plantation work as they believe that Vietnamese work harder 
for lower wages (Baird 2011: 21). Cases have been reported of rubber tapping wages 
dropping in 2013-2014 on Vietnamese plantations leading to Lao citizens stopping tapping 
and seeking wage labour elsewhere, including migrating to Thailand. The plantation 
investors turned to importing Vietnamese labour to replace them (Baird and Fox 2015: 444). 
In-migration is not a focus of the present study although increasing numbers of Chinese and 
Vietnamese are symptomatic of the complex reweavings of Lao and regional space that are a 
present concern. The reterritorialization of Lao space through investment projects is not 
only tying Laos to the region as a space of reproduction for regional capital but also 
extending networks of social reproduction into Laos. As much of this migration appears to 
16 See Chapter 5. 
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be undocumented and therefore unprotected it seems that migration-linked valorization 
processes in Laos are dependent on the creation of informal labour regimes weighted 
towards capital. 
6.9 Manufacturing Labour
In keeping with the small size of the sector there is a paucity of information on labour in the 
Lao manufacturing sector. The few studies which exist have focused on the export-oriented 
garments sector in Vientiane. I thus address that sector to uncover some of the dynamics of 
labour in manufacturing in Laos. Exact numbers of garment workers in Laos are difficult to 
establish but estimates from 2012 report between 28,000 and 30,000 workers in the 
industry (Care 2012: 4). In 2012 the figure of 30,000 was said to represent 19.6 percent of 
the total manufacturing labour force in Laos (Nolintha and Jajri 2016: 110). The majority of 
these workers are young females and many are rural to urban migrants. Women constitute 
85 percent of the total garment workforce (World Bank 2012: 18). The division of labour is 
gendered with men more likely to be employed as technical or professional staff. Women 
are employed mainly as sewing machine operators or cutters and also represent the 
majority of line supervisors in the industry (79 percent) (ibid.). 51 percent of female workers 
in 2011 were internal migrants – as opposed to Vientiane residents – and 37 percent of male 
workers were also migrants (ibid. 19). The majority of rural migrants in Vientiane appear to 
be from the northern provinces (Phouxay and Tollefsen 2011: 429; Sisaleumsak 2012: 2).
For young women migrants, participation in garment wage labour is apparently shaped by 
several considerations. On the one hand economic concerns are central with the 
requirement to provide remittances for their families’ upkeep and younger siblings’ 
educational advancement (Phouxay and Tollefsen 2011: 428; Care 2012: 25). On the other 
hand young rural women also appeared to be motivated by participating in the modernity of 
big city life and the social and consumption possibilities that urban employment presents 
(Sisaleumsak 2012; Khamphouvong 2014). Changing mores of desirable employment were 
reflected by some migrants rejecting agricultural production under the hot sun in favour of 
industrial employment performed indoors (Phouxay and Tollefsen 2011: 428). 
Recruitment in Vientiane garment factories is reportedly most effective through informal 
methods rather than formal methods such as advertisements. Hiring is generally deemed to 
be swift and ‘on the spot’ with little explanation of contractual rights and obligations (World 
Bank 2012: 27). Word-of-mouth recruitment utilizes workers’ kin and friendship networks to 
facilitate labour migration to the city (Care 2012: 8). Another key method used is the 
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recruitment drive, involving either factory management or private recruitment agents 
driving a bus to northern provinces and approaching village heads to ask for workers. Village 
heads then discuss with villagers and find young women for the manager or agent. The 
women get on the bus and the process is repeated at other villages until the bus is filled and 
the bus returns to Vientiane for the women to start work. Women may not have fully 
informed consent and the possibility for coercion is also heightened by the practice of giving 
village heads per head incentive payments to recruit (ibid. 8-9). 
Recruitment is a persistent issue for garment factory managers as turnover in the industry is 
high. Larger firms have reported turnover rates of 3.5 percent a month and smaller firms of 
6 percent a month, which managers deem high by regional industry standards (World Bank 
2012: 21). The inability to attract and retain workers is a recurrent theme in discussion of 
the Lao garment industry with many, including factory managers and industry association 
officials, viewing the lack of labour as a significant restraint on the growth of the industry. 
Problems with recruitment have been attributed to variously workers having opportunities 
elsewhere in an expanding economy, higher wages in Thailand, and returning to home 
communities due to family responsibilities (ibid. 20; Vientiane Times 7/9/2015; Vientiane 
Times 28/3/2016; Nolintha 2016). The realities of factory employment may however provide 
an additional reason for high turnover. 
Garment factory workers are subject to harsh factory discipline and an industrial relations 
system where rights are difficult to access or absent. Workers have reported struggling to 
adapt to the imposed discipline and scolding of supervisors, even when regarding factory 
work as preferable to farm work overall (Phouxay and Tollefsen 2011: 430). Excessive, 
compulsory overtime, low wages, and unjustified wage deductions have all been observed in 
Lao garment factories (ibid. 430; World Bank 2012: 29-30). Workers were often apparently 
happy to work high amounts of overtime to boost their income but many complained that it 
sapped energy and motivation and was a key reason for quitting (World Bank 2012: 29). 
Industrial relations in the garment sector appear to offer evidence for state and capital’s 
attempts to construct Lao manufacturing labour as ‘in-fact’ informal. Workers have been 
observed as having little knowledge of their entitlements under the labour law and having 
ineffective dispute resolution mechanisms even when the LFTU is present in a factory. It has 
thus been suggested that workers have little recourse to problems apart from being ‘patient’ 
and quitting when they find the situation unbearable, leaving for work elsewhere or using 
the spatial safety valve of return to their home communities (ibid. 28, 30; Sisaleumsak 2012: 
53). 
156
In more general terms the case of garment manufacturing in Vientiane reflects key themes 
in the feminized export-oriented manufacturing literature of low wages, rights abuses, and 
strategic engagement by workers in search of better lives (Elson and Pearson 1981; 
Pangsapa 2007; Dominguez et al 2010). As a point of reference for the current case it 
indicates the importance for foreign capital and its state backers of enacting a gendered and 
spatial construction of labour that mobilizes labour from rural areas. A specific combination 
of capital accumulation, social reproduction and governance formulated a new pattern of 
territorial coherence within Laos which allowed an export-led territorial coherence between 
Laos and neighbouring countries. It is a point left unexplored in the extant literature, 
however, whether these communities had experienced land loss and livelihood changes due 
to foreign investment projects. At any rate, the mediation of state actors at both village and 
factory levels appears to have enabled a construction of labour beneficial to capital, first by 
providing recruits, and second by helping to make workers ‘in-fact’ informal labour. Worker 
retention issues remained however.
Conclusion
Tracing the development of labour legislation in Laos is instructive for considering how the 
Lao state is developing forms and functions which respond to its historical specificity. At a 
time of rapid development and increasing investment, concerns over skills shortages and 
out-migration prompted the promulgation of a law which instructs state officials at all levels 
of the territorial hierarchy to promote skills and employment within Laos. The Lao state is to 
assume a central role in inducing Lao citizens into capital-labour relations within Lao 
territory. The laws on industrial relations would seem to reflect both Laos’ authoritarian 
governing stance and also the need to project a stable environment to investors where 
industrial peace and harmony will reign. While the laws stipulate various entitlements it is 
less obvious that workers will be aware of them or, if they are aware, be able to access them. 
Consequently, there is a reasonably strong suggestion that ‘in-fact’ informal labour exists in 
Laos beside the more clearly informal and unprotected types of employment, as examples 
from the garments industry indicate. 
The power of capital and state to mould workers as they wish should not be overestimated, 
however. As the historical examples show, subaltern actors including peasants and workers 
have at times been refractory in the face of unwanted policies and their actions have led to 
policy changes. In studies of labour in Laos it seems that it would pay to be aware of the 
possible autonomous actions which disrupt or contest the stratagems of the powerful. The 
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constant churning of garment factory workers as they seek out better opportunities or 
return to maintain distant home villages suggests the power of everyday forms of labour’s 
agency in Laos to influence development trajectories. That the state is adapting to the 
realities of out-migration is also indicative of labour’s everyday power. The Lao state it 
would seem is attempting to not only reterritorialize Lao space but reterritorialize Lao labour 
as a necessary part of this process. 
Individuals and households in Laos appear to build their livelihoods by making use of 
multiple activities. It seems then that we should be sensitive to the many ways that a single 
person or household may have of surviving and prospering. An existing territorial coherence 
and form of regional integration involving migration to Thailand and agriculture appears as 
the context for increasing foreign manufacturing investment in the Lao lowlands. New 
foreign factories in the Savannakhet border manufacturing enclave would have to contend 
with these realities in order to construct labour forces for implanting new valorization 
processes and forms of regional integration.
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Chapter 7: Foreign Investment in Savannakhet
Foreign investment in Savannakhet province and the town of the same name has 
accelerated in the past decade. The town has emerged as a nodal point on the East-West 
Economic Corridor and as a locus for the new manufacturing operations of foreign 
companies. Significant manufacturing investments have concentrated in the Savan-Seno 
Special Economic Zone in the town. Zone companies, as well as those foreign factories 
located outside the zone, articulate Lao space with regional production networks, especially 
those based in Thailand.  The location of the zone on the border and its orientation to 
Thailand has entailed that it and the foreign manufacturing investment outside it give the 
town an enclave quality. Foreign companies take advantage of cheaper labour and 
production costs as well as proximity to Thailand – important in order to move goods swiftly 
within production networks - while building few connections with the broader Lao economy 
beyond that of incorporating Lao labour. The zone thus provides a form of territorial 
coherence between Laos and Thailand, and thus the region, which privileges foreign actors. 
The Lao state has undertaken an administrative transformation in order to establish this 
form of territorial coherence and enact the territorialization of the zone. The creation of the 
Special Economic Zone Authority represents a rescaling of the Lao state to a highly local 
scale the better to articulate Lao space with the regional scale.  
7.1 Savannakhet Province
The town of Savannakhet is situated on the Mekong river in Savannakhet province1 in 
southern Laos. Officially known as Kaysone Phomvihane (KP) district (meuang) the town lies 
around 460 km2 by road from the Lao capital Vientiane. The smaller town of Seno lies some 
30 km to the northeast. Savannakhet lies opposite the Thai provincial centre of Mukdahan, 
some 650 km by road distant from Bangkok. Savannakhet province borders Khammouan 
province to the north, Salavan to the south, Thailand across the Mekong to the west, and 
Vietnam to the east. It occupies 21,774 km², making it the largest province in Laos. The 
landscape is characterized by plains in the west which rise to hilly terrain in the east. The 
Mekong forms the entirety of the border with Thailand to the west. The province is divided 
administratively into 15 districts of which Kaysone Phomvihane is the capital and main 
1 Savannakhet will henceforth refer to the town unless otherwise indicated. 
2 This distance is within the borders of Laos, roughly following the course of the Mekong. The distance 
is shortened to 350 km via Thailand. 
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administrative and commercial centre.  The population of the province was 953, 511 in 2013, 
making it the most populous province (GoL 2014: 23). 1010 villages were recorded in 2013 
with 153,487 households (ibid. 21). Population is concentrated in the west of the province, 
especially in the districts of Outhouphone, Champhone, and Kaysone Phomvihane (PRF 
2012). The province’s extensive plains in the west make it a key agricultural region and ‘one 
of the most important rice-producing provinces in Laos’ (Newby et al 2013: 3).
7.2 FDI in Savannakhet, 1992-2014
The province has seen increasing amounts of foreign investment in the last decade.3 
Provincial data record foreign investments in the period from 1992-2005 as totalling 
registered capital of USD 26,759,779 (SPA 2014a).4 Between 1992-2005 annual investments 
did not exceed USD 4.1 million in a year, apart from the anomaly of 1993 when they hit USD 
12.48 million, due to a USD 5 million investment in mining exploration by an Australian 
company. The pioneer foreign investor in Savannakhet was the Hong Ta Good Luck Lao–
China cigarette factory, with a USD 1.5 million investment in 1992. The other most important 
foreign investment in the 1990s came from Motolao, the South Korean motorcycle 
manufacturer, with an investment of USD 2.5 million in 1997. The company would come to 
establish itself as an important employer in KP district. 
3 Provincial data provides details of the value of approved investment projects, i.e. not actually 
invested, and also registered capital amounts, i.e. capital declared at the time of the project’s 
registration and which actually exists as assets in Lao PDR (GoL 2005: Article 20). Approved figures are 
significantly higher than the registered capital amounts listed for the same projects. Registered capital 
(RC) reflects initial levels of investment as it is used for operating costs in early stages of investment. 
Approved investments data thus appear substantially higher than data provided by the World Bank on 
net FDI inflows. Approved investment data should therefore be treated with caution (for a similar 
caveat see Freeman 2001: 103). Therefore in the following discussion amounts will refer to registered 
capital amounts, unless otherwise indicated. RC reflects initial investments, so will likely 
underestimate the value of investments to a certain extent in enterprises which are at a more 
advanced stage of development. Unfortunately the provincial data is not fine-grained enough to 
provide actually invested amounts, so the RC must be taken as an indicative minimum baseline of FDI 
in Savannakhet.
4 This data does not record figures for the years 1994, 1998, 1999, and 2001, and it is not clear from 
the source why they have been omitted. World Bank figures state that total net FDI in Laos was USD 
59.2 million (World Bank 2016). Freeman (2001: 104) notes that 1994 was actually a peak year for the 
approval of foreign investment projects with almost USD 2.6 billion worth of FDI pledges licensed. It is 
therefore unlikely that Savannakhet would not have been a destination for some of this investment. 
The effects of the Asian Financial Crisis – which heavily impacted Laos’ main foreign investor, Thailand 
– and resulted in an estimated 41 percent contraction in actual FDI inflows and 97 percent reduction 
in FDI pledges (ibid. 104) may account for the lack of data on 1998 and 1999. World Bank figures 
report a mere USD 23.9 million FDI in 2001 (World Bank 2016). This low amount Freeman (2001: 114) 
notes may have its reasons in Laos’ macroeconomic instability and poor business environment making 
it unattractive to investors in post-crash Asia. Reduced total amounts do not explain the total 
omission of provincial data for the year but the paucity of investment may indicate a lack of data to 
build statistics on.
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Over the period 2006-20145 registered foreign investments ran at USD 553 million. In dollar 
terms 82.2 percent of approved investments and 95.3 percent of registered capital from 
1992-2014 in Savannkhet province came in the eight and a half year period from 2006 to 
mid-2014. The 2006-2014 period thus saw over a twenty-fold increase in the value of 
registered capital. 
Over the total period of 1992-2013 certain countries emerge as key sources of foreign 
investment. Chinese investors claimed first place in total amount of investment, initiating 36 
projects with a total registered capital of USD 145.5 million. Thailand matched China in 
terms of projects, with 36, and had registered capital of USD 118.2 million. Vietnam trailed 
the top two with USD 58 million invested in 22 projects. Malaysia, Japan, South Korea, India, 
Australia and France were also all important contributors of investment. Out of 168 projects 
listed for 1992-2014 in the provincial data 116 projects (69 percent) were solely foreign 
investment and 48 (28.5 percent) were joint ventures,6 although it is uncertain what 
percentages were contributed by each partner or how much joint ventures partnered with 
the state, private Lao capital, or a combination of the two. Joint ventures contributed 21.5 
percent of the total foreign investment over the 1992-2014 period, and 27 percent between 
2007-2014 (SPA 2014a).7 While the contribution of joint ventures is lower than that of solely 
owned foreign capital, their presence indicates a not insignificant trend towards the 
integration of Lao and international capital. 50 percent of the joint venture projects came 
from just two countries: China (10 projects); and Thailand (14 projects). Vietnam, Malaysia 
and South Korea all had four joint venture projects each, Japan and Taiwan three, and 
Singapore one (ibid.). 
This provides evidence that a Lao capitalist class is emerging through intertwining with 
regional East and Southeast Asian capital and that Savannakhet is a locus of regional class 
integration in Laos. The most prominent Lao capital in Savannakhet in 2013-2014 were 
companies forming part of the Bua Corporation Limited. The Bua Corporation’s precursor 
business was originally founded in 1940 and imported and distributed consumer goods and 
construction materials. After the pro-market reforms in 1986 the family in charge 
reconstituted and expanded the company. It has interests in manufacturing, logistics, facility 
maintenance, construction, and labour recruitment within Laos (Bua Corporation 2016). In 
Savannakhet they are engaged in two manufacturing joint ventures. The Lao state and 
5 Figure for 2014 is not for the whole year. The source does not indicate for how many months of 
2014 the figure applies, although the source was obtained by the author in June 2014. 
6 Four projects were missing this data. 
7 Author’s own calculations. 
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foreign capital are also intertwining. For example, the main industrial site developer, Lao 
Samudra,8 is a joint venture between the government and a Malaysian company, with Dr. 
Soupanh Keomixay, the provincial governor in 2013-2014 acting as the company’s chairman 
(Lao Samudra manager interview 13/1/2014). In addition another Lao company, the Namtha 
Road and Bridge Construction Company, is reported to be involved in the site development 
of part of the SASEZ (see below). A Lao capitalist class thus seems to be playing a role in 
facilitating the spatial fixes of regional capital and in doing so rescaling social relations within 
Laos and across the region.   
7.2.1 Agriculture
The agriculture and forestry sector has led the way in foreign investments in the province. 
Cumulative investments from 1992 to mid-2014 amounted to USD 341 million, or 58.8 
percent of total investment (SPA 2014a). Cassava, rubber, eucalyptus and sugar have been 
the main cash crops targeted by investors. Chinese investors initiated 12 projects 
concentrating on cassava and rubber. Vietnam was responsible for nine projects, with a 
prominent focus on rubber production. Thai companies invested in six projects, with the vast 
majority of investment contributed by two large sugar projects (ibid.). 
Agricultural investments were made in both producing crops and processing plants, thus 
tallying with the Lao government’s attempts to retain a greater part of the commodity value 
chain within the country and boost industrial growth (Vientiane Times 20/3/2011). There 
was a spike in foreign investment in 2006 as Laos’ investment frontier reputation began to 
build. Significant investments in that year came from large Asian multinational corporations. 
Mitr Lao, a subsidiary of Mitr Phol, a large Thai sugar company, invested USD 6.75 million for 
a sugar processing factory in Saybouli district. Mitr Lao made subsequent large investments 
in 2008 with USD 8.25 million (SPA 2014a; Mitr Phol 2011). Mitr Lao has entered into 
contract farming agreements with local villagers, which have reportedly led to high levels of 
indebtedness amongst the farmers (Phoumanivong et al 2015). Birla Lao, a subsidiary of the 
Aditya Birla Group from India, contributed USD 125 million to set up pulp wood plantations 
(SPA 2014a; Aditya Birla 2016). 
8 Companies participating in the study have been anonymized under pseudonyms to protect identities. 
Companies anonymized are: Belgium Costumes Group; Bua Corporation; Bua Corporation Services; 
Bua Pagop Manufacturing; Flight Pro; Hokkaido Toys; Honshu Automotive; Lao Clothing Company; Lao 
Samudra; Motolao; Savan Toys; Tokyo Camera Inc; Visetec. All other company names are real.
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7.2.2 Energy and Mining
The energy and mining sector contributed according to provincial statistics USD 35.9 million 
or 6.2 percent to foreign investment in Savannakhet over 1992-2013 (SPA 2014a). The most 
prominent investment in this sector has been the Sepon mine in the east of the province. An 
open-pit copper and gold mine, it is the country’s first large-scale mine and started gold 
production in 2003 (Hatcher 2014: 332; 342). Lane Xang Minerals Ltd (LXML), controlled by 
Mineral and Metals Group (90 percent) and the Lao government (10 percent), operates the 
mine. The mine was established by Rio Tinto, an Anglo-Australian multinational, in 1999 and 
bought by Oxiana, another Australian firm, one year later with Rio Tinto keeping a 20 
percent share. Ownership was transferred to Minerals and Metals Group in 2009, which is 
majority controlled by Chinese shareholder China Minmetals Corporation (ibid. 327; 341) 
Gold production ceased in December 2013 due to depleted ore reserves and lower profits. 
The mine now focuses on the copper operation, producing 89,253 tonnes of copper cathode 
in 2015. The copper is exported to cable and wire manufacturers in the Southeast Asian 
region (MMG 2016). The closure of the gold operation in 2013 led to 400 of the 4000 strong 
workforce being laid off (RFA 28/1/2014). 
7.2.3 Services
The province reports cumulative investments in services of USD 96.9 million in 1992-2014 
(SPA 2014a). Some infrastructure development projects are included within the category of 
services and make up the lion’s share of the listed provincial total. Over a third of the 
approved total - USD 100 million – is intended for one project; the construction of a railway 
between Savannakhet and Lao Bao on the Vietnamese border. In 2012 the government 
signed an agreement with a Malaysian company, Giant Consolidated Ltd9, to construct and 
operate the rail line. The project is expected to cost some USD 5 billion. The 220 km stretch 
would link to the Vietnamese port city of Danang and is intended to reduce the cost of 
exporting and consumer goods (RFA 3/1/2014). The Savannakhet-Lao Bao railway is a 
component of the government’s ‘land-locked to land-linked’ strategy (Vientiane Times 
1/10/2015). The line is also to follow the route of the East-West Economic Corridor and 
connects with the Savan-Seno SEZ. Other key foreign ‘services’ investments in recent years 
are connected to the development of the zone. The developer of Site C – the main industrial 
site of the zone - is Lao Samudra Ltd., a private Malaysian and Lao government joint venture. 
The developer of Site A – the commercial site – is Savan City Co., a joint venture between a 
9 Also referred to as Giant Rail Company Limited in press reports. 
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Thai investor, a Lao company and the Lao government (Savan City n.d). They invested 
registered capital of USD 2 million and USD 5 million respectively (SPA 2014a). 
Another noticeable foreign services investment in Savannakhet is the Savan Vegas casino 
and hotel. Sanum Investments registered USD 7.5 million for the construction of the large 
complex which lies on the outskirts of the Savannakhet urban area (SPA 2014a). Sanum 
Investments is described as a Chinese-based or Macau-based company in some reports and 
provincial data (RFA 11/9/2012; Bangkok Post 29/9/2013; SPA 2014a) but Lao Holdings N.V. 
– the parent company of Sanum Investments - is described as being based in the 
Netherlands. The casino has become the object of a protracted dispute between the Lao 
government – which seized the casino - and the investors over unpaid taxes which the 
company claims not to owe (RFA 11/9/2012; PR Newswire 2016). 
7.2.4 Industry and Manufacturing 
Foreign investment in the industrial sector in Savannakhet province reached a cumulative 
total of USD 105.8 million over 1992-2014. The vast majority of this came in the period 2007-
2014 with USD 88.6 million registered in 45 projects, or 83 percent of the 1992-2014 totals 
(SPA 2014a). These figures do not include agro-processing investment which is treated as 
agricultural investment in the provincial data. In the foreign investment wave from 2007-
2014 the largest national investor was South Korea with USD 29.5 million –  33.3 percent of 
the industrial FDI total for that period. Korean investment in Savannakhet’s industry over the 
period is mainly attributable to one company – Motolao. Motolao made large investments 
to expand production in 2008 and 2013 (SPA 2014a). China was the next largest contributor 
with 10 projects totalling USD 13.9 million registered (15.7 percent of the period total). 
Japanese capital became prominent during the later years of the period with USD 15.5 
million or 17.5 percent of the total.  Of the Japanese investment over 2007-2014, 97.1 
percent came in just two years, 2013 and 2014, in investments related to manufacturing in 
the SEZ. Thailand was also amongst the top contributors to industrial investment with USD 
8.5 million (9.6 percent) in eight projects. Out of 45 projects recorded between 2007 and 
mid-2014, 29 were solely foreign-invested and 14 were joint ventures.10 The sectors of 
investment varied but construction materials was most prominent with 10 projects. Sectors 
also included chemicals and plastics (6), electronic and electrical goods (5), automotive (4), 
wood products (3), garments (2), cigarettes (2), food and drink (2), rubber products (2), and 
miscellaneous others. The top year for industrial investment was 2013 with USD 45.3 million. 
10 Data was missing for the others. 
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Already in mid-year 2014 USD 11.8 million (8.3 percent) had been approved (ibid.). The 
reason for such an upswing in industrial foreign investment is due to the Savan-Seno Special 
Economic Zone located in the provincial capital of Savannakhet.
7.3 Savannakhet: Kaysone Phomvihane District
The modern town of Savannakhet is of recent provenance. The French founded Savannakhet 
in the early years of their rule (Toye 1968: 45-46) and it assumed importance as an 
administrative and commercial outpost on the frontier with Siam. In 1895, the French first 
ruled Laos as a single administrative entity with a Resident Superieure originally based at 
Savannakhet before relocation to Vientiane a year later (Stuart Fox 1997: 30). The province 
of Savannakhet was subsequently constituted as an administrative unit in 1899 as part of a 
French drive to reorganize their Indochinese colonies along provincial lines (Gunn 1990: 15).  
Savannakhet’s commercial importance stemmed largely from its position on the river 
(Robequain 1944: 114-116) and the Thai border and then from its position ‘at the end of the 
strategic Route 9’ (Langer and Zasloff 1970: 28).  This road, opened in 1930, runs from 
Savannakhet through Sepon and the pass over the Say Phu Luang cordillera at Lao Bao to 
Quang Tri province in Vietnam, and thus was a key artery of debloquement (Robequain 1944: 
101; Stuart-Fox 1997: 49). Savannakhet province was thus a conduit for the extraction of 
natural resources such as metal ore to the Vietnamese coast (Robequain 1944: 261). 
Savannakhet also came to be a major locus for the import of goods (Gunn 1990: 40). 
Savannakhet grew to be one of the major towns in the country. Vietnamese migration 
contributed to increasing the size of its population (Gunn 1988: 45; Vorapeth 2015: 10). By 
the later colonial period one estimate put the Vietnamese population of Savannakhet as 72 
percent of the total (Hanh 2014: 194), and the town became a focus of Vietnamese 
communist activity (Gunn 1988: 44ff). Kaysone Phomvihane, one of the foremost leaders of 
the Lao revolution and former president of the Lao PDR was born in the town in 1920 
(Phomvihane 1981: 5), and the town district was officially named for him in 2005 (Nolintha 
2011: 189). 
In 2013-2014 the district of Kaysone Phomvihane was divided administratively into 13 gum 
baan (‘village clusters’) of between four and seven baan (‘village’) numbering 67 in total. In 
2013, according to local government statistics the total Lao citizen (phonlameuang) 
population of the district numbered 128,182, of whom 50.9 percent were women and 49.1 
men. 123,455 (96.3 percent) were classified as ethnic (son phao) Lao. The next largest ethnic 
group was the Phu Tai minority, an ethnic Tai group, numbering 4,144 people (3.2 percent). 
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The remainder are small numbers of Katang and Makong minorities and 496 ‘other’. 18,124 
households were recorded (SPA 2014b). It is not clear how well these figures actually 
capture the population of Savannakhet. The figures may not capture migration accurately, 
both to and from the town. Savannakhet province has a significant number of people who 
migrate to work in Thailand and the source does not clarify if the figures are actual residents 
or persons registered to the household but not resident. There is also a significant 
Vietnamese community in the town and it is uncertain if they are captured by the 496 
‘other’. Provincial statistics record that in 2013 there were 480 Vietnamese working in 
Savannakhet, the majority of whom were working in either construction or trading (SPA 
2013a). Although these numbers are similar the 480 Vietnamese workers are classified as 
dtaang pathet, ‘foreigners’ rather than citizens. Hanh (2014: 194-195) indicates that 
although most Vietnamese living in Savannakhet were born in Laos only around 60 per cent 
have Lao citizenship and puts the total Vietnamese population at 2800 in 2007. 
The population figures are for the whole district which is spatially extensive and includes 
both urban and rural areas. In 2013 79,408 people, or 61.9 percent, lived in urban villages 
(baan dtua meuang) and 48,774, 38.1 percent, in rural villages (baan sonnabot) (SPA 2014b). 
Ethnic minorities were concentrated in urban areas according to provincial statistics, and the 
town’s rural hinterland is overwhelmingly ethnic Lao. 
7.4 Industry in Kaysone Phomvihane: Domestic and Foreign
Industry in Kaysone Phomvihane is characterized by a plethora of small domestic ventures 
overlain by a small number of large foreign-invested factories, which have become 
increasingly significant in terms of employment and total investment. There were 301 
domestic enterprises in the years 2013-14 (SPA 2013d). According to the provincial 
government’s classification system11 24 were medium-sized enterprises, 48 were small, and 
the overwhelming majority, 229, were ‘family’ enterprises.  These enterprises employed 
1,311 people, 655 women and 656 men. 179 of these enterprises were in food processing. 
Most of these were small-scale rice milling enterprises, and in addition meat products, 
noodles, ice, bread, and snacks were being produced in 2013-2014.  The production of 
construction materials also made a notable contribution to the district’s industrial landscape, 
with 33 enterprises producing bricks and concrete blocks. Brick factories constituted the 
majority (21) of ‘medium-sized’ enterprises in the district and typically employed 10 or more 
11 Information was not available on the criteria for the categories. 
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people (SPA 2013d).  Small-scale industrial activities such as wood processing (worker 
interviews 4/5/2014; 25/5/2014) and salt production (fieldnotes) are also present.
Foreign investment’s importance in the industrial development of KP district first emerged in 
light manufacturing in the 1990s. A clutch of foreign-invested factories, producing goods 
ranging from cigarettes to garments to motorcycles, established themselves in the district 
and continue to the present day. The pioneer in this regard was the Hong Ta Good Luck 
tobacco company, investing in 1992 (SPA 2014a). The company is still operating in 
Savannakhet to the present. 
Laos Clothing Company Ltd. (LCC), a French-invested garments factory followed in 1993 (SPA 
2014a). The French investors may have taken over the factory from a Thai company which 
went bankrupt (LCC manager interview 18/3/2014) although this could not be confirmed. 
The French owners also reportedly had a factory in Vientiane and subcontracted for a main 
factory in Thailand exporting women and men’s garments to France. Belgium Costumes 
Group, a Belgium company, acquired the factory in 2008, and in 2014 was producing party 
costumes for European department stores. Belgium Costumes Group had previously 
produced in Thailand but moved to Laos due to concerns about poor quality and high costs 
at the Thai plant (LCC manager interview 18/3/2014).
Another foreign garment factory, Fuli Laos, was also established around 2011. In 2013-2014 
their factory was located in Ban Nonsavath in the south of the town. Provincial statistics list 
their initial registered investment as USD 2.5 million in 2011, and the investors as from the 
People´s Republic of China (SPA 2014a). The factory may have subsequently been run by 
Hong Kong investors rather than PRC nationals (LCC manager interview 18/3/2014). 
Motolao was another notable foreign investor to launch production in Savannakhet in the 
1990s. Motolao is one of the most prominent companies in Laos due to their ubiquitous, 
affordable motorcycles. Motolao was established by Korean investors in 1997 and has 
become one of the largest companies in Laos. Motolao initially started with the knock-down 
manufacture and sale of cars in Vientiane. It acquired a factory in Savannakhet in 1999 and 
launched the manufacture of a new in-house motorcycle brand there in 2003 (Motolao 2013: 
4; Motolao 2016). In 2013 the company established an additional new production facility in 
Savannakhet, opposite the SASEZ’s Zone C, the main manufacturing production site. The 
new site manufactures complete knock-down pick-up trucks, and employs approximately 
300 assembly engineers (Motolao 2013: 20-23). The truck factory investment shows up in 
the provincial foreign investment statistics as the largest single investment - USD 23.1 
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million. (SPA 2014a). Motolao manufactures automobiles mainly for the domestic market. In 
2013-2014 Motolao was also planning to export vehicles to Cambodia, Myanmar and 
Vietnam (Economist Intelligence Unit 2013; Motolao 2013: 32-33).
After the year 2000 several other foreign investors established production in Laos which 
bound Savannakhet’s space to the circuits of regional Asian capital. Craft Industry Co. Ltd., a 
Japanese company established a sock manufacturing factory in 2004 (Craft Industry 2016). 
The company is geared towards manufacturing socks for clients in Thailand, with offices in 
Bangkok and Mukdahan, and marketing itself on both cheap labour costs and close 
proximity to the Thai border. Its website assuages clients´ concerns about access to shipping 
with the remark: ´Normally, trucks leaving our factory can reach the port in Laem Chabang, 
Thailand, within 24 hours´ (Craft Industry 2016). As we shall see workers in the study have 
passed through the Japanese sock factory in their engagement with the economic forces 
swirling around the banks of the Mekong. 
Bua Pagop Manufacturing (BPM) has become another important player in the emergence of 
a light manufacturing base in Savannakhet. The company is a joint venture between Lao, 
Thai and Japanese investors. The Lao investors are the Bua Corporation discussed earlier. 
BPM is the Lao operations of the Pagop Manufacturing company which is based in Thailand 
and has Thai and Japanese investors. Tech Manufacturing is the majority shareholder. BPM 
established their factory in 2009, manufacturing camera components. Initially, they 
manufactured camera micro-motors but switched in 2012 to producing LDS single lens parts. 
BPM is part of Tokyo Camera Inc.´s regional production network. Materials are imported 
from Thailand, assembled into components, which are then exported back to Thailand for 
assembly into cameras (BPM interview 10/6/2014). 
The motivations for BPM establishing production in Savannakhet are: cheap labour; a 
positioning as a node in regional transport infrastructure; and a pro-business institutional 
framework at a sub-national scale. The company takes advantage of the cheap labour costs 
on the Lao side of the border and articulates this with the benefit of operating along one of 
the GMS´s main economic corridors: ´The East West Corridor is being promoted by Thai and 
Lao. Right now we don´t use the Vietnam side yet because is not ready yet. But in the future, 
hopefully we can export it directly to Burma, which will go to Europe much easier´ (BPM 
manager interview 10/6/2014). Furthermore, the provincial scale of governance is geared 
towards promoting investment. Even before the SEZ was established the province was 
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promoting investment, and furthermore is reportedly accommodating of the businesses 
requirements, more so than the central level: 
The province...gave us special breaks for investment at that time [when establishing 
the factory]...tax breaks and also the lease here was almost comparable to the special 
zone at that time...we have, based on the investment law...we got a tax break...They 
are pretty cooperative if we ask for their support. Certain issues like customs clearance. 
It seems like the provincial government is easier to work with than the central 
government because I think this province...really tries to draw more investment to the 
province (BPM manager interview 10/6/2014)
It is clear then that the provincial scale of economic governance provided an important 
support for the firm´s operations. 
 The CEO of Pagop Manufacturing is also the CEO of BPM (BPM manager interview 
10/6/2014) indicating that Pagop Manufacturing may also be partly Lao capital. BPM´s role 
in the development of light manufacturing in Savannakhet illustrates the way that an 
emergent Lao capitalist class is facilitating the grounding of transnational capital in the 
territory. BPM represents foreign capital through its Thai and Japanese investors but the Bua 
Corporation is an emerging Lao conglomerate. Bua Corporation also has another joint 
venture with Japanese capital in Savannakhet, Savan Toys (see below). Besides these 
ventures, Bua has facilitated the entry of foreign capital in two ways: introducing Tokyo 
Camera Inc., a large Japanese camera manufacturer, to Savannakhet as a production base; 
and creating the Bua Corporation Services (BCS) company to perform labour recruitment 
and provide dormitories for foreign factories.  According to a manager at BPM (interview 
10/6/2014): 
Our mother company in Bangkok has connections with [Tokyo Camera Inc.] in Thailand 
and then we introduced [them] to use the Lao factory due to labour and the cost of 
assembling here is much cheaper than Bangkok. Originally [Tokyo Camera Inc.]  
wanted to join with us, open the [Tokyo Camera Inc.] factory here but later they did it 
on their own. But...they will honour... provide us the work here since we already 
invested in the factory (interview 10/6/2014)
In addition to introducing a key investor in the SEZ to Laos, BPM´s status as an experienced 
Savannakhet company resulted in it educating potential investors. This role it performed in 
conjunction with the investment-boosting provincial government:
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It seems like our factory has become a visiting centre. Almost everyone who comes 
here [Savannakhet] has to come to this factory...sometimes I thought...I would have an 
initial fee to visit!  Because the province always introduces...calls me up ´oh hi I have 
this guy who wants to come visit your factory. They visited our office´. I say ´no 
problem´ (BPM manager interview 10/6/2014) 
Bua Corporation established Bua Corporation Services (BCS) in 2012 as a response to issues 
BPM was having with labour recruitment (Bua Corporation 2016). It also had the added 
benefit of being a good business opportunity in the context of an expanding industrial 
territory attempting to construct a workforce: ´we created BCS to support our factory plus to 
support all the surrounding factories here´ (BPM manager interview 10/6/2014). The 
creation of BCS was one proposed solution to the labour force issues of foreign-invested 
companies springing up in the SEZ. 
 Savannakhet´s specific, border territoriality and a previous wave of foreign investment laid 
the groundwork for the development of the special economic zone. Savannakhet´s key 
strategic position on the border between Laos and Thailand and along a regional economic 
corridor has allowed foreign investors to engage in a form of territorial arbitrage which takes 
advantage of low labour costs in Laos while at the same time moving products swiftly to 
international markets through Thailand (or Vietnam) or further processing (in Thailand) so 
that turnover time is reduced and the circuit of accumulation can be completed and 
repeated. The positioning of Savannakhet manufacturing industry on the border and its form 
of integration into regional production networks suggests to me that it is an enclave which is 
primarily extractive of cheap labour (Sidaway 2007b). In the following I will thus refer to the 
Savannakhet border manufacturing enclave to discuss the ensemble of foreign-invested 
manufacturing plants within and outside the zone. Lao actors play crucial roles in this 
process by integrating domestic capital with foreign capital and facilitating and promoting 
foreign investment. In this case, the building of regional and global economic scales hinges 
on transnational capital entering into specific, grounded social relations in a bounded 
territory. Uneven development, that is the territorially constituted economic and 
institutional differentiation between Laos and Thailand, is the premise of this new scalar fix. 
The Savan-Seno Special Economic Zone, and the factories contained therein, represents the 
latest phase in the development of the enclave. The zone builds upon these dynamics of 
border territoriality and foreign investment. 
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7.5 Savan-Seno Special Economic Zone
The Savan-Seno Special Economic Zone was founded in 2003 as part of the government’s 
SEZ development strategy. It got off to a slow start but by 2013 had become one of the 
country’s most well-advanced special zones, and by far the most well-developed 
manufacturing zone. 
7.5.1 Legal and Institutional Framework
Savan-Seno was formally established by three Prime Minister’s Decrees: No. 2 2002, No.148 
2003, and No. 177 2003 (Suzuki and Keola 2008: 112). Decree No. 148 established SASEZ as 
two sites, A and B, with respective areas of 305 ha and 20 ha, with the aim of ‘attracting 
investment and high technology by being [sic] economic, industrial, trade, service and 
cooperation centre of the region’ (GoL 2003a: Article 2). The decree also mandates the 
Savan-Seno Special Economic Zone Authority (SEZA) as the state organization responsible for 
the administration of the zone.12 Provincial and district authorities are tasked to assist and 
cooperate with SEZA with acquiring and securing land, recruiting labour, and attracting 
investment to the SASEZ (ibid. Article 7). Provincial authorities thus retained a role despite 
the more direct governance from the zone authority. 
Decree 177 (GoL 2003b) sets out the management policies and incentive policies for the 
zone. Within the zones investors are able to lease land for 75 years (Article 29). Investors 
who lease land for 30 or more years are given a rent-free discount of twelve years (Article 
30), with the Lao government thus encouraging long-term investment in the zone. SASEZ 
offers a host of tax incentives to lure capital to the area. Turnover and 
consumption/utilization tax breaks are granted on imported goods or commodities for use, 
production, processing or sale in the SASEZ (Article 25.1 and 25.2). Profit tax breaks are 
applied differently to different activities, whether production, trade, or services. In the 
production category, which includes manufacturing, profit taxes are granted an exemption 
or a deduction rate based on the proportion of exports in the total quantity of a produced 
good. For a proportion of exports equal to or over 70 percent ‘or for the manufacture or 
assembly of high-technology equipments [sic], instruments and products’ a ten year 
exemption is available from the first profit making year, and an eight percent profit tax 
applies thereafter (Article 25.6). Smaller export proportions are granted shorter exemption 
periods of seven and five years (ibid.), indicating a clear attempt on the government’s part to 
attract exporting producers. Production businesses also benefit from the exemption of 
12 See Chapter 5 for SEZA’s relation to the central administrative level. 
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customs duties on goods and commodities used in the production process, including plant 
construction materials and semi-finished products (Article 26), the latter being important for 
a number of factories operating assembly platforms in the zone (see below). Products 
exported from the zone to foreign countries are exempted from export customs duties 
(Article 26.6). The import and export of all categories of merchandise, equipment and means 
of production ‘shall be granted reduced control or controlled according to the regulations’ 
(Article 32). Business operations profits and personal income may be repatriated to another 
country on condition of transfer through a Lao bank and once customs duties and tax 
obligations are paid (Article 31). 
In the aspect of suspension of tariffs and business taxes, the SASEZ, can be said to be 
neoliberal in character. It is part of a government policy to engage with and benefit from 
neoliberal globalization through deregulation and liberalization. The strategy is to create a 
bounded zone of exception, a territorial enclave within the wider territorial state boundaries, 
which is capable of fixing mobile capital in place by providing liberalized and competitive 
incentives.  ‘Competitive’ here applies to both the state’s competition for foreign investment 
and companies’ search for low-cost production sites to enable better competition on world 
markets. The territorial constitution of new scales of accumulation and development are 
achieved through state regulation, but also crucially through the actions and practices of 
state administrators. 
Article 52 of Decree 177 details the rights and duties of SEZA. Important rights include: 
 the consideration and approval of investments; 
 controlling the implementation of rules, regulations and laws issued by the 
government or SEZA;
 contacting and negotiating contracts and making joint-venture businesses 
with state-owned or private enterprises;
 mobilizing funds from the private sector, capital resources and other SASEZ 
revenues to enable land development, the construction of public facilities and 
housing inside the SASEZ
The duties of SEZA are more extensive and include:
 creating a comprehensive plan and a complete set of policies of the SASEZ; 
 implementing regulations on business operation;
 mobilizing funds and investors for land development, and building 
infrastructure to serve as an investment support base;
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 labour management and supply;
 training Lao workers;
 creating conditions where Lao people can benefit from job opportunities and 
business management knowledge transfer;
 monitoring the conditions of labour in the zone;
 work jointly with the provincial authorities to study the problem of land 
expropriation and resettlement for people displaced from the SASEZ 
development project area;
 identifying  types of business activities to target for promotion and attracting 
to the zone;
 designing a plan for any necessary extension of land area;
 reporting on the progress of zone activities to the central government and 
provincial authorities
In addition, SEZA is required to establish a One-Stop Service unit in order to expedite the 
investment process (GoL 2003b: Article 55). The One-Stop Service will register businesses, 
issue investment licenses, import and export licenses, and other licenses, and speed up the 
collection of business charges. Such a concentration of activities would provide a large 
advantage to investors over working through the fragmented and slow bureaucratic system 
of Laos. The importance of SEZA as a centralized facilitating body was confirmed by a SEZA 
official:
So our function here is to promote, attract and facilitate investment inside the zone. 
What we offer to the zone is to facilitate smooth entrance operations…it’s just for the 
entrance of the business…license, business registration and related permits are also 
handled here so the investors that are coming here to establish the company, they 
don’t need to look around different government organizations (interview 20/12/2013) 
Here the centrality of the state to enabling and mediating the development of capitalist 
social relations is clear. The territorial reconfiguration of Laos is accomplished through 
transformations in the state apparatus, whereby a highly localized administrative 
organization operates outside the usual scalar hierarchy of governance (district-province-
central). The concentration of powers and responsibilities in this organization provides a 
direct channel linking the zone to regional and global investors, and so its operations and 
practices partly constitute the zone’s specific form of scale-forming territorialization.
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Figure 6: Entrance of SASEZ Zone C.13 
SEZA is not however hived off from the scaled power structure within Laos and it and 
provincial authorities are tasked by the decrees to work together to promote investment in 
the zone. As noted above, the provincial authority is already strongly inclined to investment 
boosterism and so a territorially-based institutional complex seeking to ground capital flows 
is emerging. In SEZA’s duties, labour is an important consideration, and this will be fully 
treated in Chapters 8 and 9. 
7.5.2 Savan-Seno and Economic Development Strategy
Savan-Seno SEZ is sited at a significant juncture in the regional and national spaces. In 
regional terms it is situated on the border with Thailand and on Route 9 which leads to the 
Vietnamese border. It is located at a key point on the ADB-supported East West Economic 
Corridor project. The opening of the Second Mekong International Bridge in 2008 and 
upgrading of Route 9 as part of this project ensured that Savannakhet is integrated into the 
transport infrastructure traversing Thailand, Laos and Vietnam. The ADB’s typology of East 
West corridor towns identifies gateway (port cities), commercial, border, and interchange 
(intersection points) nodes. Savannakhet is a commercial, border and interchange node 
according to this schema (Lainé 2014: 341-342). The development of industry would thus 
benefit from the particular stretch of territorial infrastructure binding Savannahet to the 
region and its position on the border facilitating easy international transport of goods. 
13 Source: Author’s photo. 
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Savanakhet’s status as an interchange node is because in Seno Route 9 intersects with Route 
13, the main north-south highway in the country. Nolintha (2011: 189) claims that the name 
‘Seno’ was given to the place when the US army was using Savannakhet as a base in the 
Vietnam War: ‘”SENO” is an acronym for four French words: Sud, Est, Nord and Ouest, which 
means South, East, North and West in English’ which ‘signals the geographical importance of 
the province’. 
The advantageous border location on the EWEC was one of the foremost reasons why the 
government established SASEZ in Savannakhet (SEZA official interview 20/12/2013). As the 
zone developer put it:
Laos is a landlocked country, it doesn’t have a seaport. So, in Savannakhet we have 
more choice. If we put it in Vientiane we can only go to Bangkok, only one road. If it’s 
in Savannakhet we can go to Danang, we can go to Bangkok, in the future, we’re 
working [on], Myanmar (Lao Samudra manager interview 13/1/2014)
The zone developer also highlighted the advantages of Laos within the emerging scalar 
frame of the GMS. The complementarity between Laos and Thailand was highlighted in 
cultural terms and also those of Savannakhet’s territorial differentiation from both Thailand 
and other places in the GMS:
today I welcome a lot of entrepreneurs from Bangkok, especially those from 
overseas…like Europe…Japan. They already have factories in Thailand, so now they 
have to move out from Thailand, so Laos is the first choice for him, because of what. 
Because in Laos we have the same language… And then we are nearest to Thailand. Of 
course I was in this factory today, a lot of things they will do in Bangkok, they will try 
to reduce the production line in Bangkok…finish the product and R and D…processes 
will be implemented [outside of] Thailand but not far from Thailand, that’s why 
Savannakhet is the right choice. Everything we have, we have good policies, we have 
good infrastructure, we have low tariff for electricity, we have stability, we 
have…quality compared with Phnom Penh and Rangoon (Lao Samudra manager 
interview 13/1/2014)
The government hoped that the SASEZ would utilize these spatial advantages to build a 
brand name for itself to attract investors (SEZA interview 20/12/2013). The relocation of 
large multinational businesses to the zone was a significant boon to their plans for 
drawing in more foreign capital: 
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so far up to now one of the key successes is we have successfully captured the world-
reputable companies...one of anchor business or company is already located [here].. 
it’s going to be one of the big magnet in order to attract support industries like [Tokyo 
Camera]. Once they come the [Tokyo Camera] supporting industries follow, like 
[Honshu] also because you know, [Honshu] cannot produce the whole things, they 
need the suppliers (SEZA official interview 20/12/2013) 
The government was aware also that backward and forward linkages needed to be made in 
order for the zone to act as a catalyst for broader economic development. The government 
was interested in the possibility of integrating Laos´s existing agriculture and natural 
resources production base into the zone:
 So in Lao PDR, so even though we have low and stable electricity costs, at the same 
time we also have...locally available raw materials. So what we want to emphasize for 
promoting business related to the, you know, what we have so far in the country. For 
instance we have the largest copper mine in this province. So from the copper it can be 
inputs for other industries. In that sense we promote this sector. Like…food processing, 
like a copper-based products related to the electronic appliance and also automotive 
appliance... besides the raw materials available here, we also have to look at, what we 
have strengths in Lao PDR itself and also in Savannakhet province. So in terms of the 
agricultural products that are based on food industries, they’re also potential for here... 
we can have...sufficient inputs for those industries and then it may have...downstream 
industries coming. So what we focus [on] is the private sectors, not just the foreign 
investors but local investors need to be involved to have...a cluster of industries (SEZA 
official interview 20/12/2013)
The zone developer differed somewhat in conceptualizing how the zone would impact on 
local development, identifying improved incomes for local workers as the main channel 
through which development would unfold: 
Once the people reach the job, they have a stable job, stable income, so they will 
increase the buying power, once you increase the buying power the economy cycle will 
start, once you increase the buying power they need a lot of things…the 
manufacturing will start, the trading will start...once they start this country will have 
no more poor people, this province…other provinces will use the same model, they will 
start with an industrial park, they start with this, so it’s a pilot project (Lao Samudra 
manager interview 13/1/2014)
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The multiplier effect of more stable jobs was deemed to have an important role in 
generating more local investment. The government was also concerned with encouraging 
local investment and furthermore articulating it to a wider Southeast Asian space. The SASEZ 
for the government is a means of utilizing foreign capital to boost domestic investment and 
create an industrial agglomeration within Lao territory. Foreign capital was to act as a 
bridgehead into industrial development, creating linkages with local suppliers of raw 
materials and encouraging domestic investment. The SASEZ would thus, through such links, 
reach out from its zone of exception deeper into the Lao territory and thus integrate that 
broader Lao space into a new scalar formation. 
A key part of such scale building was the zone´s logistics capacity and its role in creating Laos 
as a ´land-linked´ territory within the wider GMS space: 
But services of course, like logistics...this logic that once [there are] already industries, 
factories, companies coming, of course the supporting businessmen come 
automatically. But for trading I think at the same time...the fact that Lao PDR is 
located at the middle, the heart of Asia so we have five neighbouring countries with 
emerging economies, like China, Vietnam, Thailand. Total population size is...huge, 
so...trading is much more prominent because Lao PDR has its very strong ties and 
relationships with neighbouring countries, with Thailand, with Vietnam, with China. So 
we can do trading with them, why not? (SEZA official interview 20/12/2013)
The official seemed to imply that the future of the zone as a manufacturing site was less 
certain that that as a logistics site (´but services of course’). The zone´s location enabled it to 
fulfil a role as a logistical node within the emerging GMS system, but the expansion of 
manufacturing would depend on attracting foreign investors and mobilizing the requisite 
labour, something that was not altogether certain.   
7.5.3 Zone Development
JICA, the Japanese development agency, assisted the Lao government to do an exploratory 
study in 2002 and they advised the government to establish two sites, including an industrial 
zone near to the Mekong river in order to use it as a water supply for the industrial park 
(SEZA official interview 20/6/2014). Site A, the 305 hectare site, is established in Decree 177 
as in Khantabouly district (the old name for Kaysone Phomvihane) and Site B in 
Outhoumphone district (GoL 2003b: Article 3). These sites are on the peripheries of the 
towns of Savannkahet and Seno respectively. Article 6 establishes that the SEZ should be 
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divided into three zones, each with a specific sectoral focus: an export processing zone; a 
free trade zone; and a services and logistics centre (ibid. Article 6). In 2013-2014 this zoning 
had expanded to four designated zones: Zone A, located next to the Mekong border crossing 
is the free trade zone; Zone B is the services and logistics zone (with B1 a planned extension); 
Zone C is the industrial park; and Zone D for residential purposes (Sayavongkhamdy 2011). 
 
Figure 7: Location of SASEZ zones in Savannakhet.14 
In 2014, a Zone E was also under consideration at Lak 21 (Kilometre 21), on the highway 
between Zones C and B. A Lao investor was reportedly interested in developing a golf course 
and hotel on the site but had not yet been approved (SEZA official interview 20/6/2014).
Development of the project after the initial establishment in 2003 was slow. The preparation 
phase including surveying, designing and human resource development lasted for five years. 
In 2008 implementation commenced with the development of infrastructure including roads 
and communications (SEZA official interview 20/12/2013). The development of the SASEZ is 
a joint venture, or rather cluster of joint ventures, between the government and private 
investors. Each joint venture is structured on a 30/70 percent contribution from respectively 
the government and the private investor. By 2009 all of the zones were constructing offices 
and other buildings (MMN 2013: 285). 
14 Source: Sayavongkhamdy 2011. 
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The development of the SASEZ entailed moving some local residents off the land designated 
for the zone’s construction. The loss of land to government development projects and 
concessions, as well as related issues over compensation, have become contentious issues in 
recent years (Baird 2011; Lund 2011; Lestrelin et al 2012). Around 200 families had to move 
to accommodate the SASEZ (SEZA official interview 20/6/2014). Some locals felt they were 
forced to relocate and cases were also reported of local villagers putting household 
livelihood plans – such as expanding farming – on hold due to uncertainty. Others however 
reported gains from selling land at rising values (MMN 2013: 286-288). There have been 
issues regarding non-payment of compensation for affected villagers. A SEZA official claimed 
that compensation would be given – if the government did not give it they would not even 
start the project  - ‘baw hai baw kao pai’ (SEZA official interview 20/6/2014). However, in 
mid-2015 displaced villagers were complaining that compensation had not yet been paid 
with government officials unable to confirm exactly when this would occur (Vientiane Times 
23/7/2015). 
Zone C is officially known as Savan Park. It was developed by Lao Samudra. This is the name 
for the joint venture between the government and Samudra Development, a Malaysian 
company. Samudra Development signed a project development agreement with the Lao 
government in February 2008, undertaking to jointly research and develop the industrial 
zone (Savan Park 2016).  Lao Samudra had a registered investment of USD 2 million and an 
approved total of USD 13.8 million in April 2008 (SEZA 2014). The project concession period 
is for 50 years, after which the government will take over activities. Construction of 
infrastructure began in 2008 after the agreement was signed and Lao Samudra spent around 
USD 24 million to provide roads, an electricity system, water, telecommunications, and 
water treatment systems (Vientiane Times 20/3/2011). Zone buildings were constructed by 
Vietnamese workers according to one source, as construction companies in Savannakhet 
apparently import labour from Vietnam (Motolao manager interview 24/3/2014). However, 
Lao workers were also reported as hired on a casual basis to clear land for the zone (MMN 
2013: 286). The zone was officially opened for business in November 2011 (Vientiane Times 
22/11/2011). 
The developer of Zone B is the Savan-Japan Joint Development Company. This company 
comprises investment from the Phnom Penh Special Economic Zone Company – a Japanese 
firm with experience in SEZ development in Cambodia – and the Namtha Road and Bridge 
179
Construction Company – a Lao company.15 A tripartite joint venture agreement was signed in 
May 2013 (Vientiane Times 13/5/2013). According to SEZA the investment share was split 
30/20/50 percent between the government, Namtha, and Phnom Penh SEZ respectively 
(SEZA official interview 20/6/2014). The Savan-Japan agreement resulted in a USD 5 million 
investment in August 2013. Phnom Penh SEZ had invested USD 260,000 by the end of 2014. 
The development of Zone B lagged behind that of Zone C and construction was not expected 
to be finished until the end of 2016 (Phnom Penh Post 22/4/2016). Two factories – Tokyo 
Cameras and Koyo – were built in the zone in 2013 and were opened during 2013-2014. Four 
companies were operating in Zone B in mid-2014, the aforementioned factories, plus 
Logitem, a Japanese company, and Double A Logistics, which has Thai investors (SEZA 2014). 
Both companies operate international logistics and their presence in Zone B is explained by 
that zone’s location in Seno at the intersection of Route 9 and Route 13. 
Zone A was the site which was least well-developed during fieldwork. It is designated as a 
free trading zone and is located at the border gate. The joint venture is Savan City Company. 
Savan City had USD 5 million registered capital in 2008 (SPA 2014a). Savan City’s website 
states that Savan City is a venture between a Thai investor, a Lao enterprise, Khounlasy 
Trading Export Import Co., and the Lao government (Savan City n.d.). In 2013-2014 the site 
was vacant. The only constructions around the site were the soon to be opened new offices 
of SEZA and the border gate buildings (fieldnotes). Zone A’s development had apparently not 
moved forward because the investors had had problems with raising the capital to proceed 
(SEZA official interview 20/6/2014). 
7.5.4 Zone Manufacturing Companies
Manufacturing firms who have relocated to the zone include multinational firms, and also 
smaller firms which are in the supply chains of multinational firms. Significantly, most of the 
firms already had existing production networks in the region, especially in Thailand. The 
firms are typically producing components of larger assembled goods, for example camera 
lenses or car seats. Raw materials are imported, often from Thailand, assembled in Savan-
Seno and then re-exported for final assembly at larger factories in Thailand, as noted in 
border enclave factories outside the zone. Factories were thus operating as branch plants, 
and the zone as an assembly export platform.  Interviews with three zone companies were 
15 Namtha has also been involved in road construction in Vientiane and is apparently closely linked to 
the former Vientiane mayor, suggesting evidence of a Lao capitalist class emerging around the Party. 
See Vientiane Times 21/8/2014 and RFA 22/6/2015.
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conducted: Flight Pro, Visetec, and Savan Toys. This section also briefly profiles Tokyo 
Camera Inc. and Honshu Automotive because of their prominent position in the zone.
Flight Pro was founded in Europe in 2000. It has facilities in Europe and Thailand as well as 
Laos (Flight Pro 2016). Provincial data records a USD 500,000 investment in 2011 for the 
company (SPA 2014a). Flight Pro was the first manufacturer to open in the SASEZ. The 
factory makes internal parts for aircraft such as door locks, seats, washroom fittings, 
overhead lockers, and door and window fittings. The company´s customers include Boeing 
and Airbus (Vientiane Times 8/9/2011). Construction of the factory began in early 2011 
(Vientiane Times 20/4/2011). The Flight Pro factory opened in 2011. The factory started in 
the region in 2000 with a factory in Chonburi, Thailand. A key reason for the spatial fix was a 
risk management strategy due to political turmoil in Thailand at the time. If there were 
problems in Thailand disrupting production then they would still have the Lao facility for 
support. Advantages more specific to the SASEZ suggest why it was chosen as a production 
site. The location enabled the factory to connect with other countries easily to obtain parts. 
Every week a delivery of parts was sourced from Thailand. The equipment and parts came 
from Thailand and the firm did not have any relations with local suppliers. Exemption of 
import taxes also made the SASEZ attractive for Flight Pro. In addition, lower wages were 
also a consideration. The impending AEC was not a consideration for them, as at most it 
would enable greater cross-border mobility of Thai management staff. The factory made the 
same parts as those produced at the Thai facility, in order to learn from the manufacturing 
experience in Thailand. Parts were made using CNC16 machinery and then polished by hand. 
The production was exported to markets in the US and Europe. In 2013-2014 the company 
employed 70 workers, with a greater number of females than males. Depending on orders 
the company planned to expand production at the plant that year to have a workforce of 
300 (Flight Pro manager interview 10/1/2014). 
Visetec is a European-based multinational specializing in the manufacture of spectacle 
lenses. It has production facilities worldwide. Visetec was founded in France in 1972. It now 
has facilities in 62 countries employing 55,000 people (Visetec 2016). Provincial statistics 
state that the company had USD 300,000 registered capital in 2013, although an approved 
investment of USD 25 million, indicating the intention for significant investment (SPA 2014a). 
Visetec’s motivation for implementing a spatial fix to Savannakhet was because it is a low-
cost production location or as a manager put it: 
16 ‘Computer numerical control’ – computer-controlled machinery. 
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The target is to make profits...We have factories in Thailand, Philippines, in India, 
Vietnam, in China. All those factories are high cost because of the labour costs, and we 
saw that the Lao government has good policies to attract, not just for us but for other 
companies as well. And [Visetec] is one company that is interested to invest here...so 
first they need to [have] low tax (Visetec manager interview 27/2/2014).
In addition to low wages and tax breaks, a manager also suggested that the Lao labour law 
and its effective prohibition on strikes was a consideration in moving to Laos: ´In Laos the 
government do not have a policy to let people strike so it is different [to] Thailand´. More 
broadly the calm political situation in Laos was also valued when compared to Thailand. 
Laos´ differences from Thailand were emphasized but crucially so were their similarities:  
'Lao and Thai have similar language and can understand each other. Thai people can work in 
Laos and Lao people can speak Thai so it is easy. Investing in Vietnam would be difficult for 
communication. This...reason is important´ (Visetec manager interview 27/2/2014). 
Furthermore, the SASEZ´s position on the EWEC was deemed to be a good location for 
exporting to Thailand (ibid; Vientiane Times 23/6/2012). Laos´ territorial differentiation from, 
and cultural similarity to, Thailand were significant attributes in the investors´ eyes in the 
creation of the GMS scale. 
Lenses were produced in the Lao facility and then exported through Thailand to the US and 
Europe without further processing. Raw materials for the lenses were imported from Europe 
through Thailand. The Thai facility processes these raw materials before sending them on. 
The Lao plant did not at that time have a purchasing department and had only established a 
few links with local companies for consumable goods and construction materials.  There 
were 81 workers at the factory at the time of interview with approximately 70 percent 
women. Visetec also had plans for expansion. It was possible that they would produce more 
types of lenses at the plant and start to market goods in Thailand and Laos. There were also 
plans to increase the quantity of production with an associated workforce rise: 'We have 
plans to hire about 250 [including existing staff] in the near future. The maximum for our 
company if we expand our factory here would be around 800-1000 employees. This will take 
up to 5 years' (Visetec manager interview 27/2/2014).
Savan Toys is a joint venture between Lao, Thai and Japanese investors. Hokkaido Toys Ltd. 
hold 65 percent of the investment, Bua Corporation 30 percent and Bua Pagop 
Manufacturing 5 percent. Registered capital was USD 1 million in 2012 (Vientiane Times 
14/12/2012). Savan Toys (ST) had similar reasons as the previous companies for relocating 
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to the SASEZ. The zone was suitable for them logistically, with a manager noting that they 
are linked to the Da Nang port in Vietnam via the EWEC. The zone´s tax exemptions were 
also important: ´Here is the free trade zone, free of tax so that [was] one of our 
considerations in investment, import and export, just only in the zone´ (ST manager interview 
16/5/2014). Low labour costs also entered the calculation.  It can be inferred that the access 
to Da Nang was important for the company as they operated within a Northeast Asian 
production network. The company´s mother facility was located in China, from where they 
imported raw materials and packaging. Savan Toys were manufacturing a single product; a 
novelty toy (doll-like figure) with a soap component. The product was produced for the 
Bandai toy manufacturer and exported to Japan. The company was the only one interviewed 
which was seriously considering sourcing materials locally. Savan Toys had sourced materials 
from a local Lao company and were investigating the possibility of buying salt from a salt 
factory in the rural part of Kaysone Phomvihane district. Could it be that Savan Toys´ greater 
share of Lao capital caused it to align itself more closely with the government´s hopes of 
zone companies building more integrated links with local companies? It is possible but it 
should be borne in mind that its sister company BPM was not sourcing locally, although it 
may have been limited by the sheer lack of any Lao suppliers in the electronics sector. 
Nevertheless, Savan Toys had advanced most in the direction of forming part of an 
integrated territorial production complex (Storper and Walker 1989). The sourcing of 
materials was the major way in which the company hoped to benefit from the AEC. Although 
they sourced cheap goods from China, transport increased the costs, and so they thought 
they may be able to source competitively from Thailand or Vietnam when the AEC was in 
place. Savan Toys had 130 assembly line workers in May 2014, of whom 111 were female (ST 
manager interview 16/5/2014). 
Honshu Automotive is a subsidiary of the Honshu Group, a group of companies with supplier 
and investment relations to Honshu, a major automotive manufacturer. The forerunner of 
Honshu Automotive was founded in 1918 in Tokyo and entered the manufacture of 
automotive components, including car seat fabrics, in 1972. After a merger in 2004 the 
company changed its name to Honshu Automotive Corporation and in the following decade 
established itself as a multinational automotive component manufacturer.  In 2013, Honshu 
Automotive Lao Co. Ltd was established in Savannakhet for the manufacture of seat covers 
(Honshu Automotive 2014). Honshu opened up in the SASEZ because of the ´convenient´ 
location of the zone and attractions of the zone´s investment promotion policies (Vientiane 
Times 13/11/2012). The location is convenient as the Lao facility is intended to ´serve as a 
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satellite complementing the [Honshu Automotive] group production base in Thailand. It will 
start producing interior components such as vehicle seat covers…and supply them to 
production bases for seats in Thailand´ (Honshu Automotive 2014). In addition, low-cost 
labour, Laos´s ´political stability´, and good infrastructure were motivations for investing in 
the SASEZ. The firm commenced production in May 2014 with a workforce of 180 people 
(Vientiane Times 23/5/2014). 
Tokyo Camera Inc. commenced building of their factory, located in Zone B in Seno, in March 
2013 (Tokyo Camera 2013). The factory started operations in September of that year, 
manufacturing parts for digital single-lens reflex cameras. The company may have been 
aware of Savannakhet as a production facility dues to their links with BPM (BPM manager 
interview 10/6/2014). The low cost of labour in Laos was a central consideration according 
to a Tokyo Camera Inc. executive: ´We wanted a supply of workers for our new 
manufacturing plants and Savannakhet can serve our needs...The minimum wage is the issue 
for us´ (Bangkok Post 23/9/2013). Tokyo Camera was also seriously affected by the floods in 
Thailand in 2011 and the Lao facility could assist them to maintain production. The factory in 
Thailand was still operational and the Lao factory was integrated into the Thai production 
chain. The parts produced in Laos were exported to the Thai facility in Ayutthaya province 
where they were assembled into final cameras. In addition Tokyo Camera´s suppliers were 
also relocating to Laos to be near their factory (ibid).  Koyo, a Tokyo Camera supplier, 
established a factory in July 2013, also at Zone B (Koyo 2016). 
Conclusion
The Savannakhet border manufacturing enclave is the latest manifestation of the increasing 
importance of foreign investment in Savannakhet province. Rising investment levels have 
occurred as foreign companies have sought to exploit Savannakhet province´s natural 
resources, abundant agricultural land, and a large provincial population which can be used 
as cheap labour. The majority of foreign investment comes from Laos´s immediate 
neighbours, China, Thailand and Vietnam, but increasingly from further afield in Asia, with 
Japan of growing significance. Savannakhet province emerges as a key destination for 
regional capital escaping the pressures of overaccumulation. Recent investments in industry 
are not on a terrain innocent of foreign industrial development. A previous wave of foreign-
invested industry has prepared the ground for the SASEZ´s manufacturing investments. 
Recent foreign investors have benefitted from having previous investors to advise them. 
Also, provincial authorities would have built experience with dealing with foreign investors. 
184
Last but not least, as we will see the previous wave of foreign factories has sensitized Lao 
workers to factory employment. There are also hints that an emerging Lao capitalist class is 
playing a role in integrating foreign capital into the territory, as most clearly illustrated by 
the operations of the Bua Corporation and their joint ventures with Thai and Japanese 
capital. 
The SASEZ represents a key rescaling of the state and national territory. On the one hand the 
state is rescaled to the level of SEZA to provide a highly localized and specialized state 
administrative entity, operating outside of usual administrative hierarchies and mandated to 
serve the needs of foreign capital. This state rescaling is thus an internationalization of the 
Lao state. The Lao state is rescaled downwards precisely to process a global set of social 
relations between foreign capital and Lao labour. This downwards rescaling is crucial for the 
incorporation of the local territory and the wider Lao national space into a broader GMS 
economic scale. The SASEZ´s strategy of territorial differentiation at once abrogates and 
reaffirms state power. The suspension of trade taxes and the position of the zone on the 
Thai border creates an overlap of territory between the Thai and Lao sides (Mezzadra and 
Neilson 2013) creating the conditions where foreign-invested production networks can 
extend into Laos to benefit from lower production costs and cultural similarities between 
the two countries. Foreign investors engage in a form of territorial arbitrage which takes 
advantage of low labour costs in Laos while at the same time moving products swiftly to 
international markets through Thailand (and Vietnam in one case). This suggests that the 
‘strategic coupling’ (Coe et al 2004) and territorial coherence of the enclave favours foreign 
capital over local actors. The lack of firm connections to the wider economy and the focus 
on low labour costs suggest that local value capture would be limited (Henderson 2002 et al). 
The surrender of sovereign rights to taxation allows capital to circulate on an expanded scale 
through the circulation of capital, commodities, and also skilled labour.17 However, as we 
shall see in regard to labour, the rescaling of the Lao state also provides another layer of 
governmental mediation between local people and foreign capital, creating forms of 
governance which attempt to mould local people as productive labour. The moulding of 
people into labour is beset with difficulties because of the diverse agency of workers 
themselves, which includes spatial fixes of their own.
17 See Chapter 8.
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 Chapter 8:  Workers’ Agency in Lao Border Manufacturing
Foreign capital and their Lao state backers were carving out a border manufacturing enclave 
in Savannakhet oriented towards a functional integration into Thai space to take advantage 
of proximity and low labour costs. New factories thus required increasing amounts of 
workers. Lao workers had their own orientations for their social reproduction. Workers’ 
agency affected the establishment of the Savan-Seno SEZ and the dynamics of the border 
enclave. Workers’ agency was expressed spatially, both through mobility and fixity – the 
strong ties to a place and associated activities to reproduce that place (Harvey 2006; Smith 
2006; Kelly 2009). Workers’ thus enacted their own spatial fixes. It is important to remember 
in the following that fixity and mobility involves contradiction and the interpenetration of 
opposites – what was fixity from the perspective of labour may have been mobility from the 
perspective of capital. Workers’ agency was constrained by capital, state, and household 
relations (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011), although following Knafo (2010) these constraints for 
workers are interpreted as one side of a social relation. Workers’ mobility and their 
simultaneous fixity within local Savannakhet communities thus also constrained and enabled 
the agencies of other developmental actors. The focus on everyday practices of resilience 
highlighted how the territorial differentiation of the SEZ and wider enclave depended on a 
wider territorial division of labour which mobilized household and agricultural work into the 
‘social factory’ supporting accumulation in foreign-invested manufacturing in Savannakhet 
(Dyer-Witheford 2002). Workers thus participated in their own social construction, securing 
a particular position within the local social relations of production from which benefits could 
be derived and a limited set of demands made. Workers’ practices and participation in their 
own social construction were a key part of the territorial formation of the emerging GMS 
scale, and ensured that this scale-making was a contested and uneven process. This chapter 
focuses on mobilities, fixities - especially the reproduction of place - and workplace relations 
to highlight workers’ agency. It opens with an assessment of the local labour market in order 
to understand the context of increasing employment in foreign-invested factories.1 
1 In the following company names, and worker names have been anonymized in order to protect 
identities. ‘Factory’ refers to the factory of a single company each – those referred to in the previous 
chapter - and will be referenced by a number e.g. ‘Factory 2’. 
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8.1 The Border Manufacturing Labour Market
8.1.1 Provincial Labour Market
Savannakhet province has the largest population of any province in Lao PDR and Kaysone 
Phomvihane district one of the largest populations of any Lao district. On the face of it these 
demographic facts should ensure an adequate supply of labour for new industries but the 
reality is more complex. The exact sizes of provincial and district labour markets are difficult 
to ascertain given the paucity of available and up-to-date statistics. Estimates can be 
constructed through extrapolating from available surveys and censuses. The 2010 Labour 
Force Survey records that Savannakhet province had a total population aged 15 and over as 
549,906. Out of this population there was a provincial labour force of 460,574 with a labour 
force participation rate of 83.7 percent (GoL 2010b: 69). The population of the province was 
recorded as 953, 511 in 2013 (GoL 2014: 23). Assuming a steady labour force participation 
rate this gives an estimated 2013 labour force of 506,945.2 Provincial level statistics on 
sectoral employment were not available. World Bank estimates for 2013 put the national 
sectoral division of labour at 66 percent in agriculture, 26 percent in construction and 
services, manufacturing at 7 percent and energy and mining 0.62 percent (WB 2014). 
Applying these percentages to Savannakhet province’s employed total of 502,991 for 2013 
would put the agricultural labour force at 331,974 people, construction and services 130,778, 
manufacturing 35,209 and energy and mining at 3119.3 Savannakhet province’s employment 
structure is likely to differ in some respects from these national level percentages however. 
For instance, the Sepon mine alone was employing some 4000 people in 2013, reducing to 
around 3600 in 2014 (RFA 28/1/2014; MMG 2016). It is also possible that a greater number 
of Savannakhet province’s population than the national average is engaged in manufacturing 
due its emerging status as a manufacturing and processing hub (Vientiane Times 20/3/2011; 
Vientiane Times 15/8/2014). Furthermore, the issue of international migration makes the 
labour market picture more complex.
Provincial statistics show that 35,607 of the population were recorded working abroad in 
2013. Of these recorded only 88 people had gone to work abroad through official channels 
(SPA 2013b). The provincial figures do not give a breakdown of destination countries for 
Savannakhet’s migrants but it is likely that the vast majority went to Thailand. The number 
2 In 2013 the percentage of the Lao population aged 15 and over was 63.52 (GoL 2014: 24). Assuming 
that Savannakhet has a country-average age distribution this gives a population of 605,670 who are 
15 years and over. Applying the 2010 provincial labour force participation rate of 83.7 to this figure 
gives 506,945 (author’s own calculations).
3 Author’s own calculations. 
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of international migrants in 2011 was around 59,000 according to Phothirhath (2012: 13). 
The decrease does not appear to be related to a general decrease in Lao workers in Thailand 
(SADC 2014: 7). It is unlikely that the Savan-Seno SEZ would have had a significant impact on 
drawing labour back to Laos for 2013 because most major employers there only started 
operations in late 2013 and 2014. The provincial figures should therefore be treated with 
some caution as they seem anomalous when compared with broader trends and previous 
figures. Furthermore, other estimates have put the number of migrants as much higher than 
35,000. BCS, the local labour recruitment agency, estimated that 75,000 people from 
Savannakhet province were working in Thailand (BPM manager interview 10/6/2014). 
2323 international migrants came from Kaysone Phomvihane district. Other significant 
numbers came from Champhone (10,543), Outoumphone (7131), Songkhone (5707), and 
Sonbuli (3991) districts (SPA 2013b). All of these districts are in the more densely populated 
west of the province. Greater migration from the west of the province suggests that there is 
more surplus labour available to be released from subsistence production (Newby et al 
2013). Andriesse and Phommalath (2012: 21), in their 2011 study of Ban Gnang Pho Sy, a 
village in the north of Kaysone Phomvihane, found that most workers were young, aged 18-
30 years, and that 55 per cent were female. 
The provincial statistics for 2013 indicate that 18,932 women (53 percent) and 16,675 men 
(47 percent) were migrants abroad (SPA 2013b). The greater share of women migrating can 
be attributed to gendered access to local employment opportunities and changing social 
attitudes to, and scope for, female migration. Khumya and Kusakabe (2015) highlight the 
importance of cross-border infrastructure for international mobility and women’s migration. 
The improved infrastructure such as the Second Mekong International Bridge facilitated 
migration to Thailand in distinct gendered patterns. Women were more likely to migrate, 
both because men had more access to decent employment opportunities around their 
villages and also because new transport possibilities existed. The new infrastructure both 
made travel to Bangkok, the major destination for women migrants in the study, more 
convenient and also psychologically reordered villagers’ sense of place. Bangkok became a 
more accessible and desirable destination for young women to migrate to rather than a 
prohibited one (ibid. 1021). A greater share of female out-migration would also complicate 
the social construction of a light manufacturing labour force, as we shall see.
Migration networks have been established in western Savannakhet province. Phouxay (2008: 
288-289), in her study of two villages in Champhone district, found that villagers worked 
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only in Bangkok and that they were persuaded to go by fellow villagers who had previously 
migrated. The single destination in Thailand for the migrants suggests a strong network 
connecting the two distant places. Phouxay (ibid. 288-289) notes that migrants from 
Savannakhet work in construction, domestic work, and manufacturing. Phothirhath (2012: 
55), in her study of eight villages in Kaysone Phomvihane, similarly found that migration 
networks were a crucial mechanism for the circulation of labour from Laos to Thailand. 
Phothirhath (ibid. 55) also reports that the main destination for Kaysone Phomvihane 
workers was Bangkok with 54 percent of the total surveyed, and a further 24 percent going 
to neighbouring provinces within the Bangkok Metropolitan Region. 
Cross-border migration also occurs at a smaller transnational scale than travelling to work in 
distant Thai cities. Migrants from Savannakhet province also cross the river to work as 
agricultural wage labour in paddy fields on the Thai side in Mukdahan province. Due to 
cultivating season labour shortages in Thai villages seasonal labour is absorbed from villages 
on the Lao side from June to August and from November to December (Rungmanee 2014: 
345). Fieldwork findings confirmed Savannakhet workers’ participation in both near and far 
Thai labour markets.
8.1.2 Kaysone Phomvihane Labour Market
Exact figures for the size of the labour force in Kaysone Phomvihane or their employment 
sector are not available but estimates can be made with population data from 2013 and 
labour force participation rates from the 2010 Labour Force Survey. Applying the provincial 
LFPR of 83.7 (GoL 2010b: 69) percent to the district’s population of 128,182 brings an 
estimate of 107,365. Kaysone Phomvihane’s population however consists of a substantial 
urban population – 61.9 percent. Urban and rural LFPRs differ (72 and 82 percent 
respectively). Following these LFPRs the size of the urban district’s labour market is 57,174 
people and the rural district 39,970, a combined total of 97,144.4 A proportion of this total 
migrates to Thailand. Statistics from the provincial administration recorded 2,323 
international migrants (SPA 2013b). 480 foreign workers were recorded in KP for 2013. All of 
these were Vietnamese and recorded as having work permits (SPA 2013a). As noted above 
these statistics may be inaccurate and not capture the full extent of those working abroad or 
undocumented migrants in Savannakhet (Phothirhath 2012: 20-23). On the available data 
4 Author’s own calculations. 
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however a rather high estimate of a potential labour market of 95,000 for the district can be 
made.5
The provincial migration data does highlight several other important issues which have a 
bearing on the social construction of a labour force for foreign-invested manufacturing in 
Savannakhet. Regarding gender, figures indicate that 1,310 migrants from KP were women 
(56 percent) and 1013 men (44 percent) (SPA 2013b). A higher share of females in migrant 
flows is corroborated by Andriesse and Phommalath for KP district (2012) and Khumya and 
Kusakabe (2015) for the province. As will be shown below female out-migration arguably 
affected the creation of a Savannakhet labour force due to the specific gendered tilt of firms’ 
hiring practices. The provincial data also highlights that four other districts in western 
Savannakhet province sent higher numbers of migrants abroad than KP district (SPA 2013b). 
Even bearing in mind the caveats of underestimated number of migrants from KP, this 
possibly indicates that in 2013 there were more well-remunerated job opportunities in KP 
than in more rural districts nearby, thus affecting the surplus labour available for absorption 
into foreign manufacturing. Phothirhath (2012) provides some support for this line of 
reasoning, noting that even within KP district migrants were more likely to come from 
villages further away from the main urban area on the Mekong, having less employment 
opportunities than people in the town. 
Sectoral employment figures for the district are only available for those categorized as 
haeng ngaan, the common word for ‘labour’. In available statistics only 4947 workers, haeng 
ngaan, are listed (SPA 2013c). This equates to 5.2 percent of a 95,000 strong labour market. 
A possible explanation for this discrepancy is found in how ‘labour’ is defined in Lao 
statistical practice, whereby only workers in wage labour unmediated by household and 
family relations are included.6 However, if the Labour Force Survey is taken as a guide there 
is still a large discrepancy between the 15 percent at national level in paid employment and 
the five percent from the local statistics (GoL 2010b: 89). Another possible part of the 
explanation is that the local statistics only list paid employees in private enterprises (tulagit) 
in the industrial, agricultural, and services sectors. Savannakhet town is the main 
administrative and educational centre of the province and so houses significant numbers of 
government employees. This may account for some of the discrepancy although exact 
figures on government employment were unavailable. Of the 4947 workers listed as haeng 
ngaan in the district in 2013, 1465 were working in industry, 520 in agriculture, and 2962 in 
5 Author’s own calculations. 
6 See Chapter 6.
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services (SPA 2013c). Details from companies give a clearer indication of the manufacturing 
workforce in KP district however, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Savannakhet Manufacturing Workforce: 2014 and Projected
Company Number of Employees in 
2014
Projected Demand
Flight Pro 70 200
Visetec 81 2000
Honshu Automotive 180* 700
Motolao 920* 2000
Tokyo Camera 500* 1000
BPM 363 800
Savan Toys 130 800
Lao Clothing Company 120* Not available
Total 2364 7500
*Approximate numbers. Sources: Manager interviews 1/2014-6/2014; Honshu Automotive 
2014; company brochures; personal communication (5/2014).
The prospective numbers come from a slide the author was shown in a Motolao manager 
interview (24/3/2014). The slide came from a presentation on projected labour needs, 
apparently compiled by the government. These projected numbers are supported by press 
reports which state that projected labour needs for the zone would be 5000 in 2015 and 
10,000 in 2018 (Bangkok Post 23/9/2013). Zone officials have been even more optimistic in 
terms of the possible jobs that the zone may generate, saying that if the SEZ ‘is fully 
developed there will be between 500 and 800 factories and it will create between 50,000 
and 100,000 jobs’ (Vientiane Times 11/8/2014). However, a Factory 1 manager suggested 
that it would be perhaps unrealistic to have such high numbers working at Savannakhet 
factories (interview 10/6/2014). The relatively large population of Savannakhet province and 
Kaysone Phomvihane district combined with an agrarian employment transition to off-farm 
wage labour would suggest that factories would have little trouble in recruiting workers. 
That this was not so in 2013-2014 was in large part due to the multiple practices of mobility 
which workers used to reproduce their lives and households.
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8.2 Mobilities 
8.2.1 International Migration
International migration was a key strategy of social reproduction for many in Savannakhet, 
with remittance flows sustaining households. It also posed an obstacle for new foreign 
manufacturers seeking Lao labour. Out of 33 Savannakhet workers interviewed, 15 either 
worked in or had worked in Thailand. Three were currently working in Thailand and 12 had 
previously worked in Thailand, eleven of whom were now working in local factories. The 
most common reasons for migrating to Thailand were low wages within Laos and a lack of 
job opportunities in the local area (worker interviews 3/2014-6/2014).7 Ae, a 37 year old 
women who migrated in her twenties and had returned from working in Thailand, related 
some of the decision-making processes:  
At that time it was common for people from the village to go there. Our town didn’t 
have many factories then and many people thought it was good to go there, so I 
wanted to go like my friends. If I went I could save money for my father and mother so 
I went to try it out. I went along with my friends. Mostly people…get money to buy a 
vehicle, buy this, buy that. I saw my friends get money…If you go you’re able to buy 
things (interview 3/2014). 
The theme of providing for the family was confirmed by Tip, a 32 year woman, who had 
previously worked in Thailand but was now working at Factory 4: ‘Before, the family had 
many children and couldn’t find enough income. We wanted to have a house but didn’t have 
any savings. So I went [to Thailand] and got a monthly wage of over 6000 baht [USD170] and 
saved it so that a house could be built for my children’ (interview 3/2014). Fah, aged 25 and 
another female employee of Factory 4, had gone to work in Thailand around ten years 
previously and also highlighted the lack of opportunities: ‘At that time our town didn’t have 
factories so I went to look for work there’ (interview 6/2014). 
Khong, a 23 year old male migrant currently working in Bangkok, said that he dropped out of 
school when his friends did and he came under pressure from his family to find work: ‘I did 
not want to study and my mother told me to earn money’. He decided to go to Thailand - 
without being encouraged to migrate by his family - because in Laos ‘the wages aren’t much’ 
(interview 5/2014). Lin was 25 years old and also working at Factory 4. She had worked in 
7 Only the month of the interview is given in order to protect identities.
192
Thailand for seven years and been back in Laos for a year when interviewed in early 2014. 
She highlighted the background of poverty which framed the decision to migrate: 
[If] they paid a decent monthly wage, you went because at that time monthly wages in 
Laos were very little, 400,000 [kip per month, USD 49] at the most. My family was very 
poor and in difficulty. We didn’t have enough to live, enough to eat. Whatever place 
had decent wages, I had to go (interview 3/2014)
Wages in Thailand varied, mostly within a reported range of 3000-10,000 baht (USD 85-285) 
per month. The highest wage reported was up to 15,000 baht (USD 428) per month, for 
working in a shrimp factory in southern Thailand, and the lowest was 2200 baht (USD 63) per 
month for working in a restaurant in Mukdahan. Migrants reported working in low-paying 
jobs in services and the industrial sector such as domestic work, waiting in restaurants, 
working in a beauty shop, and working in garments and food processing factories.8 Some 
migrants reported holding a number of jobs at different times. Work in Thailand appeared to 
vary by gender with three out of the four men working in factories, with the other helping to 
trade illegal petrol. Seven out of the nine female migrants reported working in a restaurant, 
either serving or preparing food. Two had worked as domestic workers and one had worked 
as a nanny. Most workers reported working in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region but some 
worked in the south of Thailand (Phuket, Trang) and some across the river in Mukdahan 
(worker interviews 3/2014-6/2014). These examples appear to maintain other studies’ 
findings of strong migration networks between Savannakhet and the Bangkok conurbation 
(Phouxay 2008: Khumya and Kusakabe 2015). Migrants typically obtained work in Thailand 
through contacts with friends and family from Savannakhet. Most workers went through 
informal channels and worked without legal documentation (worker interviews 3/2014-
6/2014). 
Joi, aged 20, worked for one year in the BMR as a domestic worker in a private home. She 
did not have a job and her mother had no money to send her to school. Her cousins worked 
at Factory 8, where she subsequently got a job when she returned. They had previously 
asked her to work there but at that time it was not recruiting women. She decided to go to 
work in Thailand because higher wages were available there. She heard about the Thai job 
through friends in her village and subsequently obtained a passport and travelled to work 
8 There is of course the possibility that Lao workers were engaged in more illicit occupations but were 
understandably not forthcoming during interviews.
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there without a work permit. When she arrived in the BMR her Lao friends arranged the job 
for her. 
Fah went to Thailand with the help of her cousin. She went when she was very young – 
around 15 years old – and was unable to get a work permit. She worked in Trang in southern 
Thailand. Her employers took her to register for a card which allowed her to work in Trang 
province – this appears to be a reference to the Thai government’s temporary registration 
scheme for undocumented migrants9 - and when she needed to go back to Laos she merely 
went to the Lao embassy and requested documents to return (interview 6/2014). 
Migrant workers were responsible for remitting money and supporting their families from a 
distance. Of the ten migrants who gave amounts for the money they remitted, only three 
reported sending it back every month. It was more common to save up and send money 
back every two to four months. Workers reported sending back between 2000 and 10,000 
baht (USD 57-285) per time. Money was used to improve the material circumstances of 
families and also to support education, as Ae noted:
I transferred money to my parents so that they could buy rice fields, buy vehicles [seu 
lot]…and save money…build a house. My younger sibling could go to study and my 
older brother could study (song nawng hian song aai hian). I could buy motorcycles for 
them (seu lot hai) (interview 3/2014)
Phone, a female returned migrant in her twenties, also contributed to her family’s education: 
I sent back 10,000 or 20,000 baht (USD 285-570) per time. If there was an amount needed 
(kan tawng gaan taw dai) I would send it…. [the money] was used for my siblings to study 
(aai euay nawng hian) [I would send] once every one or two months (interview 4/2014). Dee, 
a 23 year old male who was working in a shrimp processing factory in southern Thailand 
highlighted the importance of remittances being used to physically fix Lao households more 
securely in place. He reported remitting 4000 baht (USD 114) a month with the money used 
to cover living expenses of his family in Laos, and also to extend the family’s house (sang 
pheum, dtaw lang). Remittances appeared to play an important role in the area’s social 
reproduction (cf. Manivong et al 2014). 
Migrant workers from Savannakhet thus performed their own spatial fix of moving to labour 
in Thailand in order to reproduce their own lives and households within in Laos. Low wages 
and lack of opportunities in Savannakhet were cited as key reasons to move. Remittances 
9 For a review of Thai migrant registration policy see MAP Foundation 2010, pp.43-62. 
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were an important theme, with migrants undertaking their long-distance travails in order to 
support families in Savannakhet.  Mobility for delocalized work thus produced its opposite, 
fixity within villages. Villages were reproduced as fixed complexes of social relations and 
material infrastructure by people leaving them and remitting. Mobility both reduced the 
population of the villages, in a sense making them smaller, but simultaneously expanded the 
village transnationally. Migration to Thailand, often operating on an informal and 
clandestine basis, thus acted as a subterranean counterpart to the integration projects of 
the GMS and the Lao state. In a Thompsonian vein, this might be deemed an example of 
‘geography from below’ in which subaltern actors construct their own lives and with it the 
larger socio-spatial relations of Southeast Asian capitalism (Thompson 2013; Sturgeon 2013; 
Laungaramsri 2014). Lao migrants integrated into the wider economy of the region by 
moving into the Thai labour market at their own behest, an action which would complicate 
the border manufacturing territorial scheme. The mobility of international migrants created 
a tight labour market for the zone which presented a problem for the state and foreign 
capital, an issue to be explored in Chapter 9. 
8.2.2 Labour Market Mobility
Mobility also operated internally to the territory, within the local labour market, as workers 
shifted jobs in search of better wages and conditions. A manager at Factory 1 confirmed that 
workers were often on the lookout for better wages: ‘They think for more wages they can 
sell barbecue…They compare this company with other companies’ (interview 10/6/2014). 
The atmosphere in a factory and the harshness of factory labour regimes were assessed by 
workers as an important factor in choosing whether to stay working at a given factory. 
Daeng, an 18 year old women, was working at Factory 4 and had previously worked at 
Factory 1. She decided to move to Factory 4 when she talked with friends:
When my friends started working at [Factory 4] they called me and told me [Factory 4] 
was better [than Factory 1]. The wages were better and it was more comfortable there. 
When there is no work to do they let you sit in the air-conditioned room. There are 
holidays, you can have time to rest, they let you out to eat on time. The morning 
watchman lets you eat before you go to start work (interview 6/2014)
Oy was a 17 year old female who also worked at Factory 4, having previously worked at 
Factory 1. Factory 1 and Factory 4 have ownership links and so she was moved to Factory 4 
because they needed workers and there was less work available at the original factory. She 
disliked the many rules and working with chemicals at Factory 1 but stated that she much 
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preferred to work at the new factory because the workers there are friendly and they have 
time to relax during work. She planned to stay at this factory and not return to the old 
(interview 5/2014). 
La, a 21 year old woman, used to work at Factory 9, earning between 600,000-800,000 kip 
(USD 74-98) depending on whether she worked the day or night shift. She was frustrated 
that her wages had not increased in a long time and heard from her sister that she could 
earn around 1.2 million kip (USD148) per month at Factory 6 and that working conditions 
were better:
My sister went to work there and got better wages and also there are fans, it is cool. 
The work isn’t too hard…suppose I work there for a long time and I am well-behaved 
(mee malanyat) and there is OT. I can do it, I can go there (dai khao)…and each year 
they will increase the wages (interview 5/2014)
Goong, 18 and the youngest daughter in her household, used to earn 400,000-500,000 kip 
(USD 50-61) per month at Factory 5, one of the companies outside the zone. For Goong the 
job was unsatisfactory because the wages were low and because the factory was hot 
without air conditioning. She left the factory because of these low wages and sought 
employment at Factory 7, a new SEZ factory. Here she reported being paid 400,000 kip (USD 
49) every two weeks. There were other benefits as well: ‘They give you food to eat…there is 
breakfast, there is lunch…the supervisor is kind (jai dee), there is air-conditioning, a car 
comes to pick you up for work (mee lot hap song), they give you a uniform to wear (mee 
keuang hai sai)’. 
Workers used their mobility between jobs to access greater wages and better conditions. 
This finding assumes greater relevance when we examine the effects it had on wages, 
benefits and the labour regime in the local area. In the context of a tight labour market with 
increasing competition between new factories for labour, factories took measures to fix 
their workers in place by holding out better wages and benefits, and arguably influenced the 
creation of more paternalistic and consensual labour regimes. By moving it is possible that 
workers were putting pressure on factories to improve working conditions. Beyond workers’ 
frustrations with low wages, there appeared to be dissatisfaction with material conditions 
and social relations of power and control, which would lead them to prefer one factory over 
another (see Chapter 9).  Workers’ ‘mobility power’ (Smith 2006) – the ability to leave or 
threaten to leave a job - was a key channel through which they would derive greater 
benefits from the increasing foreign investment in Savannakhet, mobility thus representing 
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‘a material critique’ of the social relations in certain factories (Mezzadra 2004: 270). Labour 
market ‘mobility power’ is thus one factor which counters a ‘race to the bottom’ argument 
predicated on low wages or poor labour conditions. It also implies that for any project of 
economic territorialization which requires a stable local labour regime, the management of 
mobility is a key issue for labour and capital as their spatial fixes butt against each other. 
8.2.3 Agrarian-Industrial Mobility
Some workers would also leave factory employment to return to subsistence-oriented rice 
production, providing another important source of resilience through which they could 
reproduce their lives. Managers from Factory 1 and Factory 2 stated that they noticed many 
workers leaving in order to farm during the rice season (interviews 10/6/2014 and 
10/1/2014). Given these high levels of mobility it may seem something of a puzzle that 
foreign companies persisted in coming to Savannakhet. It must be recalled however that 
companies benefited from significant tax breaks and reduced production costs and the 
border location which created a sort of territorial overlap between Savannakhet and the 
Thai-based production networks. The prospect of an informal and politically weak labour 
force also appeared to be enticing for some,10 even though the reality on the ground was 
somewhat different due to mobility power. Subsistence agriculture in the area also may 
have benefited companies in some ways.11 
Workers often stated that rice gave them a guaranteed supply of food and saved them 
money because buying rice would be expensive.  Workers would leave for quite short 
periods or sometimes quit their jobs completely in order to farm. For instance, Tip would 
make arrangements with the factory to enable her to farm rice: ‘I ask for time off. I ask the 
factory to leave beforehand. I go to work [in the fields] for about a week and then return [to 
work at the factory]…they let me take time off’ (interview 3/2014). Ek, a 32 year old male at 
Factory 8, stated that he was given a short time off by the factory - three days - in order to 
farm rice (interview 5/2014). Mee on the other hand decided to quit her factory job. She 
was a 29 year old woman who was married and living with her husband, mother and young 
son. She used to work in a restaurant across the river in Mukdahan, Thailand earning about 
5000 baht (USD 143) per month. She came back to live in Laos when she had enough money 
to get married. She got a job on the assembly line at Factory 7, working there for around 5 
months.  She left the job because ‘there was no one to look after my child and mother’ (baw 
10 See Chapter 9.
11 See Industrial Wage Labour and Diverse Livelihoods below
197
mee kon beung luuk mae) and also because the rice season was coming and she needed to 
work in the fields to grow rice. The factory had arranged to allow workers seven days off but 
Mee considered this insufficient time for the rice-growing work to be done. When the rice 
season was over she planned to return to work in one of the factories again (interview 
5/2014). Sing’s story had a number of similarities. Sing was 28 and married. Her story 
Figure 8: Kaysone Phomvihane Rice Production.12
echoed Mee’s in that she had also worked in Mukdahan before, until returning and seeking 
what would be temporary industrial employment in Savannakhet. She had also worked at 
Factory 7 for five months and then left in order to prepare the paddy fields for the rice 
growing season (interview 5/2014). In addition to leaving work, some workers continued to 
be partly responsible for farm work while they were still employed at the factory. For 
example Jit, a 21 year old male working at Factory 1, reported helping out his parents in the 
rice fields at the weekends (interview 5/2014). 
Seasonal mobility which cycled workers between agrarian livelihoods and industrial 
employment signified another important means of reproducing workers’ lives. Seasonal 
mobility was another practice of local workers which foreign capital had to adapt to, 
entailing changes in the labour process.13 Seasonal mobility is also an example of what Rigg 
(2001) has termed ‘spatial interpenetration’ whereby agrarian and industrial spaces become 
interpolated. The territorial project of the Savan-Seno SEZ attempts to establish industrial 
12 Source: Author’s Photo.
13 See Chapter 9.
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modernity in Laos by creating a bounded space of global accumulation. Following workers’ 
agency demonstrates that the bounded space cannot operate on its own neoliberal terms 
but its functioning is inextricably linked with the broader national territory and its existing 
division of labour and livelihood systems. Spaces of neoliberal globalization carved out of 
national territories for accommodating the ‘race to the bottom’ cannot necessarily be 
insulated from the existing economic geography, especially due to the trajectories of labour 
mobility which criss-cross them. Rice farming was used for food security and factory 
employment as just one means to a livelihood, the implications of which are returned to 
below. The image of a proletarian divorced completely from the means of production was 
thus inaccurate for some workers in Savannakhet (Marx 2013). Taken together these 
mobilities also suggest that companies will find it hard to meet projected labour demands, 
with implications for future factory expansion.
8.3 Fixity: Reproducing Places 
Workers’ agency also operated through their fixity – their strong social ties to certain places, 
such as home villages, and the associated material resources and activities they utilize to 
reproduce social relations within those places and the material existence of those places. 
With ‘fixity’ as a spatial practice, something was often literally fixed in place, whether this 
was the physical body of a worker, a rice crop, remitted money, or infrastructure such as 
new or extended houses. 
8.3.1 Gender and Care
Gendered care roles within household relations placed limits on mobility, drawing back 
migrants, young women especially, from work in Thailand (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011). 
There was thus a contradictory tension between some workers’ mobility and fixity. Some 
workers themselves expressed a strong sense of place, viewing their returns as positive 
moves which allowed them to reconnect and reproduce their household relations. There 
were also contradictory consequences for foreign capital from gendered care responsibilities. 
On the one hand they helped to reterritorialize Lao labour and dovetailed with fixing a 
potential workforce in place. On the other hand, they sometimes appeared as mobility to 
labour as women left factory employment to perform care work for their families. Female 
workers could be fixed in the country through their responsibilities, but those same 
responsibilities may have made it difficult to fix them within factories. 
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Phone had worked in Thailand for around ten years before returning. She returned because 
her mother had died. Her father did not want her to go back and expected her to be within 
the household in order to perform gendered care responsibilities (interview 4/2014). Tip had 
been working in Thailand at a recycling factory for three years. She worked in the same 
factory as her Lao husband. Changes in her family situation in Laos prompted her to return:
My grandfather was ill and then he died so it was difficult for the family. There was no 
one living with my mother [Tip’s parents had divorced]. My mother was already old. I 
came back first and not long afterwards my husband returned as well because there 
was no one to do the farming (interview 3/2014)
Returning to care for her mother entailed going to work in a local factory. In turn factory 
work was enabled by her mother looking after Tip’s children while she was at work (ibid.), an 
example of the reciprocal relations of care which build resilience and bring forth social 
reproduction (Katz 2004: 246). Caring for children in Laos was also an important reason for 
returning. Lin, for example, returned to Laos because her son, who was being cared for by 
her parents while she was in Thailand, was getting older and she wanted to be present for 
him (interview 3/2014). Fah returned from Thailand because she became pregnant and was 
unable to work. She came back so that she could be cared for by her family during her 
pregnancy and childbirth, after which she did not want to return to Thailand but instead 
valued being able to stay within her own village:
I didn't like it [in Thailand]. If I can choose, if there are factories in Laos, it's more 
comfortable to stay in Laos because over there I have a heavy heart (lambaak jai) that 
it's not my country. So I can stay in my village and work and I can just get a bit of 
money but I came back, I can see my mother and father. Staying in my own village I 
am contented (sabaai jai) (interview 6/2014)
Dao, a 26 year old women who had been working at Factory 2 in the SEZ, had followed her 
husband to work in Thailand. He worked at a shrimp farm in Phuket and she found work for 
a year at a restaurant close by. She had a child with her husband and ended up staying 
permanently in Laos when she made a return trip to make merit (het bun) for her father.14 
‘My husband didn’t let me [return to Thailand]. He had me stay with my mother. I had a child 
already so he didn’t let me go back’. She had no plans to return to Thailand at any point 
because there would be ‘no one to care for my child’ (baw mee pai yoo nam luuk) (interview 
5/2014). 
14 This more than likely indicates that her father had died. 
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Family relations also acted as a constraint on mobility for women who had never gone to 
work in Thailand. Nat, a 26 year old woman working at Factory 6 in the SEZ, stated that she 
had wanted to go to Thailand in the past but her husband didn’t allow her (interview 
6/2014). Nang, a 19 year old female worker at Factory 8 had never thought of going to 
Thailand, because she would worry about her family (interview 6/2014). Maeo, 18 years old 
and working at Factory 6, perhaps signalled some families’ attitudes to their daughters going 
to work in Thailand, when she responded to the question of whether she would ever 
migrate there: ‘No, my mother wouldn’t let me go (baw, mae baw hai bpai)’ (interview 
6/2016). 
Some Savannakhet workers enabled foreign companies to enact their spatial fix of relocation 
by choosing to reproduce the social relations of households and communities in their 
villages. Workers were thus available for work in Savannakhet factories and incorporation 
into global social relations. The territorial project of the border enclave, and the scale 
making process of which it is a part, were thus enabled by a gendered construction of care 
work amongst other factors. The bounded space of global capital accumulation drew value-
producing sustenance from the relations of social reproduction in the local area by 
employing female workers. The return of young women was significant because of the 
gendered construction of the local industrial workforce, as we will see.
8.3.2 Factory Labour and Socially Reproductive Labour
Tasks of social reproduction usually fell to either the worker herself or female members of 
the household. Workers were facilitated into factory employment by this socially 
reproductive labour. Factory employment appeared to lead to re-divisions of the household 
division of labour and so reorient social labour towards the ends of capital accumulation, 
incorporating more people’s work indirectly into capitalist social relations and so increasing 
the ‘radius of exploitation’ (Dyer-Witheford 2002: 4) in the ‘social factory’ (Dalla Costa and 
James 1975). The gendered construction of labour on which the enclave was based 
extracted both direct and indirect female labour.
Nat lived with her husband and two young children. She typically got up at 5am in order to 
cook and clean before she went to work at Factory 6. She chose to work at Factory 6 
specifically because it started work at 8.30am rather than the start time an hour earlier 
typical at other Savannakhet factories. This gave her enough time to do her household tasks 
before starting work. She spent two-three hours a day on household tasks in addition to the 
nine-eleven (depending on overtime) hours she spent at the factory. She cooked, cleaned 
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and cared for her children (although in the hours she was at work there was likely someone 
else caring for the children). She said emphatically that the only time she had to relax was at 
night when she was sleeping (interview 6/2014). Fah told a similar tale. She rose at 4.30am 
and worked for three hours at home to prepare food and clean. Fah’s mother looked after 
her child while she was at work and did housework if Fah had to do overtime and arrived 
home late (interview 6/2014).
Female household members young and old were expected to do household work. When she 
was working at the factory Sing depended on her mother, who lived with Sing and her 
husband, to help with care responsibilities. Her mother looked after the children and 
cleaned the house. Her husband helped around the house but it was her mother who was 
the main domestic worker. At the weekends when Sing was home from the factory, she 
instead of her mother would be responsible for household tasks (interview 5/2014). Joi, 
whose mother had died, was too tired to do the housework when she returned from work. It 
thus fell to her younger sisters to do the housework and tend to the family’s animals. At 
village festivals, where households are typically expected to make gendered labour 
contributions in preparing food etc., either Joi or her younger sisters would go as the 
household’s representative and cook and wash dishes (6/2014). Noi reported that when she 
was employed her mother, who worked primarily as a farmer, was responsible for all the 
household tasks. However, if Noi was unemployed then she herself would be responsible for 
household tasks (interview 4/2014). 
8.3.3 Industrial Wage Labour and Diverse Livelihoods
Factory wage labour often provided but one part of a broader livelihood system for 
Savannakhet workers. There were only a few informants who were solely dependent on 
wage labour for their survival. This gave workers on the one hand a basis for their social 
reproduction which complicated the efforts of factories to incorporate them into globalized 
manufacturing, and on the other was likely providing a hidden subsidy to companies which 
alleviated the social cost of labour in border factories. Many workers came from rural parts 
of KP district and the province. Often the daughters and sons of rice-farming households, 
workers’ wages supplemented a subsistence basis of household rice production and animal 
rearing for consumption. Allocation of surplus household labour to factory employment 
enabled households to diversify livelihoods, become more resilient, and provide more 
opportunities for enhanced lives, for example in the building of better accommodation or 
funding of children’s education. 
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22 out of 29 Savannakhet factory workers who were interviewed still lived in the parental 
household, or that of their spouse. Of the other seven, some still lived with a parent but they 
and their spouses were the effective heads and main economic decision makers in the 
household. 17 of the 22 living in parental households reported contributing wages to the 
household budget. The amounts given ranged from occasionally giving 100,000 kip (USD 12), 
to giving half of the wages to the household, up to giving all wages to parents (worker 
interviews 3/2014-6/2014). Several young women were the main wage earners in their 
families. For example, Nou was 19 years old and the only daughter left living with her 
parents. She reported earning around 1.5 million kip (USD 185) per month at Factory 3, 
keeping around 200,000-300,000 kip (USD 24-37) per month and giving the rest to her 
parents, who worked as rice farmers (interview 5/2014). 
Workers reported using income for covering daily expenses, and also for larger consumer 
goods such as motorcycles (worker interviews 3/2014-6/2014). Several workers highlighted 
that their income was used to support the education of younger siblings, mirroring the use 
of migrants’ remittances (worker interviews 5/2014 and 6/2014). Another important use of 
wages was house construction. Maeo, for example, reported giving wages for house building 
as one way in which she supported her family. The family currently lived in a single-room 
wooden house. They were building a concrete house with three rooms (interview 6/2014). 
Nat also reported living in a cramped dwelling she described as a dtoop (‘hut’). She planned 
to use wages to build a two room concrete house (interview 6/2014). Ek was building a 
house for his young family because they had previously lived with his parents and desired 
their own home (interview 5/14). Jit reported that it was good that the family grew rice 
because his wages could then be used for other things, including the house which they were 
constructing (interview 5/14). Foreign investment was thus not only changing the economic 
landscape by establishing new workplaces and creating a new territorial divisions of labour 
but it also appeared to be changing the physical landscape of Lao villages through house 
construction. Following the agency of labour again allows us to see how places are being 
reproduced and transformed through the formation of global social relations. 
Subsistence rice production and animal rearing provided a basis for many workers’ families. 
The seasonal planting and growing of the rice crop represented a form of fixity which 
secured workers’ livelihoods in their villages. A factory manager noted the importance of 
rice growing for many workers and the implications for recruitment15:
15 Addressed in Chapter 9.
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Right now [there is] seasonal labour. Because in Laos, the majority of the workers here 
are the sons or daughters of rice farmers… if you look for…just entry-level [workers]…it 
depends on the time of the year…sometimes they are reluctant to come [to work in the 
factory until] the rice season is done…the harvest season is done (Factory 1 manager 
interview 10/6/2014)
The vast majority of workers’ families grew rice and/or raised animals. 21 out of 33 (18 out 
of 29 local factory workers excluding international migrants) interviewed workers stated that 
they or members of their households farmed. Out of 29 local factory workers 18 workers’ 
families had access to some land and grew rice. Land holdings were typically small. From the 
seven workers who estimated the size of the family’s land in hectares, the average size of 
holding was 1.9 hectares (worker interviews 3/2014-6/2014). Small holding sizes in Kaysone 
Phomvihane district appeared to be confirmed by the results of a small survey of farming 
households conducted in Ban Phonsim village and not including households of interviewed 
workers. For 41 households the median holding size was between 1-2 hectares (22 
responses). 15 more households had below one hectare, while only four households had 
between 2-5 hectares (author survey 14/6/2014). 
The majority of farmers in Savannakhet appeared to be growing just one annual crop of 
rainfed rice (naa seng) only for household consumption (worker interviews 3/2014-6/2014). 
Rice was viewed by the household as an economic foundation of food security and as a way 
to save on food expenses (worker interviews 3/2014-6/2014; see also Manivong et al 2014). 
Only two workers reported selling rice, but only if there was some small surplus after 
household consumption needs had been met (workers interviews 3/2014 and 6/2014). 
Because household labour did not need to be allocated to it the whole year rainfed rice 
agriculture could form part of a package of livelihood activities. Fah stated that she had a 
good opinion of agriculture because if she was ever unemployed then she would still have 
rice to eat. ‘Rice growing isn’t an all-year round activity and doesn’t take up a lot of time’ 
(naa het baw bpajam, baw dai sai waylaa laai) and so she prefers to work in a factory most 
of the time (interview 6/2014). Tip also viewed agriculture as a positive but limited activity: 
‘Farming is good but, you know, it’s only seasonal’ (het naa ga dee dtae wa man pen suang 
naw) (interview 3/2014). Fah could help her parents with the planting and harvest work 
when necessary but they also hired people to help with the harvest. She also suggested a 
way that industrial wage labour would support agriculture: wages could be used to buy 
fertilizers (interview 6/2014). Mee continued to farm because she did not consider the 
wages enough to feed the family: ‘It is better to work in the fields because there [at the 
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factory] the wages are quite low so you can’t buy rice with that money’ (interview 5/2014). 
Bpet, a 24 year old woman at Factory 2, didn’t have any land but also had a positive opinion 
of agriculture, because it meant that one did not have to buy rice. She performed some 
agricultural labour for other households and was paid in kind in rice (interview 5/2014). 
Labour was hired in by some workers’ households. The going agricultural wage rate in KP 
district in 2014 was 50,000 kip (USD 6) per day (author survey 5/2014; worker interview 
6/2014).
The growing of rice was thus a central part of many workers’ livelihoods. Rice provided food 
security and meant that wages could be used for other needs. In 2014 a kilogram of rice cost 
around 3000 kip (USD 0.37). The national criterion for rice self-sufficiency is 350kg per 
household member16 per year (Newby et al 2013: 7). If this figure is taken as a guideline for 
consumption then it would cost 1.05 million kip (USD 110) to keep a household member in 
rice for the year, or around one month’s factory wages. This could indicate a significant cash 
saving and would mean that rice growing was providing a subsidy for foreign-invested 
factories. Some workers considered the wages too low to give up growing rice. Without 
recourse to rice it is possible that factories would have faced increased calls to raise wages. 
This is important to note because it means that the social cost of labour would have been 
reduced as companies avoided the full cost of social reproduction. Subsistence rice 
production emerged as a territorial effect from which capital appeared to benefit once 
workers were in production.
Animals were also a prominent source of food and financial security. Chickens and ducks 
were typically raised for household consumption (worker interviews 3/2014-6/2014). Larger 
animals tended to be kept to generate income or as an insurance policy during times of 
emergency. For example, Ying was an 18 year old female worker at Factory 6. Her family had 
no rice fields but raised cows to sell. They had ‘three or four’ cows and they received around 
6000-7000 baht17 (USD 170-200) for each one they sold (interview 5/2014). Joi’s family kept 
pigs as an insurance policy against economic uncertainty, selling them for between 700,000-
2 million kip (USD 86-247) in emergencies (interview 6/2014). Animal rearing thus played an 
important part in the economic background of workers. It not only provided an income 
stream for households - thus providing economic resilience - but also provided consumption 
goods which did not have to be bought with wages.  Arguably the practice of raising animals 
also provided a subsidy to capital.
16 The source does not differentiate between adult and children.
17 Thai baht is sometimes used as currency in Laos.
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Continuing norms of subsistence rice production in Savannakhet reproduced peri-urban and 
rural villages in Kaysone Phomvihane district as agrarian spaces. Rice production and animal 
rearing were two distinct practices which built resilience for workers. It implied that workers 
were not fully dependent on wages for their survival, a fact which, as shall be demonstrated, 
had consequences for the stability and social construction of the workforce and so the 
stability of the territorial economic project and the emerging GMS scale. The incorporation 
of factory wage labour into household livelihood strategies provided extra income and also 
helped to reproduce families and places. Indeed it not only reproduced but also transformed 
places, for example in the building of new houses. Agrarian labour was arguably mobilized 
into subsidizing industry through lowering the cost of labour – a benefit to capital which was 
itself counteracted by also facilitating easier exit from work, as we shall see in Chapter 9. On 
the other hand industrial wage labour could also pay for inputs (e.g. fertilizer) and the hiring 
of harvest labour so feeding back into agrarian production. 
8.4 Factory Employment
Workers’ agency was apparent throughout the cycle of factory employment, as they made 
decisions about where to work, what working conditions were acceptable, how they should 
get better wages and benefits, and when and why to leave, all of which would have 
implications for the functioning of the border enclave factories. 
8.4.1 Entering Factory Employment
The majority of interviewed Savannakhet factory workers stated that they applied for their 
job because they had a relative, friend or neighbour already working at the factory or who 
had told them that the factory was hiring (worker interviews 3/2014-6/2014). Managers 
confirmed that recruiting through workers’ existing social networks was effective. The 
manager of Factory 5, a non-zone factory, had had several years’ experience of recruiting 
and recounted:
We announce in the factory…they have sisters, brothers at home who even previously 
worked with us and we encourage them, ok for example, we need 3-4 boys for the 
packing department, someone who has in their family please invite to join our 
company…we will say please don’t forget we want to recruit…We will also ask the 
supervisors. OK you need 3-4 people in the packing department, if you know someone 
in your village please invite (interview 18/3/2014)
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The Factory 5 manager added that potential workers made decisions to enter work based on 
their friends: 
It's so funny, if in this house they have a girl and in that house they have a girl, they 
will talk together, do you want to try, and if the other one doesn't want to try this one 
won't come by themselves because they are so shy...if they know someone is working 
there, yeah ok I will go with her (interview 18/3/2014)
A manager from Factory 2 stated that at first they had signs to announce vacancies but 
subsequently the company found it more effective to get workers to bring their friends and 
families to the factory. Indeed, workers at Factory 2 actively sought to find work for their 
friends as a manager noted:  'My workers come to ask 'Do you want to employ people or not? 
If you want I will tell my friends' like this. They come to ask me every day' (interview 
10/1/2014). A Factory 3 Manager estimated that around 60 percent of the workforce had 
been recruited through friend and family networks (interview 27/2/2014). Workers 
themselves also stated that they valued working in a place with many friends and this was 
one reason they preferred working in local factories over agricultural work. Maeo for 
instance asserted: ‘at the factory I have lots of friends...but in the fields I don’t have friends, 
I’m alone’. Sing stated that she found working in the factory decent enough and she had 
many friends (mak yoo, mee moo laai) (interview 5/2014). 
Figure 9: Workers Outside Savannakhet Factory.18
18 Source: Author’s photo.
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More comfortable working conditions in air-conditioned factories were also reported as an 
important reason for working in factories. Daeng appreciated that the conditions in her 
factory job were not hot and expressed her dislike of agriculture and refusal to go back to it 
as an occupation: ‘It’s hot, it hurts your back (buat lang) and I won’t do it again…I can’t do it’ 
(interview 5/2014). Bpet stated that the good thing about working in a factory was that ‘you 
are out of the sun all the time’ (yoo hom talawt) (interview 5/2014). Jit heard about the job 
from his sister who also worked at Factory 1 and chose to work there because the work was 
not hard and there was air-conditioning which he compared favourably to his friend’s job 
working at a hot and physically demanding wood factory (interview 5/2014). Higher wages 
were also another key reason workers entered factories (see Labour Market Mobility above). 
Workers initial engagement with the new factories opening in Savannakhet was motivated 
by a hope that they could work for higher wages in decent (and cool) conditions. Higher 
wages operated as part of the households’ livelihood strategies and enabled greater 
economic resilience as we have seen. Some workers expressed disdain for agricultural work 
indicating a cultural and psychological shift away from agriculture for the younger 
generation in Laos (see Rigg 2001). Factory work stood in tension with agricultural 
employment however as although there was a move away from it for some workers, it was 
still a key part of families’ livelihoods. Workers typically entered work through their social 
networks, indicating how workers’ agency was ‘leveraged’ through the informal community 
structures of the village (Konings 2010). The agency of capital can also said to be ‘leveraged’ 
through its use of pre-existing community- and household-level social relations, as word of 
mouth recruitment fed a steady supply of workers into the maw of global production, 
communal structures thus mediating the capital-labour relation (Knafo 2010). Foreign capital 
thus came to depend on accessing community structures in the area in order to effectively 
implant itself in the border territory. 
8.4.2 Adapting to Factory Employment
Workers engaged in different ways with factory employment. Some workers were prepared 
to enter and stay in factory employment for higher wages; a kind of negotiated 
incorporation mediated by their mobility. Other workers refused to adapt to factory 
discipline, a refusal that was again enacted through their command over space. The refusal 
of factory discipline was a recurrent theme among company managers and government 
officials, one which problematized the spatial fixes of foreign companies. Many workers only 
stayed for a short time in foreign-invested factory employment, reportedly chafing at the 
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imposed discipline which controlled the labour process and the time of workers. Workers in 
employment also displayed evidence of prioritizing the social reproduction of their families 
over the reproduction of the capital relation. Other workers however made efforts to 
become obedient workers and internalize the lessons of factory discipline. 
Informants highlighted that Savannakhet workers were prone to leaving employment easily 
due to a dislike of the industrial discipline and the availability of other means of survival. The 
manager of the Zone C site developer stated: 
The turnover is high, first because the worker is not suitable for the job. …they want to 
leave the company because it’s not suitable. And then the second thing is because of 
salary or income. They feel…they better go outside for a better job, because… the two 
main aspects are salary [and the job is not suitable] (Lao Samudra interview 
13/1/2014)
The manager clarified that he meant ‘not suitable’ in that some workers simply could not 
adapt themselves to working in factories. The Lao Samudra manager estimated staff 
turnover rates at ‘below 10 percent’ which he still considered to be quite high (interview 
13/1/2014).  Estimates of turnover varied between factories with the mean average of 
turnover at four factories who provided estimates of monthly turnover standing at 10.2 
percent19 (factory manager interviews 1/2014-6/2014). Factory 5 estimated a turnover rate 
of between ’20-30 percent’ a year (manager interview 18/3/2014). A SEZA official 
highlighted the difficulties some workers had with industrial employment:
Maybe also one factor is you know, the factor is they are used to freedom. When they 
shift to the factories they have to work in the team, they have to obey regulations 
including eating, drinking, dressing, working. Some people are not comfortable…is Lao 
PDR different from other countries, like in other advanced countries? No job, no life, 
you cannot survive [in other countries], but over here because of the abundance of 
natural resources if there is no work they still have rice…they still have fish ponds, they 
can go back to [their] families, they still survive, much easier, very comfortable…why 
should they come for this pressure environment? Some people do believe like this…in 
other countries if you are unemployed it’s a very big, big problem but over here it’s 
normal, normal [laughs] (SEZA official interview 20/12/2014)
19 Author’s own calculations. 
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This assessment of the agrarian substrate of workers’ interaction with industrial 
employment was shared by a manager from Factory 8:
They work hard in the fields but they can rest when they feel like it but in a factory 
they have to work even if they are tired. They are not used to working in a factory…The 
workers don’t care [about having a job], they can still survive. They think ‘If I have no 
job, I can stay at home and my family will feed me’. If they have nothing they can still 
survive (interview 24/3/2014)
Absenteeism was also a significant phenomenon in Savannakhet factories. The Factory 5 
manager stated: 
We analyzed last month, the attendance records, we found out that we had 60 days of 
non-attendance, absence…in one month. If we have let's say 100 people, it means 
there were two people who were absent for the whole month...it's a significant 
amount because we calculate how many [units] they can produce, two people, how 
many [units] how many hours these are, and maybe these are the hours we can pay 
our…telephone line or internet line, monthly or something you know...and trying to 
explain to them but it’s quite difficult (interview 18/3/2014)
The Factory 8 manager estimated that every day 50 workers from around 900 at the factory 
would be absent and complained that workers only call up on the day and never inform 
beforehand (interview 24/3/2014). Several managers highlighted that workers preferred to 
prioritize their family responsibilities over work, leading to absence from work. A Factory 2 
manager noted the difficulty of employing people from rural areas as workers wanted to 
return to the rice fields in the rainy season and that ‘they take care of their family more than 
their work’ (interview 10/1/2014). The manager from Factory 8 asserted that there were not 
real problems with lateness but that workers did not turn up sometimes as they had other 
matters to attend to: ‘If they have to take their daughter to the hospital then they will just go. 
They care more for their family than work’ (interview 24/3/2014). A Factory 4 manager 
stated that common reasons given for absences were that ‘I need to look after children, my 
mother was unwell’ (aang wa beung luuk, mae baw sabai) (interview 16/5/2014). 
Some workers also internalized the factory discipline and reported attempting to become 
better and more productive. Ying, an 18 years old women at Factory 6, stated that the 
hardest part of her job was sewing at the required pace: ‘I have to sew fast enough to keep 
up with the other people on the line (tawng nyip hai man tan moo)…If you don’t keep up the 
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supervisor will force you to…I have to sew faster to adapt myself to the supervisor’ (interview 
5/2014). She went on to describe how she adapted to management by listening to them, not 
having any disagreements with them, and following the rules and their suggestions. Daeng 
complained that a supervisor accused her of not caring about the work, which she denied: 
If we had done the work already the supervisor (khao20) would say the work was no 
good. The supervisor would be angry (haai). The supervisor would tell us I don’t care 
about the work (baw sonjai nam wiak). We did care about the work really but it didn’t 
come out well. So we didn’t know what to do (interview 6/2014)
Workers caused problems for foreign capital through refusing to submit to factory discipline 
and leaving factories completely, and by high levels of absenteeism. Factories would take 
measures to rectify these issues and fix workers in production more securely, as shown in 
Chapter 9. The flipside of this however was a process of acculturation to factory discipline. 
Other workers were acquiescent in their construction as productive workers.   
8.4.3 Improving Wages 
Workers’ agency appeared to improve wages in two key – and arguably interrelated - ways. 
Workers’ mobility in choosing to migrate internationally and leave in search of better wages 
appeared to increase pressure for higher wages in order for companies to retain workers. 
There was also evidence as well that higher wages at several factories stemmed from 
workers applying collective pressure to increase them. The tight labour market may have 
allowed workers to pressure more successively. 
Reported wages at Savannakhet foreign-invested factories were mainly in the range of 
800,000-1.2 million kip (USD 98-147). Wages rates were thus significantly above the national 
minimum wage of 626,000 kip (USD 77) per month. Higher wages may be attributed to 
upward pressure from the tight labour market. However, it seems that the minimum wage 
was set at a level below the cost of reproduction of labour power, implying that wages 
would have to be higher than the minimum even without such a tight local labour market 
(Vientiane Times 5/5/2014). Wages could be increased with overtime. Reported overtime 
rates ranged between 4,500-7,500 kip (USD 0.55-0.92) per hour. Workers reported being 
able to increase their wages through overtime by between 200,000-400,000 kip (USD 24-49) 
per month, depending on the factory (worker interviews 3/2014-6/2014). Overtime was 
generally reported as compulsory across factories and added two hours to the working day 
20 ‘Khao’ is a gender neutral third person pronoun, so it is unclear if the supervisor was male or female.
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(ibid.). Workers varied in their attitudes to overtime. At Factory 4, where overtime was not 
always compulsory, Daeng reported that she prefers to work overtime when it is available so 
she can increase her wages (interview 5/2014). At other factories overtime was unpopular. 
Mee explained: 
Overtime is compulsory because there are not enough people [in the factory]. There 
aren’t many people who want to do overtime…many people are forced to [it is because] 
for most people the money is low…4,500 [kip per hour of overtime]…people don’t want 
to do it because a lot is deducted, social security is deducted, tax…is deducted 
(interview 5/2014)
There was some suggestion of overtime not being paid at one factory. Noi alleged that she 
did not receive any money for the overtime she did, being forced to work until 6pm almost 
every day and then sent home without money (interview 4/2014). Deductions from wages 
were made for social insurance (pagan sangkom) payments and tax (akon). Workers 
reported various amounts deducted, ranging from 100,000 kip (USD 12) for social insurance 
and tax combined to 23,000 kip (USD 2.8) for the two combined, and it was not clear what 
was the basis for the variation (worker interviews 3/2014-6/2014).  
Many workers did not feel that their wages were enough. 15 out of 20 responses who 
offered an answer on whether they felt they were paid enough stated that they did not. Of 
the five who answered their wages were enough, all had some land and grew rice for 
consumption. Of the 15 who replied that wages were not enough six had no land and grew 
no rice. Of those six without land, three explicitly noted that food costs had been a factor in 
increases in expenses (workers interviews 3/2014-6/2014). This could be interpreted as 
evidence for the argument that rice growing provided a subsidy for foreign-invested 
factories. 
Workers also reportedly took various steps to push for increased wages. At Factory 2 
workers were reported to have successfully pushed for an increase in wages of around 30 
percent. Factory 2 was one of the first factories to start operations in the zone and initially 
began paying 650,000 kip (USD 79) per month, barely above the national minimum wage of 
626,000 kip (USD 77) per month, according to the manager of Factory 1 (interview 
10/6/2014). According to Bpet, who had worked at the factory since it started, the wages 
were increased to 900,000 kip (USD 110) per month in December 2013. Bpet said that many 
workers asked together as a group (interview 5/2014). Xay, a 26 year old male at Factory 2, 
confirmed that workers had asked collectively for the increase (interview 5/2014). It is 
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noteworthy that this increase was given when other factories were beginning to open in the 
Savan-Seno SEZ and competition for a scarce labour force would have been increasing. It is 
possible that the ‘mobility power’ of workers at Factory 2 and the potential lure of higher 
wages elsewhere prompted a rapid wage increase. If this were the case the tight labour 
market would have provided the conditions for a successful collective push by the Factory 2 
workers. 
Another case of worker pressure for higher wages occurred at Factory 3. A manager 
described workers pressing for wages:
They talk to their supervisor, they say the pay rate is quite low, can the company 
increase and then suppose they talk to their manager and manager talks with HR, we 
consult with the director, he approves, so we do an increase. [Workers stopping work] 
has happened one time. They just stopped work for one or two hours and they came to 
see me and ask them [me?] to help...one by one. And then talk to them. They were 
asking for more salary (interview 27/2/2014)
When asked if the workers were successful in their action, the manager responded ‘yes’ but 
did not offer more details. Nou, a worker at Factory 3 seemed to confirm that this event had 
occurred but painted a different picture which highlighted the power differences between 
capital and labour and suggested a different outcome:
I asked for higher wages before…but they didn’t increase the wages…Many workers 
went to ask but they [the company] gave a warning. They thought it was some kind of 
strike (patuang nyang sak yang) so they warned us. So the workers didn’t dare (baw 
gaa) to [ask]….They warned us not to do like that again. They gave a warning. There’s 
a first warning and then for a second warning you’ll be fired. The workers didn’t dare 
to ask (interview 5/2014)
Whether a wage increase was actually effected by worker action in this case is perhaps less 
significant than what the action indicates about Lao workers’ potential. Zone workers 
indicated, first, a recognition of their collective interests and, second, a willingness to act in 
concert in pursuit of those interests. The first can be read as an indication of a developing 
class consciousness among Lao industrial workers, even at a nascent stage of industrial 
development, which can reasonably be expected to increase as industrial workforces grow 
and workers become more familiar with the conflicting interests at play in capitalist 
production. The case at Factory 2 adds weight to the thesis of the development of class 
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consciousness in new Lao factories. The second factor, the willingness to pursue interests 
collectively, indicates that some level of spontaneous worker organization, operating outside 
any formal trade union structures, occurred at the Savan-Seno SEZ. The LFTU was not 
present in the zone.21 An action which could be interpreted as a wildcat strike – and was 
possibly interpreted as such by management - took place even within the repressive political 
context of Laos.  Indeed, the Factory 3 was not without precedent in industry in Savannakhet, 
as according to an interview with the provincial LFTU a work stoppage had occurred at a 
service sector company in Savannakhet:
[there was a strike (patuang)] one time three years [ago?] the workers didn’t go 
anywhere. They just stayed in the factory and did not work. They stayed there and 
refused to work until we [LFTU] went there to mediate (gai gia kaojai gan)…We went 
down there and mediated so that the company didn’t fire the workers and work 
continued according to the framework of the labour law (het wiak dtaam gawp labiap 
gotmaai haeng ngaan dtaw) (provincial LFTU official interview 10/2/2014)
Labour unrest and collective action in pursuit of interests within foreign-owned factories is 
reportedly not confined to Savannakhet province (RFA 26/3/2015), indicating a wider 
pattern of class conflict as foreign investment increases.  
Wages in Savannakhet foreign-invested factories were significantly above the national 
minimum wage. Partly this may have been because the minimum wage was set 
unrealistically low compared to the cost of living, but it also stemmed from the tight labour 
market, the potential mobility of workers to leave factories, and in some cases workers 
applying collective pressure to demand more. Analyzing the actions of workers around 
wages brings out how these actions emerged as a constraint on the options and strategies 
open to capital (i.e. on determining wages unilaterally). Moreover, focusing on agency shows 
that labour markets are not naturally occurring, with the wage being determined by an 
abstract notion of what the market will bear, but rather that markets are constructed 
through a complex process of social action and strategies.  
8.4.4 Reasons for Leaving
Spatial strategies of mobility and fixity were intertwined when workers left employment. 
Labour market mobility in search of higher wages, not adapting to factory discipline, the 
fixity of family care responsibilities and returning to work in the fields emerged as important 
21 See Chapter 9.
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reasons for leaving factory employment (see above). There was also some suggestion that 
workers who encountered conflict with managers saw no recourse apart from leaving, as has 
been observed before in Lao factories (World Bank 2012). 
Nat stated that if she ever had a disagreement with a manager then she would simply leave 
rather than try to resolve it. In her experience every person who had had a problem with a 
manager had been fired, so she understood that if she had a problem she would be fired too, 
so therefore it would be better just to leave (interview 6/2014). Maeo suggested that her 
response to a conflict with managers would be similar. She stated that she would talk with 
managers and if the solution was not clear she ‘would just leave’ (mee dtae awk) and that 
everyone would do the same (interview 6/2014). While Som did not explicitly state 
unresolvable conflict would make her leave, she appeared to see no alternative to leaving 
given a bad environment. She complained that the managers were not kind and always 
angry. They did not explain about how to work but were just angry. She thus declared that 
she soon intended to leave work (interview 4/2014). Workers were sensitive to conditions 
within the factories and without systems of effective grievance resolution were wont to 
simply leave. This issue will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 9. 
Some factories were open for 24 hours and working the night shift was problematic for 
some workers, prompting them to leave. A manager from Factory 3 stated that ‘four or five’ 
people (the factory had only been open for several months) had already left from working 
the night shift. Adapting routines to the night shift may have been an issue for some but 
family concerns also played a role as the manager elaborated: ‘People have difficulties with 
their families. They may have problems with their families to work. When they travel at night 
it is not safe for them. And their family does not allow them to work and asks them to stop’ 
(interview 27/2/2014). 
Some workers also indicated that they may return to Thailand. Khone, a male working at 
Factory 8, had previously worked in Thailand and considered going back there, although was 
currently held back by family obligations (interview 4/2014). Daeng also suggested that she 
wished to return to Thailand at some point as she found village life boring and still had many 
friends in Thailand. She had returned because she was concerned by the protest and 
political turmoil in 2013-2014 near where she worked in Bangkok (interview 5/2014). This 
indicates that Lao workers may have still seen Thailand as an attractive option despite the 
new jobs available in Savannakhet. The existing territorial coherence of Lao labour’s 
215
integration into the regional scale was a challenge with which foreign factories would have 
to contend. 
Conclusion
Workers enacted their own spatial fixes to sustain and improve their lives. Their spatial 
practices operated through the dialectic of mobility and fixity. International migration, 
labour market mobility, and seasonal mobility between industry and agriculture were all 
important practices which were used to ensure survival and improvements of workers’ and 
their families´ lives. Practices which I have termed as fixity typically sought to reproduce 
places materially and socially by fixing something in place, whether that was the physical 
body of a worker, infrastructure such as housing, or material resources such as rice crops. 
These spatial practices were also interpenetrating – for example seasonal mobility allowing 
food security to be fixed as a rice crop – and contradictory – reproducing the next 
generation in place would limit international mobility. The territorialization project of 
foreign-invested manufacturing in the Savan-Seno SEZ and more broadly in Kaysone 
Phomvihane district seeks to capitalize on lower production costs in Laos and functional 
integration into the Thai economic space. The Savannakhet enclave was a differentiated 
territorial space which was seemingly not integrated into the broader national territory at 
the level of production network but was nevertheless tightly integrated at the level of 
production itself and dependent on the relations and conditions of production and social 
reproduction prevalent within Kaysone Phomvihane. Following workers´ agency in analyzing 
the zone highlights the simultaneously social, economic and spatial practices which on the 
one hand allowed the zone to function as a low-cost platform but on the other hand 
destabilized and constrained production. Clearer insights into the fine-grained 
developmental effects of the Savannakhet enclave are enabled than would be allowed by 
identifying its contribution to macroeconomic variables such as GDP or trade balances. 
There was a multi-tiered gendered construction of labour, as female migrants returned to 
villages to perform care responsibilities in households, and were then incorporated as local 
factory labour. Entry of female workers into enclave factories also entailed gendered 
reallocations of household labour to mothers and younger sisters. The rescaling of class 
relations to incorporate Lao workers into globalized manufacturing was thus enacted 
through processes operating at scales ranging from the international to the household. 
Capital appeared to appropriate and extract labour from a sphere far beyond the factory 
walls. 
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 Agrarian labour was also incorporated into the emerging territorial division of labour which 
linked the territory to global currents. The fact that factory wage labour formed only a part 
of a workers’ livelihood had several effects for foreign-invested companies. First, subsistence 
rice production appeared to provide a subsidy to foreign investors as it meant that the 
wages they paid did not have to bear the full cost of the social reproduction of the workers. 
If this is correct surplus value was extracted from workers not only at the point of the 
production but also from workers and family members in the rice fields. This may have 
allowed companies to escape pressures from workers to pay higher wages. Income was 
generated by jobs at the zone but the amount of labour needed to generate that income lay 
hidden within fields and households. The transformation of labour into value in this case 
would indicate a rate of exploitation that was quite high; a high amount of social labour with 
limited income and developmental benefits. Some income generation was evident, which 
was transforming local places to an extent, for example in the building of new houses. 
Industrial wage labour could also feed back into agriculture, for example by paying for inputs 
(e.g. fertilizer) and the hiring of harvest labour. Reproduction was reconfigured for the 
benefit of capital but apparently without large gains based on this particular territorial effect. 
Capital was able to appropriate the powers of space through this subsidy. However, that 
workers were able to wrench back a greater proportion of the surplus they produced also 
appeared to stem from their command of space. International mobility, seasonal mobility, 
labour market ´mobility power´, and related livelihood bases in the subsistence economy 
appeared to create the conditions enabling successful pushes for wage increases and better 
benefits. The intended and unintended effects of Savannakhet workers’ actions and 
practices put them in a position to make demands on employers and foreclosed certain 
options and strategies for capital and the Lao state, and presented others as suitable 
responses to the need to fix workers in place and control them. Spatial practices thus 
emerged as an important constitutive part of a local class composition, in this case which 
provided labour with the power to make some demands (Cleaver 1992). This suggests that 
even in the context of multinational production networks and a poor, developing country 
seeking to capitalize on cheap labour, the race to the bottom is not a one-way process of 
exploitation of the powerless. The case suggests that understanding how workers command 
and control productive and socially reproductive space in the target area for capital seeking 
weak, informal labour will be a determining factor in to what extent capital is able to 
construct that labour.
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Overall, workers’ agency and practices appeared to facilitate some capital accumulation but 
the difficulties that companies had in retaining these workers suggested that expansion of 
enclave factories would be limited and projected demand difficult to meet. The creation of a 
space of global accumulation was both enabled and undermined by workers’ mobility and 
fixity, with a pre-existing territorial division of labour being transformed by and transforming 
the territorial project. The differentiated, liberalized space of the Savannakhet enclave was 
made unstable and uncertain by the agency of labour, and in order to firmly establish 
foreign-invested capital’s spatial fix - and in doing so constitute the emerging GMS scale - 
capital and state had to respond, as will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 9: Workers’ Agency, Territorial Coherence, and the Social 
Construction of Labour 
Workers’ agency in Savannakhet, as manifested through spatial practices of fixity and 
mobility, actively shaped their incorporation into global manufacturing, and moreover 
contributed to forming a particular territorial and scalar configuration of Southeast Asian 
capitalism. This chapter seeks to demonstrate how workers’ agency was an integral part of 
the socio-spatial construction of a labour force for foreign-invested manufacturing, and so 
how workers’ agency is constitutive of contested race to the bottom processes. Workers’ 
agency constrained the range of options available to capital and state in forging a suitable 
workforce. Here the relevance of space, and the spatial reacting back on the social in the 
socio-spatial dialectic, is most clear. The existing territorial-labour configuration between 
Laos and Thailand acted as a barrier which capital and the Lao state had to overcome. The 
increasing foreign investment in manufacturing from 2009 had to re-assemble a 
configuration of territorial social reproduction based on migration to Thailand and 
subsistence agricultural production. The new socio-spatial construction of Lao labour now 
required workers to be fixed in place in Lao territory to be incorporated into the emerging 
GMS scale of capital accumulation. Struggle over workers’ fixity and mobility became a key 
object of capital and state strategy. Capital had to ‘fix’ their workers in employment for 
stable production. The state participated in this endeavour but also enacted strategies to 
reterritorialize Lao labour by attracting migrants back and blocking potential migration. 
Capital and the state enacted various strategies to construct labour, including hiring 
primarily young women as unskilled labour, recruiting skilled and managerial labour from 
Thailand, and sourcing labour largely from the rural hinterland of Kaysone Phomvihane 
district. Once in factory employment capital and state engaged in practices to informalize 
and discipline labour, but workers’ tendency to leave jobs easily meant that seemingly too 
coercive control tactics were risky. Labour control regimes were thus established which 
tended to paternalism. Workers’ tendency to absenteeism or flight from factory discipline 
generated capital strategies to offer workers benefits and incentives to reduce absences and 
turnover, and increase effort. Seasonal migration necessitated capital’s accommodation to 
the farming livelihoods of their workers. Accumulation was eventually able to proceed, 
seemingly ultimately facilitated by labour’s agency in their use of wage labour as part of 
wider livelihoods, but in a slow and attenuated way which posed challenges for capital and 
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allowed labour to capture some extra surplus value. Questions were thus raised over the 
longer-term stability of the zone.
This chapter focuses on the socio-spatial construction of Savannakhet labour as a contested 
process manifested through the confluence of labour, capital and the state’s agency. Three 
main sections will deal with the mobilization of labour for Savannakhet industry through: 
recruitment practices and the state’s efforts to reterritorialize Lao labour; the construction 
of labour as informal and disciplined within the factory walls; and capital’s strategies to 
respond to a mobile labour force able to command and use alternative spaces of social 
reproduction, strategies which included a range of wage increases, bonuses, and incentives. 
9.1 Mobilizing Labour: Recruitment Practices and Blocking Migration
9.1.1 The State and Migration
Lao workers’ international migration prompted the Lao state to control and manage 
migrants for the benefit of capital. The Lao state was concerned about the tight labour 
market for the new industries in Savannakhet and part of its planning for the construction of 
the labour force focused on the one hand on blocking migration and on the other hand 
encouraging migrants to return to Laos. The Department of Labour claimed to have reduced 
the number of people from Savannakhet province working in Thailand by around 10,000 and 
used a discourse of close family relations to persuade workers to stay in Savannakhet. The 
state thus sought to fix workers in place for foreign manufacturing by emphasizing the need 
for close family relations:
We try to educate and raise awareness (feuk op hom lae bpuuk jit samneuk) of the 
young women and men (saao num) because our town has opened to investment and 
has many more factories. We encourage (hai paa gan) them to seek various kinds of 
work in our town. They can stay near to their parents and they will have warm family 
relations (het hai khawp khua mee khwaam opun).  We have the village heads of each 
village report about the impacts (pon gatop) of going to work in Thailand. After we 
educated and disseminated (feuk op hom lae peuy pae) [migration] decreased. Before 
[in 2013] the number going to Thailand was about 46,000. Presently it is somewhat 
over 36,000 (Department of Labour official interview 9/1/2014)
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As noted in Chapter 8, the claim of a 10,000 reduction in a single year must be treated with 
caution, but equally for some workers interviewed in the preceding chapter, the importance 
of reproducing family relations and communities in local villages was an important 
motivation for returning. The Department of Labour interview also highlighted the 
importance of the existing government hierarchies which reach down to village level 
administration being adapted for the benefit of foreign capital. Foreign firms were able to 
access the local level governance network of village heads to dissuade people from 
migrating and promote factory work in Savannakhet. The economic territorialization process 
thus incorporated new relations between foreign capital and local state actors in search of 
the new territorial coherence that an immobilized labour force could provide. The 
transformation of the Lao state apparatus to mobilize labour into the capital relation can be 
interpreted as a historically significant development transforming the state into a social form 
of capital-labour relations (Clarke 1991b). The Special Economic Zone Authority highlighted 
how a wider set of state institutions were to be involved in forming capital-labour relations 
by making Lao labour and territory cohere: 
how to prevent labour migration and how to attract it back. Of course in the past 
because there was no job availability offered to them…because the SEZ was just newly 
established, that’s why maybe they still don’t have information about it. But to attract 
them back, yes we have got to include it [in] our planning. So what we are going to do 
is first discuss with stakeholders, educational institutions, the government 
administrative bodies to disseminate this information that [job] availability is already 
here with working environment with incentives (SEZA official interview 20/12/2013)
The Lao state attempted to not only work internally within Laos to restrict the mobility of 
migrants but also pursued the repatriation of labour through its embassies. The 
management of Lao citizens’ mobility for the purposes of industrial development in Laos was 
again couched in a discourse of community bonds (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011), a 
gemeinschaft which all Lao naturally wanted to return to:
we’re going to work with the Lao embassies overseas, because people are going to 
work overseas, they need travel passports, travel documentation. So we also provide 
information to them. ‘So in Laos we also have got business job offers, so why not you 
here?’ So you can have, do some kind of comparison that the cost and benefits over 
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here also have a salary like this, you work with these benefits. Of course I believe that 
if information is already provided to them, if they are, the benefits, the salaries 
comparison is not a very big difference, I don’t think any Lao people are willing to work 
outside the country far away from their home town. Yes, I really do believe that once 
we already set up this kind of mechanism, so we work together with the stakeholders, 
we can help them to come back home…[There is] human trafficking, you know many 
crimes, many accidents happen, and you know they have…big problems. Like illegal 
migration, like working unpaid. But working in the home town, very safe…why not? 
(SEZA official interview 20/12/2013)
Lao labour’s spatial organization became the object of state transformation. Workers’ 
command of space provoked state efforts to decompose labour’s mobility power by fixing 
them as sedentary and re-bound to local community relations. The actions of the Lao state 
here illustrate not only that the state ‘internalizes in its historic development the 
preservation of the substance of value (living labour)’ (Bonefeld 1992: 119) but also that this 
‘preservation’ has an inherent spatial element. The class struggle which generates a state’s 
particular institutional forms and various functions is conducted spatially leading to a 
concomitant spatial rendering of those forms and functions. This includes the ideological 
refraction of concrete forms of social life, namely the state management of workers’ 
mobility through the discourse of ‘warm family relations’ in the ‘home town’ (Clarke 1991a; 
Roberts 2002). The Lao state’s important role in containing and mediating the process of the 
class struggle was also evident in its role in companies’ recruitment practices and its social 
construction of labour as informal within Savannakhet factories, as discussed below (Clarke 
1991b; Chang 2009).
9.1.2 Recruitment Practices
Recruitment practices of firms were a key part of the social construction of Savannakhet 
manufacturing labour. Gender, ethnicity and geographic location were the main lines along 
which factories assembled their workforces. Companies’ recruitment was conducted 
through many methods including advertising through billboards, posters and radio, going 
directly to villages with the aid of government officials, and especially through the social 
networks of workers themselves.1 
1 See Chapter 8 for social network recruitment. 
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The tight labour market generated by out-migration to Thailand and seasonal returns to 
agriculture presented problems for capital in incorporating factory labour. Factory 1 had 
surveyed the labour situation in the 2000s before moving to Savannakhet, and they had 
information that Savannakhet had plenty of labour, and a lot of people were looking for 
employment. ´That´s why we chose that [to move to Savannakhet]…but it´s not true! 
[laughs]´ (Factory 1 manager interview 10/6/2014). A Factory 8 manager noted the irony 
that although Savannakhet was the most populous province ‘no one’ lives in Savannakhet 
and ‘most’ people go to Thailand to work (interview 24/3/2014). Workers’ agency was also 
evident in that their social networks were reported by managers as the most effective 
means of gathering labour. This section focuses on capital and state recruitment strategies 
beyond that of relying on labour itself, but which were also affected by workers’ everyday 
practices. The tight local labour market prompted companies to reach far into rural areas to 
mop up labour surpluses.
The construction of labour for light export manufacturing followed a typically gendered 
pattern in Laos. The findings thus fit with the perhaps almost universal idea within the 
literature on female labour in manufacturing of it being constructed as diligent and good at 
detailed work (Elson and Pearson 1981; Theobald 2002; Caraway 2005; Dominguez et al 
2010). 
Table 4: Number of Workers by Gender at Selected Enclave Factories in 2014
Company Total Number Female Male
Visetec 81 55 26
Tokyo Camera* 500 485 15
BPM 363 293 70
Savan Toys 130 111 19
Total 1074 944 130
Sources: Manager interviews (1/2014-6/2014); company brochures; personal 
communication (5/2014)
*Approximate numbers
A manager from BCS, a local recruitment agency estimated that ’99 percent’ of the workers 
they recruited were female, a recruitment practice which was at the specific request of their 
client factories. Managers contended that Lao women were more hard-working than men 
and better at detailed work (BCS manager interview 24/5/2014). The site developer 
manager put it bluntly: ‘Generally Laotians are hard-working. Especially females. Males are 
more lazy’ (Lao Samudra manager interview 13/1/2014). Factory managers also claimed that 
Lao women were ‘stronger’ which made them better suited for working in factories: ‘Lao 
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women…they’re stronger than men’ (Factory 2 manager interview 10/1/2014). The strength 
in question was specifically the concerted application to tasks that female workers displayed: 
‘They have [a lot of] concentration, they are stronger, stronger for trying to work’ (Factory 4 
manager interview 16/5/2014). Managers deemed women workers to be better at the fine, 
detailed work of component manufacturing and quality control: ‘This kind of job men cannot 
do, it requires patience and coordinated with the hands, it’s like sewing’ (Factory 1 Manager 
interview 10/6/2014). One manager framed the employment of women in a paternalistic 
way, claiming that the factory was ‘supporting’ women by using their fine-grained skills:
We would like to support women and in our work women can work more effectively. 
[They work in] quality control, because women…look at details…I don’t mean that men 
are not good but this work women can do, [it is] the role or duty women can do so we 
support women workers (Factory 3 manager interview 27/2/2014)
One manager suggested that the factory made specific efforts to enable the migration of 
female workers from other districts through the provision of dormitory accommodation due 
to their importance for production: ‘we have dormitories for only females, but males we 
don’t support them. And our production needs females. We have…more skills. [They are] 
better at quality and detail’ (Factory 4 manager 16/5/2014)
Another familiar trope, female docility, was also present in managerial discourse. Males 
were construed by the site developer manager (Lao Samudra interview 13/1/2014) as lazy 
and undisciplined because he believed Lao women were the main financial controllers of the 
household, and thus more hardworking and compliant than the men: ‘I can say here [the 
Savan-Seno SEZ] 70 or 80 percent are female…even my workers are 90 percent 
female…males because of the culture…males have a very easy life’. Cultural explanations of 
Lao women’s compliance were reiterated by a Factory 1 manager: ‘I think [it is easier to 
manage women] because culture wise…Lao women…they’re not forceful’ (interview 
10/6/2014). The latter quote especially illustrates how the Lao case resonated with the 
feminization of light manufacturing workforces in other contexts as supposedly easier to 
control (Theobald 2002). The issue of labour control will be returned to below. Other aspects 
of workers such as age are relevant to the issue. 
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Workers were generally young. Interviews and observations of factories and their environs 
suggested a clear managerial preference for hiring young women. A manager from BCS, the 
local recruitment agency, reported they recruited workers primarily between the ages of 15 
and 30 years for local factories (BCS manager interview 24/5/2014). Oy, a Factory 4 
employee, confirmed that most new employees in her factory were female teenagers 
(interview 5/2014). Older women it appeared were only employed by the factories as 
cleaners (Factory 7 worker interview 3/2014; fieldnotes). Workers often reported being 
supervised by older supervisors (both male and female), aged over 30 years old. Lao culture 
tends to encourage respect and deference to elders and this may have additionally 
reinforced the labour control possibilities created by the construction of young, female 
workforces. 
Figure 10: Recruitment Difficulties – Recruitment Sign, Savannakhet Factory.2 
Seemingly, one effect of the gendered construction of the Savannakhet enclave workforce 
was that factories were chasing a segment of the labour market more given to migrate to 
Thailand. A higher proportion of international migrants in 2013 were women (53 percent).3 
It was thus especially pressing for foreign capital in Savannakhet to break down the barrier 
of the previous gendered socio-spatial construction of labour in order to construct their own 
female workforce. The return of female migrants to work in Savannakhet appeared to be 
happening to a certain extent, as women workers swapped migration for staying in their 
villages. 
2 Source: Author’s photo. The text reads ‘Hiring sewing staff. High salary’.
3 See Chapter 8.
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Rural villages were key sites of recruitment for assembly operators. Factory managers 
reported that the majority of their workers were recruited from rural areas, mainly in 
Kaysone Phomvihane district but also from farther afield. Kaysone Phomvihane district 
appeared to have a territorial division of labour with distinct urban/rural segmentation with 
workers from urban areas more likely to work in offices, shops or restaurants in the city and 
labour surpluses from the rural areas more likely to migrate to Thailand, work in agriculture 
or work in local factories. The development of enterprises in the town appeared to increase 
factories’ reliance on rural labour, as one manager of a more longstanding factory noted the 
changing geographical origin of workers in 2010: 
Previously there were lots of [workers] from Savannakhet city and those [workers] we 
lost because in Savannakhet they opened quite a lot of shops, small restaurants, or 
they just sell outside or in the market. They can get the same or even more income and 
we are thinking now of a strategy to go even further and recruit people from the 
villages that don't have any exit to the main road and places where they can get 
money…that's why we went to Ban Huay which is about 20 km in the direction of 
Pakse from Savannakhet (Factory 5 manager interview 18/3/2014)
The need to access a more spatially extensive labour market was an important theme 
emerging from interviews, and is returned to below. The above quote however illustrates 
that factories were ill-equipped to compete for urban labour. A Factory 4 manager stated 
that more labour came from rural villages ‘because in the towns they have many companies’ 
(interview 16/5/2014) while a Factory 2 manager (interview 10/1/2014) claimed that people 
from the town did not want to do manual labour but instead wanted to work as ‘officers’, 
accountants and secretaries. Moreover, the state emerged as a desired employer due to the 
relatively high wages it paid and the security it could offer (cf. High 2014). It is likely that this 
factor was especially pertinent in the urban area of Savannakhet due to it being the main 
administrative and educational centre of the province and Laos’ upper south. A manager 
from Factory 1 explained how the state was a competitor for labour: 
We have had many meetings with the government and the government says that they 
need people to go and work in the factories but meanwhile the government has set up 
very high pay. For example, janitorial work for the government pays 900,000 [kip per 
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month] so people want to work in those jobs. We start off lower and then add to it in 
order to get closer to the government pay (interview 10/6/2014)
A Factory 2 manager also raised this issue, claiming that people want to work for the 
government because there are many types of welfare available (interview 10/1/2014). State 
employees are entitled to all categories of benefits under the 2013 Social Security Law (GoL 
2013c: Article 10). If it is indeed true that the government was a competitor for Savannakhet 
labour then the government appeared to be in contradiction with its own efforts to mobilize 
labour for private capital. One conjecture for this contradiction concerns the extent of state 
transformation in rapid economic development. The Lao state is becoming more complex 
with more government bodies and institutions founded as it develops the governance 
infrastructure to deal with its capitalist transformation. This entails increases in the number 
of government employees (Vientiane Times 6/1/2014). This would mean the very process of 
state transformation in relation to capitalist development was undermining that 
development in one respect. 
Due to problems with recruiting sufficient labour in Kaysone Phomvihane district, companies 
were looking further afield. A Factory 3 manager stated that assembly operators came from 
villages in Savannakhet but that some came from 40 km away in ‘Seno’ (Outhoumphone) 
district (interview 27/2/2014). This may have represented a significant commute for some 
workers in the Lao context of very few public transport links – necessitating motorcycle use - 
and poor road infrastructure in places. At another factory the extent of the labour market 
was extended even farther: ‘We had to go out all the way to Sepon and Meuang Phin [in the 
east of Savannakhet province], even go to another province, Khammouan and Salavan’ 
(Factory 1 manager interview 10/6/2014). 
A manager from BCS, the local labour recruitment company, expanded on the problematic 
issue of recruiting in other areas of the province and other provinces. The agency travelled 
to villages in the least developed areas of the province in order to recruit workers. The 
agency would go for a single day to a village but found that this was not enough time to 
persuade villagers to come. Villagers from these areas tended to be suspicious and 
suspected that the agency was trying to deceive them (BCS manager interview 23/5/2014). 
The manager’s colleague confirmed this and suggested that villagers had been deceived by 
migration brokers before and so were wary (BCS manager interview 24/5/2014). Some 
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parents were protective of their children and didn’t want them to go to Kaysone 
Phomvihane to work – a difficulty that may have been exacerbated if families were more 
protective of female children. Recruitment in the least developed areas took place in ethnic 
minority villages where the basic issue of communication became a problem: ‘The language. 
There are many ethnic minorities (son phao), Lao theung, Lao sung, Lao loum,4 it is hard to 
talk with them, the language, communication, there are problems with comprehension’. The 
company recruited workers for several study factories including Factory 1, Factory 4, and 
Factory 7. The manager estimated that 30-40 percent of the total number of workers they 
recruited for these factories were ethnic minorities from the distant hinterland and who 
stayed in the dormitories, although the manager did not provide a total number of workers 
recruited monthly or annually. This segment of the workforce the manager reported was 
especially hard to fix in place with an estimated monthly turnover of 50 percent for ethnic 
minorities from the less developed districts. A key reason for this high rate was that ethnic 
minority workers were ‘homesick’ and returned to their villages. When asked about the 
effects of this on the production process, the recruitment manager responded that it was 
difficult to replace workers quickly with the result that in production ‘development is slow, 
not continuous’ (BCS manager interview 24/5/2014). Ironically, the Lao government 
discourse of the attractiveness of migrants working in the home town for ‘warm family 
relations’ had quite a different meaning for another set of workers, internal migrants, and 
these workers’ fixity in their communities appeared to limit capital’s ability to fix them in 
production. 
State agencies played an important role in the mobilization of rural labour. The state’s 
mediation operated through the internationalized administrative entity of SEZA and the 
established village level governance structures. SEZA facilitated companies to go to villages 
to promote themselves and announce vacancies. The site developer highlighted SEZA’s role: 
We go to SEZA as the governmental agency, it’s easier to go to the village. If I go with 
the private company there’s no way we can reach so we have to go using SEZA. SEZA is 
in direct touch with the government so they have…the power to (unclear) the head of 
the village working on this (Lao Samudra manager interview 13/1/2014)
4 This is the tripartite classification of ethnicity promoted by the LPRP in the early years after the 
revolution to promote all ethnic groups in Laos as ‘Lao’. Lao loum (‘lowland Lao’), Lao theung 
(‘mountain slope Lao’), and Lao sung (‘mountain-top Lao’) refer to the elevations that different ethnic 
groups live at and roughly correspond to respectively Tai-Lao, Mon-Khmer, and Hmong-Mien ethnic 
groups. 
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A Factory 2 manager confirmed that SEZA had assisted them to go to villages to speak to 
locals and noted that this strategy had some success: ‘After that we also had more people 
come’ (interview 10/1/2014). The site developer manager was perhaps mistaken with the 
claim that it was necessary for SEZA to go with companies to the village as a non-zone 
factory manager reported going to villagers without the intercession of SEZA (Factory 5 
manager interview 18/3/2014) and a Factory 3 manager, a zone factory, also stated that the 
company was presenting itself in villages without SEZA (interview 27/2/2014). Not all 
companies wanted to use the service that SEZA provided as there was a charge for SEZA’s 
aid, the Factory 3 manager asserting that the company would prefer to try recruiting by 
themselves. However if Factory 3 went to the village with SEZA then they would be able to 
hire workers immediately, and bring them straight from the village (interview 27/2/2014). 
Factory 3 preferred instead to present the company and motivate people to apply at a later 
time and so declared they would only use SEZA when necessary (ibid.). The point remains 
however that SEZA was actively engaged into turning local villagers into wage labour for 
foreign capital, and moreover could facilitate more rapid hiring of labour.  
Village heads also emerged as crucial local level intermediaries helping to funnel villagers 
into global production. The site developer elaborated on how local scales of governance 
assisted monitoring of the labour market and access to potential workers: 
[In] Laos we have a very good concept to monitor people. Because they have the 
family book ok? Every family has a family book. The family book is controlled by the 
head of the village. So the head of village can provide it to the head of the district, so 
we assess. How we assess, we go to the head of the district and the head of the district 
goes to the head of the village. The head of the village, they can know everyone in the 
village…they still implement the family book, so they can control the people….today 
our concept is to go to the village, directly to the worker (Lao Samudra manager 
interview 13/1/2014)
A BCS manager confirmed that in their recruitment efforts working with the village heads 
and village governing committees was useful. Making announcements through village 
officials brought some success in mobilizing labour to come to Savannakhet factories 
(interview 24/5/2014). 
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It should be emphasized however that the cooperation between the Lao state and foreign 
capital was not always smooth. In addition for competition over labour outlined above, 
foreign investors had been dissatisfied with government agencies in providing adequate 
labour supplies. One factory manager was of the opinion that the government had planned 
to create an SEZ but had not given sufficient attention to how the country’s educational 
system could support it. The government’s priority was to attract investment, leading to 
many companies in the zone but a lack of workers, especially with adequate skills for 
industry. The manager recalled attending a meeting between state officials and foreign 
investors in another town, where investors were complaining to the government and asking 
them to resolve the labour question (Factory 8 manager interview 24/3/2014). Other firm 
managers reported lack of follow up by the government, weak communication even within 
government departments, and an ineffective response when attempting to recruit via the 
Department of Labour (Lao Samudra manager interview 13/1/2014; Factory 5 manager 
interview 18/3/2014). However, the state appeared to be taking its responsibility to capital 
seriously. Government officials were aware of the need to gear vocational and university 
education towards providing forms of labour power suitable for use by foreign industrial 
capital (SEZA official interview 20/12/2013). Reportedly study tours from the National 
University of Laos in Vientiane had been arranged to promote the zone as a desirable 
employment destination and presumably inculcate a spirit of industry among Lao youth (Lao 
Samudra interview 13/1/2014). State transformation is of course a contested and uneven 
process but the direction of travel in favour of international capital was clear.
International migration was also targeted as a key method to compose economic coherence, 
in addition to the spatial extension of the labour market within Laos. Far from Laos being 
merely a source of cheap migrant labour, the possibility was raised of increased labour 
inflows (cf. Tan 2012; Hanh 2014). A Factory 8 manager voiced frustrations at recruiting 
enough workers from within Laos and suggested that it was possible that they would recruit 
from Cambodia and Vietnam in the future, noting that a factory associated to their company 
in Vientiane had already recruited from Cambodia (interview 24/3/2014). One manager 
suggested that integration into the AEC may allow the factory to cast the net for labour 
internationally: 
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of course we will employ foreigners, especially in those positions where we need the 
skills... for accounting for example I'm sure most of the companies here will employ 
Philippine staff, and even in the [assembly] line we were discussing building the 
dormitories and employing foreigners, like Vietnamese, or Indonesians or Cambodians 
in the future. So we see [the AEC] as an opportunity to grow, we are happy…we will be 
able to have foreigners inside Laos, we are very sorry for the local people because we 
will have a bigger choice and we will select. And only the best one will really stay and 
have a good job (Factory 5 manager interview, 18/3/2014)
The possibility that this company would opt for foreign labour to the detriment of Lao labour 
raises questions about the border enclave’s main intended developmental benefit, that of 
providing local people with jobs. In-migration would provide a possible means to decompose 
the local spatialized class composition. This quote also raises another key aspect of 
Savannakhet enclave labour. Staff with managerial skills and experience tended to be 
foreign nationals. The highest management positions appeared to be occupied by nationals 
of the home countries – European and Japan - of the transnational corporations. 
Intermediate management staff tended to be Thai. Workers from four factories reported 
Thai supervisors (worker interviews 4/2014 and 5/2014).5 On the one hand this reflected a 
perceived lack of managerial skills in Laos as the site developer manager explained: 
the white collar [workers] are very few in Laos. Now the white collar supply, supply is 
short…So I have an idea for recruitment of the white collar. I try to get from Thailand, 
like Mukdahan province, Ubon [Ratchathani] or…Nakhon Phanom….these people like 
from Mukdahan [if] they work here they can get a good salary. About 1000 US or 1500 
[USD], it’s better than to work [in] Bangkok (Lao Samudra interview 13/1/2014)
On the other hand the import of Thai staff was an expression of Savannakhet factories as an 
extension of Thailand-based transnational production networks. The manager interviewed 
from Factory 2 was a Thai national who had worked for the company in Thailand for several 
years, before transferring to Laos (Factory 2 manager 10/1/2014). Factory 1 also had Thai 
managers transferred from their Thai facilities because of a lack of managerial skills among 
Lao staff, although employing Thai staff involved problems related to the social cost of their 
labour as a manager explained: 
5 Factories 1, 2, 4, and 7
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Right now we promote a lot of Lao staff to the manager level….because hiring Thai 
staff is really expensive [laughs] because they come from our mother company and so 
they take the salary and when they come here we have to pay them the cost of living 
and provide them with housing (Factory 1 interview 10/6/2014)
In sum, workers’ international and seasonal mobility constrained the ability of capital to 
recruit labour easily, provoking capital strategies to access a spatially more extensive labour 
market and facilitate internal migration through the construction of dormitories. 
International migration of managerial staff was also encouraged but also came at a cost. 
Capital recruited with the intercession of the state in the form of SEZA and village heads. The 
limited effectiveness of these strategies entailed reliance on recruiting through workers’ 
relational networks. Companies’ preferences for young women may have been hindered by 
chasing a segment of the labour market more likely to be internationally mobile and 
reinforced the state’s need to prevent migration and attract back existing women migrants. 
Sourcing of labour in rural areas was necessary for capital but also posed problems, as will 
be shown below. The mobilization of labour into factories was but the first step in workers 
incorporation into foreign-invested manufacturing, and capital and the state had to adapt 
their strategies of training, discipline and control to form stable labour forces. 
9.2 The Construction of Savannakhet Factory Labour Regimes: Informality, 
Paternalism, and Labour Process 
9.2.1 Informality 
Savannakhet enclave workers lacked access to basic labour rights such as the right to 
industrial action, effective grievance resolution procedures, and collective wage bargaining. 
Capital and state colluded to construct workers as ‘in-fact’ informal despite working in high 
profile transnational, ‘formal’ enterprises. It appeared that it was not common practice to 
give written contracts to many workers, workers had limited knowledge of the labour law, 
the LFTU was not present in factories, and there was limited evidence of in-company 
mechanisms where workers could have grievances effectively addressed. 
Representatives of state and enclave capital suggested that labour contracts were used. 
Speaking in the context of worker involvement in training a SEZA official stated: 
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People already signed the contract to join the companies….that means at least 90 
percent are willing to work in the companies and of course we also mention in the 
labour contract, once after the training programme is over…you have to work for the 
company how many years, one year or two years, it depends on the contract signed 
(interview 20/12/2013)
The official thus suggested that labour contracts stipulated not only length of service but 
also training provisions. The site developer manager also suggested that contracts were used 
which stipulated tasks and duties: ‘We had to tell them exactly what to do and state very 
clearly. If they don’t have step five in the contract then they will never do it. [They follow the 
regulations well] they are quite honest to the contract’. Most workers however reported that 
they did not have contracts and contracts were only provided to certain staff who were 
being trained in specific skills. Kit, a Factory 6 worker, stated: ‘I didn’t get a contract, they are 
only for the group who go to train in Vietnam (baw dai het mee dtae phuak pai feuk op hom 
yoo Viet Nam)’ (interview 3/2014). Maeo confirmed this saying that only workers who go to 
train in Thailand or Vietnam would be awarded with a one year contract. Maeo expanded by 
saying only higher skilled staff were given contracts and not normal assembly operators like 
her (interview 6/2014). Workers generally described their recruitment procedure as 
straightforward, with a cursory interview, asking for example if they would be comfortable 
to work certain shifts, as well as needing to provide documents such as the family book 
(bpeum sammano khua) and a letter proving residence in their village (worker interviews 
3/2014-6/2014). Employment contracts in Lao law may be either written or verbal but if at 
least one of the parties is a ‘legal entity or organization’ then the contract must be written 
(GoL 2013a: Article 77). From the workers’ testimony it would appear that companies were 
not applying the law and so workers may have been unaware of their legal rights and 
entitlements. Workers’ status as lacking knowledge of labour rights was supported by their 
responses when asked if they had received any training on labour law or health and safety 
issues. Workers generally answered that they had received no or little training on these 
aspects and knew little about the labour law (worker interviews 3/2014-6/2014). For the 
majority of workers it thus seemed that companies were excluding workers from knowledge 
which would make them more secure. 
The state also colluded in the informalization of Lao workers. In Chapter 6 I outlined the 
labour legislation which placed strict constraints on industrial action. There was also 
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evidence that some investors saw the authoritarian nature of the Lao government as a boon 
to maintenance of labour control, as one manager explained: 
We comply with the [labour] law and regulations. It’s [industrial conflict] not a very 
[big] issue…because here they don’t have the politicians involved, we just have a single 
party in the country, so already we reduce third parties becoming involved. Like in the 
last two weeks, Cambodia,6 because of an opposition party, they come and support 
the workers…it became a big issue. But Laos, I think no, because we have a single party 
so no problem (Lao Samudra manager interview 1/2014)
Both managers and workers responded that there was no LFTU presence in zone factories 
and only limited presence in a non-zone enclave factory. Managers from two zone factories 
said that they were considering it but had no plan as such (Factory 2 interview 10/1/2014; 
Factory 3 interview 27/2/2014). A Factory 1 manager reported that the LFTU had attempted 
to come to the factory and the company was open to the union coming in. However the 
manager claimed ‘but so far none of my employees want to join. They say ‘what would I 
gain’’ (interview 10/6/2014). A Factory 1 worker, Jit, confirmed that the LFTU had entered 
the factory to give training about the labour law, but Jit perhaps contradicted the manager 
on having nothing to gain when he reported that he had missed the labour training because 
the LFTU had gone to another department, and he would have liked to participate so that he 
could learn about the labour law and moreover educate his colleagues about it (interview 
5/2014). Workers generally knew little about the LFTU or even what a trade union was or did. 
Fah, for example, asked what a trade union was when she was asked if there was the LFTU in 
her factory (interview 6/2014). 
Savan-Seno SEZ legislation does make provisions for the management of industrial relations. 
Article 56 of the Savan-Seno SEZ Decree 177 (GoL 2003b) states that the zone should have a 
committee to promote ‘harmonious working relations’ and is to be comprised of 
representatives from the Ministry of Labour or SEZA, two labour force representatives and 
three business representatives. When asked about this a SEZA official’s reply was instructive 
about the zone’s priorities, and illustrated what could be termed an ambivalent attitude to 
the question of the LFTU:
6 The interviewee was referring to the Cambodian garment workers’ strike and protests in December 
2013-January 2014. See AMRC 2014. 
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We have not yet established this committee because this committee still you know still 
provided, the services that investors require but for the next stage when we have 
certain numbers of employees working inside the zone of course we’re going to think 
about labour unions, we’re going to think about the social welfare and social security 
and medical centre...Then at the time, ok we might think about establishing by 
including representatives from the public sector (interview 20/12/2013)
The first priority for SEZA was to cater to the needs of the foreign investors before 
guaranteeing decent and secure employment for local workers. One of the purported aims 
of the SEZ project was to provide jobs for local people, but this was to be done on foreign 
capital’s terms. Given that the Savan-Seno SEZ was a flagship project for attracting 
investment from prominent global firms and a ‘stable political environment’ was touted as a 
reason to invest in Laos it was perhaps inevitable that the labour for these firms would be 
‘in-fact’ informal despite limited provisions for protection in the labour law. When pressed 
on the issue of trade unions in the zone, a SEZA official presented the government as a 
neutral mediator of capital-labour relations and protector of labour while simultaneously 
denying the right of labour to challenge the power relation with capital:
according to the labour law, a trade union is to be established under [the] 
enterprise…on behalf of their benefits, for their interests, and of course I believe that 
we don’t encourage to have strong labour unions otherwise they are going to go on 
strike or something like this, because we want to protect not just labour itself but…the 
company also…we are the neutral. But of course they have the right to establish the 
trade union legally (interview 20/12/2013)
The site developer was rather less equivocal about the possibility of labour organizing and 
industrial action in the zone and suggested that some attempts at spontaneous worker 
organization were rapidly clamped down on:
we have to control, if someone tries to become a leader, otherwise [we] have to kick 
first, kick out first. Because they will bring people to strike…We had one person who 
tried to become a leader to the group so they were the one we had to kick out first 
(Lao Samudra manager interview 13/1/2014)
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When pressed the manager was not forthcoming on which factory or factories ‘leaders’ had 
emerged in but reiterated that they got rid of ‘him’ and asserted that there were not many 
of such ‘leaders’. Managers suggested that it was easy to fire workers. Managers asserted 
that they followed the labour law in labour procedures, including dismissing workers. This 
however begs the question of how closely the law was adhered to when workers appeared 
to lack written contracts and knowledge of the rights under the labour law. The very lack of 
written contracts was in contravention of the labour law. It appears workers were fired 
easily if they experienced problems with management or suggested they would just leave 
the factory as they believed they would have no effective remedy in this system of 
‘harmonious working relations’.7 It thus seemed that even within the terms of restrictive 
labour legislation, improvements to treatment of workers could be made by fully adhering 
to the law. 
Companies and the state constructed Lao factory labour as informal, lacking knowledge of 
and access to labour rights and the ability to remedy grievances even through the 
attenuated corporatist union form of the LFTU. It appeared then that foreign capital’s 
relocation to Savannakhet was undertaken in part to take advantage of a labour force easily 
constituted as unprotected and precarious. The informalization of workers and the level of 
control it could afford over workers might have suggested a labour control regime based on 
strict discipline and coercion, but elements of workers’ agency – particularly their mobility 
power in the local labour market context - seemed to promote more consensual and 
paternalistic relations between capital and labour. 
9.2.2 Paternalist Management
Managers and worker interviews indicated that overly strict and coercive labour control 
methods would be counter-productive in the Savannakhet context and prompt workers to 
leave. This would have exacerbated the factories’ existing problems with recruitment, and so 
more paternalistic methods appeared to be present, with some managers emphasizing a 
discourse of family relations in the workplace, as well as invoking Lao culture as something 
which capital needed to adapt to. Notably, it was factories which had been operating for 
several years in Savannakhet which described their need for paternalistic industrial relations 
most clearly. This indicated that more established factories had already adapted to the 
7 See Chapter 8.
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realities of a mobile workforce from rural backgrounds which was unused to factory 
discipline. 
The site developer manager, a foreign national from an Asian country, insisted that 
companies had to adapt to the necessity of maintaining ‘face’ – social standing and dignity in 
front of others – when incorporating workers into factories and also soften the management 
style to suit Lao expectations about social relations:
The culture of Laos…the Laotian ego...is very high. In public you cannot scold them, 
they have to …save their face….motivation costs…you have to let the workers feel they 
are one of the family of the company. You have to absorb this kind of culture. You 
cannot use ‘I am boss, you are my staff’…it cannot work in Laos. Laos has the different 
culture. They work something like the family, like a family concept. You work for this 
company, then this company can get more income and you can get more rewards (Lao 
Samudra manager interview 13/1/2014)
The site developer’s opinion was supported by the account of a Factory 5 manager, a 
European national with several years’ experience in Savannakhet. The manager described 
how strict attempts to discipline workers had resulted in them simply leaving in response, 
prompting a change in tactics to retain workers and also convince those who had left to 
return: 
You cannot confront Lao people directly, you have to find a way of nicely talking to 
them. Maybe also sometimes [it's] my mistake. As a foreigner I am too direct. I will 
say...you don't give me enough. That's normal if my boss is calling me...I don't take it 
as personal...they take it personally…By giving support to them and by making them 
understand that we care, we can have a much better relationship [and get workers to 
return], even improve the discipline and the attendance and everything (interview 
18/3/2014)
Foreign managers highlighting ‘Lao culture’ for workers’ behaviour perhaps raises the 
possibility that they were presenting an essentialized view of Lao culture – the importance 
of ‘saving face’ over other considerations -  and blaming Lao workers’ culture itself for a 
rational response to harsh treatment in precarious, informal employment. Nevertheless, 
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company concerns over workers leaving appeared to make managers treat workers with 
more care. Lao managers also used a discourse of familial relations and adaption to Lao 
culture. The Lao manager of Factory 8 emphasized the significance of the company’s 
workforce slogan: ‘We Work Like a Family’. This manager went on to explain that if the 
worker has a sister then the company will welcome them to work in the factory and look 
after them (interview 24/3/2014). A Factory 2 manager when asked about principles of 
factory management answered that it was the company’s principle to make the workers 
‘strong’ and happy to work at the factory. The management wanted them to be happy with 
‘everything’ and not just the wages (interview 10/1/2014). The importance of both building 
consensual relations with workers and also adapting to a Lao way of doing things were 
emphasized by a Factory 1 manager: 
We are always looking for ways to…make employees more comfortable. For example 
we provide them with a cafeteria. During the break time they just buy the food 
there….Make it easy living, not make it too complicated. Even in the dormitories we 
have somebody to look after them at night. If somebody is sick we take them to 
hospital (interview 10/6/2014)
When asked if workers responded the best to a friendly or a strict management style, the 
manager invoked Lao culture as an important element in labour control strategies:
Yes [friendly]…we do not call it aggressive. We understand Lao culture. That’s the 
thing about the system here. Because the system we brought here has been practiced 
in Thailand for many years. We use the same policy that in Thailand has been a 
success. For example we’re not too aggressive about it. We’re passionate 
[compassionate?] that way…We do the water festival,8 we invite monks here and 
every Buddhist ceremony we have invited monks here to give alms [to them]. The 
whole employees help us…they feel relaxed [laughs]….Over here we even go to each 
village that has employees here, every year we go to make an offering at the temple. 
We also support the local school by donating a certain uniform or footballs or anything 
like that (Factory 1 manager interview 10/6/2014)
8 Here the manager is likely referring to the Lao new year festivities (pi mai lao or songkan) which are 
celebrated with Buddhist water sprinkling ceremonies and more pervasively with large-scale water 
fights/throwing in the streets.
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Of note here is the apparent rescaling of an existing management style from Thailand and 
more evidence for the cultural mediation of the labour relations. The reported extension of 
specific management practices points to the relocation of capital as the relocation and 
expansion of social relations of power between capital and labour, and thus that scale is 
used as a form of class struggle (Gough 2004). The reproduction of one Thai-based capital 
was achieved through the rescaling of existing elements of a consent-based labour control 
strategy to incorporate lower-cost Lao labour. Labour’s agency however, as shown below, 
also drove other elements of this company’s labour control strategies, especially with regard 
to incentives to retain workers. The manager may also have been suggesting that cultural 
similarities between Thailand and Laos enabled the rescaling of the paternalist labour 
control regime although this was not clear. What was evident however was that the 
company appeared to make attempts to incorporate labour via the mediation of workers’ 
existing religious practices and generate prestige for itself by beneficence within workers’ 
communities. The religious merit and cultural prestige that the company’s donations to local 
temples would have brought to workers’ villages may have acted as an indirect form of 
control which encouraged workers to continue their association with the company. 
Workers themselves reported various experiences of management styles with evidence for 
some coercion, such as complaints of angry managers,9 but also paternalistic relations of 
consent. European, Japanese, Thai, Lao, and at one factory Chinese managers were 
employed at Savannakhet enclave factories, and workers reported differing national 
management styles. Male and female supervisors, according to workers, were generally 
older – in their 30s – than the assembly line workers. One manager, from Factory 4, stated 
that they preferred to use female supervisors for their largely female workforce as female 
supervisors were better at communicating with women workers, as well as the workers 
being more comfortable and ‘flexible’ when supervised by other women (interview 
16/5/2014). Some workers left the factories because they encountered strict discipline and 
what they experienced as unfair treatment, but other workers reported less strained 
relations with supervisors. Kit, a 29 year old male at Factory 6, reported that Japanese 
managers were very strict and disciplinary and so he had to be careful when he worked. This 
was different to being supervised by Thai managers who he inferred were more relaxed 
(interview 3/2014). Other workers supervised by Lao and Thai managers reported a more 
easy-going style. Joi at Factory 8 said that her Lao manager was not strict but ‘like a friend’ 
9 See Chapter 8.
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(baep moo pheuan) (interview 6/2014). Ying, working at the same factory as Kit, reported 
that the managers were quite strict during working time, but friendly during the breaks and 
outside working time, adding that she understood why they were strict and felt that this was 
normal (interview 5/2014). Workers thus supported to an extent managers’ claims of 
paternalism in enclave factories. 
The evidence thus suggests that concern for workers’ propensity to exit generated specific 
labour control strategies, which tended to consent over coercion. Workers’ agency – 
specifically their mobility power – induced changes on the part of capital. As argued in 
Chapter 2 it is not enough to approach labour control from the needs of capital but rather 
focusing on the actions and practices of workers enables clearer insights into why particular 
capital strategies are adopted over others; how workers’ agency emerges as a constraint to 
that of capital and drives forward the specific forms of industrial relations and associated 
patterns of accumulation and distribution of surplus. As noted in Chapter 8 coercive, 
disciplinary elements were also in place which caused workers to leave and industrial 
relations were framed by a strong anti-unionism and non-enforcement of labour rights so, to 
be clear, sticks were used as well as carrots. Various types of carrot were necessary to 
maintain stable production however. Incentives will be dealt with below but first I turn to 
how workers’ spatial practices affected the stability and organization of the production 
process. 
9.2.3 The Production Process
Savannakhet enclave factories generally experienced difficulties recruiting thus placing 
restrictions on production, and when workers regularly left employment the issue was 
exacerbated. A Factory 1 Manager reported that during difficult periods of worker turnover 
they met only 80-85 percent of their production targets, compared with 96 percent of 
targets at other times. Once the manager said production had to come down to 30 percent 
of the factory’s capacity due to low levels of staff (interview 10/6/2014). Recruiting workers 
was especially difficult when there was competition for agricultural labour: ‘Sometimes they 
are reluctant to come here until the rice season is done, until the harvest season is done’. 
Several strategies were adopted to deal with the issue of workers wanting to leave for 
agricultural work. One method was to allow workers a set amount of time off so that they 
could go to help on their families’ farms. Workers reported being given variously three days 
and a week off (worker interviews 3/2014 and 5/2014). This was possibly an annual holiday 
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entitlement. Other strategies were to control an industrial reserve battalion, if not quite an 
army, and to extract absolute surplus value through extending the working day. Factory 1 
would attempt to recruit a number of workers beyond that actually needed for production 
in order to cover for the contingencies of absence and exit. The manager gave the example 
that if they needed 100 workers they would recruit ‘112’ workers so that they would have 
ten percent spare to ensure the assembly line would not stop. During difficult times of low 
staffing the factory utilized a lot of overtime and had to ‘make a lot of employees tired’ 
(Factory 1 Manager interview 10/6/2014). Savannakhet workers’ command over agrarian 
space thus led to struggles over labour time, with labour time devoted to agriculture for 
some workers leading to factories imposing a strategy of absolute surplus extraction through 
extension of the working day. This however would have imposed extra costs on capital as 
overtime was paid at a higher rate. It seems that this strategy may have enabled extra 
surplus value extraction from the remaining workers but at a lower rate of exploitation 
during overtime hours (Fine and Saad-Filho 2004: 41-42). Absolute surplus extraction was a 
tactic also used by Factory 3. When asked whether workers leaving disrupted production a 
manager responded: ‘In the last month not much because we use our existing employees to 
do extra work with overtime’ (interview 27/2/2014). The same manager however went on to 
elaborate that the expansion of production presented worker-related problems:
If we need 30 people we cannot find immediately. It takes some time to find, so it may 
take one or two months to get…Our big boss said that we needed to double production 
and we need 15 more operators in one week! We don’t plan for this but they just order 
(interview 27/2/2014)
In this case the manager reported that they managed to find 15 workers in time, but it is 
possible this did not translate smoothly into the doubling of production required by the 
company hierarchy due to the costs of training new workers, an issue experienced by several 
Savannakhet factories.  
A Factory 8 manager confirmed workers’ mobility and absenteeism as disruptive. This 
manager stated that the worker issue made it very difficult to plan production as they could 
not plan to replace workers. Churning of workers imposed burdens on different 
departments of the factory, especially human resources and training. Training was made 
especially difficult. Workers needed to be replaced quickly and new workers trained. The 
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company could thus not wait for ‘50’ people to start training, which it can be inferred would 
save on time and costs. The company instead waited for groups of ten to start training but 
overall the organization of training was made ‘very difficult’ by workers’ movement in and 
out of employment (Factory 8 Manager interview 24/3/2014). Factory 4 also experienced 
similar problems with constant employment of new workers as a factor hindering 
production. New workers lacked skills and training them meant that daily production targets 
for workers were missed until new workers could get up to speed (Factory 4 manager 
interview 16/5/2014). 
At Factory 5, a manager reported similar issues. The manager stated that a problem for the 
company was that they always had more orders than they could produce. Sometimes the 
management would plan production for the month and would be happy that they could 
achieve the targets but then ‘ten percent’ of the workers would leave and production would 
be hampered. Staff turnover was especially problematic when it involved staff with specific 
skills: 
let’s say if it’s a person with technical skills to prepare samples…we cannot replace it 
here…I had a very good girl and we had a misunderstanding, there was a conflict and 
she left…[it disrupts] a lot, a lot, because mistakes can be made…if the sample is not 
prepared correctly then we are producing in the line with a mistake and we have to 
remake it. It takes us time and time is money (Factory 5 manager interview 18/3/2014)
Some companies turned to rotation of workers through tasks and departments to solve their 
recruitment problems. At Factory 4 a manager outlined the adaptions that had to be made 
to the labour process: 
Production has problems so that we do some rotation…It’s better they [assembly 
workers] can do all processes…We need fixed [workers] for skills, fixed for injection, 
fixed for cosmetics, but now we cannot because the operators are also [often] absent 
or leave. We have to rotate, now every day (interview 16/5/2014)
The manager stated that it was not difficult to rotate workers, but the time and training 
costs involved in ensuring workers had multiple skills may have hindered the amount of 
production that could occur in the Savannakhet facility. Factory 2 also adapted the 
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organization of their labour process by rotating workers between departments. If workers 
had to go back to help their families in the rice fields for a week or so, then workers would 
be exchanged between departments. Workers were trained in many tasks thus enabling 
rotation (Factory 2 manager interview 10/1/2014). Savannakhet enclave factories then 
appeared to be turning to flexible skilling of the labour process, rather than limiting workers 
to one specific department or skill. Even if this were a company’s favoured skilling strategy, 
the objective conditions of the Savannakhet context demanded that they implement this 
labour process. The dependence on recruitment from rural areas also imposed on capital the 
arduous process of disciplining and sensitizing local workers to the rigours of industrial 
production. 
The site developer, in an interview conducted in English, described Lao labour as ‘raw 
workers’ (Lao Samudra manager interview 13/1/2014). The site developer elaborated that 
the rural base presented specific problems for workforce formation: 
Of course Lao workers have this….baw bpen nyang10 culture…so this is a big 
problem…but they come to the factory, of course we will start with motivation 
something like that…working time, so first they didn’t follow, we had to implement 
punchcards, we had to prove it, why are you late? And then slowly, slowly [they stop?]. 
The discipline is not a one-day job, it is day to day. It’s a day to day job (Lao Samudra 
manager interview 13/1/2014)
A Thai manager from Factory 2 expressed his initial surprise at supervising Lao workers, 
underestimating the effects of significant uneven development between territories now 
welded together through the Savannakhet border enclave: 
In Laos it's not fast. I thought at the beginning, ok Lao Thai are not different, but oh I 
was wrong. They're very different. I understood you have to do it slowly…They come 
from farms, they are not experienced with industry. Also, everyone is new, they don't 
know the machine, they don't know the parts, they don't know the process, they don't 
know the regulations (interview 10/1/2014)
10 This common Lao phrase translates as ‘never mind’ or ‘do not worry about it’. 
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Despite some workers being sensitized to industrial employment11 the expansion of industry 
in the area entailed a slow process of changing labour’s experiences, attitudes and 
expectations of work. For Factory 1, a more established company, their workforce had been 
inculcated with the values of industrial discipline, but it had taken them some years to instil 
this type of consciousness in workers: 
 I think every factory in Savannakhet now [has issues with absenteeism]...because you 
have to understand these people have never worked in industry before...I think it´s 
become better now compared to what we used to have. For example, old workers who 
have been here for two or three years…I think there´s a lot of improvement. They´ve 
become industrialized workers instead of like a volunteer or an amateur worker 
(Factory 1 manager interview 10/6/2014)
The formation of ‘industrialized workers’ from ‘raw workers’ was not a straightforward 
process due to both workers’ propensity for moving between jobs or countries and also their 
transitional status between a rural base and industrial wage labour. Workers’ control over, 
and use of, space entailed increased struggles over labour time. Allied to paternalism were 
other methods which fixed workers in place, involving forms of coercion but also incentives 
which allowed workers to capture a greater share of the surplus produced and imposed 
additional costs on capital. Companies moved to Savannakhet to increase the amount of 
surplus value relative to other locations. This may have been broadly successful due to lower 
costs than previous sites in Thailand, but the labour issues imposed higher costs than Laos’ 
minimum wage suggests to investors. The higher social cost of labour raised questions about 
the expansion and sustainability of the zone with implications for it as a developmental 
strategy, issues which will be addressed below.  
9.3 Fixing Workers in Place
Workers’ agency manifested in the forms of international and labour market mobility, and 
their fixity - in terms of social reproduction in their villages and command over agricultural 
space - represented barriers to foreign capital’s accumulation which had to be overcome 
through fixing workers in a different place - within the factory walls. To achieve this, state 
and capital cooperated in local labour regulation within the SEZ, and capital held out a range 
of monetary and non-monetary incentives to retain workers in - or even tempt them back to 
11 See Chapter 8.
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- employment. Workers’ actions and practices thus generated capital strategies from which 
they derived greater material benefits, even though at first glance Lao workers appeared to 
be in a highly constrained and disadvantageous situation of informality. Lao workers thus 
emerged not as passive victims of a teleological race to the bottom but as active participants 
in the creation of an open and contested global development process.
9.3.1 Regulatory Fixing 
State and capital cooperated to fix workers within factories. There was a zone specific 
regulation in place to limit the mobility power of workers and prevent potentially 
destabilizing competition between companies for labour, as a Factory 3 manager explained:
We have many factories and they need more people but they can´t get people…and 
the other thing is about people that want to get more salary. It is a challenge for us 
and then they try to look for other companies as well. If they know someone will pay 
more they will go…We also planned to solve this problem. If employees are working in 
this zone we have an agreement to not steal people from each other´s companies. If 
people leave from one factory they must take time up to six months before working for 
another (interview 27/2/2014)
The site developer elaborated that this policy was enacted through the combined agency of 
SEZA and capital and was necessary for the viability of the zone. It was stressed that 
workers’ free mobility would impose damaging non-wage costs on companies and possibly 
create conflict between them:
Whoever is working in a factory one time, you cannot go today I work at [Factory 2], 
tomorrow I work at [Factory 3]. No. We have the workers…controlled by SEZA. You 
cannot jump. Because we have to get a very peaceful working environment here. 
Whoever wants to jump, a [Factory 2] worker wants to jump to [Factory 3], I will 
banish them…for six months, you are not working here….Because I have to protect my 
investors’ interests…one worker for them today becomes an operator, how much did 
we spend on the training course, we already offered to him today, simply going from A 
to B…it would create a big problem for this industrial park. So every factory has a 
common understanding…you cannot get my workers, I cannot get your workers. You 
want workers we train together…unless today, these people [skilled employees] are 
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very clever. They are experts. I cannot use, so I can surrender to you. That is a different 
story. We cannot block the career for the worker (Lao Samudra manager interview 
13/1/2014)
It was thus clear that workers ‘simply going from A to B’ in the context of the SEZ 
represented a challenge to the coherence of this bounded space of global accumulation. 
Zone authorities attempted to limit workers’ freedom within the zone with a spatio-
temporal strategy of exclusion. It seemed then that cooperation between companies and 
the state was necessary to manage populations and limit a key source of power available to 
workers – in effect to decompose the local spatialized class composition (Cleaver 1992). The 
state and capital thus acted to incorporate labour into the zone, touting the importance of 
providing jobs, but only allowed them access to employment up to a certain point in order 
stabilize the benefits accruing to individual capitals. Companies’ efforts to monopolize the 
productive power of location (Swyngedouw 1992: 423) would be potentially confounded by 
other companies’ strategies of relocation and their territorial competition for labour. A 
specific territorial form of regulation emerged which on the one hand stabilized 
accumulation across the territory, but also potentially limited any expansion of factories – at 
least until a further reterritorialization of labour – Lao or possibly international migrant – 
could take place to solve the labour supply issue. Also of interest in the above quote is the 
prospect of career development for Savannakhet workers. Upward mobility within firms, as 
we shall see in the section below, was used by companies as one incentive amongst others 
which could induce workers to stay. 
9.3.2 Fixing Workers with Incentives
Companies adapted to their labour problems with a range of incentives, incorporating 
money bonuses, travel stipends, free transport, and consumer goods, but on condition of 
regular attendance and diligence. The low social cost of labour companies sought in 
Savannakhet was raised in some respects by the existing means of labour´s social 
reproduction contradicting industrial capital´s requirements.  Capital benefited from its 
social construction of a primarily young, female and rural workforce in certain respects but 
the contested substance of the socio-spatial construction of Savannakhet labour - the 
struggle to gain control over labour’s spatiality and time - necessitated a raft of concessions 
to labour´s social reproduction.  At least one SEZA official was aware that to effectively 
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reterritorialize Lao labour the indirect social wages and benefits had to be stressed to 
workers: 
I think talking about…the wages, I think what we have to emphasize, don’t look at just 
the gross income, but they have to look at the net income. What they, the figures they 
bring home because in overseas they can have such high wages but of course at the 
same time the expenses are also high. They have to pay for the accommodation, they 
have to pay for anything. But here we have policies…the employees working here will 
be provided free of charge transportation, free of charge accommodation, meals, 
social welfare, you know medical facilities and then when comparing net income, and 
of course at the local economies or criteria I think they will be very happy (SEZA official 
interview 20/12/2013)
It thus seems that in government thinking that indirect social benefits – not direct wages – 
would act as a sufficient lure to return labour to Laos, or keep it in the country, and also that 
bearing the social cost of labour would be distributed between key actors. Capital, the state, 
and labour all appear in the quote as providers of certain parts of labour´s social 
reproduction, even though the statement presents the issue in the terms of the benevolence 
of capital and state. Benefits such as ´free of charge transportation´ would be provided, it 
can be inferred, by the companies. The state would contribute to ´social welfare´, 
presumably through the National Social Security Fund.12 Claims of ´free of charge 
accommodation´ and ´meals´ were presented as policies, but the official would most likely 
have understood that these highly important elements of workers´ social reproduction 
would largely be borne by workers themselves. Returned migrants would move back into 
parental households and gain a large portion of their sustenance from family food 
production, households thus subsidizing capital (Kelly 2013: 88-89). Some accommodation 
and food costs did appear to be borne by capital but these and other incentives emerged as 
responses to workers´ agency after the establishment of factories rather than generosity 
flowing from the outset.  
Incentives took different forms and important measures to retain or attract workers were: 
attendance and diligence bonuses; travel and food costs; and regular wage increases and 
upwards career mobility. Present and future material rewards were held out by companies 
12 See Chapter 6.
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and with upward career mobility perhaps the prospect of higher social status was also 
present. I start by analyzing attendance and diligence bonuses and travel and food 
allowances because they were the clearest cut examples of factories actively responding to 
workers´ spatial practices. 
The establishment of the SEZ and new factories caused problems at Factory 5, a more 
established factory outside the zone, leading to workers leaving to try their luck at the new 
companies. Workers´ mobility power drove factory strategies to keep workers in place. The 
manager described the practices of workers and important examples of the company´s 
responses: 
If there is an increase in wages in the region let´s say, what they will do, they won´t 
come to us to discuss raising the wages, they will just leave. Then if we see them 
[moving jobs] then we ask what is happening. Then the supervisors will tell us, yes 
there was talk about the salary and that company is giving a bit higher salary so they 
want to try there. But it can happen after two months they come back to us, they´re 
just trying. If we see that they´re leaving and leaving and leaving and we lose staff 
then we will discuss together about what we can do...We make rules for them for the 
discipline and the attendance. We give them some extra bonuses, like they have an 
attendance bonus and at the end of last year we faced a lot of migration [moving jobs]. 
They were moving to the other companies and then they would come back and 
actually the last three, four months of the year were quite disturbing [disrupted] 
especially because it’s the high season for us. So we decided to give them a small 
amount for food. It´s like an extra 100,000kip [USD 12] a month, but the condition was 
that if they were not absent during the month they will get this extra. But if they are 
absent without permission [without notifying company at all] they don´t lose any 
bonus, any incentive, anything, but if they are absent without permission then we can 
cut about 200,000 kip [USD 24] a month (interview 18/3/2014)
In addition to the food bonus the manager was referring to an existing attendance bonus of 
100,000 kip per month, which workers would lose if they were absent without permission. 
The attendance bonus was also used to discipline workers to be at work and back from 
breaks on time - ´they know if they come late they lose their attendance bonus´ – and the 
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bonus system was generally used as a carrot to induce behaviour befitting a productive 
worker:  ´we try to push them to better discipline´ (Factory 5 manager interview 18/3/2014). 
A Factory 3 manager explained that the company had experienced problems with high 
turnover and because they had invested in training workers they implemented measures to 
retain them. This included a ´diligence´ bonus which was between 80,000-100,000 kip (USD 
10-12) per month and required workers to be on time to work and not to be absent, as well 
as a range of other measures:
We try to give more incentives...New starters, before we gave them one month´s 
probation without adjusting the wage, but now we adjust the wage for them after one 
month´s probation. And after that we adjust the wages for them...and if they are sick 
they can get sick leave. Before we deducted their salary, their wages, but now we 
don´t deduct...It´s many things we have changed to do more incentives for them...to 
make them motivated and happy to stay working with us (Factory 3 manager 
interview 27/2/2014)
When asked how the workers had responded to this the manager claimed that they were 
very happy and it had reduced workers exiting: ´Even no one has left´ (interview 27/2/2014). 
At Factory 4, where the management required ´fixed´ workers for each department but had 
had to resort to rotations, a range of consumer goods were offered as diligence bonuses: 
´[We are] concerned with attendance...If [a worker] is not absent, does not leave, is not late 
for three months we provide some [clothes] iron or some gifts´ (Factory 4 manager interview 
16/5/2014). Factory 1 used a similar system to retain and attract workers. The manager of 
Factory 1 also stated that travel and food stipends were used and there was a system of 
bonuses for workers based on the annual profits that the company made (interview 
10/6/2014). Jit, one of the workers at the factory, was able to elaborate on how the 
incentives appeared to increase in value according to the length of time a worker was 
present for work. He also noted the existence of diligence bonuses related to work 
performance:
If you work for three months without absence you will receive a clothes iron. If you 
work for six months without absence then you will receive a rice cooker. If you work for 
nine months without absence you will receive an electric cooking pot (maw dtom 
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naam). If you work for a whole year without absence you will receive 500,000 kip [USD 
61]... Working at the factory you have to be hard working (mee khwaam duman) and 
then you get an increase in diligence money, over 30,000 kip [USD 32] per month 
(interview 5/2014)
Factory 7 also applied bonuses but as a relatively new zone factory it may still have been 
figuring out the best balance between incentives and attracting and retaining workers. Mee 
reported that there was a daily 9000 kip (USD 1.1) food allowance and a diligence bonus 
(ngeun wiak kayan). The diligence bonus was reportedly paid monthly for both not being 
absent and good work performance, and was given in increasing monthly increments 
(interview 5/2014). Presumably absences would have broken the increments at any point 
during the cycle thus providing extra incentive for attendance. Sing, who had worked at the 
same factory at the same time as Mee thought that the benefits were little and reported 
that the managers had told them that it was a new factory and if they produced more then 
more benefits would be added at a later date (interview 5/2014). Encouraging workers to be 
more productive was one benefit of this strategy but the lure of more money was also likely 
held out to retain workers. 
Factory 6 also appeared to be considering how best to retain its workforce without raising 
the social cost of labour too significantly. Workers reported that their basic wages at this 
factory were 1.2 million kip (USD 148) a month, slightly higher than other factories in 
Savannakhet (worker interviews 3/2014, 5/2014, 6/2014). Factory 6 was one of the more 
recent factories to open in the area in early 2014 and so one reason behind the better 
remuneration may have been to ensure a supply of workers. Higher wages did not however 
rid the company of worker pressure to gain extra stipends. In what appears to be another 
example of spontaneous organization and recognition of collective class interests, Ying and 
Ad reported that a large group of people had asked the factory for a travel stipend (kaa 
deuhn thaang) to cover petrol money (interviews 5/2014). Ying compared the situation 
unfavourably to a previous factory she had worked at which gave the stipend. Ad stated that 
the whole of the factory asked for this which implies some level of communication and 
organization among workers to apply collective pressure. The company responded, 
according to Ying, that it would give this subsidy but it was not yet ready to (interviews 
5/2014). Maeo confirmed that the company had not given travel and a proposed food 
allowance yet (nyang baw dai hai) as managers told the workers it was not yet ready to give 
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them (interview 6/2014). A possible explanation for this reticence on the company’s part 
was that it had to take time to adjust itself to the unexpected cost of literally mobilizing 
workers, a social cost which workers in the area refused to bear fully themselves. 
Factory 2 also utilized a diligence bonus to encourage worker attendance and discipline. This 
bonus according to one of the managers was a money bonus paid monthly on condition of 
punctuality and attendance (interview 10/1/2014). Bpet confirmed that the basic wage was 
around 900,000 kip (USD 111) a month but with the various bonuses it was raised to 1.1 
million kip (USD 123). Bpet claimed that the benefits were ´decent enough´ (dee yoo) 
(interview 5/2014). The manager claimed that this system of benefits had induced workers 
to stay in employment, presumably resulting in lower turnover rates and a more stable 
workforce (Factory 2 manager interview 10/1/2014). In addition, the company was not 
averse to using more coercive methods to retain workers. Bpet had become frustrated with 
working at the factory, remarking that she was annoyed that she had been marked down as 
late when she had arrived on time (presumably with a negative effect on her attendance 
bonus). She had written a resignation form (bpai kian bai laa laeo) ´but the manager did not 
allow me to leave´ (dtae taang hua naa baw hai awk), saying that Bpet should stay because 
she was a good employee and her position was difficult to replace (interview 5/2014). Bpet 
thus felt pressured to stay. 
Bpet’s case suggests that the training and substitution costs involved in turnover increased 
companies’ incentives to retain workers. Foreign firms appeared to be instituting internal 
labour markets and offering upward career mobility within the firm as a conscious strategy 
to retain their investments in workers. In the scarcity of Savannakhet’s labour market such a 
firm strategy would have given workers first, greater employment security, partially 
counteracting their construction as informal labour, and second, access to higher wages 
(Smith 2006: 398). A Factory 3 manager neatly summarized the strategy: ‘We motivate them 
by career path. After they train if they are good, good skills at doing their job they will be 
promoted to higher positions or they can adjust wages, increase wages´ (interview 
27/2/2014). Moreover, the prospect of career progression within firms was regarded by the 
site developer as a means for limiting migration to Thailand. The manager also neatly 
indicated how the reterritorialization of Lao labour was to be achieved through the agency 
of workers themselves, as they recalibrated their relational networks away from migration 
and towards local employment:
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today if [you are] working in Laos, your home country, like [in the Savan-Seno SEZ], 
working today maybe you are at operator level, tomorrow you are level two, level 
three...If today you are working in Thailand you work your whole life you are still at 
level one. You don’t have a work career…This type of thing doesn’t come from our 
mouths, this type of things will come from the workers’ mouths. Every worker, their 
friends. The workers can spread the news. I cannot do it…no one will listen to you…The 
worker themselves will spread the news, not me (Lao Samudra manager interview 
13/1/2014)
Across the Savannakhet enclave, factories enacted systems of bonuses and incentives to 
stabilize production. The labour control regimes developed had to be sensitive to a restless 
workforce that was always on the lookout for better opportunities or reluctant to submit to 
factory discipline. What emerges clearly is that the development of labour control regimes in 
the area was an ongoing process of trial and error which required new strategies and tactics 
from capital as workers bargained for wages with their feet, as in the case of Factory 7, or 
pressured capital collectively as with Factory 6 and the cases described in Chapter 8.  
Conclusion
The collusion of state and capital to create a low-cost, informal, and politically weak labour 
force for global capital’s gain was thus counteracted by the everyday agency of labour. The 
territorial construct of the Savannakhet border enclave could only gain coherence for 
accumulation by coming to terms with the wider territorial organization of social 
reproduction characterized by the migration/agriculture axis. It was here at the interface of 
an existing territorial division of labour and the emerging one brought by increasing 
industrialization that economic development and the division of the spoils took place. 
Foreign manufacturing capital’s movement into Savannakhet via the Savan-Seno SEZ did 
attain territorial coherence within the zone, and within the wider enclave of border 
manufacturing, through its connections to the wider territory of KP district and Savannakhet 
province beyond the enclave. The territorial embeddedness which transnational firms 
needed to proceed entailed adapting to and constructing a new territorial division of labour 
within Savannakhet. The contested manner of this socio-spatial construction meant that 
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workers were able to capture more of the value than might be supposed for informalized 
workers in constrained political circumstances (Henderson et al 2002). The necessity of fixing 
labour in place for production entailed that the social cost of labour rose, but apparently 
only to an extent that was still tolerable for capital’s spatial fix (Chang 2009). The 
Savannakhet border enclave played an important role in Laos’ rescaling into the Greater 
Mekong Subregion’s space, but the territorial reconfiguration it created to achieve this 
operated through the expansion of state practices of power to demarcate particular portions 
of its territory and bring its citizens back within the boundaries of the country and the 
enclave. The creation of a wider regional scale thus hinged on both socially constructing 
territory and articulating it with flows of capital, labour, and commodities into a temporary 
and contested ‘structured coherence’ that both provisionally allowed capital to accumulate 
and labour to threaten to undermine that accumulation. 
Labour’s agency appeared to ultimately facilitate accumulation through their use of factory 
labour as part of wider livelihood strategies, but the specific socio-spatial construction 
suggests that only limited patterns of accumulation are possible. Some expansion may be 
possible but it is likely to be slow and require difficult labour recruitment and retention 
processes. The projected demands of up to 10,000 workers in 2018 may be very difficult to 
meet (Bangkok Post 23/9/2013). The Savannakhet enclave fulfils capital’s need to lower 
production costs in assembly of components while still being functionally integrated into 
Thai-based production networks. Expansion of capital into much larger factories or the 
integrated manufacture of final commodities is perhaps unlikely because producing on a 
larger scale would entail a high cost of social labour relative to other production locations. 
The territorial coherence that has been attained would need to be broken down and 
reconstructed once again in order to facilitate further larger-scale industrial development, 
likely only possible if labour’s control over agricultural space is broken and out-migration to 
Thailand is blocked further, or Savannakhet becomes an important site of international 
migration for surplus labour from neighbouring countries. Both strategies would entail 
further attempts to reconfigure the fixity and mobility of labour. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion  
The case of foreign-invested border manufacturing in Savannakhet, Lao PDR has served as a 
necessarily partial yet illuminating illustration of the dynamics of global corporate relocation 
and regional integration. Tracing workers’ agency and their course into, within, and out of 
local factory employment has revealed important themes which can be usefully 
incorporated into theoretical conceptualization and empirical investigation of analogous 
cases. The central research question addressed was how has the agency of Lao workers 
shaped 1) labour relations in export-oriented foreign-invested manufacturing; and 2) 
territorial economic development in global export-oriented foreign-invested manufacturing 
in Kaysone Phomvihane District, Savannakhet, Lao PDR in the period 2009-2014? The 
question sought to uncover how workers shaped the grounds of their own existence and 
their relative status and power in employment, as well as how they affected the broader 
process of industrialization in Laos. Answering the first part of the question is crucial if we 
want to understand why companies or state institutions cannot have it all their own way 
even in circumstances which would appear to place the whip hand firmly with these 
powerful actors. Crucially, how and why labour constituted and was affected by the 
industrialization process was also revealed. Answering the second part of the question helps 
us to understand the prospects for continued industrialization in Savannakhet and what its 
limitations and possible future policy directions are. 
Chapter 2 argued for the importance of conceptualizing a more variegated understanding of 
agency that goes beyond resistance and includes spatial agency. Going beyond resistance 
and formal organization when considering labour’s agency, I argued, allows a wider set of 
practices and relations to come into view. This methodological choice not only opens up the 
process of social construction more keenly but also provided clear advantages in 
approaching the case.  A variegated concept of everyday agency was extremely useful in 
analyzing an empirical context which is politically authoritarian and where independent 
labour organizing is forbidden. The theory allowed an insightful shift to incorporate social 
reproduction as well as production. Social reproduction is often enacted through strategies 
to use or command space. The contradictory, interpenetrating dialectic of fixity and mobility 
offered explanatory potential in analyzing workers’ complex spatial practices. Fixity and 
mobility also provided a guiding thread from labour to the state and capital in understanding 
wider-scale territorial processes such as the race to the bottom. The race to the bottom was 
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theorized in terms of creating informality to reduce the social cost of labour. This approach 
allows both power relations to come into view and a broader set of relations and processes 
which may raise the cost of labour and provide lines of enquiry for how labour’s agency may 
affect capital’s relocation. Open Marxism was utilized to suggest how states transform into a 
political form of the capital-labour relation. Open Marxism had the benefit of recentralizing 
labour – and so accorded with the agency approach – but also providing a means to 
understand how the forms and functions of capitalist states develop in historically specific 
and open ways in capitalist development.
Chapter 3 introduced the notions of the spatial fix, territorial coherence, and regionalization 
as political economic scale building. Elaborating the concept of the spatial fix provided a 
theoretical grounding for the process of the race to the bottom which complemented its 
conceptualization as informality and social cost of labour. I introduced the notion of 
territorial coherence to integrate the agency of multiple actors – state, labour, and capital - 
and how they attempt to command and constitute space to their advantage. Spatial 
practices to command space were deemed a constitutive part of class composition. By 
refocusing attention on the importance of social reproduction in territorial coherence I 
provided a way to integrate labour’s agency as a determining power in spatial development. 
Territorial coherence highlights how the organization of space can function, or not, for 
different actors – capital accumulation or social reproduction - and can provide answers as 
to why a spatial fix is successful or not, why and to what extent economic development 
occurs, and how and why some are excluded from developmental processes. The notion of 
territorial coherence could be integrated with regionalization and rescaling. I suggested that 
the reterritorialization of space can create new territorial coherences between countries 
thus forming regionalization and enacting the rescaling of circuits of capital and class 
relations. This provided a means to understand how Laos is being integrated into the GMS, 
how and why Laos benefits or not, and how and why a subaltern actor such as labour can 
influence a process such as regionalization. 
In Chapter 4 I noted that the peripheral centrality of Laos within mainland Southeast Asia 
and powerful neighbouring forces contesting Laos’ space and resources have been recurrent 
themes in its history. I demonstrated how Lao actors have historically balanced and 
reoriented to different neighbour polities in order to derive benefits and survive. I thus 
showed how recent capitalist development is the latest manifestation of attempts to 
produce a Lao space that is simultaneously connective and exclusionary.  Chapter 4 provided 
an understanding of the need to question to whom and how is Laos connecting and 
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integrating with in its current conjuncture. The chapter also introduced the particular 
importance in Lao history of the fixity and mobility of populations, thus situating 
contemporary spatial practices in a long sequence of contestation. 
Chapter 5 suggested that the Lao state was facilitating FDI-led capitalist transformation and 
the creation of a class structure revolving around capital-labour relations. The 
reterritorialization of Lao space is, I argued, a useful way to illustrate the processes of state 
transformation and FDI-led regional integration. On the one hand the Lao state creates new 
bounded spaces which provide the conditions for regional capital to circulate on an 
expanded scale, while simultaneously managing populations, thus producing state-society 
relations and particular forms of sovereignty. I also began to apply the notion of territorial 
coherence to development processes in Laos. I argued that the extension of foreign capital 
into Lao space was an attempt to reorganize territory in order to create territorial coherence 
between countries in the region which benefited capital accumulation over social 
reproduction of labour. 
The transformation of the state was also a theme of Chapter 6, which outlined the 
government’s increasingly complex legal mediation of capital-labour relations. The theme of 
the state as a form of capital-labour relations was made more empirically concrete in 
preparation for the analysis of the case. Other important themes on contemporary labour 
highlighted were the historical ability of subaltern actors to affect developmental policy, 
contemporary complex livelihood strategies which incorporated wage labour and other 
activities, the role of migration, and the conditions in the light manufacturing (garments) 
sector. All of these contemporary labour trends would be manifested in the analysis of the 
Savannakhet case. 
The last three chapters turned to the empirical investigation. In Chapter 7 I analyzed 
increasing investment in Savannakhet province and Kaysone Phomvihane district. I argued 
that border manufacturing and the Savan-Seno SEZ in particular had driven foreign 
investment flows into the province from around the late 2000s. I presented evidence which 
suggested that foreign manufacturing firms were relocating to Savannakhet to take 
advantage of lower production costs, proximity to Thailand, and similarities in Lao and Thai 
language and culture. Lower production costs were given by both the tax breaks offered by 
the special economic zone and the Lao investment law as well as low wages. The form of 
Laos’ integration with Thai-based regional production networks was thus one of providing a 
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low-cost export platform with foreign firms having limited connections to local firms and the 
wider Lao economy. 
In Chapter 8 I identified workers’ spatial strategies as a key expression of agency which 
shaped their incorporation into manufacturing. What emerged was a socio-spatial 
construction of Savannakhet labour which revolved around the axis of international 
migration and agriculture. Key mobilities evident in Savannakhet were migration to Thailand, 
seasonal mobility between agricultural and industrial employment, and labour market 
mobility between jobs. Workers’ fixity – their strong ties to and reproduction of villages of 
origin – was contradictory and interpenetrating with mobility. Some workers stayed in their 
villages or returned from Thailand in order to perform socially reproductive labour of care 
work for their families. Other workers cycled between farm and factory employment in 
order to ensure sufficient rice for subsistence. Household rice production and animal raising 
suggested a first important territorial effect on the social cost of labour in Savannakhet; that 
factories appeared to escape paying the full cost of workers’ social reproduction. Another 
reorientation in the territorial social construction of labour appeared to be evident in 
household work as labour performed by family members, typically female, to perform care 
work and household tasks enabled workers to enter the workforce. As suggested by 
evidence of spontaneous work stoppages to press for higher wages, Savannakhet labour did 
not submit willingly to low wages. 
Chapter 9 argued that the establishment of this new form of territorial coherence had to 
accommodate an existing territorial organization which was coherent for the social 
reproduction of local communities. I proposed that the existing form of territorial coherence 
based on remittances from Thailand and subsistence agriculture – and so on labour’s 
strategies of fixity and mobility – constituted a barrier for spatial-fixing foreign capital. The 
spatial organization of social reproduction in Savannakhet would shape the social relations 
of the emerging manufacturing enclave. A second important territorial effect, contradicting 
the first, became apparent. The tight labour market caused by migration to Thailand and 
workers’ tendency to use subsistence agriculture as a social safety net presented significant 
challenges for capital and the state and prompted both to formulate strategies to fix labour 
within factories and within Laos. Companies offered higher wages and assorted extra 
benefits to persuade workers to stay at their factories. Some companies had to implement 
changes in the organization of the labour process in order to maintain production. Factories 
also seemed to deploy paternalist labour control regimes tending more to consent over 
coercion in order to retain workers. The state was also complicit in managing the mobility of 
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Savannakhet populations, for instance approving regulations in the Savan-Seno SEZ which 
prohibited workers from hopping jobs between factories. Also, and in parallel with efforts to 
reterritorialize and sedentarize mobile ethnic minority populations in the north, the state 
was also discouraging migration to Thailand to retain workers in the country.  
Several powerful actors prominent in creating the Savan-Seno zone suggested 
developmental benefits that the zone, and more broadly the Savannakhet enclave, would 
provide to Laos. A SEZA administrator highlighted the logistical potential of the zone and 
also that the zone companies may build forward and backward linkages with local suppliers, 
for instance, of copper. If the zone operates more as a logistics base it seems to imply that 
Laos will be traversed by commodity flows and act as a better land bridge without 
necessarily capturing much value which can be distributed within the country. Whether Lao 
actors are in a sufficiently strong position vis-à-vis other regional actors to appropriate the 
opportunities that cross-border trade flows present is open to question. One way logistics 
development could benefit Laos is by attracting more firms to invest in manufacturing 
production in Savannakhet. However, as was suggested by interviews with companies 
already in the zone and broader enclave, few linkages with local firms and producers had 
been established. The border enclave gained its coherence for capital by it operating as a 
functional extension of Thai territory for Thai-based production networks. The Savan-Seno 
SEZ and Savannakhet border industry thus functioned as a territorial overlap between Laos 
and Thailand which created a highly partial new form of territorial coherence and regional 
integration weighted primarily towards the circulation and reproduction of foreign capital 
over broader development and distribution of surplus within Laos; essentially a form of 
territorial arbitrage to take advantage of lower production costs.
The private zone developer suggested that the developmental benefit to Laos came through 
providing jobs to local people, which would have a multiplier effect on the local economy. 
While some evidence of this may have been present in for example workers using wages to 
contribute to house construction and consumption goods such as motorcycles, the benefits 
are perhaps less clear cut when we consider how the labour force for foreign-invested 
factories was constructed. It appeared that the labour force was largely young women, in 
many cases still living within parental households. Factories had a clear preference for hiring 
young females, entailing that many men and older women would have been excluded from 
employment in local industrial development, thus limiting the direct distribution of income. 
Moreover, it was also perhaps possible that any wider multiplier effect on extra consumer 
spending was made possible by local households’ subsistence production providing a de 
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facto subsidy to the wages paid by local factories. This could be interpreted as the ‘social 
factory’, where all forms of work and social relations become oriented towards capital 
accumulation. This extractive relationship has historical and contemporary parallels in the 
Lao case. The manufacturing enclave appears to fit into an extractive model of Lao resources, 
in this case labour. The contemporary parallels can be found, it seems to me, in other 
foreign investments in, for example, plantations and hydropower which have prioritized 
foreign capital’s capacity to extract value over wider developmental benefits. It appeared 
that the border enclave and the state territorialization that enabled it were in some key 
ways exclusive and extractive, tilted towards the benefit of foreign capital. Through tax 
breaks and profit repatriation companies could escape contributing towards the district’s 
and country’s social infrastructure while benefiting from that agrarian-based social 
infrastructure already in place. 
Overall it seems that foreign capital in Savannakhet was able to push down the social cost of 
labour by relocating to Laos, although there were strong and unexpected barriers to them 
doing so. It appeared that zone companies benefited from: paying fewer taxes; paying lower 
wages than those in Thailand; and a wage subsidization from local agriculture. However, it 
was apparent that companies experienced significant challenges due to labour’s agency in 
the existing form of territorial coherence. Labour thus induced changes in the surplus that 
accrued to them, the labour process and the labour control regime. 
Workers did report experiencing manufacturing employment positively, for example in that 
they could work out of the sun in a cool environment. The positive experience of some 
workers indicates that a flow of local Savannakhet workers will continue to enter and stay in 
employment in the factories. It appeared evident however that factories had to make 
continuous efforts to maintain that positive experience and prevent their workers from 
leaving with various incentives. The increase in the number of new factories created 
problems for existing factories and caused them to adjust wages and benefits to meet an 
apparent emerging local standard. Here it seems that workers were implicated in creating 
that positive experience rather than foreign firms necessarily importing best practice from 
developed countries. In the act of refusing lower wages and worse conditions in certain 
factories and seeking out higher and better in others, it seemed that workers were playing a 
part in inducing changes in both the factories they fled and the factories they sought. 
This upwards pressure on the social cost of labour suggests that the zone will have limited 
potential for expansion, and will certainly be slower than companies hope. Labour will not 
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necessarily stay in Savannakhet employment if workers decide that wages are too low, and 
the entry of new factories it seems will be circumscribed by the existing difficulties in 
mobilizing supposedly cheap and pliant labour. Thailand remains as a lure which may 
destabilize Savannakhet factories if for example local wages do not rise to meet inflation. 
That the zone is so oriented towards Thai-based production networks and Thai territory 
appears to indicate that little foreign investment will come from elsewhere. In addition, with 
factories operating as labour-intensive manufacturers of components, and only limited and 
low-skill labour available in Laos, it seems there will be little incentive for firms at present to 
relocate other parts of the production process. Any relocation of firm functions that might 
represent technological upgrading or moving up the value chain appear a long way off. It 
appears then that Savannakhet border manufacturing is locked into a subordinate position 
in regional production networks and GMS regionalization. In terms of ‘strategic coupling’ 
(Coe et al 2004) for development, the enclave seemed to serve the strategic needs of capital 
over the development of local economic linkages. The orientation of the enclave to Thailand 
and the possibility of a rising social cost of labour overall cast significant doubt on whether 
the enclave would promote sustainable structural transformation within Laos. With regards 
to whether Lao workers’ strategies of social reproduction and resilience ultimately 
facilitated or blocked capital accumulation, it seems that they did allow capital accumulation 
to occur but in an attenuated way which was not optimal for capital. Workers leveraged 
some extra benefits through their spatial practices but this was predicated on exploitation of 
labour throughout the social territory.  
The Lao government does indeed aim for development and modernity but it appears that in 
the rush to facilitate and attract foreign capital it places the country in a developmental bind. 
Foreign capital appears to be enabled in such a way that it can circulate, extract and exclude 
within Lao territory without, in many cases, sustained value capture and sustainable 
generation of income. The Savan-Seno SEZ certainly provides an appearance of modernity 
and development but the wider developmental benefits are seemingly limited. The 
appearance is perhaps important however, as it provides a means through which the state 
may reproduce its legitimacy and power. The repeated trumpeting of increasing foreign 
investment and the success of the special economic zone policy in the government-
controlled press appears to play an important ideological role in presenting the government 
as the fount of modernity and progress.1 There may be other benefits to the zone from the 
perspective of the state, even if it is realized that the developmental model it represents is 
1 See for example Vientiane Times 19/9/2016. 
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limited. We perhaps should not underestimate that the state’s power over the Savannakhet 
population is increased if migrants return to Laos. Workers do of course return willingly and 
to reproduce their families and local places, but from the state’s perspective it is possible 
that in this reterritorialization the potential of Thailand as a site of anti-governmental 
activity2 is curtailed, the corrosive influences of Thai culture and society are reduced, and 
Lao labour can also be taxed for revenue. The zone, it seems to me, could be interpreted in 
the light of other territorialization projects of the Lao state which manage the fixity and 
mobility of Lao citizens. While this argument remains somewhat conjectural it seems that 
we should at least consider the population management effects that are made possible by 
placing a zone in a province with high levels of migration to Thailand.
The empirical evidence allied with a reading of relevant legislation indicates that the Lao 
state is becoming increasingly capitalist in line with the capitalist transformation of the 
country. The Lao state appeared to consistently side with the foreign capital it courted over 
local workers. The state’s authoritarian stance also seemed to dovetail with capital’s search 
for sedentarized and informalized labour. However, with increasing wage labour and its 
attendant conflicts, it remains to be seen how exactly the state will adapt its industrial 
relations system to mediate capital-labour conflict. Freedom of association would certainly 
seem too politically challenging and jeopardize one of the country’s selling points to foreign 
capital. A policy of toleration of wildcat strikes as happened in Vietnam in 2006-20113 also 
appears unlikely given the repressive attitude the government takes to any form of 
independent organizing in civil society. Extensive reform of the Labour Law in favour of less 
restrictive industrial relations thus also seems unlikely. The extension of the existing 
corporatist tripartite model of mediation to more enterprises and, possibly, improved 
enforcement of existing laws seem more likely, when the government does act to improve 
or reform the industrial relations system. 
With regard to labour, it seems that the state will have ongoing efforts to reterritorialize 
workers from Thailand. Further refinements of their policy to attract workers back are a 
possibility. There is also a chance that if the Savannakhet border manufacturing is unable to 
adequately source enough Lao workers, then the state will continue to reformulate its policy 
on the number of foreign workers it allows in enterprises, and possibly encourage or tolerate 
increased in-migration. 
2 Three Lao migrants to Thailand were arrested on return to Laos in March 2016 for involvement in 
political activities critical of the Lao government while living in Thailand. See RFA 27/5/2016.
3 Siu and Chan 2015. 
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The government it seems should perhaps rethink the special economic zone strategy. While 
the government has clearly been thinking how SEZs may boost economic development, the 
hopes for backward linkages, for example, appeared to be far from fruition. The exclusionary 
and extractive tilt of the zone and enclave indicate that SEZs in their current form are likely 
to reinforce uneven development both between Laos and other regional countries, and also 
within Laos. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to detail what an alternative industrial 
strategy may look like, any alternative must surely seek to be more inclusive in providing 
incomes and ensure that developmental benefits are distributed more equitably through, for 
example, the taxation system.
The case of manufacturing in Savannakhet offers some pathways to reconstructing theory. 
The relevance for theory using the race to the bottom and the social construction of weak, 
informal labour forces is that local territorial effects must be integrated. The insertion of 
capital into new places represents a new form of territorial organization in that place and an 
effort to appropriate the productive power of place (Swyngedouw 1992). Even with a 
supportive state, capital may find this territorial reorganization difficult if existing spatial 
organization is already coherent for local social reproduction. It seems that the very spatial 
process of the social construction of labour can impose significant costs on capital. 
Interpreting the race to the bottom in terms of an effort to informalize and drive down the 
social cost of labour is useful as it reveals the numerous points of antagonism and 
contestation – indirect as well as direct labour costs - where labour may resist downward 
pressure. Incorporating the contests over how labour commands space – both fixity and 
mobility - more clearly makes this theory more exhaustive and provides an avenue of 
explanation for counter-tendencies to a general preference of capital to find low-cost 
production sites with cheap and pliant labour. Additionally the concept of territorial 
coherence can, it would seem, be applied more widely to investments disruptive to existing 
local conditions of social reproduction. 
In the Savannakhet case labour’s ability to influence the course of capital’s relocation 
provides suggestive empirical evidence for autonomist Marxist arguments that labour is a 
driving force in capitalist development. Spatial strategies, actions and practices of workers 
are perhaps underrepresented in autonomist writings. It seems to me however that when 
considering the concept of class composition it is useful to integrate the dialectic of fixity 
and mobility. If class composition emerges through the technical and social division of labour, 
the cultural milieu, and organizational forms (Dyer-Witheford 2004: 8), then incorporating 
the contradictory effects of labour’s fixity and mobility on these constitutive elements adds 
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extra explanatory potential. For example, the social division of labour is simultaneously a 
spatial division of labour. The ability to move within this spatial division of labour potentially 
confers a degree of mobility power on workers, as in the Savannakhet case. Mobility and 
fixity may help us understand how even in a context where there are few organized forms, 
even hidden or spontaneous ones, labour’s agency and class composition may still have a 
bearing on the course of development and capitalist strategy, as in changes induced by the 
interpenetrating fixity and mobility of Savannakhet labour. 
The foregoing has implications for the methodological approach to labour’s agency in 
development and its conceptualization. If labour’s agency can be consequential for capital 
and the state even in unorganized and spontaneous forms then it seems we can follow 
agency and its effects at all points along a spectrum of class-consciousness and organization. 
Viewing strategies, actions and practices in themselves as potentially driving change seems a 
more fruitful approach than framing meaningful agency in terms of a particular category of 
action (resistance) or in terms of an organizational form (trade union). 
Taking this view seems to run counter to the conclusions of Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011) in 
their discussion of constrained agency. To recap, these authors argue that re-embedding 
labour within the structures of global production networks, the state, community politics, 
and labour market intermediaries is necessary for ‘if labour geography is to offer researchers 
a better analytical framework – one which can explain why some workers’ actions seem to 
matter more than others – a more sophisticated understanding of the structural constraints 
and social relations that shape labour’s agency is required’ (ibid. 228). Posing the issue in 
this dichotomous way the authors seem to indicate that meaningful agency is determined by 
the lack of structural constraints and therefore structurally determined (ibid. 229). Within 
tight structural constraints workers have much less capacity for agency, meaning agency for 
some over here and enforced passivity over there. I agree with Coe and Jordhus-Lier that we 
should indeed look at the constellation of social relations which give differential potential for 
some actions over others. I differ by proposing that we open up agency to identify which 
actions become meaningful in a particular set of social relations. I am suggesting that we 
should be asking where, when, how and why does labour’s agency matter in any situation 
regardless of how constrained it might appear at first. What strategies, actions and practices 
do workers deploy, for example, which may emerge as a constraint for the agency of capital 
on the other side of the structurally mediated social relation?  
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Taking this perspective it seems to me opens up the number of pathways we can make to 
relating labour’s agency to developmental change. We can follow labour’s agency 
throughout the employment process, through spheres of production and reproduction, and 
across space to identify meaningful agency. This last point brings me to a potential 
refinement of Coe and Jordhus-Lier’s four sets of social relations in which labour’s agency is 
embedded: other workers. Characteristics of a local labour market may be formed as much 
by the agency of those who choose not to participate in it as those who do. The agency of 
workers who may never have left Savannakhet was leveraged (Konings 2010) by those who 
did and created the conditions which enabled them to access more of the produced surplus 
value. Labour’s agency within Savannakhet was enabled by the agency of distant others who 
had left. It seems we should be considering how does the agency of workers in different 
places constrain and enable, especially in an increasingly integrated world. 
Categorization of actions runs inherent risks. This is apparent, I would suggest, even in Katz’s 
(2004) more nuanced conceptualization of agency as resilience, reworking, and resistance. 
This is because of the overlapping and multiple effects of actions and social practices, and 
the associated difficulty and arbitrariness of creating the borders between different actions. 
There is an associated danger then of these categories becoming closed and teleological in 
that resilience and reworking are seen as stage-posts of consciousness on the way to 
enlightened resistance. This could potentially undo the work that Katz has done to dissolve 
resistance as a hegemonic category in labour studies. Again invoking Knafo’s (2010) 
arguments on the importance of approaching agency as a methodological question rather 
than an ontological one, it appears more fruitful to use Katz’s schema as an entry point to 
analysis rather than the conceptual boundaries of the analysis. Refusing to fall into the trap 
of a strict and arbitrary classification allows different forms of practices and/or discourses to 
emerge in their own right. 
Research is guided by the researcher’s own particular intellectual history, theoretical 
concerns and positionality in a given fieldwork context. As such this thesis represents an 
inquiry of necessarily focused scope. The study is thus not exhaustive but rather a platform 
for understanding development in Laos which can be built on further. The study sought to 
follow workers’ agency throughout the process of hiring, within employment, leaving 
employment, and within household livelihoods and divisions of labour. The study thus took a 
wide view of workers’ engagement with factory employment - investigating the various 
points where workers’ agency became relevant - and so in some regards depth was 
necessarily sacrificed for breadth. A similar issue arises with the territorial framing of the 
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analysis. The study sought to understand the broad dynamics of the local labour market for 
foreign manufacturing and so was not restricted to one particular manufacturing sector or 
type of factory. This spatial rather than sectoral framing of the analysis was useful, it seems 
to me, for studying a specifically demarcated spatial entity such as a special economic zone. 
The relevance of the spatial framing is enhanced when we consider that manufacturing was 
sited on the border in order to take advantage of the territorial differences between Laos 
and Thailand. Both these issues leave plenty of scope for expansion of the empirical 
investigation. 
A number of areas of study are suggested to provide extra depth to complement this thesis’s 
breadth. Within factory employment the organization of the labour process and the labour 
control regime in relation to workers’ agency are both important areas for further study. 
Comparative studies of different sectors in the enclave or as part of a wider country-level 
study, or alternatively comparative investigation of processes and regimes in factories of 
different foreign national origins – including joint ventures with Lao capital - are both 
possible areas of study relevant for understanding Lao labour and FDI in more detail. 
Migration is also another key area for further investigation. The emphasis of the study was 
on the local labour market, workers from Savannakhet and their relations to foreign-
invested factories. The fieldwork was largely oriented towards those actually in zone 
employment rather than international migrants. The territorial framing influenced the 
choice of a study of local Savannakhet labour. Mobility emerged as a key theme and it is a 
future pathway of inquiry to study the relation of increasing investment to migration flows. 
Will the state successfully manage to reterritorialize more labour from Thailand? Is the zone 
successful in preventing out-migration? To what extent is the zone contributing to labour 
migration to Savannakhet, both from other countries and from other places in Laos. It was 
learned rather late in the fieldwork4 that a recruitment company was sourcing labour from 
highland ethnic minority areas in the east of the province. Thus within-country migration, 
and the ethnic element of it, appear to require further examination. 
In terms of livelihoods and divisions of labour, changing household level and community 
level dynamics are possibly fruitful avenues of research.  The contribution of workers’ 
incomes to household livelihood strategies and the effect this has on labour allocation and 
consumption choices is fertile ground, likewise the potential effects workers’ employment 
and wages may have on household dynamics. For example, as more young women become 
4 At the end of May 2014, with the fieldwork ending at the end of June 2014.
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important wage earners in their households to what extent does this change gender roles 
and relations in household consumption decisions? Another suitable area for more detailed 
study is the exact relation between agrarian labour and factory labour. For example, the 
exact extent of the agricultural subsidy to industry is an important topic for future 
consideration. Also there is the question of to what extent factory labour is affecting the 
division of agricultural labour in rural villages. Some workers noted that their households 
hired in labour or bought fertilizer with wages and so there are question regarding to what 
extent factory employment is contributing to changing agricultural labour markets in the 
area or to changing levels of rice production. Related to this is also the issue of social 
differentiation within villages. For example, to what extent does access to factory labour 
affect social differentiation or social mobility?
Another potential avenue of investigation is how engagement with foreign industry is 
affecting the economic landscape and spatial organization of Lao villages, including the 
construction of houses but also potentially how new sources of wages may affect land and 
housing markets, use and distribution (Kelly 2013). 
The state’s institutional and regulatory transformation has been an important theme in this 
thesis. There was an empirical focus on the state’s institutions in a specific geographical area, 
a necessarily restricted view due to the territorial framing. There is clear potential therefore 
for extending the empirical investigation of state-labour relations to other geographical 
areas or scales. Work on the central governmental level could be undertaken, as could 
comparative studies of, for example, institutional transformations in different provinces or 
special economic zones. 
The case of Savannakhet has suggested that even in unlikely circumstances labour can have 
an effect on developmental processes. Lao workers did indeed shape their own lives and 
labour relations in important ways. Lao workers, like others elsewhere, seek to live their 
lives with dignity and a sense of responsibility to their families and communities. It is to be 
hoped that their future actions continue to allow them and their families dignified and 
prosperous lives in the face of rapid and disruptive capitalist development and powerful 
forces which may not always have workers’ best interests at heart. 
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Appendix A 
List of Interviews
Non-governmental and International Organizations 
1. 1/11/2013
2. 15/11/2013
3. 15/5/2014
4. 11/6/2014
Workers
5. 23/3/2014
6. 23/3/2014
7. 23/3/2014
8. 23/3/2014
9. 23/3/2014
10. 30/3/2014
11. 30/3/2014
12. 30/3/2014
13. 30/3/2014
14. 6/4/2014
15. 6/4/2014
16. 6/4/2014
17. 6/4/2014
18. 4/5/2014
19. 4/5/2014
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20. 4/5/2014
21. 4/5/2014
22. 4/5/2014
23. 11/5/2014
24. 11/5/2014
25. 11/5/2014
26. 18/5/2014
27. 18/5/2014
28. 18/5/2014
29. 25/5/2014
30. 25/5/2014
31. 25/5/2014
32. 25/5/2014
33. 8/6/2014
34. 8/6/2014
35. 8/6/2014
36. 8/6/2014
37. 15/6/2014
38. 15/6/2014
State officials
39. 20/12/2013
40. 9/1/2014
41. 3/2/2014
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42. 4/2/2014
43. 6/2/2014
44. 10/2/2014
45. 20/6/2014
Company Managers
46. 10/1/2014
47. 13/1/2014
48. 27/2/2014
49. 18/3/2014
50. 24/3/2014
51. 16/5/2014
52. 23/5/2014
53. 24/5/2014
54. 10/6/2014
Technical School Manager
55. 6/3/2014
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Appendix B
Agricultural Land and Labour Survey Questionnaire 14/6/2014
General
1. What is your name? ເຈົ້າຊື່ຫຍັງ ?
  
2. How old are you? ເຈົ້າອາຍຸຈັກປີ ?
 
3. Where are you from?  ເຈົ້າມາແຕ່ໃສ ?
 
4. What is your occupation? ເຈົ້າເຮັດວຽກຫຍັງ ?
 
5. How many people are there in your household?  ມີຈັກຄົນຢູ່ບ້ານຂອງເຈົ້າ ?
 
6. What are their occupations? ເຂົາເຈົ້າເຮັດວຽກຫຍັງ
Person 1:
Person 2:
Person 3:
Person 4:
Person 5:
Person 6:
Person 7:
Person 8:
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Land
7. How much land do you have? ເຈົ້າມີທີ່ດິນຫລາຍປານໃດ 
a) less than one hectare  ໜ້ອຍກວ່າ 1 ເຮັກຕາ
b) 1-2 hectares  1-2 ເຮັກຕາ 
c) 2-5 hectares 2-5 ເຮັກຕາ
d) 5-10 hectares 5-10 ເຮັກຕາ
e) more than 10 hectares ຫລາຍກວ່າ 10 ເຮັກຕາ
8. Do you…?      ທ່ານ … ບໍ ?
a) own the land     ທ່ີດິນຂອງຕົນເອງ
b) rent the land     ດິນເຊົ່າ
c) other (please describe)   ແລະ ອື່ນໆ ກະລຸນາອະທິບາຍລະອຽດ  
If b) rent the land please answer question 3. If not b) go to question 4.
ຢູ່ໃນຄຳຕອບ ຂໍ້ b.) ຖ້າເປັນດິນເຊົ່າກະລຸນາຕອບຄຳຖາມເຫຼົ່ານີ້ ຖ້າບໍ່ໄດ້ຕອບຂໍ້ b.) 
ໃຫ້ຂ້າມໄປຕອບຂໍ້ 4 ເລີຍ 
9. If you own your land how did you acquire it? Do you have land title? Yes/No 
ຖ້າຫາກວ່າເຈົ້າມີທ່ີດິນເຈົ້າໄດ້ມັນມາຄືແນວໃດ ? ເຈ້ົາມີໃບຕາດິນບໍ່? ມີ / ບໍ່ມີ
a) given by / inherited from parents ໄດ້ມາຈາກມໍລະດົກຈາກພໍ່ແມ່
b) given by / inherited from another family member 
ໄດ້ມາຈາກມໍລະດົກຈາກສະມຊິກຄອບຄົວຄົນອື່ນ
c) given by another farmer ຈາກຊາວນາຄົນອ່ືນ
d) given by government ຈາກລັດຖະບານ
e) given by another ຈາກຄົນອື່ນ (ກະລຸນາອະທິບາຍລະອຽດ)
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e) bought from family member ຊື້ຈາກສະມາຊິກໃນຄອບຄົວ
f) bought from government ຊື້ຈາກລັດຖະບານ
g) bought from another ຊື້ຈາກຄົນອື່ນ (ກະລຸນາອະທິບາຍລະອຽດ) 
10. Who do you rent the land from?  ທ່ານເຊົ່າທີ່ດິນຈາກໃຜ ? 
a) another farmer in the village  ເຈົ້າຂອງທີ່ດິນເປັນຊາວນາທີ່ຢູ່ໃນບ້ານ
b) a non-farmer in the village     ເຈົ້າຂອງທີ່ດິນບໍ່ແມ່ນຊາວນາທີ່ຢູ່ໃນບ້ານ
c) a farmer in another village     ເຈົ້າຂອງທີ່ດິນເປັນຊາວນາທີ່ອາໄສຢູ່ບ້ານອື່ນ
d) a non-farmer in another village or town      ເຈົ້າຂອງທີ່ດິນບໍ່ແມ່ນຊາວນາ ແລະ 
ອາໄສຢູ່ບ້ານ ແລະ ເມືອງອື່ນ  
11. Which statements are true for you? ຄຳເວ້ົາໃດທີ່ຖືກກັບທ່ານ ?
a) ‘I have sold land in the past five years’ (If yes, how much, to whom and why?)
ຂ້ອຍໄດ້ຂາຍທ່ີດິນຂອງຂ້ອຍເມ່ືອ 5 ປີກ່ອນ (ຖ້າແມ່ນ, ທ່ານຂາຍເທົ່າໃດ ໃຫ້ໃຜ ແລະ 
ຍ້ອນຫຍັງ ?)
 
b) ‘I have bought land in the past five years’ (If yes, how much, from whom and why?)
ຂ້ອຍໄດ້ຊ້ືທີ່ດິນເມື່ອ 5 ປີກ່ອນ (ຖ້າແມ່ນ, ທ່ານຊື້ເທົ່າໃດ ນໍາໃຜ ແລະ ຍ້ອນຫຍັງ ?)
 
c) ‘I have divided my land and given it to a family member in the past five years’ (If 
yes, how much and why?) ຂ້ອຍໄດ້ແບ່ງທີ່ດິນໃຫ້ກັບສະມາຊິກຄອບຄົວເມື່ຶອ 5 ປີກ່ອນ 
(ຖ້າແມ່ນ, ປັນເທ່ົາໃດ ແລະ ຍ້ອນຫຍັງ)
 
d) ‘I have divided my land and given it to a person not in my family in the past five 
years’ (If yes, how much and why?) 
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ຂ້ອຍໄດ້ແບ່ງທ່ີດິນໃຫ້ກັບບຸກຄົນທີ່ບໍ່ແມ່ນສະມາຊິກໃນຄອບຄົວເມື່ຶອ 5 ປີກ່ອນ 
(ຖ້າແມ່ນ ປັນເທົ່າໃດ ແລະ ຍ້ອນຫຍັງ)
 
Land Use
ການນຳໃຊ້ທີ່ດິນ
12. How do you use your land? ທ່ານນຳໃຊ້ທີ່ດິນຂອງທ່ານເຮັດຫຍັງ ?
a) growing rice     ປູກເຂົ້າ
b) growing other crops (if yes, please describe what) ປູກພືດທັນຍາຫານ
c) raising animals ລ້ຽງສັດ
d) collecting non-farmed foods (e.g. edible insects, fruit, frogs)  
ເກັບມ້ຽນອາຫານທີ່ບໍ່ໄດ້ປູກຝັງ ເຊັ່ນ:ແມງໄມ້ທີ່ກິນໄດ້,ໝາກໄມ້, ກົບ)
e) other (please describe) ອື່ນໆ ກະລຸນາອະທິບາຍລະອຽດ
If you answered yes to a) please answer questions 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.4. If you 
answered yes to b) please answer question 12.5, 12.6, 12.7 and 12.8. If you 
answered yes to c) please answer questions 12.9, 12.10, 12.11, 12.12.
ຖ້າຂ້ໍ a.) ທ່ານຕອບວ່າແມ່ນ ກະລຸນາຕອບຄຳຖາມຂ້ໍ 6,7,8,9 .  ຖ້າຂໍ້ b.) 
ທ່ານຕອບວ່າແມ່ນ ກະລຸນາຕອບຄຳຖາມຂໍ້ 10,11,12 ແລະ 13 . ຖ້າຂໍ້ c.) 
ທ່ານຕອບວ່າແມ່ນ ກະລຸນາຕອບຄຳຖາມຂໍ້ 14 ແລະ 15.  
12.1. How much rice do you grow in a year? ທ່ານປູກເຂົ້າໄດ້ຫລາຍປານໃດຕໍ່ປີ ? 
a) 10-20 sacks
b) 21-30 sacks
c) 31-40 sacks
d) 41-50 sacks
e) 51-60 sacks
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f) 61-70 sacks
g) more than 70 sacks
12.2. How do you use this rice? More than one can apply. 
ທ່ານນຳໃຊ້ເຂົ້າເພື່່ອຫຍັງ ?ຕອບໄດ້ຫລາຍກວ່າ 1  ຢ່າງ
a) consume in the household  ບໍລິໂພກພາຍໃນຄອບຄົວ
b) sell  ຂາຍ
c) give away   ໃຫ້ຜູ້ອື່ນ
d) other   ອື່ນໆ 
If b) then answer questions 15 and 16. ຖ້າທ່ານຕອບຂໍ້ b. 
ແລ້ວກະລຸນາຕອບຄຳຖາມຂໍ້ 8 ແລະ 9 ຕໍ່
12.3. Where do you sell the rice? ທ່ານຂາຍເຂ້ົາຢູ່ໃສ ?
a) direct to consumers ໄປຂາຍໃຫ້ກັບຜູ້ບໍລິໂພກໂດຍກົງ
b) rice merchant  ຄົນຂາຍເຂົ້າ
c) other farmer ຊາວນາຜູ້ອື່່ນ
d) other (please describe) ອື່ນໆ ກະລຸນາອະທິບາຍລະອຽດ
12.4. How many kilos do you sell and what price do you receive for a kilo? 
ທ່ານຂາຍເຂົ້າໄດ້ຈັກໂລ ແລະ ກິໂລເທົ່າໃດ ?
 
12.5. How much of other crops do you grow in a year? 
ທ່ານສາມາດປູກພືດຊະນິດອື່ນຫລາຍປານໃດຕໍ່ປີ ? 
 
12.6. How do you use this crop? More than one can apply. 
ທ່ານນຳໃຊ້ພືດດັ່ງກ່າວເພື່ອຫຍັງ ? ຕອບໄດ້ຫລາຍກວ່າ 1  ຢ່າງ
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a) consume in the household ບໍລິໂພກພາຍໃນຄອບຄົວ
b) sell ຂາຍ
c) give away ເອົາໃຫ້ຜູ້ອື່ນ
d) other ແລະ ອື່ນໆ
12.7. Where do you sell this crop? ທ່ານຂາຍພືດດັ່ງກ່າວຢູ່ໃສ ? 
a) direct to consumers  ໄປຂາຍໃຫ້ກັບຜູ້ບໍລິໂພກໂດຍກົງ
b) merchant ແມ່ຄ້າ/ພໍ່ຄ້າ
c) other farmer ຊາວນາຜູ້ອື່່ນ
d) other (please describe) ອື່ນໆ ກະລຸນາອະທິບາຍລະອຽດ
12.8. How many kilos do you sell and what price do you receive for a kilo?
ທ່ານຂາຍພືດຜັກໄດ້ຈັກໂລ ແລະ ກິໂລເທົ່າໃດ ? 
 
12.9. What animals do you raise and how many? More than one can apply.
ທ່ານລ້ຽງສັດຫຍັງ ແລະ ຫລາຍປານໃດ? ຕອບໄດ້ຫລາຍກວ່າ 1  ຢ່າງ
a) cows ງົວ
b) water buffaloes ຄວາຍ
c) pigs ໝູ
d) chickens ໄກ່
e) ducks ເປັດ
f) other (please describe) ອື່ນໆ ກະລຸນາອະທິບາຍລະອຽດ
12.10. How do you use these animals? More than one can apply. 
ທ່ານນຳໃຊ້ສັດດັ່ງກ່າວເພື່ອຫຍັງ ?ຕອບໄດ້ຫລາຍກວ່າ 1  ຢ່າງ
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a) consume in the household ບໍລິໂພກພາຍໃນຄອບຄົວ
b) sell ຂາຍ
c) give away ໃຫ້ຜູ້ອື່ນ
d) other ແລະ ອື່ນໆ
12.11. Where do you sell these animals?
a) direct to consumers ໄປຂາຍໃຫ້ກັບຜູ້ບໍລິໂພກໂດຍກົງ
b) merchant tແມ່ຄ້າ/ພໍ່ຄ້າ
c) other farmer ຊາວນາຜູ້ອື່່ນ
d) other (please describe) ອື່ນໆ ກະລຸນາອະທິບາຍລະອຽດ
12.12. How much do you get for each animal? 
ທ່ານມີລາຍໄດ້ຈາກການຂາຍສັດຫລາຍປານໃດ? 
 
25. Which of the following do you use to produce crops? 
ທ່ານນຳໃຊ້ຫຍັງແດ່ເພື່ອທຳການຜະລິດພືດທີ່ມີຄຳຕອບຢູ່ລຸ່ມນີ້ ?
a) tractor (lot tai naa). Own? Yes/No?  ລົດໄຖ່ນາ ມີເປັນຂອງຕົນເອງບໍ? ມີ /ບໍ່ມີ
b) purchased seeds ພັນພືດ/ແກ່ນທີ່ຊື້ເອົາມາປູກ
c) chemical fertilizer ປຸ່ຍເຄມີ
d) organic fertilizer (e.g. animal dung)  ປຸ່ຍອິນຊີ (ຕົວຢ່າງ: ຂີ້ສັດ)
e) irrigation  ຊົນລະປະທານ
f) chemical pesticides   ສານເຄມີປາບສັດຕູພືດ
g) organic pesticides    ອິນຊີປາບສັດຕູພືດ
26. How much do inputs for the whole crop cost approximately? Where does the 
money to pay for them come from? 
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ທ່ານນຳໃຊ້ພັນພືດເຂົ້າໃນການປູກຝັງທັງໝົດລາຄາເທົ່າໃດ (ໂດຍປະມານ) ? ແລະ 
ທ່ານຊື້ພັນພືດມາຈາກໃສ? 
 
Labour
ແຮງງານ
27. Who works on your land to grow rice or other crops? 
ແມ່ນໃຜເປັນຜູ້ປູກເຂົ້າ ແລະ ພືດຕ່າງໆຢູ່ໃນທີ່ດິນຂອງທ່ານ ?
a) Only myself   ທ່ານເອງ
b) Myself and family members (please describe who) ທ່ານ ແລະ 
ສະມາຊິກພາຍໃນຄອບຄົວ ກະລຸນາອະທິບາຍລະອຽດ 
c) Myself and hired workers ທ່ານ ແລະ ກຳມະກອນຮັບຈ້າງ
d) Family members and hired workers ສະມາຊິກຄອບຄົວ ແລະ ກຳມະກອນຮັບຈ້າງ
e) Myself/family and neighbours and friends ທ່ານ ພ້ອມດ້ວຍຄອບຄົວ / ເພື່ອນບ້ານ 
ແລະ ຫມູ່ເພື່ອນ
f) only hired workers ,ມີພຽງແຕ່ກຳມະກອນຮັບຈ້າງ
g) other (please describe) ອື່ນໆ
28. If you use hired workers how much do you pay per worker per day?
ຖ້າທ່ານໃຊ້ແຮງງານກຳມະກອນ ທ່ານຈ່າຍຄ່າແຮງງວັນລະເທົ່າໃດ? 
 
29. How many workers do you usually hire? ທ່ານຈ້າງກຳມະກອນຈັກຄົນ ?
 
30. How many worker days (number of workers x number of days) does it take to 
plant and collect the rice harvest of one hectare?
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ເຮັດວຽກຈຳນວນຈັກວັນ  (ເອົາຈຳນວນແຮງງານ x ຈຳນວນມື້ເຮັດວຽກ) 
ມັນໃຊ້ເວລາເທົ່າໃດໃນການປູກຝັງ ແລະ ເກັບກ່ຽວຜົນຜະລິດເຂົ້າຕໍ່  1 ເຮັກຕາ ?
a) less than 15 ໜ້ອຍກວ່າ 15 ວັນ 
 b) 16-30 16-30 ວັນ
 c) 31-45 31 - 45 ວັນ
 d) 46-60 46 - 60 ວັນ
 e) 61-75 61 - 75 ວັນ
31. Do you or any members of your household have off-farm jobs in the non-growing 
season which they quit to come back to work in agriculture in the growing season? 
Yes / No
ເຈົ້າຫຼືວ່າສະມາຊິກໃນຄອບຄົວມີວຽກອື່ນເຮັດບໍ່ໃນລະດູທີ່ບໍ່ໄດ້ເຮັດນາເຊິ່ງພວກເຂົາຈະ
ລາອອກແລ້ວກັບມາເຮັດວຽກໃນຍາມເຮັດນາ ? ມີ / ບໍ່ມີ
Household Income
ລາຍໄດ້ພາຍໃນຄອບຄົວ
32. Approximately how much income does agriculture contribute to your household 
income per month?
ທ່ານມີລາຍໄດ້ເທ່ົາໃດຈາກການເຮັດກະສິກຳພາຍໃນຄອບຄົວ
33. Does farming alone provide you with enough income? If no why not?
ເຮັດນາຢ່າງດ່ຽວລາຍຮັບຂອງເຈົ້າພໍບໍ່ ? ຖ້າຫາກບໍ່ ເປັນຫຍັງ ?
a) agricultural crop prices are too low ລາຄາຂອງສິ່ນຄ້າກະສິກຳ ຕ່ຳ
b) not enough agricultural land ມີດິນປູກຝັງບໍ່ພ່ຽງພໍ 
c) family members do not want to work in agriculture 
ສະມາຊິກໃນຄອບຄົວບ່ໍຕ້ອງການເຮັດນາ
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d) not enough workers to farm the land ແຮງງານບໍ່ພ່ຽງພໍ
e) poor crop harvests ເກັບຜົນຜະລິດແຕ່ນ້ອຍ
f) high input prices ຕົ້ນທຶນໃນການຜະລິດສູງ
g) other ອື່ນໆ (ກະລຸນາອະທິບາຍລະອຽດ)
34. ‘Agriculture is my household’s most important livelihood activity’ With this 
statement do you…? ການເຮັດກະສິກຳ ແມ່ນກິດຈະກຳ  ທີ່ສຳ ຄິຄັນທີ່ສຸດໃນດຳ 
ລົງຊີວິດຂອງຄອບຄົວເຈົ້າຄິດແນວໃດ ?
a) agree ເຫັນດີ
b) neither agree nor disagree ເຫັນດີໜ້ອຍ
c) disagree ບໍ່ເຫັນດີ
35. Did farming alone provide you with enough income ten years ago? If yes what 
was different then? ການ້ຮັດນາຢ່າງດ່ຽວສິບປີກ່ອນລາຍຮັບເຈົ້າກຸ່ມກິນບໍ່ ? 
ຖ້າຫາກວ່າລາຍໄດ້ພໍແມ່ນຫຍັງເປັນສິ່ງທີ່ແຕດຕ່າງໃນຕອນນັ້ນ ?
a) higher agricultural crop prices ລາຄາຂອງສ່ິນຄ້າກະສິກຳ ສູງກວ່າ 
b) enough agricultural land ມີດິນປູກຝັງພ່ຽງພໍ
c) enough family members to work in agriculture 
ມີສະມາຊິກໃນຄອບຄົວເຮັດນາພ່ຽງພໍ
d) enough workers to farm the land ແຮງງານພ່ຽງພໍ
e) better crop harvests ເກັບຜົນຜະລິດຫຼາຍ
f) lower input prices ຕົ້ນທຶນໃນການຜະລິດຕຳ ກວ່າ
g) other ອື່ນໆ (ກະລຸນາອະທິບາຍລະອຽດ)
36. What other sources of income do you have? More than one can apply.
ລາຍຮັບຂອງເຈົ້າມີມາຈາກບ່ອນອື່ນອີກບໍ່ ? ມີຫຍັງແນ່ ?
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a) wages from your own work ຄ່າແຮງຈາກບ່ອນເຮັດວຽກຂອງເຈົ້າ
b) wages from family members’ work 
ຄ່າແຮງຈາກການເຮັດວຽກຂອງສະມາຊິກຄົນອ່ືນໃນຄອບຄົວ
c) wages sent from family member working in Thailand 
ຄ່າແຮງທີ່ສົ່ງກັບມາໃຫ້ຈາກການເຮັດວຽກໃນໄທ 
d) profit from trading goods ກຳ ໄລຈາກການຂາຍສິນຄ້າອື່ນໆ
e) other ອື່ນໆ (ກະລຸນາອະທິບາຍລະອຽດ)
37. If you have family members working in other sectors (e.g. working in industry, 
migrating to Thailand) why did they choose to work in those sectors and not 
agriculture? More than one can apply.
ຖ້າຫາກວ່າສະມາຊິກໃນຄອບຄົວກຳ ລັງເຮັດວຽກຢູ່ບ່ອນອື່ນ ຕົວຢ່າງກຳ 
ລັງເຮັດວຽກຂະແໜງອຸດສະຫະກຳ  ກຳ ລັງເຮັດວຽກຢູ່ໃນປະເທດໄທ 
ເປັນຫຍັງພວກເຂົາຈຶງເລືອກເຮັດວຽກຢູ່ບ່ອນນັ້ນແລະບໍ່ເຮັດກະສິກຳ  ? 
ສາມາດເລືອກໄດ້ຫລາຍກວ່າໜຶ່ງຄຳ ຕອບ
a) they wanted higher wages in other sectors 
ພວກເຂົາຕ້ອງການຄ່າແຮງສູງກວ່າບ່ອນອື່ນ
b) didn’t like agricultural work ບໍ່ມັກເຮັດວຽກກະສິກຳ 
c) wanted to develop other skills ຕ້ອງການພັດທະນາທັກສະອື່ນ
d) wanted to experience other work/places 
ຕ້ອງການປະສົບການຈາກບ່ອບເຮັດວຽກອື່ນ
e) they wanted more independence ຕ້ອງການຄວາມອຶສະຫຼະ
f) you encouraged them to find other work to contribute more money to household 
ເຈົ້າເປັນຄົນກະຕຸ້ນໃຫ້ພວກເຂົາໄປຊອກວຽກອື່ນເຮັດເພື່ອຫາເງິນໃຫ້ແກ່ຄອບຄົວ
g) household needed higher incomes ຄອບຄົວຕ້ອງການລາຍໄດ້ສູງກວ່າ
h) not sure ບໍ່ແນ່ໃຈ
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Higher incomes for what expenses? ລາຍໄດ້ສູງເພື່ອຄ່າໃຊ້ຈ່າຍຫຍັງ More than one 
can apply. ສາມາດເລືອກໄດ້ຫລາຍກວ່າໜ່ຶງຄຳ ຕອບ
a) building house ສ້າງເຮືອນ
b) buying land ຊື້ດິນ
c) buying car/motorcycle ຊື້ລົດໃຫຍ່ ຫຼື ລົດຈັກ
d) buying clothes / phones etc. ຊື້ເສື້ອຜ້າ ຫືຼ ໂທລະສັບ ອື່ນໆ
e) everyday expenses ຄ່າໃຊ້ຈ່າຍພາຍໃນເຮືອນ
f) special event (e.g. wedding) ງານສັງຄົມຕ່າງໆ
g) higher food prices ຄ່າອາຫານສູງຄຶ້ນ
Status of Agricultural Work
39. Do you think many people of the younger generation want to do agriculture? If 
no, why not? 
ເຈົ້າຄຶດວ່າຄົນສ່ວນຫລາຍໂດຍສະເພາະໄວໜຸ່ມຕ້ອງການເຮັດການກະສິກຳ  ? ຖ້າບໍ ່
ເປັນຫຍັງ?
a) farmers do not have a high status ຊາວນາບໍ່ມີຖານະສູງ
b) more jobs in other sectors are available now ອາຊີບອື່ນແມ່ນດີກວ່າຢູ່ໃນປັດຈຸບັນ
c) they don’t like agricultural work ບໍ່ມັກເຮັດວຽກກະສິກຳ
d) higher wages in other jobs ຄ່າແຮງສູງກວ່າບ່ອນອື່ນ
e) agricultural work is not ‘modern’ ວຽກກະສິກຳ ບໍ່ທັນສະໄມ
f) they want to buy more consumer goods (e.g. more clothes, mobile phones, 
computers) ພວກເຂົາຕ້ອງການເຄື່ອງອຸປະໂພກ (ເຊັ່ນ ເສື້ອຜ້າ ໂທລະສັບ ຄອມພິວເຕິ)
g) not sure ບ່ໍແນ່ໃຈ
40. In your opinion what is now the best type of work in Lao society?
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ໃນທະສະຄະຕິຂອງເຈົ້າວຽກປະເພດໃດແມ່ນປະເພດດີທີ່ສຸດຢູ່ໃນສັງຄົມລາວປັດຈຸບັນ
ນີ້ ?
a) services (e.g. restaurant, hairdresser, motorcycle repair, tourism) ການບໍລິການ 
(ຮ້ານອາຫານ ຊ່າງຕັດເຄື່ງ ຊ່າງແປງລົດ ການທ່ອງທ່ຽວ)
b) agriculture ກະສິກຳ
c) industry (manufacturing, food processing, construction, mining) ອຸດສະຫະກຳ  
(ໂຮງຈັກໂຮງງານ ການແປຮູບ ການກໍ່ສ້າງ ບໍ່ແຮ່)
(d) civil servant ພະນັກງານລັດ
e) office work (e.g. accountant, computer technician) ພະນັກງານຫ້ອງການ 
(ນັກບັນຊີ ຊ່າງຄອມພິວເຕິ ອື່ນໆ)
f) migrate to Thailand ໄປຮັດວຽກຢູ່ປະເທດໄທ
g) not sure ບ່ໍແນ່ໃຈ
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